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Abstract 
Continental Warfare and British Military Thought 1859-1880: How the Issues were Explored and their Impact on Change 
The purpose of this study is to look at how British soldiers reacted to the issues thrown up 
by the major wars which took place in this period - particularly in Europe, but with some 
references to America. This involves seeking answers to the following questions. 
" Was the military establishment concerned by, and properly interested in, professional 
matters in general, and developments on the continent in particular? 
" If so, how was this interest expressed? Which mechanisms were effective in nurturing 
this interest; feeding it with information, promoting the right climate of opinion and, 
crucially, leading to changes actually happening? 
" Why, at the end of the day, did the British army continue to be so different? 
" What does this say about the army's professionalism? 
The argument is based on what soldiers said and wrote at the time. It is developed on a 
thematic basis, taking in turn matters relating to changing technologies, army organisation, 
tactics, command and leadership. It seeks to show how the reaction to these issues contributed to 
the army's development throughout the nineteenth century. 
It concludes that the interest shown by British soldiers in these issues was deep, and that 
the degree of professionalism revealed was greater than they have since been given credit for. At 
the same time it recognises that thoughtful soldiers at the end of the period were concerned that 
the army of 1880 was still not capable of doing all that might be asked of it, and that it was 
reasonable that they should lay much of the responsibility for this on ministers who were not 
prepared to acknowledge the sustained level of resources required. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
There will be some to say - `What! Is the splendidly-appointed English Army to learn 
from continental soldiers? ' Yes, gentlemen, we still have much to learn. 1 
The intention of this study is to examine the impact on the British army of the succession 
of wars which took place on the continent of Europe, and in the United States of 
America, between 1859 and 1880. It will look at the issues - the growth in the numbers 
of men under arms, the formidable advances in the technology of weapons, the revolution 
in means of communication; and the fundamental changes in military structure, training 
and tactical organisation which they brought in their train. The importance of the 
increasing cost of national defence arising from these requirements will come into the 
argument, but the main thrust of the work will be to look at the soldiers involved - how 
they learned about developments; how they debated the issues amongst themselves and 
with ministers; the extent to which the desirability, if not the pressing necessity, of 
responding constructively was accepted by the leadership; the impact on the careers of 
the officers involved, and what this has to say about the reaction of the military 
establishment. 
A concept of serious importance to this study is that of `professionalism', as applied 
to armies and the military art. In 1815 the small but battle-hardened British army was a 
sharply honed instrument of war, accepted as at least the equal in professional skills of 
the other antagonists of the time. A century later the British Expeditionary Force was 
similarly described as truly professional, if insignificant in numbers. 
2 It is therefore one 
of the paradoxes of the period in between that the armies of the great continental powers, 
developing the revolutionary concept of `the nation in arms' and based on the 
conscription of the country's menfolk for a short period of service, are seen as being 
professional in their approach - while the British army, recruited 
from volunteers for a 
long term commitment, is represented as being conspicuously lacking in this very quality. 
1 Brackenbury, Captain CB, RA, `Autumn manoeuvres; considered in their place between drills and war', 
lecture delivered 19 December 1870, Proc RAI, vol. 8,1871-2,46. 
2 Strachan, Hew, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the 
British Army 1815-1854 (CUP, 
1985), vii. Barnett, Correlli, Britain and her Army 
(London, Allen Lane, 1970), 371-2. 
R 
The process of examining the British army's response to the issues involved will help to 
explain why this is so, and the extent to which this representation is justified. 
British histories of the century between the end of the Great War against 
Napoleonic France in 1815 and the beginning of the Great War against Germany in 1914 
emphasise progress and prosperity. They talk of the wealth created by industrialisation 
and trade with an increasing number of colonies; of the translation of these colonies into 
an empire and eventually a commonwealth of nations; they take pleasure in the 
promotion and promulgation of liberal institutions, while ruefully admitting the growth 
of a smug and rather stultifying public moralism. They describe a commercial people, a 
nation of shopkeepers, whose mission - insofar as they had one - was to make money 
while leading a life of comfortable respectability. They take unqualified pride in the 
security which an incomparable navy conferred on this fortunate nation as it went about 
its business. Their references to the army, on the other hand, have tended to be equivocal 
at best. There is recognition of its heroic deeds in furtherance of Britain's imperial 
ambitions, but set against this has been an embarrassed perception that the army 
continued to prove inadequate when confronted by the challenges posed by European 
powers, usually ascribed to a lack of responsiveness by its leaders. 3 
During the last fifty years a new generation of historians has set out to examine the 
Victorian army in greater depth, and there will be many references to their work in later 
chapters. The American historian Jay Luvaas was one of the pioneers of the new 
approach. His Military Legacy of the Civil War first appeared in 1959, and its sub title, 
The European Inheritance, made its purpose clear. In his introduction to a new edition he 
emphasised the debt which he owed to the British soldiers who had written about the 
American Civil War; and the book which followed five years after the first, The 
3 Two typical references; `A hand as dead as that laid by Wellington on the 
British army in the years after 
Waterloo'; McElwee, William, The Art of War Waterloo to Mons (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1974), 298. `The control of the army remained in the hands of men out of touch with, and out of sympathy 
with, the social and technical changes of the age'; 
Barnett, Britain and her Army, 314. 
Q 
Education of an Army, focused entirely on the British soldiers whose thinking influenced 
the army's development between 1815 and 1940.4 
Since these works appeared in the early 1960s there has been an increasing number 
of studies of the Victorian army, in particular by Professors Bond, French, Gooch and 
Spiers, and Doctors Howard Baffles and MD Welch. 5 They have been looking in detail at 
such issues as the political background of the Cardwell reforms and the extent to which 
these and later reforms succeeded in their objectives, the development of officer 
education and the move towards the establishment of a General Staff. Much of this work 
has focused on the later years of the nineteenth century, largely because of the dramatic 
impact of the 2d Boer War, and then on the first years of the new century, in the period 
leading up to the fateful commitment of the BEF to the continent in 1914. Dr Howard 
Bailes's thesis, `The Influence of Continental Examples and Colonial Warfare Upon the 
Reform of the Late Victorian Army' and subsequent articles have been particularly 
enlightening, as will appear when specific issues are being discussed in later chapters. 6 
Meanwhile, Professor Strachan has shown, in a succession of books and articles, 
that it is misleading to see the period between Waterloo and the Crimea as simply the 
time of stagnation and smug complacency described, for example, by Correlli Barnett. 
7 In 
Wellington's Legacy, published in 1984, and From Waterloo to Balaclava, which 
appeared a year later, he sets out all the aspects of military life which those connected 
8 
with the army were trying to improve before 1854. 
4 Luvaas, Jay, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, new ed. (University Press of Kansas, 1988), ix. The 
Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, Cassell, 1965). 
5 Fourteen books and eight articles by these distinguished historians and relating to this period are 
included 
in the bibliography of the present work. 
6 Baffles, Howard, `The Influence of Continental Examples and Colonial Warfare Upon the Reform of the 
Late Victorian Army', unpublished PhD thesis, King's College, London, 1980. 
`Technology and 
Imperialism: A Case Study of the Victorian Army in Africa', Victorian Studies, 24,1,82-104. 
`Patterns of 
Thought in the Late Victorian Army', The Journal of Strategic Studies, 4,1, 
March 1981,29-45. 
'Britain and Her Army, 282. 
8 Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army 1830-54 (Manchester 
UP, 1984). From Waterloo to 
Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army 1815-1854 (Cambridge 
UP, 1985). His articles `The 
British army in society', The Historical Journal, 22,1,1979,247-254, and 
`The early Victorian army and 
the nineteenth-century revolution in government', 
EHR, 95,1980,782-809, are also relevant. The earlier 
In 
On the important issue of officer education, Strachan describes how a few 
concerned politicians and soldiers such as Gleig (the Chaplain-General), Lord Grey and 
Sidney Herbert worked to institute promotion examinations and training for young 
officers, and the establishment of Schools of Infantry and Artillery at Hythe and 
Shoeburyness. Another issue was the attitude of the army to the idea of a General Staff, 
where he shows how the experienced and many-faceted Staff for the field army which 
Wellington had created by the end of the Napoleonic War was allowed to decay in the 
years which followed, and the efforts which were being made to recover at least some 
aspects of a proper structure by the conversion of the old Senior Department of Sandhurst 
into the Staff College. 
Strachan emphasises the growing awareness of the extent to which technical 
developments were forcing continental armies to adapt not only their tactics but also their 
organisations, while explaining how the day-to-day necessities of sustaining the troops in 
the colonies made it so difficult for the British army to respond in a coherent manner. 
Above all, he stresses the unwillingness of ministers to come to terms with reality where 
the army was concerned. `The army had prepared itself for war as best it could by the 
standards of the day, but the shifts in foreign policy were more in accordance with 
popular pressures than with the army's capabilities. ' 9 
A principal intention of the present study, in looking in some detail at contemporary 
reactions of soldiers to the challenges created by the wars in Europe (and America) 
during the quarter century which followed 1854, is to reinforce the work which Strachan 
and the historians of the later period have done to make it clear that efforts to reform the 
army were not just short-lived reactions to specific crises such as the Crimea and the 2nd 
Boer War, but a process which continued throughout the century, and beyond. 
Despite the efforts of the scholars referred to there remains a general perception that 
the leaders of the Victorian army were lacking in professionalism when compared with 
article is particularly valuable for its demolition of the description of Victorian officers 
in Gwyn Harries- 
Jenkins's The Army in Victorian Society, (London, Routledge, 1977). 
9 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, 269. 
II 
those of the other great powers, and that one of the ways that this was displayed was by 
an arrogant and ill-informed indifference to the changes which European armies were 
undergoing during these middle years of the century. There will be several examples of 
this attitude to the Victorian army in later chapters, usually expressed in trenchant terms, 
when looking at such topics as its social structure, the character of the Commander-in- 
Chief and the development of artillery. That this stereotypical attitude to the British 
soldier has not disappeared can be demonstrated by two passing observations from very 
recent books; Guy Hartcup, writing on The Effect of Science on the Second World War, 
declared that co-operation between scientists and the military was ` .... something 
unknown before 1939', while Alex Danchev quoted two famous military commentators 
in one paragraph to emphasise how little professionalism there was. 
As Shelford Bidwell laconically observed, `British soldiers are little given 
to theorising. Clausewitz, Jomini, von der Goltz and Hamley were read 
only by those eccentric enough to study their profession. ' Less a 
profession than a part-time employment, quipped Liddell Hart. 10 
It seems strange that simplistic judgments like these can have survived the efforts of 
the scholars referred to above, but it has to be acknowledged that the records of the time 
are not lacking in material which tends to support their case. The tone of such significant 
documents as the report of the committee investigating the management of the Crimean 
expedition and the Akers-Douglas committee's analysis of the state of officer education 
in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War are cases in point. For example, a significant 
and much-quoted paragraph from the Akers-Douglas report describes the lack of a 
professional attitude of young officers in stark terms. 
The witnesses are unanimous in stating that the junior officers are 
lamentably wanting in Military knowledge, and what is perhaps even 
worse, in the desire to acquire knowledge and in zeal for the Military art. 
The Committee have been informed on very high authority that the 
majority of young officers will not work unless compelled; that `keenness 
is out of fashion'; that `it is not the correct form; the spirit and fashion is 
rather not to show keenness'; and that `the idea is, to put it in a few words, 
to do as little as they possibly can'. 
10 Hartcup, Guy, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (London, Macmillan, 2000), xiv. 
Danchev, Alex, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 
1998), 175. Similarly, see Tucker, AV, `Army and society in England 1870-1900: A reassessment of the 
Cardwell Reforms', The Journal of British Studies, vol. 2, May 1963,110-1 and 141. 
11) 
By no part of the evidence laid before them have the Committee been 
more impressed than by that which shows in the clearest manner the 
prevalence among the junior commissioned ranks of a lack of technical 
knowledge and skill, and of any wish to study the science and master the 
art of their profession. ' 1 
What has to be born in mind is that much of this language was being used for 
dramatic effect, to focus attention on a genuine need to make changes rather than to give 
a balanced account of a complicated situation. This point will be explored in chapters five 
and six, when issues relating to officer education, including entrance and promotion 
examinations, are being examined. 
One of the questions at issue is how much influence the continental wars actually 
had on the thinking of the British army. Those who support the view that Victorian 
soldiers were not professional in their approach tend to play this down. AW Preston, 
writing on `British military thought, 1856-1890', summarises the value of the information 
brought back by British observers of the American Civil War in these words; `.... there is 
no concrete evidence that they had any material effect, though it is possible that the 
authorities wasted the information that had been collected'. Of the European wars he is 
more equivocal. `The Prussian Wars were not closely or critically analysed by British 
officers, nor did they lead to the development of any new or independent theories of war', 
but this is followed later in the same article by something more positive. `Of all the 
British officers to study the Franco-Prussian War, and translate the various Continental 
interpretations, none was more decisive in consolidating the rapid transformation of 
official doctrine than Colonel Robert Home. ' 12 Subsequent chapters in this study will 
elaborate on the contribution of Robert Home and his professional colleagues, and argue 
that the Prussian wars were in fact copiously analysed. 
Constitutional questions, the relationship between monarch, government and 
army, and the extent to which the national budget was the decisive factor in 
determining 
11 Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of the Officers of the 
Army, PP (1902), vol. 
X, Cd 982,131. 
12 Preston, AW, `British military thought', The Army Quarterly, vol. 89, October 1964,63,69,72. 
1I 
the army's effectiveness, must be taken into account, but the influence with which this 
study is principally concerned will be that exercised by soldiers on soldiers. 
There were ten Secretaries of State during the period under consideration. 
Ambitious ministers do not seem to have regarded the post as particularly attractive, and 
it certainly proved to be no sinecure for the conscientious. Indeed, the first two 
incumbents, Sidney Herbert and Sir George Cornewall Lewis, were reported to have died 
from the overwork arising from their responsibilities. " The gritty nature of the position 
was sardonically acknowledged half a century later by Campbell-Bannerman (who had 
had experience of the War Office as Financial Secretary under Childers in 1880) when, as 
Prime Minister, he appointed Haldane; `We shall now see how Schopenhauer gets on in 
the Kailyard'. 14 This acknowledgment, in passing, of Haldane's intellectual pretentions 
has some significance. There were occasions when the British Government made rather 
half-hearted efforts to emulate the French by appointing soldiers to this equivalent of a 
Minister of War; Jonathan Peel, who served briefly, in Lord Derby's Administrations of 
1858 and 1866-7, was a Lieutenant-General (though it had never been his fortune to serve 
in war, and he had bought every step from Ensign to Lieutenant-Colonel); but in the 
event two different backgrounds seem to have been of more practical use for the holders 
of this office. Sir John Pakington, `a conscientious and painstaking administrator', 15 who 
was Peel's successor in 1867 (when Peel resigned because he could not support the 
extension of the franchise), and HCE Childers, who did so much to refine Cardwell's 
reforms in the light of experience, had both benefited from exposure to the way that the 
navy was run, by serving as First Lord of the Admiralty, much though this may have 
depressed senior soldiers at the time. 16 Sir George Lewis and Lord Cardwell, like 
Haldane, were scholars as much as politicians, and the intellectual powers which they 
brought to bear on the problems of the army, though unqualified by previous experience 
of the problems involved, helped them to tackle the job with a receptive mind - and this 
13 See their DNB entries. 
14 Haldane, Richard Burdon, An Autobiography (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1909), 182. 
'5 DNB. 
16 Illustrated by the quotation from General Sir Patrick MacDougall on Childers's appointment, on page 
237 of this study. 
14 
was a valuable property to have when the realities of parliamentary politics required 
`economy' to be at the forefront of any Secretary of State's mind. 
Cardwell naturally stands centre-stage in the years with which this study is 
concerned, not only because he held the responsibility for six years in the middle of the 
period but because of the importance of the changes which the army underwent during 
his tenure. His contribution has been exhaustively examined by historians in recent times, 
and, although the effectiveness of the reforms which he achieved has been to some extent 
reassessed in the light of their work, it is clear that events on the continent in the period 
immediately before and during his incumbency had a significant impact on the 
determination with which he addressed problems which had been building up for years. It 
is important to take account of the influence of these events on the thinking of the 
military establishment when the achievements of Cardwell and his successors as 
Secretary of State are being evaluated. 
To show influence at work convincingly is not always a straightforward matter. 
`Actually, even the most extreme claims of influence, when seriously pursued, almost 
always reveal themselves to be something far less specific .... 
' is a warning not to be 
taken lightly. 17 Certainly there are dangers in arguing post hoc, ergo propter hoc, as will 
be acknowledged in chapter three in the case of William Howard Russell and the needle 
gun. However, despite the difficulties involved, there are often sufficient pointers along 
the way to demonstrate a reasonable link between cause and effect in many of the issues 
with which this study is concerned. One such is the habit of many of the participants in 
the debates and decisions of the time to scribble comments in the margins of reports and 
books which caught their interest. This can provide evidence, not only that they had read 
the document in question, but that they had thought about it. Both Lord Palmerston and 
Viscount Wolseley will feature in this connection. Another is the frequent taking for 
granted, in the lectures and discussions, that a particular book or pamphlet was too well 
known to the audience to need more than a brief reference. Generally speaking, however, 
17 Paret, Peter, `Napoleon and the revolution in war', ch. 5 in Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 141. 
is 
the claims to show what was influential will have to be based on an accumulation of 
evidence from debates, discussions and reports - and by inference from the career 
progressions of the most vociferous presenters of the issues - more than from some 
demonstrable direct link to a subsequent change. 
In Victorian Britain `society' was small. The people who were in a position to exert 
influence on any aspect of life tended to come from the same educational and family 
backgrounds and share many close connections. The officers of the army were part of this 
society, and the interlocking networks of their connections certainly contributed to the 
creation of the attitudes of mind which led to specific decisions being taken, though 
evidence will be produced in the next chapter to show that there was a greater diversity of 
background and ambitions within the officer corps than has been generally 
acknowledged. An investigation of the interrelationships within some of these military 
dynasties would be of some value, but the ramifications are too large for it to be possible 
to do justice to the subject within the confines of this study. However, as an illustration of 
the sort of connections which did exist, appendix A3 takes the Biddulph family and their 
circle as a case in point. 
This study is based on what soldiers were writing and saying at the time, but it is 
recognised that some direct testimony is less reliable than others. Although there will be 
several references to the memoirs of some of the main actors in these events, such works, 
usually written years after the events which they describe, are not put forward as carrying 
anything like the same authority as the contemporary records. A somewhat similar caveat 
has to be made in the case of private letters between intimates, which seem sometimes to 
have been a convenient way for the writer to let off steam rather than express his 
reasoned opinions - an issue which will be touched upon 
in the next chapter. 
There will also be due recognition of a tendency, known nowadays amongst 
professionals in the National Health Service as `shroud-waving', to exaggerate the scale 
of difficulties and dangers in order to frighten the authorities 
into paying more respect to 
the views of the writer, and usually into handing over more money. 
The authors of doom- 
16 
laden `factional ` accounts of an unprepared country overcome by a merciless invader, 
exemplified by Sir George Tomkyns Chesney's Battle of Dorking, and the exploitation of 
the invasion scare of 1859 revealed by Colonel Claremont, illustrate two aspects of this 
tendency. 18 
The subject is a broad one, and constraints of time and space dictate that the areas 
of military involvement in which events in Europe generated the greatest changes have to 
be given priority. As a result, it has not been possible to consider matters relating to 
supply, housing and horse-drawn transport in any detail. This has also meant that the 
ever-important questions of the provision of horses of all kinds and their forage can be no 
more than touched upon in passing. 
One specific characteristic of the time needs to be noted; the tendency of many 
people in public life to use the word `English' in circumstances where the institutions of 
the whole United Kingdom were involved. To those who live in Scotland, Wales or 
Ireland today the insensitivity involved in calling an army which was so largely recruited 
from those national minorities the English army seems remarkable, but it has to be 
acknowledged that, to almost all foreigners at least, the words `English' and `British' 
were synonymous. In this usage, as in the spelling of words like `organisation', the 
intention in this paper will be to use the more usual modern version except when quoting 
directly. The spelling of foreign names presents a similar problem. Where possible the 
version used in the narrative here will be taken from the idiom of the country concerned; 
thus, the Prussian `Red Prince' will be called Friedrich Carl rather than Frederick 
Charles. 
The chapters which follow develop their argument on a thematic basis. Chapter two 
will look at the men who made up the officer corps of the army, the institutions within 
which the issues were addressed and the extent to which the leadership was prepared to 
18 The Battle of Dorking is discussed on page 23 and Claremont's comments on the invasion scare on page 
74. Professor Strachan argues that the Schlieffen Plan may be, at least in part, a European instance of the 
same phenomenon, The First World War, vol. 1, (Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 166. 
17 
be responsive. Chapter three will examine the impact of changing technologies. Chapter 
four will concentrate on the need to change the army's structures, involving the questions 
of recruitment, the difficulty in designing a shape for the army which would meet 
requirements at home as well as overseas, and the establishment of what Spenser 
Wilkinson called the brain of an army, its General Staff. 19 The theme of chapter five will 
be application in the field of the lessons learnt, including the need to improve the 
education and professional training of the officer corps, the necessary revolution in 
tactics and attempts to create some kind of coherent doctrine for an army facing such a 
diversity of possible problems. 
Chapter six will seek to draw the threads together; the level of interest shown by the 
military establishment in the lessons arising from the continental wars; their response to 
clever officers, and particularly to officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers; 
the most effective influences; their impact on the organisation, equipment and doctrine of 
the army; and what this has to say about its professionalism. 
19 Wilkinson, Spenser, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the 
German General Staff 
(Westminster, Constable, 1895). Henry Brackenbury originated this metaphor of 
the Staff as the brain of an 
army, as Wilkinson acknowledges on page 
39. 
1R 
Chapter 2 The Army 
The chapters which follow will be concerned with the issues which arose from the 
continental wars. This chapter will look at people and institutions. The people are those 
who were directly concerned by the need to react to the rapid changes taking place in the 
techniques and tools of war, and the institutions those which provided the forums within 
which such needs could be examined. It will consider 
- the soldiers, and others, who studied the issues 
- how much encouragement they received from their superiors, and the climate of 
opinion within the army in general 
- those who were in a position to act on the information - the establishment 
- those who could develop the ideas - the professors and instructors, the writers 
and debaters amongst the active soldiery 
- the means by which ideas were disseminated and debate promoted. 
Most of the chapter will be concerned with the activities of military men; how those 
who advocated radical change related to the rest of the officer corps and the means by 
which proposals for change were put forward; but there were also voices outside the army 
eager to express their opinions on how the army should react to continental 
developments. The nature of their contribution, and the reaction of the military, will be 
briefly considered first. 
At this time the readership of newspapers was expanding rapidly and the formidable 
editor of The Times, John Thadeus Delane, had every reason to be confident of his power 
to influence opinion in every aspect of public life. 
' Where military matters were 
concerned this had been greatly enhanced by two recent developments, the appointment 
of special correspondents to report on foreign wars and the establishment of a network of 
electric telegraphs to facilitate the rapid transmission of their contributions. There 
had 
been an early demonstration of this power in the Crimean campaign. The devastating 
' Hudson, R (ed), William Russell Special Correspondent of The Times (London, Folio, 1995) quotes 
President Lincoln's recognition of this power, 171. 
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despatches from William Howard Russell and Thomas Chenery provoked huge public 
indignation about the disorganisation of the army's supply arrangements and the 
lamentable conditions under which the troops had to live. As the century moved on, the 
increasing ability of newspapers to give their readers rapid and dramatic eye-witness 
accounts of battles and campaigns helped to enhance the reputations of their 
correspondents and reinforce the ability of editors to express trenchant views about 
matters relating to the army. At moments of perceived crisis these interventions made a 
significant impact on the climate of opinion in the country. During the invasion scare of 
1859-60, for example, The Times gave sustained encouragement to the development of 
the Volunteer movement, and a few years later agitated strongly (if inaccurately) for the 
adoption of breech-loading rifles. 2 Ministers throughout the period showed their 
awareness of the extent to which such campaigns could influence public opinion, and 
were not above exploiting them for their own purposes. 3 
Captain Colomb, a powerful advocate of the `blue water' thesis (that the navy could 
be depended upon to protect the shores of Britain as well as the country's overseas 
interests, and that there was no case for diverting scarce resources to equipping the army 
for more than a subordinate share in this commitment) expressed his alarm that the public 
were being dangerously influenced by the colourful reporting of the war correspondents. 
Every volunteer from the Land's End to the Orkneys, every militiaman 
from Dover to Donegal, is the apostle of a purely insular theory of defence, 
the practical preacher of purely military precautions: Russell, from nearly 
all battle-fields of modern times: Hozier, from `the mountains of Rasselas'; 
Brackenbury, from the plains of Italy; and Forbes, from the ruins of Sedan, 
have so stirred the heart of England that her head has well nigh ceased to 
2 Encouragement of the Volunteer Rifle Corps was notably carried on by The 
Illustrated London News, 
which featured regular weekly accounts of the activities of 
individual units. The Times's contribution to the 
development of breech-loaders is discussed in chapter 3,121-4. 
3 For instance, the impact on public opinion, and eventually British policy, of the reports 
in The Daily News 
in 1876 of the atrocities being committed by the Turks on the 
Bulgarian populace is described in Mathews, 
Joseph J, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1957), ch. 9, and bolder claims 
for their influence can be found in Archibald Forbes's 
Memoirs and Studies of Peace and War (London, 
Cassell, 1895), 16. For an example of Ministers' willingness to plant material 
in The Times, see Ramm, 
Agatha, (ed. ) (The Gladstone - Granville Correspondence 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), no. 671, 
313. 
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regard the influence of water as practically ruling the whole principle of her 
own and that of her Empire's defence. 4 
But were the military themselves noticeably susceptible to this sort of influence? 
On the whole the evidence suggests that they were not. From time to time there were 
rueful acknowledgments that, particularly where money matters were involved, the power 
of the press was undeniable, as Major-General Sir Lintorn Simmons admitted in 1871. 
He was sorry to say that changes almost invariably involved expenditure 
of money, which was the great obstacle to their adoption. Unless an idea 
was well written up in the papers - and he doubted very much whether 
such a proceeding was within the province of an officer - it was difficult 
to press it home. 
Sometimes, indeed, officers were glad to record their gratitude for the attentions of the 
press, even when the reputation of the army was being called in question. The Crimean 
War is a case in point. On the one hand Lord Raglan, feeling that Russell's explicit 
reporting gave aid and comfort to the enemy, had written sadly home to the Secretary for 
War that ` .... the 
innocency of his intentions does not diminish the evil he inflicts', but, 
in contrast, Sir Evelyn Wood, looking back on the Crimea later in life, declared of 
Russell that ` .... 
by awakening the conscience of the British nation to the sufferings of 
. the troops 
he saved the remnant of those grand battalions' 6 
More often, however, soldiers were irritated by the way that the papers presented 
military matters, and scornful of what they saw as a shallow and unprofessional attitude 
to complex problems. Major-General FM Eardley Wilmot (a noted reforming gunner), 
speaking in the same debate as General Simmons, clearly enjoyed general support when 
he declared that ` .... 
(junior officers) might hear and see in the newspapers all sorts of 
quack propositions (laughter) - for increasing, controlling, re-organising, and bothering 
the army in all manner of ways (laughter and applause). The army wanted to improve 
itself 
.... '' 
4 Colomb, Captain JCR, RN, `Naval Intelligence and protection of commerce in war', JRUSI, vol. 25,1881, 
553. 
5 Proc RAI, vol. 7,2 Feb. 1871,365. 
6 Cook, Sir Edward, The Press in Wartime (London, Macmillan, 1920) 16,8. 
7 Proc RAI, vol. 7,2 Feb. 1871,365. 
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The professional soldier's reaction to the writings of the war correspondents was 
neatly summed up in a letter which the veteran Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne wrote to 
another old soldier, Lord de Ros, at the height of the Franco-German War in December 
1870, which merits quoting at some length because it offers practical suggestions about 
what military attaches, as well as correspondents writing from the field, ought to concern 
themselves with. 
I have in a general way formed very much the opinion you have on the 
value as a military study of the information we usually get from the 
correspondents of the press with the armies in the field; the very 
expression of their letters being so graphic, is with me, condemnation; as a 
soldier, I want what is instructive, not what is graphic. 
Nor do I attach any value to reasonings on the great strategical 
movements, by those present, whether civilians or military men. What 
they see is in very small limits, and what they hear from those about them, 
is quite untrustworthy .... 
I quite agree however with what I understand to 
be your view, which is to turn the attention of our military attaches and 
correspondents to objects in details which they can themselves observe, or 
on which they can obtain on the spot, correct information, that would be of 
8 great interest to us. 
Issues affecting the army were inevitably of concern to thoughtful civilians, at this 
time of almost constant warfare in Europe and North America as well as in the rapidly- 
expanding Empire. Many members of the two Houses of Parliament had held 
commissions in the army or were active members of the Militia and Volunteers, and they 
did not hesitate to intervene in what they considered an authoritative manner when 
debates about the service took place. The opinions of such men, including John 
Holms, 
Sir Charles Trevelyan, Lord Elcho and Viscount Melgund, will have their place when 
specific issues are discussed in later chapters. 
Friedrich Engels holds a prominent place amongst the many contributors outside 
Parliament. Although better known for his radical political views, he was acknowledged 
to be something of a military expert, particularly where 
German interests were involved. 
(In addition to serving as a volunteer in the Prussian 
Guards Artillery in 1841-2, he had 
8 Burgoyne to de Ros, 13 December 1870. Quoted in Wrottesley, 
Lieut. -Colonel the hon. George, Life and 
Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, Bart. 
(London, Richard Bentley and Son, 1873), 
441-2. 
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fought under Franz Sigal in the abortive revolt in the Bavarian Palatinate and Baden in 
1849. ) He strongly espoused the cause of the Volunteer movement in response to the 
1859 invasion scare, contributing pieces to the Pall Mall Gazette, the Manchester 
Guardian, and the Volunteer Journal (not to mention the New York Daily Tribune and the 
Allgemeine Militärzeitung of Darmstadt). His views on all aspects of military 
organisation and thought were well reasoned, but his judgments and predictions on the 
broader strategic issues, such as the pattern and outcome of the 1866 war, were often 
completely wrong. 
Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, although in fact a professional soldier (and the 
brother of the influential Colonel Charles Chesney), falls into a somewhat similar 
category. He rose to the rank of general in a distinguished career, but his reputation with 
the public at large rests on one work, his famous `Battle of Dorking', which first 
appeared as a long article in Blackwood 's in May 1871. IF Clarke has described and 
analysed the impact which this fictional account of the subjugation of an inadequately 
defended Britain had on a public still recovering from the shock of seeing France 
overwhelmed by Germany; on the Prime Minister's fury; on the swathe of imitators; on 
the inevitable reaction against it. 9 In the end, despite describing the sensation which it 
caused, his verdict is that `.... there is no evidence that his story had any influence on the 
reorganization of the army'. 1° Curiously, a decade earlier, Sir James Fergusson, General 
Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel JA Ballard had all tried to influence public opinion by 
publishing articles which used much the same technique to show that Britain would be 
powerless to withstand a French invasion, but without achieving the same dramatic 
impact. 11. 
The importance of periodicals such as Blackwood 's in providing a forum for 
officers like these to put forward their views, to influence their colleagues, the 
9 Clarke, IF, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars 1763-1984 2nd. Ed. (London, OUP, 1992), ch. 2. 
10 Ibid., 42. There can be no denying, however, that it was a huge popular success. 
11 Fergusson, J, `The invasion of England', The Quarterly Journal, vol. 16, July 1859,245-84. 
Burgoyne, Sir John, `Our Volunteers', Cornhill, vol. 1, Jan. 1860,77-84. 
Ballard, JA, `National defences and Volunteers', Blackwood's', vol. 88, August, 
1860,135-54. 
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government or the public at large will be considered later in this chapter. First, it is time 
to look at the military themselves. 
The Commander-in-Chief His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was the holder of 
this office throughout the period of the continental wars. 12 As professional head of the 
army he was the focal point for the army's views on the need for reform, but also the 
officer ultimately responsible for executing the government's decisions in that respect. 
His own position on these matters, and his temperament, were therefore crucial when it 
came to bringing influence to bear and to reacting to it. This makes it important to try to 
identify the role which he played at the time. 
Prince George of Cambridge was born in Hanover in 1819 (the same year as his 
cousin Victoria), where his father, seventh son of King George III, was at the time 
Governor General; and his mother was a daughter of the house of Hesse Cassel. Both 
these circumstances, his close relationship with Queen Victoria and his German 
connections, have a significance when his character is being explored. On the one hand 
he was a devotedly loyal upholder of the dignity of the British crown and a staunch 
patriot; on the other, he felt a strong affinity with his German relations, and his early 
military education followed a pattern similar to that of many German princelings. In 1836 
he was put under the charge of a Military Governor, Colonel Cornwall of the Coldstream 
Guards, and entered as a cadet in the Guards of the Hanoverian army. ' 3A year later the 
death of his uncle King William IV precipitated major changes. Victoria became queen in 
England, their uncle Cumberland king of Hanover, and George's father ceased to be 
Governor General. George was therefore given a brevet Colonelcy in the British army 
and sent, still under the direction of Colonel Cornwall, to Gibraltar, where he was 
attached to the 33rd foot to `learn my duty with them'. 
14 
It is noteworthy that none of his contemporaries, even those, like Wolseley, who 
12 Strictly speaking, the title was General Officer 
(later Field Marshal) Commanding in Chief, until 1887. 
13 Sheppard, Edgar, George Duke of Cambridge, 2 vols. (London, Longmans, 1906), 30-1. 
14 Ibid, 55. 
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clashed bitterly with him, ever accused him of being other than a loyal, hard-working, 
well-informed and generally well-loved soldier. At the same time, however, he has been 
traditionally represented as the epitome of conservatism, a died-in-the-wool reactionary, 
totally opposed to any alteration in the army's traditional ways. Peter Boroughs, in his 
chapter of The Oxford History of the British Army, sums up this common attitude in a 
sentence; `Reformers also encountered on many issues a resuscitated complacency and 
conservatism at the Horse Guards under the Duke of Cambridge'. 15 Winston Churchill 
was decisive in his verdict; `The Commander in Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, was 
opposed to any reform whatever.... '. 16 Joseph Lehmann's judgment was that `.... the 
strongest foe of army reform and Wolseley's personal bete noire was Prince George, 
Duke of Cambridge'. 17 
Some of the fiercest verdicts are to be found in the relevant volume of the original 
Oxford History series; Ensor's England, 1870-1914. Ensor's six references to the duke 
create a devastating picture of a `.... sworn foe to all progress' and one who, although 
never accused `.... of serious corruption, ... 
had nearly every other disqualification for his 
post. ' 18 Ensor was writing as long ago as 1936, but his influence continues. In 1999 
Major Kevin W Farrell presented his doctoral thesis to Columbia University on `The 
Military and the Monarchy: The Case and Career of the Duke of Cambridge in an Age of 
Reform', which he said gave a new and more accurate view, not only of Cambridge but 
also of the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the army. Dr Farrell has 
carefully studied the royal archives, and particularly the correspondence between 
Cambridge and Queen Victoria, but his judgments are heavily based on Ensor, and his 
conclusion, that Cambridge's career was an unqualified disaster for the British army, is 
sadly simplistic. '9 
15 Chandler, David (ed. ), The Oxford History of the British Army ( OUP, 1996), 185. 
16 Churchill, Winston, A History of the English-speaking Peoples 4 vols., (London, Cassell, 1958) vo1.4, 
227. 
17 Lehmann, Joseph, All Sir Garnet, (London, Cape, 1964), 16. 
18 Ensor, 16n, 9,11,130,220,290. 
19 Farrell, Kevin W, `The Military and the Monarchy: The Case and Career of HRH George Duke of 
Cambridge in an Age of Reform (unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia, 1999). His enthusiastic view of Ensor 
is declared on page 324. His unremittingly negative opinion of the duke permeates the thesis. For an 
example of his simplistic approach, see pages 78-9, where he says that, in the class-ridden Victorian army, 
no gentleman would consider serving in the artillery or engineers. 
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This assessment of the duke seems, in fact, to have become as deeply embedded in 
the folklore of the Victorian army as that attitude to Earl Haig which the likes of Alan 
Clark and Denis Winter have perpetuated, and which a generation of serious academic 
historians has struggled to refute. 20 In the case of Cambridge, while historians such as 
Edward Spiers, Hew Strachan and Albert Tucker have examined his contribution in a 
more balanced manner, 21 other writers continue to take it for granted that he can be 
dismissed as an irredeemable reactionary. 22 
There is another side to the picture, but it has been allowed to go largely by default. 
Sir Willoughby Verner produced his Military Life in two large volumes immediately after 
the duke's death, and this is an excellent source of material for the student of the period, 
but it was written so soon after the events themselves, and by a player in the game, that it 
has not been accepted as an objective assessment of the duke's contribution. 23 More 
recently, Giles St. Aubyn's more readable account, The Royal George, has emphasised 
the duke's attractive domestic and social life without contributing much new material 
from the duke's own writings, which fill the pages of Verner's book. 24 When these are 
allowed to speak for themselves, and are set alongside what he said in committees and 
seminars, a more complicated and much more sympathetic character emerges. 
Before the evidence is examined it would be sensible to look briefly at the 
relationship which the duke had with his successor, the man whom Lehmann has called 
20 A recent contribution to this reappraisal is Dr Gary Sheffield's introduction to his edition, with John 
Bourne, of Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London, BCA, 2005). 
21 Spiers, `The Late Victorian Army', ch. 9 of The Oxford History of the British Army, 191. Strachan, 
Wellington's Legacy, 169. Tucker, AV, `Army and Society in England 1879-1900', Journal of British 
Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, May 1963,110-41. 
22 Recent examples include Powell, Geoffrey, Plumer: The Soldier's General (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 
2004), 12, and Jackson, General Sir William, and Field Marshal Lord Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of 
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London, Brassey's, 1992), 8, ` .... 
The Duke of Cambridge, who 
always claimed that he disapproved of all change on principle .... 
', a comment recently mirrored in a 
review by one Robbie Millen in The Spectator of 11 December 1999,61. 
23 Verner, Col. W, The Military Life of HRH George Duke of Cambridge, 2 vols. (London, Murray, 1905). 
What a debt of gratitude researchers owe to Verner for absolving them from the pain of reading so much of 
HRH's vile handwriting. Dr Edgar Sheppard's two volume biography, George Duke of Cambridge 
(London, Longmans, 1906), supplements Verner with a memoir of the duke's ceremonial and private life. 
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his bete noire, Viscount Wolseley. Wolseley's biographers have made much of the 
antipathy between these two. 25 Wolseley himself was the main source for this view, and 
there are certainly many references, in his private papers and diaries rather more than in 
his writings for publication, in which he claimed that the commander-in-chief was trying 
to keep him out of the way or block his career. However, several of his public statements 
attest to a happier relationship. 26 It cannot be denied that such public shows of respect 
were typical of the forms of behaviour of the age, often more diplomatic than heartfelt - 
but many Victorian public figures were prickly characters, distinctly emotional in the 
way that they expressed themselves in private, particularly when they felt that their merits 
were not sufficiently recognised by those in authority. 27 
Wolseley was certainly an emotional man, driven by ambition and a conviction of 
his potential to achieve great things, and intolerant of those whom he thought of as 
standing in his way. His letters, to his wife, brothers and intimates, and the notes in his 
private papers, contain many denunciations of his superiors in the service, not just as 
unfit for their jobs but also as enemies determined to block his progress, as well as 
condemnation of potential rivals as charlatans. In 1879, for instance, when the 
government, gravely concerned by the succession of political and military failures in 
tackling the Zulu irruption, entrusted him with the responsibility of bringing the crisis to 
an orderly conclusion, his letters home to his wife show this tendency at work. On 31 
October he wrote; `It requires a stronger man than I am to pursue the line I had marked 
out for myself -I must wait for some big event before I can afford to show up HRH of 
24 St. Aubyn, Giles, The Royal George 1819-1904; The Life of HRH Prince George Duke of Cambridge 
(London, Constable, 1963). 
25 For example, Lehmann, 161 and Edward Spiers in ch. 9 of The Oxford History of the Army, 194. Arthur, 
Sir George (ed. ), The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley 1870-1911 (London, Heinemann, 1922), v-vi. 
Wolseley's influence on his younger contemporaries contributed. When reading Maurice denouncing the 
obscurantism of the Horse Guards under Cambridge ('The War Office and the Army', Quarterly Review, 
vol. 183,1896) it is salutary to bear in mind the extent to which Wolseley was his mentor and inspiration. 
Similarly, it must be noted that Robert Biddulph, Cardwell's private secretary and biographer, was a 
lifelong friend and colleague of Wolseley's. 
26 For example, his article in The Nineteenth Century, vol. 3, March 1878,438. 
27 This tendency of stressed public figures to relieve their emotions is not unknown even today, as 
Alanbrooke's wartime diaries show. See Jenkins, Simon, `Wartime heroes who make pygmies of us all', 
The Times, 18 May 2001,18. 
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Cambridge and the lot of incapables he delights to honour. ' On 16 November he 
declared; 
I know that Ellice (the Adjutant General) hates me with all the hatred of 
jealousy and I feel a pleasure in telling him he belongs to a lot of fellows 
called Generals who are useless. He has not one war medal, yet he is the 
man who thinks he should be preferred before me as C in C in India. 
Eight days later he returned to the theme. 
I am very much put out by a telegram I have just received from the Horse 
Guards saying that Baker Russell must either rejoin his Regt. in India 
forthwith or be seconded. This is a piece of spite on the part of Ellice, 
Horsford and Co to annoy me and one of those who are regarded as 
`Wolseley's men'. 28 
These were his private thoughts. His many contributions to public debate were 
more measured - but his willingness to publicise his opinions, particularly when these 
were at variance with those of the establishment, portray him as an unruly subordinate 
and an uncomfortable colleague; yet he felt betrayed when any of those whom he thought 
of as his own proteges showed signs of independent ambitions. 
Given these characteristics, it not surprising that Cambridge and Wolseley each 
found the other difficult to work with, yet the record of their association suggests a more 
complex relationship than the writers mentioned above have recognised, and a degree of 
mutual respect. Over the years they worked together for long periods, exchanging 
reasoned views, arguing often but sometimes agreeing on important issues. 
Correspondence continued between them for thirty years and in general it reflects well on 
the professionalism of both soldiers. The duke has left on record his pleasure in the fact 
that, in his retirement, Wolseley took pains to call on him regularly and keep him abreast 
of what was going on. 29 
On the broadest matters of army organisation and national defence, their written 
views resemble each other rather more than some of the comments referred 
to above 
28 Wolseley Papers in Hove Central Library. WP/8 (1879). 
29 Arthur, Wolseley Letters, vii. 
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would lead one to expect, and, if the private expressions of Wolseley's more splenetic 
comments had received less attention, subsequent historians might have given 
Cambridge's contribution to serious debate more credence. For example, if Wolseley's 
seminal article in Macmillan's in April 1871 (the year when, as Assistant Adjutant- 
General, he became part of the establishment) on `Our military requirements', 30 is set 
beside the duke's long memoranda of November 1870,13 December 1875, and 24 
October 1876, to the Secretary of State for War, the similarities in approach to the major 
issues are apparent. 31 There is not space here to make the comparison in detail, but it does 
appear that more research into their relationship might contribute to a timely reappraisal 
of the duke's general contribution. 
Some positive aspects of the Duke's vision of the requirements of the army have 
been noted from time to time, both by contemporaries and by more recent writers. Hew 
Strachan refers to him as a reformer in Wellington's Legacy, and Wheeler, in The War 
Office Past and Present, praises his early contribution, and there is no doubt some 
significance in the fact that both these references are to his early years in office. 32 
Cambridge's views on a variety of military topics appear in later chapters, often 
supported by the approbation of men such as Charles Chesney, FJ Graves, WR Mansfield 
(Lord Sandhurst) and Spencer Walpole. On many issues he was certainly to be found 
among the conservatives; on the constitutional position of the army vis-a-vis Parliament 
and the Crown, on purchase and promotion, on some details of training for staff and 
intelligence departments, and on short service - but he always gave his reasons in 
honest and principled terms, and when his fears were proved wrong his mistake was often 
handsomely acknowledged. 
His views on many other issues; on the size of the army, its principal tasks, the 
need for professional training, the crucial importance of realistic manoeuvres and training 
in large formations (this is the man accused of only being interested in seeing soldiers in 
30 Wolseley, Garnet, `Our military requirements', Macmillan's, vol. 23, April 1871,524-36. 
31 Quoted in Verner, vol. II, 38-44 and 96-100. 
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pretty uniforms on barrack squares), 33 the role and arming of cavalry, on opposing the 
reversion of the artillery to muzzle-loading, and even on the merits of field entrenchments 
- in all these cases he will be found in the ranks of those who were forward thinking, 
and often at a surprisingly early date. 
In such matters he was strongly influenced by military developments in Europe. He 
attended the manoeuvres of the Prussian army whenever he could, commenting shrewdly 
on what he saw, and his letters and memoranda are full of references to the need for the 
British army to take due note of what was being achieved. A typical example is this letter 
to Lord de Grey in February 1864, at the time of the invasion of the Danish Duchies. 
Look at what the Continental Armies have just accomplished. Within the 
last month the Prussian troops have been placed partly on the war footing, 
and within a fortnight a Corps of Austrians and Prussians of at least 
50,000 men have been transported and are at this moment on the Eider, 
with heavy reserves prepared to follow should the necessity arise. It may 
be said that the French are doing nothing and that their position and ours, 
as great European Powers, is to some extent identical. Outwardly they 
show no symptom of preparation, but I venture to say, that their 
organisation is such that within one fortnight they could collect and mass a 
large Army on the Rhine, besides having an available force at hand for 
other contingencies. Now, if we look at what we can do, we literally can 
do nothing but call out our Militia and recruit up as fast as the labour 
market will permit us to obtain men. 34 
In addition, he was an assiduous President of the Royal United Service Institution, and 
recorded in his diary the importance which he attached to lectures at which he presided 
on such matters as the Austrian manoeuvres and the significance of the newly created 
Intelligence Department. 35 
32 Strachan, 103 and Wheeler, Owen, The War Office Past and Present (London, Methuen, 1914), 169. 
33 Spiers, Oxford History of the British Army, 191. Lehmann, 160. Cambridge did enjoy such occasions, but 
not to the exclusion of more realistic manoeuvres. It is notable that Baron 
Stoffel, praising the Prussian 
King Wilhelm's qualities as a truly professional soldier, could have been describing Cambridge when 
he 
included among his special virtues his incessant inspections of the troops and 
his regular attendance at the 
fortnightly meeting of the Military Society. `Reports on the Military Forces of Prussia', 
Fraser's, Nov. 
1871,557. 
34 Verner, vol. 1,287. For examples of visits to the Prussian manoeuvres see 
Sheppard, vol. 1,80 and 218, 
and vol. 2,82. 
35 Sheppard, vol. 2,4 and 34. 
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He was by no means perfect. In particular he lacked the sustained moral courage to 
stand up to prolonged and embarrassing clashes with powerful opponents. An exchange 
of memoranda with General Peel, the Secretary for War, in1866 illustrates both these 
aspects of his character, a clear perception of the army's needs coupled with an 
unwillingness to undertake the tough business of fighting to achieve it. His initial 
memorandum, undated, shows his awareness of the potential threat posed by 
developments on the continent, the pressing need for an adequate Reserve, to be built up 
by offering shorter service with the colours in exchange for a commitment to serve in that 
body, and for the Militia to be brought to a higher state of efficiency by regular training 
alongside regular troops under the guidance of suitably qualified half-pay officers. Peel's 
reply, dated 30 November 1866, spelt out the extent of the political opposition which 
such changes would provoke, and the duke's immediate reaction was to back off, and 
recommend that other officers should be consulted before any detailed plans were put 
forward. 36 
Like his mighty predecessor Wellington, he stayed in his post too long, after the 
energy and inclination to fight for reforms had ebbed; but, for all his faults, his 
contribution was more positive than his detractors have allowed - as his response to 
some of the specific issues examined later will show. 
The military establishment In 1859 the senior ranks of the army still included a handful 
of veterans of the Napoleonic Wars; Sir John Colborne (Lord Seaton), epitome of the 
regimental fighting soldier, was commanding the forces in Ireland, Sir John Fox 
Burgoyne was Director of Fortification and Sir George Wetherall Adjutant General. The 
influence of such experienced men was strong. Ministers and Commander in Chief 
naturally sought their advice on how to address the problems confronting the army in the 
aftermath of the Crimea and the Mutiny, and under renewed pressures arising 
from 
threats of invasion. Bruised though the reputations of this generation of officers had 
been 
by the recent demonstrations of the army's deficiencies, it would be wrong to regard 
them as unthinking reactionaries. In particular, Burgoyne took pains to 
keep himself 
36 Verner, vol. 1,297-304. 
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abreast of developments on the continent and in America, as will be seen in later 
chapters. 
Some interesting comparisons can be made with their immediate successors, men 
such as Sir John Scarlett and Sir Richard Airey (Lord Airey). Scarlett, like Colborne, had 
achieved fame as a fighting soldier, and stood high in public estimation, even after the 
Crimea. Airey, like Burgoyne, had been severely, and unfairly, blamed for the army's 
shortcomings, but in both cases they rapidly recovered the respect of their colleagues . 
Airey can be described as one of the last of the old school, in that he had made every step 
in rank from Ensign to Lieutenant-Colonel by purchase, yet Wolseley (not, as has been 
noted, a man to whom praise of his superiors came easily) described Airey, Adjutant 
General during the years of the Cardwell reforms, as 
.... the wisest and ablest soldier it was ever my lot to do business with. Indeed, I never knew anyone in our Army who was better fitted for high 
military command..... He had very justly great influence with the Duke of 
Cambridge who, recognising his ability, leaned much upon him. 37 
It is significant that Airey's final service to the army was to chair the Committee on short 
service which reported in March 1880, when he was seventy seven. 
The senior ranks of the army certainly did include men whose negative qualities 
merited the criticisms of the reformers. Sir William Mansfield (Lord Sandhurst), who 
commanded the forces in India from 1865-70 and in Ireland between 1870-75, was a 
clever man, but he crucially lacked the ability to work comfortably with subordinates. His 
DNB entry quotes this devastating assessment of him by one of his contemporaries, 
Colonel George Malleson; 
He had that within him to procure success in any profession but one. He 
was not and could not become a great soldier..... His vision, indeed, was 
so defective that he had to depend for information regarding the most 
trivial matters upon the reports of others..... He disliked advice, and, 
although swayed perhaps too easily by those he loved and trusted, he was 
impatient of even the semblance of control from men brought into contact 
with him only officially and in a subordinate position. 
38 
37 Wolseley, The Story, vol. 2,242-3. 
38 Wolseley, in The Story, vol. 1,336, corroborates this judgment. 
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Yet even Mansfield was sometimes willing to accept the need to introduce new methods, 
as his positive reaction to Henry Brackenbury's exposition of the new tactical formations 
dictated by battlefield realities in 1873 illustrates. 39 Throughout this period the army 
continued to produce officers who found it difficult to see the need for change - men 
like Frederick Thesiger - but the rising generation threw up a growing number of 
officers whose minds were receptive to the new climate, and who had the determination 
to press their views on the establishment. 
Whether this was as difficult a task as Cambridge's eventual successor,. Wolseley, 
made out can be questioned, but his commitment to the process cannot be denied. 40 His 
convictions about the direction which the British army should take were of course 
coloured by the fighting which he had seen at first hand (and his only direct experience of 
European war was as a young man in the Crimea) but as he gathered about him the group 
of talented young officers who came to be known as the `Wolseley Ring' this body 
contained many of the men whose studies of continental armies are reflected in the detail 
of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The body within which such officers had to 
make their mark and influence the direction of the service, the officer corps of the army, 
must now be examined. 
The officer corps. Some twenty thousand officers served in the Regular army during the 
twenty-one years with which this study is specifically concerned. 41 The careers of the 
vast majority of these men were devoted to regimental duties, much of the time a long 
way from home, and the impact of their individual activities and opinions was confined 
within that limited sphere. Their collective importance was another matter, and much has 
been written to suggest that the Victorian officer class could be defined in terms of 
certain easily identifiable characteristics which were shared by all - or at least by all 
who had any hope of making a success of their careers. These included a common social 
background, a public school education, an innate distaste for anything smacking of 
39 See reference on page 221. 
ao Admirably demonstrated by Halik Kochanski's PhD thesis and subsequent book. 
41 At any one time there were about nine thousand on the active list, and the average length of service was 
approximately twenty years. 
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intellectualism, a conservative approach to life and an aversion to change, particularly if 
it directly affected their own way of life in the regiment. In 1999 Gerard DeGroot, 
writing on Haig's rise to high command, summed up this verdict in the following terms. 
The British Army of the late Victorian period mirrored the stratified 
society of which it was a product..... Almost invariably only a certain 
type ever joined the officer corps and only an even more select type was 
promoted to high command..... Technically-minded middle class individuals who might have aided the Army's modernization either did not join or were not given much encouragement when they did. With 
individuality and imagination suppressed and cleverness deemed suspect, 
the institution remained safe and supreme. 42 
These characteristics, and the assumptions on which their identification is based, must 
now be examined in order to establish the extent to which they governed the army's 
reaction to the continental wars. 
The method used for this purpose will be to look at the careers of a selection of 
officers, one hundred and twenty-five in all, who had some impact on the development of 
the army during this period or later. 43 This is a small sample out of twenty thousand and it 
cannot claim to be fully representative of the whole body, not least because these men 
were distinguished from the mass by reason of their responsibilities or because their 
opinions appear during analysis of specific issues in later chapters. Nevertheless, they 
provide an opportunity to make some detailed observations about the characteristics in 
question. Generally speaking, only officers who were promoted beyond the confines of 
regimental duty are listed, but there are a handful of exceptions, including Lieutenant- 
Colonel Loyd-Lindsay, VC (Lord Wantage), Captain Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) and 
Major Gonville Bromhead, VC. Only those who held commissions within the period are 
included (so, for example, Field Marshal French, Generals Plumer and Home are in, but 
42 DeGroot, G, ch. 3 in Bond, B and Nigel Cave (eds. ), Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On (Barnsley, Leo 
Cooper, 1999), 39. See also Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn, The Army in Victorian Society (London, Routledge, 
1977) for a sustained argument to this effect, epitomised by a quotation from Correlli Barnett on page 276. 
A more balanced view can be seen in Bond, Brian, The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College, 1854-1914 
(London, Eyre Methuen, 1972), ch. 1 and ch. 3, Strachan, Hew, `The British Army and Society', The 
Historical Journal, vol. 22,1979,251, and the same author's The Politics of the British Army (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1997), ch. 2. 
43 Referred to hereafter as the base group. The accumulated career details of these officers are set out in 
appendix B4. The information has been compiled 
from army lists and the DNB. 
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Field Marshals Haig and Wilson, who were not commissioned until 1881 and 1882 
respectively, are out). 
The first issue relates to social background. Was it true that British officers all 
sprang from the gentry, and that other classes, in particular the middle classes, were 
excluded? In one hundred and eight cases the broad social status of the officer's father 
has been established. All concerned came from an educated background (including 
Colonel Sir Francis Bolton, the only one of the group commissioned from the ranks), but 
biographers have used an interesting variety of ways to classify the fathers. It must be 
acknowledged that the categories used here can overlap and conceal within themselves a 
wide diversity in rank and status. For example, military officer ranges from Lieutenant 
(the Brackenburys) to Field Marshal (General Sir John Ross); cleric can be simple vicar 
(Lieut. -General Sir John Ardagh), bishop (Chaplain-General George Gleig) or vicar and 
baronet (Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood). Similarly, the category of gentleman is not a 
very precise concept, but in this context it serves to describe fathers who lived in 
comfortable circumstances, generally in the country rather than the town, and who have 
not been recorded as having engaged in any income-earning capacity. 
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By pursuing this process in some detail it is possible to make a comparison between 
those who served in the cavalry, guards or line regiments and those who served in what 
have been variously described as the scientific and ordnance corps, the Royal Artillery, 
Royal Engineers and their colonial equivalents. It will be seen in later chapters of this 
study that officers from these corps played a disproportionate part 
in addressing the 
issues arising from continental developments, and in considering why that should 
have 
been so comparisons of this kind will play their part. In the matter of social 
background it 
can be seen from the following table, which summarises the records set out 
in appendix 
B4, that there was little significant difference between those commissioned 
in the 
44 In Britain there was nothing directly equivalent to the continental rank of nobility, attaching 
to whole 
families, usually signified by a particule, an 
honorific prefix such as von or de, and carrying with 
it certain 
privileges and duties. This is not to 
deny the prevailing British snobbery relating to `trade', well 
illustrated 
by two comments of Wolseley's on the composition of 
the messes of a certain cavalry regiment (the 
`Trades Union') and the 90 Light Infantry, his own regiment 
('a home for gentlemen'). The Story of a 
Soldier's Life, vol. 1,83,84. 
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ordnance corps and the others. The one exception is in the number of aristocratic parents, 
but this can be simply explained by the fact that the `other' category (as the cavalry, 
guards and infantry will be referred to for convenience) includes the Household Troops. 45 
These statistics support the view that the army in general recruited its officers from 
a privileged class of society, but contradict the opinion that gentlemen would not consider 
a career in the artillery or engineers. 
Next is the issue of education. Where the information is available (eighty-six of the 
officers in question) once again there is a general similarity between the ordnance corps 
and the others. What is notable is that in each case more than half were educated 
privately, or at grammar schools, and only thirty-six went to public school. Of the thirty- 
nine where the details have not been found, it is reasonable to assume that most of these 
did not go to public schools, either, since this is not something which biographers tended 
to overlook. It has to be said, therefore, that if these officers shared a moral code and a 
common attitude to life it was not because they had all been to the same schools. 
Similarly, the type of school which they went to does not seem to have had much bearing 
on their progress in the army. 
RARE Other Total 
Father's status 
Military/Naval officer 22 18 40 
Royal 1 1 2 
Aristocrat 1 10 11 
Gentleman 11 15 26 
GP 3 0 3 
MP 2 2 4 
Cleric/Academic 6 8 14 
Other professional 2 1 3 
Merchant/Planter 3 2 5 
Not recorded 7 10 17 
TOTAL 58 67 125 
45 Where Royalty is involved, if foreign princes had been included in the list, counting the 
French Prince 
Imperial's training would have given the ordnance corps a two-to-one advantage over the others. 
Professor 
Strachan makes the point, in The Legacy, 140, that the 
lack of opportunities to purchase promotion in these 
corps might have been attractive to 
` .... the 
impoverished sons of a nobleman'. 
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School 
Public 15 21 36 
Private 25 20 45 
Abroad 23 5 
Not recorded 16 23 39 
TOTAL 58 67 125 
Method of Entry 
Sandhurst 0 15 15 
Woolwich 47 0 47 
Addiscombe 40 4 
Militia 02 2 
Direct 1 36 37 
Special Direct 60 6 
Not recorded 0 14 14 
TOTAL 58 67 125 
Next to be considered is their method of entry to their profession. Most of the 
cavalry, guards and infantry officers joined their regiments direct, either from school, 
generally by purchase until 1872 but sometimes (like Wolseley) through official 
patronage, or by transferring from the Militia. Only fifteen entered the army through 
Sandhurst. In the ordnance corps, where there was no purchasing of commissions, forty- 
seven out of fifty-eight entered through Woolwich and four passed through the East India 
Company's school at Addiscombe into the Bengal army. The remaining seven joined 
their service directly. One of these, Colonel Sir Francis Bolton, was appointed from the 
ranks to the Gold Coast Artillery on 4 August 1857, but the six others owed their 
commissions to the peculiar circumstances created by the Crimean crisis. 
It had rapidly become apparent that there was a serious shortage of officers to 
replace gunner and sapper casualties or fill the specialist functions required by what 
amounted to siege warfare. To a limited extent the gaps could be filled by seconding 
energetic officers such as the young Wolseley from other branches of the service, 
46 but it 
was clear that emergency measures had to be taken to increase the stock of specialists. 
' Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, vol. 1,114 
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Accordingly, a series of expedients was adopted to augment the flow of suitable 
young men into the two services. These ad hoc measures have not been easy for 
subsequent researchers to disentangle, but the records of cadet entries to Woolwich at the 
time help to unravel their complexities. Appendix Al describes these expedients in more 
detail. Here it is only necessary to make a distinction which has confused some 
biographers, between those who were commissioned directly, without enrolment in the 
body of Gentlemen Cadets, and those who spent some time at the Academy, albeit in the 
Practical Class, before becoming officers. 47 There seem to have been forty-seven of the 
direct category, and the careers of two of this group, Major-Generals Sir Robert Murdoch 
Smith and Sir Charles William Wilson, will be referred to later, to illustrate the way that 
the establishment made use of the particular talents of clever officers. 48 
The ease with which this could be done in practice was partly a result of the 
different structure of the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, compared with the rest of 
the service. The ordnance corps, like the navy, commissioned their officers into a general 
pool, whereas those who served in cavalry and infantry units were commissioned into 
particular regiments. For the average officer, the summit of whose ambition would be to 
rise to the command of his regiment or battalion, his status and in particular his seniority 
within that `family' were all-important. His status depended largely on his social skills in 
fitting in with his brother officers, and, except in a handful of supremely self-confident 
regiments such as the Rifle Brigade, this tended to encourage a conformity to a 
comfortable social style which, coupled with years of regimental routine, could easily 
depress any talents to perform on a wider stage. 49 This focus on the regiment has 
To illustrate the problem, Colonel Robert Home's entry in the DNB says that ` .... when, 
for a short time 
during the Crimean War, commissions in the artillery and engineers were thrown open to public 
competition without the necessity of passing through the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, he 
succeeded in obtaining one in the royal engineers .... 
' This is wrong. Home was one of a batch, which 
included Henry Brackenbury, who joined the Practical Class at Woolwich as cadets before passing out to 
their commissions. Further details are given in appendix Al. 
48 Sir Robert Murdoch Smith's DNB entry says that he passed first out of forty-six who joined by this 
method, but the present writer believes that altogether forty-seven officers were so commissioned. See 
Appendix Al. 
49 The curator of the South Wales Borderers' Museum in Brecon commented to the present writer that the 
distinguishing characteristics of junior officers who subsequently achieved command of their battalion 
were to have served either as adjutant or musketry instructor, rather than in extra-regimental activities. 
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continued to be both a strength and a weakness of the British system. 5° In many ways it 
suited the governments of the time to foster it, but the stultifying effect on the outlook of 
generations of regimental officers cannot be overlooked. 
For such officers their position in the regimental pecking order was vital to their 
ambitions, something about which they had to think very carefully before accepting any 
post outside the regiment which could jeopardise it. 51 This is of course a broad 
generalisation and there were many exceptions, for reasons which will be examined a 
little later, but this pressure was less important in the case of the engineers and artillery. 
These officers knew that their careers would be spent in many different units and that it 
was not so important to consolidate their position within one small group of colleagues. 
Also, and crucially, because they had all been required to demonstrate their intellectual 
powers in a competitive environment before they were commissioned (in most cases over 
a protracted period of training at the Academy) those with potential could often be 
identified at an early stage - and this potential might be exploited in a variety of ways. 
The importance of this must be emphasised. In a competitive environment the 
ambitious have to find a means to distinguish themselves from their fellows, and one of 
the issues with which this study deals is the reaction of the military establishment in 
general to those who concerned themselves with the need for change in order to respond 
to continental developments. Were their views readily welcomed? Did they thereby gain 
positions of influence, and, if so, what impact did they have? Alternative ways of 
achieving early recognition must be at least briefly examined so that comparisons can be 
made, and the career details of the officers listed in appendix B4 provide some facts to 
work on. 
The Actuaries' Report in Appendix C of the Penzance Report of 1876 gave the 
following figures for the length of time which it took for an officer to reach the 
regimental rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, averaging the figures over thirty years, as 
so For a vivid description of the continuing force of this attitude see Holden Reid, B, Studies in British 






24 years 8 months 
20 years 4 months 
23 years 6 months 
29 years 4 months 
There were no figures for the artillery and engineers, but the records of the officers in this 
study's appendix B4 offer some statistics for comparison. Taking the average of the 
thirty-four commissioned from Woolwich who achieved the regimental rank (excluding 
the Royal Duke) gives a figure of twenty-three years and eleven months. Within that bald 
figure there are a few notable variations. Sir Robert Biddulph gained this promotion 
exceptionally early, after ten years and six months of service, while Sir FM Eardley 
Wilmot took twenty-seven years and eight months, and Sir Frederick Maurice no less 
than twenty-eight years and five months, but the other officers are clustered closely round 
the average time - and there remains a strong correlation between their place in the 
order of merit when passing out of Woolwich and the date of their promotion to 
Lieutenant-Colonel, regardless of their achievements on the broader stage during the 
intervening years. More significantly, such distinguished soldiers as Grierson, Home, 
Kitchener, Gordon, Nicholson and Callwell are not recorded as ever having held the 
regimental rank at all. 
The implication is clear. While regimental promotion prospects in the artillery and 
engineers were similar to those in the other arms, this was not in itself a reliable indicator 
of either the progress of an able officer in the service or of the influence which he might 
exert. How, then, did such a man make his mark, while still young? Distinguished service 
in the field was the most obvious route, and for a young man this usually meant the 
display of conspicuous bravery under fire. Ambitious men like Wolseley accordingly 
sought every opportunity for action. 
52 Those who were lucky and determined enough to 
seize the chance, and survive, gained a double benefit - particularly if they were involved 
in a major campaign - because their gallantry usually led to their 
being taken out of their 
immediate environment and given an early opportunity to demonstrate other skills. The 
51 Bond, Brian, The Victorian Army and the Staff College (London, Eyre Methuen, 1972), 68. 
52 Wolseley, The Story, 41-2. 
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practical advantages of this can be demonstrated from the careers of the officers in the 
base group. 
This introduces the question of promotion by brevet. Throughout this period the 
military establishment was unwilling to interfere with seniority within the regimental 
environment, partly to eliminate the possibility of favouritism (and a vestigial fear that 
this could lead to a clique taking the army over for political advantage) and partly, until 
1872, so as not to upset the orderly procedure for the buying and selling of commissions. 
The method for bringing on officers whom the authorities wished to encourage was to 
give them a step in rank in the army by brevet promotion. This applied to elevation to the 
ranks of Major, Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel. The men so distinguished enjoyed the 
status of their brevet rank in the army in general (and a pay scale between that of their 
regimental and army ranks), but when serving with their own unit ranked as the junior 
officer at their brevet level. Officers who performed gallantly in the field almost 
invariably received a step by brevet. Thirteen of the base group were awarded the 
Victoria Cross. These men could count on at least promotion by brevet, and in three cases 
(Lieutenants Bromhead, Chard and Roberts) the normal rules were broken to the extent 
that they were given the immediate step in regimental rank which would then enable 
them to be promoted to Major. Even in the cases where they were not promoted 
immediately, (Lieutenants Gerald Graham and Wilbraham Lennox), they were given 
opportunities to display distinguishing qualities which would lead to their rapidly 
receiving three steps by brevet, so that each was a full Colonel by the age of thirty-seven, 
and while still a Captain in the Royal Engineers. 53 Of the base group of one hundred and 
twenty-five, sixty-nine were promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel by brevet, and of these forty 
had already gained a majority the same way. 
53 An example of Graham's contribution to the study of continental developments can be seen in his 
translation of The Operations of the German Engineers and Technical Troops, during the Franco-German 
War of 1870-71 from the German of Captain Adolphe Goetze in 1875. Further references to Graham's and 
Lennox's influence in encouraging the study of continental developments will appear in later chapters. 
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But gallantry was not the only path to brevet rank and rapid promotion. " 
Intellectual powers and administrative skills also had their place. However, there remains 
an impression, reinforced by quoting, often out of context, the `Blimpish' observations of 
crusty senior officers, that the Victorian military establishment was stubbornly hostile to 
cleverness in its officers . 
55 For example, Alfred Cochrane, writing the DNB entry for 
George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham) in the 1930s, said that, though he passed first 
out of Woolwich in 1868, ` .... 
Clarke saw little active service, and his promotion was 
slow, for the military authorities of those days had little regard for scientific young 
officers with progressive views'. Yet the record shows that his talents in the fields of 
military fortification and defence organisation were fully exploited by the establishment 
in a career of vast achievement. He reached Lieutenant-Colonel's rank in the engineers 
after twenty-five years' service (and this was a normal rate of promotion) but he had 
already achieved national recognition as Secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee 
and Secretary of the Royal Commission on navy and army administration while still a 
Major. 56 
Promotion within the regiment was important, but for truly ambitious officers it 
commonly lost much of its appeal once they had attracted the notice of the establishment, 
and had seen the possibilities for fulfilling those ambitions outside so limited an 
environment. Four examples, two each from the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery, 
will make this clear. It was noted earlier that Robert Murdoch Smith and Charles Wilson 
were placed first and second in the open competition for direct entry in 1855. Each 
subsequently spent very little time in regimental soldiering, because their talents were 
sa Nor was it sufficient on its own, as the subsequent career of Lieutenant Bromhead shows. Bromhead's 
military connections were impeccable; his grandfather, the first Baronet, was a Lieut. -General, his father 
served in the Waterloo campaign, and all three of his brothers were soldiers. The eldest died young, but 
both the others were Colonels. By comparison his own career was undistinguished; he died of enteric fever 
while still serving as a Major in India, aged forty-five. His niece Janetta married William Birdwood, 
later 
the Field Marshal, whose family was already connected to Bromhead's by marriage. (Details provided by 
the curator of the South Wales Borderers Museum. ) 
ss See St Aubyn, 117, for an example, taken from Stray Recollections, by Sir C Callwell (London, Arnold, 
1923), of the repetition of an elephantine attempt at humour on this subject by Cambridge. 
56 As a comparison, General Sir Wilbraham Lennox, with all the advantages of aristocratic 
birth, the VC 
and two brevets before he was thirty, was only promoted regimental Lt. -Colonel at the age of 
forty-three, 
after almost twenty six years' service, and six years after 
his brevet promotion to Colonel. 
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exploited in different directions. Smith, who had no background of privilege or access to 
powerful patronage (his father was a GP and his education was at Kilmarnock Academy 
and Glasgow University) was encouraged to pursue his interests in archeology and 
surveying in Asia Minor and Cyrenaica; then, after a short period of service as a 
specialist in fortification at the War Office, he was employed for twenty years installing 
and maintaining the vital strategic telegraph link across Persia, until he retired as Major- 
General with a KCMG. 
Wilson (educated at Liverpool College and Cheltenham) was employed as 
Secretary of the Commission surveying and delimiting the border between British 
Colombia and the USA when he was twenty-one. After a short time working on 
improving the defences of the Thames estuary and the Medway he was sent to survey 
Palestine on behalf of the Ordnance Survey, and this aspect of military duty dominated 
the rest of his professional life. He had short periods of duty as military Consul General 
in Anatolia in 1879, working with the military attache to the British Agency in Egypt in 
1882 and as Wolseley's chief of intelligence in the Sudan in 1884, but his topographical 
skills were never long neglected. He ran the Ordnance Survey in both Scotland and 
Ireland while a relatively junior officer, was the first Director of the Topographical 
Department at the War Office in 1870 (appointed while still a captain) and finally retired 
after serving as Director General of Military Education from 1892 to 1898, with a KCB 
to add to his KCMG. 
John Henry Lefroy (father Rector of Ashe in Hampshire, educated at private 
schools) was commissioned from Woolwich into the artillery in 1834. While stationed at 
Chatham four years later, he joined with his fellow Lieutenant Eardley Wilmot to propose 
the establishment of the Royal Artillery Institute, and became its first Secretary. This 
initiative did not go unnoticed. Within a year he and Eardley Wilmot were sent on a 
mission to the Antarctic to establish `magnetical observatories', and as soon as this task 
had been successfully completed Lefroy was despatched to Canada, where he undertook 
a long expedition to the Arctic to survey the effect of the world's magnetic disturbances. 
During his nine years in Canada he founded, and became the first President of, the 
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Canadian Institute, and was made a Fellow of the Royal Society. This was important 
work, and it was not peripheral to his service career. In 1853 he returned home to rejoin 
his Battery, and resumed his Secretaryship of the RAI. Within a year he had written the 
`Handbook of Field Artillery for Officers in the Field', which remained an official 
textbook till 1884, and had been called into the War Office as Newcastle's `scientific 
adviser on subjects of artillery and inventions'. He was then given the task of 
reorganising the Ordnance Select Committee to make it more effective - all this, it must 
be noted, while he was still a Captain. 
Thereafter his influence was felt in other crucial aspects of the army's development. 
Panmure, Newcastle's successor, sent him to the Crimea to investigate the treatment of 
the sick; he was deeply involved in the reform of the army's educational provision, 
particularly in the conversion of the Senior Department of the Royal Military College 
into the Staff College in 1857, and as Inspector General of Army Schools; he served on 
the Royal Commission on the defence of the United Kingdom of 1859; and he ended his 
military career as Director General of Ordnance. There was little regimental duty in this 
distinguished career, but he reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel after twenty years 
and nine months (his only brevet taking him to the rank of Colonel three years later), and 
when he retired from the army, as a Major-General, he continued his public service as 
Governor of Bermuda and Tasmania. 
The second example from the artillery is of a soldier who followed a more orthodox 
army career than Lefroy, Smith and Wilson - James Grierson. The eldest son of a 
Glasgow merchant, he joined Woolwich from Glasgow Academy in March 1876 as a 
seventeen year-old. He passed out in April 1878, fourth in order of merit and with prizes 
in military history and Italian, and chose to serve in the artillery. 
57 His potential had 
already been noted by his superiors, since his translation, from the Russian, of General 
Todleben's account of the siege of Plevna in the pages of the Proceedings of the Royal 
57 `His commission was announced in the London Gazette of 24th May, ante-dated six months - needless 
to say without pay - as was the custom in those days and consequently 
bearing date 9th October, 1877. ' 
Macdiarmid, DS, The Life of Lieut. General Sir James Moncrief Grierson (London, Constable, 1923), 21. 
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Artillery Institution had been written while he was still a cadet, and this must have been 
with the blessing, if not the active encouragement, of his mentors. 58 Within a year he was 
able to embark on a series of visits to the Austrian and Russian armies, and when his 
Battery was transferred to India he very quickly found himself posted to the General Staff 
as attache in the Quartermaster General's Department, Intelligence Branch, `.... the very 
work I should most of all like .... 
'. 59 When his Division was sent as part of the Indian 
component of Wolseley's army for the Egyptian campaign of 1882 he was appointed 
DAQMG (Intelligence), where he served with great credit, and it must be emphasised 
that he was then a twenty-three year old subaltern. 
Thereafter his progress was rapid, and carefully managed to include experience of 
Staff and Intelligence work interspersed with regimental soldiering at every level, which 
involved exposing him to intimate contact with the armed forces of the country's likeliest 
rivals, until his final appointment to command II Corps of the BEF in 1914. Some 
evidently carefully chosen words of his friend and rival Earl Haig describing this 
progression are significant. `Grierson was looked upon by a large number of his fellow- 
countrymen as the British soldier best fitted by natural ability and deliberate training to 
meet the German military leaders on equal terms. '60 Much has been made, quite rightly, 
of the value to the Prussian/German army of the time of the care with which the 
capabilities of their ablest officers were nurtured. Grierson's career stands as evidence 
that similar care was not unknown in the Victorian army. 
What these examples also show is that the rapidity with which a young officer 
moved through the ranks in his early career was not always of great significance, 
provided that he had talents which were regarded as valuable outside the immediate 
confines of regimental duty. This was particularly true of officers who showed an 
aptitude for teaching. Early years spent instructing at Sandhurst, Woolwich or the 
Staff 
College would limit a young officer's opportunities to display the sort of outstanding 
qualities in the field which might lead to brevet rank or 
decoration for gallantry, but there 
58 Proc RAI, vol. 10,1877,369-78. 
59 Macdiarmid, 31. 
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were significant compensations .61 
For a start, these teaching posts carried with them a 
salary of four or five hundred pounds a year, with decent living accommodation and 
allowances. Sometimes the officer in question could remain on his unit's establishment 
and continue to draw his full army pay as well; at worst, he would be entitled to half-pay 
to supplement his salary, and this would enable him to maintain a very respectable 
standard of living. 
There was also of course every opportunity to study, to contribute to the 
development of his profession by writing as well as lecturing, and to keep in touch with 
what was happening at the centre through attending meetings at such institutions as 
RUSI. The career of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice is a good illustration of the 
value of such a career to a thoughtful officer. He was commissioned in the Royal 
Artillery in 1862, had an early opportunity to study at the Staff College, and became an 
instructor in tactics at Sandhurst in 1872. He was still at that time a subaltern (aged thirty- 
one) when he drew himself forcefully to the notice of the establishment by beating a 
strong field, which crucially included that rising star Colonel Wolseley, to win the first 
Wellington Essay Prize. 62 His essay was immediately recognised to be an authoritative 
analysis of how the army should respond to developments in the armies of the major 
European Powers, and his reputation was established. His subsequent career, partly at the 
War Office, then for many years in the field under the aegis of Wolseley, led to a 
valuable career as both a teacher, including seven years as Professor of Military Art and 
History at the Staff College, and as a front-line soldier, commanding artillery brigades at 
Aldershot, the Eastern District and Woolwich, while he continued to contribute 
powerfully to the debates about the structure and doctrine of the army. 
Maurice was only one of a small, but as it turned out influential, group of officers 
whose reputations were enhanced by the contributions, both in teaching and 
in writing, 
60 Tbid, v. 
61 Sir Edward Bruce Hamley was the exception, in that he was lucky enough to participate in major 
campaigns as a junior officer, and (similarly to Gerald 
Graham and Wilbraham Lennox) was raised by three 
brevets to full Colonel before he was forty. 
62 Published as Maurice, Lieutenant F, RA, The System of Field 
Manoeuvres Best Adapted for Enabling our 
Troops to Meet a Continental Army, (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1872). 
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which they were able to make to the way that the army addressed the problems of coming 
to terms with the realities of modern warfare. The list includes Sir EB Hamley, Charles 
Chesney 
, 
Charles and Henry Brackenbury and Lonsdale Hale. Their contribution was 
continued by the efforts of the generation which followed, exemplified by the attention 
paid to Maurice's successor as Professor at the Staff College, Colonel GFR Henderson, 
but the main concern of this study is with the influential soldiers of the 1860s and 70s. 
The impact of their teaching (at the Staff College in particular) must not be overlooked, 
but it will be with the influence which they wielded through their writings, through their 
submissions to Commissions and Committees, through their participation in the great 
debates at RUSI and elsewhere, and through the power which they were able to wield 
from time to time when they found themselves in positions of responsibility that this 
thesis will be most concerned. 
Some recent scholars have cautioned against over-estimating the influence of the 
more pedagogic of this group. The value of the contributions of Hamley and Lonsdale 
Hale has been specifically questioned, but, whether or not their approach appeals to 
scholars today, the evidence that their own contemporaries took them seriously is strong. 
Lonsdale Hale (1834-1914) was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1853. He 
became an instructor in military history, at Chatham, and then a professor at Camberley, 
63 
reaching the rank of Colonel and eventually achieving a knighthood. He does not merit a 
mention in the Dictionary of National Biography, and the note in Who was Who is curt, 
which suggests that he may not have been a popular man. Dr Howard Baffles 
is inclined to 
dismiss his work, describing one of Hale's Tactical Studies as `.... a factual compilation 
of extraordinary aridity, unenlivened by any flashes of wit, or attempts to point the most 
obvious morals of the engagements', and he concludes that `.... one 
looks in vain for any 
sign of his influence outside the arena of theoretical debate'. 
64 This is a harsh judgment, 
and there is some evidence to suggest that it underestimates 
Hale's influence in 
63 Bond, Victorian Army, 248. 
64 Baffles, Howard, `The influence of continental examples and colonial warfare upon the reform of 
the late 
Victorian army', unpublished PhD thesis (London, 1980), 
13. This detailed and comprehensive work is a 
mine of information about the period. 
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professional circles. One of Garnet Wolseley's letters, written to the Duke of Connaught 
in 1889, weighing up what the British army should learn from the Germans and what it 
should not, includes this passage; 
.... I have just been very carefully over all the battle fields of the Franco- German war. We were a party of seven Generals on the active list, two 
Colonels, two Majors and one Subaltern. With map in hand and the 
German official account to read from and Colonel Lonsdale Hale to lecture 
us upon every phase of every action, no men I am sure ever went into 
minutiae more carefully than we did. 65 
The hint of weariness is palpable, but the fact is that a busy Adjutant-General considered 
it worthwhile to study the achievements of the German army on the ground, with 
colleagues, and under the tutelage of Lonsdale Hale. 
Hale was a pedant, but his contributions to the pages of Macmillan's and the 
Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution were very much in the spirit of the time, in 
seeking to apply valuable principles from German military practice for the benefit of the 
British army; and, to a twenty-first century reader's eyes, they seem no drier than most of 
the rest. 66Furthermore, there were times when his painstaking attention to detail enabled 
him to put the significance of events into a new perspective and correct a prevailing 
misconception. The incidence of casualties caused by artillery fire during the 1870-71 
campaign is a case in point. 
A general lesson drawn from the Franco-German War, said Hale, had been that only 
five per cent of casualties were caused by artillery and mitrailleuse fire, and nearly 
ninety-five per cent by rifle fire, and he cites Robert Home and Garnet Wolseley as 
having drawn conclusions from those figures. Wolseley, indeed, was using them to 
contradict the arguments of those who were drawing attention to the increasing 
importance of artillery. 67 What Hale does is to point out that the statistics being quoted 
reflected German casualties from French guns. When he investigated French casualties 
65 Wolseley to HRH the Duke of Connaught, KG, C-in-C Bombay, 30 September 1889. Wolseley papers, 
Hove, PLB 103. 
66 Macmillan's, vol. 38, May 1878,48-57, and July 1878,221-32, and 
Proc RAI, vol. 16, Oct. 1888,449-64. 
67 `This alleged increased importance of artillery is a myth. 
' Wolseley, `Our autumn manoeuvres', 
Blackwood's, vol. 112, August 1872,630. 
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from German guns, he found that twenty-five per cent were caused by artillery fire, 
which puts a very different complexion on the lessons to be learned. 68 
Baffles is almost equally dismissive of Hamley; `Professor Jay Luvaas has said all 
that is needed on Hamley in The Education of an Army (London, 1965), 130-68'. 69 
Luvaas, in the chapter which he devotes to Hamley, does indeed take him to task for the 
formalism of his Operations of War, and he is understandably indignant about Hamley's 
slowness in appreciating the lessons to be learnt from the American Civil War, but he 
acknowledges that Hamley could change his views over time. Like Baffles, he takes no 
account of the contribution which Hamley made to the general debate in the periodicals. 
There does seem to be a disposition among students of this period to denigrate Hamley, 
who was after all a teacher, for having written a textbook. `As original as most 
textbooks', says Luvaas drily, 70 and AW Preston develops the theme; 
The Operations of War ought not to be considered a classic on war. It 
contained no original theory. As the single work on strategy in an age 
worried about tactics, it received an altogether unmerited acclamation; 
and its effect on British military thinking was considerable. 71 
At least this is an acknowledgment that Hamley, however limited in his thinking, 
did wield considerable influence. He always wrote well, and in the opinion of the present 
writer his analyses of why the French war machine was a potent threat in 1864, and why 
the Prussians were so uniformly successful in 1870-1, stand comparison with the best in 
persuasive power as well as elegance. 72 
It is perhaps possible to sum up this section, about how young officers established a 
reputation, and what impact those who thought about the larger issues could wield, by 
taking the cases of two sets of brothers, the Chesneys and the Brackenburys, all of whom 
played a substantial part in the response of the army to continental developments and the 
68 Hale, L, `The spirit of tactical operations of today', lecture at Aldershot, printed in Proc RAI, vol. 16, Oct. 
1888,455. 
69 Baffles, thesis, note 27,19 
70 Luvaas, Education, 140. 
71 Preston, AW, `British military thought', 59. 
72 Hamley, EB, `Louis Napoleon as a general', Blackwood's, 
7th ed. (Edinburgh, Blackwood's, 1914), 347. 
vol. 45, March 1864, and Operations of War, 
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need for reform. George Chesney, like Hamley, had the chance to see plenty of action as 
a young officer, and rapidly reached a position of influence through achieving high rank 
after three brevet promotions. Charles, not fitted by health for so active a career, gained 
no early preferment by brevet, but his intellectual accomplishments (he passed first of his 
term out of Woolwich) led to his appointment as Professor of Military History at 
Sandhurst at the age of thirty. He subsequently held the same position at the Staff 
College, and his biographer in the DNB records that, in addition to revolutionising 
teaching methods there, he came to be accepted as the foremost military writer of his day. 
These talents did not go unrecognised. He was appointed a member of the Northbrook 
Commission on Military Education of 1868-70, was sent officially to report on the 
Franco-German War and was closely involved with Cardwell's structural reforms. His 
promotion to brevet Colonel in 1873 was perhaps a rather belated acknowledgment of his 
contribution, but it was directly related to his appointment to command the engineers of 
the Home District, in which post he died at the early age of forty-nine. 
Henry Brackenbury, one of the able batch of schoolboys selected for accelerated 
commissioning in the artillery during the Crimean War, 
73 had earned a reputation for 
`remarkable ability' and was Professor of Military History at Woolwich by the time that 
Wolseley selected him as his military secretary for the Ashanti campaign in 1873.74 As a 
favoured member of the Wolseley `ring', he saw service in Cyprus, Zululand and the 
Sudan, as well as brief spells doing humanitarian work in France during the Franco- 
German War, as private secretary to the Viceroy of India, military attache in Pans and 
(unhappily) as under-secretary for crime in Ireland, before his key appointment as head of 
the Intelligence Department between 1886 and 1891. This was followed by five years as 
military member of the Viceroy's Council, three as President of the 
Ordnance 
Committee, and finally in the crucial post of Director General of Ordnance throughout 
the 2nd Boer War. 
73 See page 38, footnote 47and appendix Al. 
74 Wolseley, The Story, vol. 2,280. Curiously, Wolseley says that Brackenbury was a stranger at 
the time, 
though he recorded that Brackenbury, like himself, was one of the officers who worked 
closely with 
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His older brother Charles served in the Crimea as a Lieutenant in the artillery 
without furthering his prospects by brevet promotion. He did secure a position as 
Assistant Instructor of Artillery Studies at Woolwich in 1860, but did not gain promotion 
to the rank of Major until 1872, when he was forty and had served for twenty-one years. 
However, his intellectual qualities had been noted, and he was brought into the 
Intelligence Branch of the War Office two years later. Promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel 
soon followed, at the age of forty-four and after twenty-five years' service, and he was 
now in a position to wield some influence, partly through his writings and partly through 
the series of responsible posts to which he succeeded; Superintending Officer of Garrison 
Instruction at Aldershot, Superintendent of the Gunpowder factory at Waltham Abbey, 
Director of Artillery Studies at Woolwich, and finally Director of the Artillery College 
(and a Major-General). 
What the careers of these officers demonstrate is that there was more than one way 
to achieve a distinguished career in the service. Patronage and family connections 
undoubtedly played their part. The interest of a powerful patron was often instrumental in 
launching a young man's military career, 75 but once in the regimental system his progress 
was governed by seniority, modified by the power of the purse if he was in a branch of 
the service where purchase was possible. However, when a campaign at any distance 
from the shores of Britain was in contemplation, there was some scope for a local 
commander to encourage the development of young officers who had caught his eye, by 
ensuring that the posts in his personal `family', and to a large extent his General Staff, 
were his own choice. This was how rising stars like Wolseley and Roberts were able to 
collect round them the groups of able proteges who came to be known as their 'Rings'. 
The friendship, coherence in approach to military affairs and continued patronage of their 
chief which such cliques enjoyed considerably strengthened the impact of their views on 
the establishment as they progressed up the ladder of seniority, despite the jealousies 
Cardwell. Ibid, 255. Equally strangely, he does not mention Charles Chesney in the list of those who 
worked with Cardwell. 
75 Wolseley's sponsorship by Wellington (Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley, 3) and the support which the 
Earl of Derby gave his illegitimate nephew Burgoyne (DNB) are cases 
in point. 
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which their favoured status (and the animosities between one clique and another) 
generated. 
This undoubtedly eased the paths of men like Henry Brackenbury and Frederick 
Maurice, but it must not be overlooked that it had been their own talents which had 
brought them to the attention of their patrons in the first place. Some instances from 
Brackenbury's early career, when he was still a Captain, illustrate this. While he was in 
France during the war of 1870-71 he made the acquaintance of the Duke of Cambridge's 
oldest son George. When this undistinguished soldier wrote a little monograph called 
Plan of the Battle of Sedan in 1871 he sent Brackenbury two copies, accompanied by a 
fulsome letter of thanks for Brackenbury's `kindness at Metz'. 76 More significantly, in 
1872 he was called upon to deliver a series of instructive lectures to the Duke of 
Connaught (also a Captain, but aged twenty one as against Brackenbury's thirty four), 
noted with favour by the Queen, and the following year he gave the crucial lecture at 
RUSI ` 
.... on the changes which the Franco-German War had shown to be needed in the 
tactics of our army' . 
77 
Family connections certainly helped to create and disseminate a common attitude, 
and appendix A3 takes the immediate circle of General Sir Robert Biddulph as an 
illustration of how wide the tentacles of such relationships could be. Another powerful 
example would be the Royal Family. The Duke of Cambridge's connections were 
touched on earlier in this chapter. His cousin the Duke of Connaught, a dedicated soldier, 
benefited from his association with the best minds in the army, such as Wolseley and 
Brackenbury, throughout his career, but he also had the advantage of close relationship 
with two of the most professional officers in the Prussian army, his father-in-law Prince 
Friedrich Carl and his brother-in-law the Prussian Crown Prince. 
76 The text of this letter, which the present writer came across inside the cover of a copy of the monograph, 
is reproduced in appendix B2. 
77 Brackenbury, Henry, Some Memories of My Spare Time (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1909), 216-7,219-22. . 
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Such international connections were not the prerogative of princes only. Four of the 
commoners in the base group were educated abroad, and significant numbers spent much 
of their leisure time travelling on the continent, often to visit relations. Even General 
Ainslie, archetype of the `unprofessional' and reactionary soldier, seized every 
opportunity to exploit his connections to see how European armies conducted 
themselves, 78 while the young Kitchener was very gently rebuked by Cambridge for 
taking time out to serve in the French army in 1870.79 
It is difficult to assess the impact of such connections, but Grierson, for example, 
has left on record the importance of the influence of his continental travels on his future 
career. 8° It is easier to evaluate the contribution of those officers whose experience of 
foreign armies arose more directly from their employment. 
Officers on detached duty. Some parts of the army, notably the Royal Artillery and the 
Royal Engineers, regularly sent small groups of promising officers to visit their opposite 
numbers in foreign armies, and report on what they had learned. 81 What is surprising is 
the extent to which such missions were welcomed, and how much valuable information 
they were readily given. When campaigns were in progress, the level of such activity was 
naturally raised. RA Preston and Jay Luvaas have recorded in interesting detail the swarm 
of British officers who were sent to the United States during the Civil War, and the extent 
to which they were made free of American techniques and thinking at a time when it was 
quite possible that Britain and the Federal Government would find themselves at war. 
82 
These two authors also looked in detail at the large number of British officers who 
took the opportunity to see the Civil War at first hand, by making private visits while on 
78 See page 242. 
79 DNB. 
80 Macdiarmid, 9-18. 
81 See, for example, `Report of a professional tour of Officers of the Royal Artillery 
in 1868', PRO 
W033/21a, `Report to the Adjutant General to the Forces, 8 October 1869 by General WJ Codrington', 
`Report by JH Ker Inns, DIG of Hospitals, on the medico-military organization of Prussia.... ', and 
`Reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Chesney, RE, and Major Stotherd, RE, commencing 21 June 1871', all 
in PRO WO 33/24. 
82 Preston, RA, `Military Lessons of the American Civil War', Army Quarterly, vol. 65, 
Jan. 1953,229-37. 
Luvaas, Jay, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940, 
(London, Cassell, 1965). 
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leave. Garnet Wolseley was the most prominent of these men, but there were many 
others, usually from the garrison in the Canadian provinces, and it would be interesting to 
learn more about the extent to which their unofficial wanderings had been actively 
encouraged by higher command. There is little evidence that what they learned found its 
way into the official records, but in the long run the influence of what they saw is easily 
discernible in the subsequent writings and arguments of men like MacDougall, Denison 
and Wolseley himself; and the last named, at least, began to put his ideas into the public 
domain immediately. 83 
Military writers. The continental wars were more accessible, and British officers sought 
for opportunities, official or unofficial, to get to the seat of the action whenever war 
broke out. In many cases they had been retained by newspapers, but, whether or not this 
was the case, their analysis of what they had seen usually appeared reasonably promptly 
in the pages of the periodicals, and later chapters of this work will include many extracts. 
Meanwhile, mention should be made of two books by British officers on the Austro- 
Prussian War. HM Hozier's `The Seven Weeks' War' and WJ Wyatt's `A Political and 
Military Review of the Austro-Italian War of 1866' made their appearance while the 
campaigns were still very much in the forefront of military thinking. 84 
The 1866 war produced two serious works of military analysis from a serving 
Prussian officer, which quickly appeared in England in Colonel Ouvry's translation, as 
The Campaign of 1866: A Tactical Retrospect and On the Prussian Infantry 1869. They 
were published anonymously, and initially there was speculation that they might be the 
work of one of the senior Prussian generals, but it was soon established that the author 
was Hauptmann May, a company commander in the 44"' (East Prussian) Infantry 
Regiment. Ouvey also translated the riposte which May's writings had provoked from 85 
83 Wolseley, Garnet J, `A month's visit to the Confederate headquarters', Blackwood's, vol. 43, Jan., 1863, 
1-29. 
84 Hozier, HM, The Seven Weeks' War, (London, Macmillan, 1867). 2°d ed. 1907. 
Wyatt, WJ, A Political and Military Review of the Austro-Italian War of 1866, (London, Stanford, 1867). 
85 Theodor Robert May, born in Kassel, 27 June 1836, killed in action at Amiens, 27 November 1870. He 
had attended the Kriegsakadamie and been attached to the Grosser Generalstab, and was described in his 
regimental history as ` .... the unforgettable 
Capt. May, model of a dedicated and outstandingly brave 
.... 
im Regiment unvergessliche Hptm. Prussian officer, and one destined for a glittering military career' (' 
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Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf, on behalf of the Prussian General Staff. The 
significance of these works will be discussed in the section on tactics in chapter five. 
The Franco-German War generated a prodigious amount of analytical writing. 
Comparatively little appeared in book form from the pens of British soldiers, but there 
was a flood of serious articles in the magazines and journals, and much of the material in 
later chapters illustrating contemporary British thinking will be drawn from this source. 
The books which were designed to stimulate thinking were, on the whole, another 
batch of translations by British officers of books by foreign, usually German, soldiers. 
The first of these works was actually the official German account of the previous war, 
The Campaign of 1866 in Germany, translated by Captain H Hozier in collaboration with 
Colonel von Wright (chief of staff of the VIIIth Prussian corps), and published in 1872 
under the aegis of the Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office. The 
monumental official German record of The Franco-German War of 1870-71 (translated 
by Captain FCH Clarke, RA, and issued by the new Intelligence Branch of the War 
Office) began to appear in 1876, and, if it achieved nothing else, the detailed study of its 
pages gave Colonel Lonsdale Hale the inspiration for his life's work. 
A work which made a greater impact on British thinking appeared in 1874. This 
was Albrecht von Boguslawski's Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, 
translated by Colonel Lumley Graham and published in London by HS King. This book 
was reissued in America in 1996, by the Absinthe Press, after being out of print for many 
years (reproducing the second edition of Graham's translation), but it is disappointing to 
find that his preface, which ran to twenty-two pages of analysis of the main points in the 
text, has been omitted. 
May, das Muster eines preussichen pflichttreuen und hervorragend tapferen Offiziers, dem noch eine 
glänzende militärische Zukunft winkte. ). Hoffmann, Traugott und 
Ernst Hahn, Geschichte des Infanterie- 
Regiments Graf Dönhoff (7. Ostpreussichen) Nr. 44 1860-1918 (Berlin, Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Rolf, 
1930), 30,413. 
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Another work of great importance in directing British thinking to the military 
revolution taking place in Europe was the appearance in translation of the reports of 
Baron Eugene Stoffel. This perceptive officer was the imperial French military attache in 
Berlin in the years leading up to the Franco-German War, and he sent regular reports to 
his masters in Paris, trying to alert them to the realities of the Prussian military 
developments and warning them of the threat to France. There is some doubt about how 
much attention his reports commanded in Paris, 86 but they were swiftly made available to 
the British army, and Lieutenant CEH Vincent was able to translate them for publication 
in Fraser's Magazine in November and December 1871.87 Vincent's short introduction 
contains some hard hitting material, considering that he was a twenty-two year old 
subaltern at the time, and this reinforces the view that bright young officers, far from 
being squashed if they dared to open their mouths, were sometimes encouraged to speak 
their minds. 
The wars in the Balkans in the late 1870s generated a literature of their own. 
Initially at least the British public were given the views of foreign professionals again. 
First, the Russian general Todleben's reports on the siege of Plevna appeared in full 
translation in the proceedings of both the Royal Artillery Institution and the Royal 
Engineers, the translators being Lieutenant JM Grierson, RA, and Captain GT Plunkett, 
RE. 88 One other foreign soldier's narrative of this war, published originally in New York 
in 1879, was produced in a British edition by WH Allen in 1880. This was the account by 
Lieutenant FV Greene, US Army, of The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey, 
1877-78. This work, published by order of the American Secretary of War, was of 
sufficient literary and analytical merit to attract immediate attention on 
both sides of the 
Atlantic, and is still used as a textbook in the training of American officers. 
89 
86 Bond , 
Victorian Army, ch. 1,36. Craig, Gordon, The Politics of the Prussian Army 
(Oxford, OUP, 
1972), 259-60. 
Brackenbury, CB, `The intelligence duties of the staff abroad and at 
home', JRUSI, vol. 19,1876,258. 
87 Vincent, CEH, `Reports on the military forces of Prussia and the North 
German Confederation, 1868-70' 
Fraser's, Nov. 1871,537-62 and Dec. 1871,671-94. Subsequently published 
in book form by Longmans. 
88 Proc RAI, vol. 10,1877, and PPRE, vol. 2,1878. 
89 The present writer is indebted to Dr. Robert 
Foley, late of the United States Marine Corps, for this fact. 
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One question which this study must address is how much influence these works 
had on British military thinking at the time. The detailed aspects are discussed in later 
chapters before an answer is hazarded, but the fact that such works were made available 
to British readers quickly and with apparent official support does suggest that there was a 
positive concern to find out what lessons might be learnt. There is direct evidence of this. 
In April and May 1878 Colonel Edward Clive, Grenadier Guards (a future Commandant 
of the Staff College), delivered two important lectures at the Royal United Service 
Institution. The subject was `On the influence of breech-loading arms on tactics, and the 
supply of ammunition in the field i. 90 The audience was formidable; Wolseley was in the 
chair, and contributors to the discussion which followed the second lecture included 
General Sir William Codrington, Lieut. -General Beauchamp Walker, Colonel Sir Lumley 
Graham, Lieut. -Colonel CB Brackenbury, Lieut. - Colonel Lonsdale Hale and Mr. CB 
Norman. 
The vigour of the discussion is significant in itself, because it shows that 
influential soldiers were anxious to debate the lessons of the continental wars, even if 
they could not readily agree on how these should be applied to the variety of problems 
which perennially confronted the British army. Clive made the point himself by declaring 
roundly: 
Many of the works that I refer to, such as those of von Scherf, von 
Boguslawski, von Verdy du Vernois, and of the late Captain May, have 
been translated into English, and are not only largely read throughout the 
Army, but are largely quoted by distinguished officers; and even form text- 
books at our military schools, colleges, and academies, and the arguments 
and views advocated in those works are now used in the daily 
newspapers. 91 
Military attaches. In 1865 a new category of British soldier appeared. This was the 
military attache, whose raison d'etre was specifically to provide the government with 
intelligence about foreign armies, and to foresee potential military threats. Verner, in his 
biography of the Duke of Cambridge, gives the Commander-in-Chief the full credit for 
90 Clive, Colonel E, `On the influence of breech-loading arms on tactics, and the supply of ammunition in 
the field', JRUSI, vol. 22, part 1,12 April 1878 and part 2,10 May 1878. 
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this innovation, citing a letter from HRH to Lord de Grey on 8 March 1864, in which he 
presses for such posts. Verner claims that the first appointments followed on 13 April 
1864 (sic); so `(i)t is interesting to know that HRH's efforts on this occasion were not 
without avail'. 92 However, Verner seems to have got the year wrong here, since the 
Foreign Office List says that the appointments of Walker to Berlin and Foley to Vienna 
were gazetted on 26 April 1865. Verner's comment is the more puzzling in that he was 
perfectly well aware, as the preceding pages of the biography make clear, that the subject 
had been under serious consideration for three years or more. 93 
The Prussians are credited with having invented the role of military attache in the 
aftermath of the Jena campaign. Their subsequent history has been described in Gordon 
Craig's long article, `Military diplomats in the Prussian and German service: the 
Attaches, 1816-1914' in the American Political Science Quarterly (vol. 64,1949) and in 
Lothar Hilbert's unpublished thesis, `The role of military and naval attaches in the British 
and German service.... ' (Cambridge PhD, 1954). 
Governments had long been in the habit of sending special representatives, often 
called commissioners, to observe particular activities. Colonel Claremont, who was one 
of the first batch of British officers to be given the official title of military attache, had in 
fact been appointed military commissioner in Paris as long before that as September 
1855. He had accompanied the French armies in the Crimea, and in Italy in 1859 (having 
been redesignated Attache on Special Service at Paris in October 1858), so his new title 
did not betoken any obvious change in duties. Similarly, Brigadier-General Rose had 
been the Queen's Commissioner at the headquarters of the French Army of the East 
in1854, and Major the Hon. St. George Foley was first his ADC, and subsequently 
Assistant Commissioner and then Commissioner in China in 1860.94 
91 Ibid, 815. 
92 Verner, Colonel W, The Military Life of HRH George, Duke of Cambridge, 2 vols. (London, Murray, 
1905), vol. I, 362. 
93 See reference to memo. to Sir George Lewis, 20 Oct. 1862, 
below. 
94 Foreign Office List, 1880. 
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These appointments had been made on an ad hoc basis, and there had been 
increasing pressure to put the collection of military intelligence onto a more business-like 
footing, culminating in the establishment of a Select Committee `to enquire into the 
constitution and efficiency of the present diplomatic service', including this issue. 95 One 
piece of evidence which they considered was a report from Colonel Cadogan in Turin, 
dated 13 May 1860, recommending `.... a system based on the employment of military 
officers permanently attached to our different embassies and legations', 96 and this was 
taken up by the committee when they reported on 23 July 1861. Recommendation 15 
read ` that military personages should be attached to the chief missions, in the manner 
recommended in the report of Colonel Cadogan'. 
Two points of interest arise from this document. The first is that the title of military 
attache was already in use; appendix 4, which contained statements taken from `Her 
Majesty's Diplomatic Servants', refers to Colonel Claremont, Captain EG Hore, RN, and 
Major General FW Hamilton as, respectively, military attache, Paris, naval attache, Paris, 
and military attache, Berlin. But the use of the name is not in itself important. The 
significance was that henceforth such appointments were to be made on a routine basis, 
not as a response to some special circumstance. 
The second point was of more serious consequence. Cadogan had recommended 
`(t)hat the correspondence between these military missions and Government be carried on 
as hitherto, through Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but 
with a direct communication under flying seal with the War Office also'. This was 
intended, as he said, to preserve direct communication between the War Office and the 
officers in question, but it turned out to be a contentious issue. The Foreign Office were 
anxious to ensure that their management of the country's relationships with other powers 
should not be circumvented, and insisted that all reports from military attaches should be 
made, in the first instance, to their head of mission. Unfortunately for the War Office, the 
Commander-in-Chief had inadvertently given the diplomats the means of ensuring that 
95 Report of 23 July 1861, Parliamentary Papers. 
96 Ibid. Appendix 9. 
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they would get their way. In a memorandum to Sir George Lewis on 20 October 1862, 
referring to the need for a military attache in Berlin, he had said that it was vital that 
`... the expense of this post must not be thrown on the War Department. It is a political 
and not a mere military appointment, according to my view of the case.... ' . 
(This 
memorandum is quoted by Verner, which must raise the question of why he claimed that 
the 1864 letter was what triggered the development. 97) Accordingly, until 1872 the 
salaries of the military attaches were met from the Diplomatic fund, and he who pays the 
piper calls the tune. In the end, Major Brackenbury's report of November 1874, on the 
departments of foreign staffs corresponding with the Intelligence Branch of the 
Quartermaster General's department, put forward the sensible compromise that, while the 
principle of Foreign Office routing was incontestable, in the end the right course of action 
must be for the military attache to use his own tact and judgement. 98 
Appendix B1 shows the names of the principal military attaches during this period. 
Their ability to perform their function seems to have varied with time. During the 1860s 
there was a general openness in the sharing of military information. What Stoffel was 
able to report to his government has already been described, and the British attaches were 
similarly able to travel where they would and discuss details of armaments and 
organisation with local commanders. 99 This freedom of access was sharply curtailed 
in 1870 (though Brackenbury had noticed signs of a change in attitude three years 
earlier). 100 When hostilities broke out both the French and Prussian governments declared 
that no foreigners of any kind were to be allowed to accompany the armies. 
'°' In the 
event, these rules were relaxed a little. Favoured officers such as Colonel Walker were 
welcomed at army headquarters on the German side, and others found their way to the 
action on both sides, some as correspondents for the papers, others in a variety of semi- 
official positions. It must also be noted that military attaches at the chief 
European 
97 Verner, vol. 1,361. 
98 PRO W033/28,1876, and PRO WO 147/23. 
99 See, for example, Colonel Walker's memo. on `Prussian Army transport arrangements', 
PRO WO33/17a, 
1866 and Colonel Crealock's `Report on the new Austrian military train', 
PRO W03 3/19,1868. 
100 Brackenbury, Henry, `The military armaments of the five Great Powers', 
St. Paul's, vol 1,1867,183. 
101 Enclosure with letter from Lord Lyons in Paris to Earl 
Granville, 19 July 1870, and the same from Lord 
A Loftus in Berlin, 30 July 1870, both in State Papers, vol. 60,1869-70. 
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capitals at this time enjoyed a totally different status from that which is normal for their 
modern counterparts. Then, royal courts in Prussia, Austria, Russia and imperial France 
were also military headquarters, because of the direct relationship between monarch and 
army. This made it possible for personal acquaintance between attaches and members of 
royal families to blossom occasionally into personal friendships. '02 
After the war was over, however, continental sensitivity to the activities of the 
attaches continued to diminish their effectiveness, particularly in Berlin, and Walker was 
withdrawn from the German embassy in 1876.103 Hilbert points out that by then the 
British ambassador, Odo Russell, had largely usurped Walker's function as a result of his 
close relationship with Bismarck. 104 
Beauchamp Walker continued to take a keen interest in the organisation of the 
army. In October 1878 he was writing in Macmillan 's on `Compulsory or voluntary 
service', '05 with many details of German practice, and there are frequent references to his 
interventions in the debates at RUSI, and no doubt his subsequent employment in the post 
of Director of Military Education reinforced the respect with which his opinions were 
received. '06 
There were also military attaches in the embassies in London. One of these, the 
French attache in London in the early 1870s, has left a fascinating account of the British 
land forces. 107 This short book is interesting on three counts; its detailed description of 
the army; its generally admiring tone, particularly when comparing the British service 
102 The friendship between Walker and the Prussian Crown Prince is well attested by Walker's reports, and 
another example is the relationship which developed between the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef and the 
young Lieutenant Kitchener. See George, Sir Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, 3 vols. (London, Macmillan, 
1920), vol. 1,12. 
103 PRO FO 64/827,850 and 868. He was replaced in 1878 by Colonel Methuen. 
104 Hilbert, 42, but see 48 for his view that military attaches at `military' courts sometimes continued to 
enjoy special favours. 
lo Macmillan's, vol. 38, Oct. 1878,452-8. 
106 See, for example, JRUSI, vol. 22, (5 April 1878), 394-6 and (12 April 1878), 841. 
logy Mandat-Grancey, M de, (Capitaine de Cavalerie, Attache Militaire A Londres), L Armee Anglaise avant 
sa Reorganisation (Paris, Librairie militaire de J Dumaine, 1873). 
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with his own; the contrast between its appraisal of the quality of the army and the 
assessments being made at the time, and since, by domestic critics. 
Where ideas were floated. Some soldiers wrote for the papers. . 
The tradition of 
publishing soldiers' reports went back at least to the Peninsular war, and since then 
editors had been in the habit of paying serving officers to write to them from the field. 
Delane and Dasent were happy to extend this practice to the coverage of the continental 
wars; Henry Hozier was commissioned to report on the Schleswig-Holstein War of 
1864,108 and he acted as Russell's counterpart in 1866 - Russell with the Austrian army 
and Hozier with the Prussians. The Times wished to send both Henry Hozier and his 
brother John, another serving officer, to the Franco-German War, but this time the British 
Government intervened, placing a strict embargo on serving or half-pay officers leaving 
the country - to Delane's scorn. `Our ministers are in such a pitiable funk that I believe 
they sit in Cabinet on close stools. ' 109 
In the end, this ban does not seem to have been rigorously applied. Colonel Kit 
Pemberton, a colleague of Russell's for The Times, was killed at Sedan, and several 
younger serving officers, including Captain Henry Brackenbury, who was writing for the 
Standard, and Captain Nolan, correspondent of the Daily News, reached the scene of 
action. "0 Henry Hozier also got there eventually, but he seems to have been despatched 
by the War Office less as a correspondent than in order to keep an eye on Colonel 
Beauchamp Walker, who was attached to the headquarters of the Prussian Crown Prince. 
Walker was indignant, and commented vigorously in letters to his wife. 111 He did not care 
108 Hanson, Alan, Man of Wars: William Howard Russell of The Times (London, Heinemann, 1982), 
193. 
109 Delane to Russell, probably 18 July 1870. Quoted in Hankinson, 212 
110 Brackenbury, General the Right Hon. Sir Henry, Some Memories of my Spare Time (Edinburgh, 
Blackwood, 1909), 89. 
111 For a typical example see Walker, General Sir CP Beauchamp, Days of a 
Soldier's Life (London, 
Chapman & Hall, 1894), 343. 
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for war correspondents, and one of his objections to Hozier was the latter's continuing 
association with them. ' 12 
The attitude of the military establishment to these journalistic activities seems to 
have varied from time to time. Brackenbury later said that they had been jeopardising 
their military careers. `And it had better at once be stated that at this time (the late 1860s) 
officers who wrote for the papers were not viewed favourably at the Headquarters of the 
army. ' 113 Still, he and his brother both did it, and their careers do not seem to have 
suffered. In fact, the more political of the rising generation of soldiers, and Wolseley in 
particular, began to appreciate the advantages of having their campaigns described by 
sympathetic pens. 
Wolseley positively encouraged the members of his staff to form connections with 
the press, and this helped to present his campaigns to the public in the best possible light. 
Russell was not impressed. At the end of the Zulu War in January 1880, at a time when 
he was admittedly at odds with Wolseley, he wrote to his editor, savagely denouncing the 
employment of staff officers as correspondents. `It is absolutely impossible to expect 
honest criticism, uncoloured statements, or even full information from men whose career 
and position are at the mercy of those whose acts and conduct they are called on to 
chronicle and analyse. ' 114 
This criticism did not apply to their comments on continental armies. The reports of 
these wars by soldier journalists undoubtedly made a significant contribution to change 
in British military thought, and their employment by the papers gave them the 
opportunity both to witness the events and hone their literary skills, though it will be 
argued in later chapters that it was generally through other means that they were able to 
exercise their influence most fruitfully. 
112 Walker to Earl Granville (privately), 6 and 7 Jan. 1871. However, his official letter of 9 Jan. does 
acknowledge Hozier's literary skill. PRO FO 64/729. 
113 Brackenbury, Some Memories, 57. 
114 Atkins, 294-5. 
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Two special cases - The Illustrated London News and the Pall Mall Gazette 
The Illustrated London News was launched in May 1842 by Henry and Frank 
Vizetelly, two professional wood-block engravers. One of its features was that, as a 
weekly publication, it was able to offer summaries of what the daily papers had been 
reporting, and it was of course lavishly illustrated. It provided a forum for the promotion 
of the (broadly liberal) issues of which it approved, and this included strong support for 
the Volunteer movement. Unfortunately, the way that it sometimes expressed its opinions 
was unlikely to find favour with the military establishment. Professional soldiers were on 
the whole pleased to see the Volunteers encouraged, but they did not relish being told that 
an army of Volunteers, `composed of the best blood in the British Isles', was fully 
capable of holding its own against the conscript armies of the continent, at minimal cost, 
and that its officers, up to the rank of colonel, should be elected by their men. l 15 
Moreover, it proved to be undiscriminating in repeating titbits which it picked up from 
other sources, and presenting rumours as facts. ' 16 
The Pall Mall Gazette operated on an altogether higher plane, in terms of accuracy, 
analysis and style. This remarkable evening paper was launched in 1865 by Frederick 
Greenwood, who had previously edited the monthly Cornhill, and George Murray Smith, 
the distinguished publisher and progenitor of the Dictionary of National Biography. Its 
stated objectives were ` .... to support the 
Liberal Government under Lord Palmerston; at 
the same time we were to be faithful to our purpose of independent criticism-). 
117 `Its tone 
has from the first been aristocratic, the tone of the club window, of the smoking room, of 
the House of Commons and of the drawing room. ' 118 
1 15 Illustrated London News, 21 May 1859,481-2 in bound volume. 
116 Two typical examples from the campaign in Italy in 1859. Its account of Montebello reported the 
death 
in action of the Austrian General Benedek (28 May) and, when describing Solferino, 
it said the same of the 
French Generals Baraguay d'Hilliers, Leboeuf and Niel, with touching detail about how the last had 
expired in his Emperor's arms (2 July). 
11 Smith, GM, quoted in Robertson Scott, JW, The Story of the Pall Mall Gazette (London, 
OUP, 1950), 
128. 
118 Ibid, 126, quoting Charles Pebody's English Journalism, 1882. 
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The fact that Pall Mall came out in the afternoon relieved it of the immediate 
pressure of competing with the other dailies to be first with the news. Instead, it could 
afford to be more analytical, and the calibre of its correspondents was sufficient to ensure 
that attention was paid to what appeared in its columns. Smith claimed that it ` .... 
had a 
greater influence on public opinion than any other paper save The Times', and 
Greenwood, the first editor, considered that he . ... occupied a place of power, at least 
equal to half a dozen seats in Parliament' . 
119 
Its analytical discussions of military matters were notably well informed. Friedrich 
Engels, who had in his youth served as a Freiwillige (a volunteer cadet) in the Prussian 
artillery, was a regular contributor in this sphere, using the letter `Z' as his usual 
signature. Many of the more technical articles were not signed. Over the years, the 
contributions relating to artillery, small arms and ammunition had a particularly 
authoritative air, and Engels may have been their inspiration, but, if he was not, the editor 
must have had access to someone with good professional connections. The value of these 
contributions will be seen more than once in the chapters which follow. 
The Periodicals 
The middle years of the nineteenth century witnessed an explosion in the number of 
periodical journals, which parallels that of the newspapers. Their circulations never 
approached those of the dailies; Cornhill and Macmillan 's, the biggest selling of the 
monthlies, appear to have averaged less than 20,000 each in 1870, and the best of the 
quarterlies less than 10,000; but they were designed for a different audience, and a large 
proportion found their way to clubs, libraries, common rooms and messes, where they 
could be read by many. 120 
'19Ibid, 140,4. 
120 Figures from Woolven, Robin, `The periodical Press and the Question of National Defence 1868-1872', 
unpublished MA dissertation, (London, 1982), 28. 
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For the present purpose they may be classified into three broad groupings; the 
literary magazines, the professional journals and a handful of specialist outlets for the 
airing of military and naval concerns. 
Literary magazines. The readership was understood to be the educated and professional 
upper and middle classes, those who could be expected to have the leisure to consider 
analytical arguments in some detail and who might have a say in how the country's 
institutions were to be run. Most of these periodicals were not specialised. There were 
regular articles on travel, aesthetics and philosophical subjects, and most made a feature 
of serialising new works of fiction; but they did also address matters of the utmost public 
concern, and this frequently included articles about national defence and the security of 
the nation. In fact, between 1859 and 1880 the magazines referred to in the list in 
appendix B1 printed altogether some four hundred articles about military matters, and 
most of these were in response to the stirring events which were happening on the 
continent. 
It was the custom in many of these periodicals for the authors to remain, in theory 
at least, anonymous, but an informed public was understood to be capable of identifying 
many of those responsible for the most important contributions. Recent researchers have 
benefited in this respect from the detailed work of the compiler of the Wellesley Index, 
and a note about this resource is in appendix B 1. 
Professional Institutions and their journals. For those who took a professional interest in 
the development of military thinking several institutions had been established to provide 
a forum for discussion and the formulation of policy. The most prominent of these bodies 
was The Royal United Service Institution, which met fortnightly to hear and discuss 
professional papers on military and naval affairs. Its journal regularly recorded and 
circulated the proceedings of these meetings, along with reviews of books and other 
professional information. The meetings were usually well attended, the participants were 
officers of distinction in their services and interested civilians, and the quality of the 
debate was high. It is noteworthy that on many occasions the Duke of Cambridge, as 
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President, took the chair, and in his absence the chairman would be of the calibre of 
General Sir William Codrington, Sir Montague Steele or Sir Garnet Wolseley. 
The high quality of the discussions is worthy of comment, because this was a forum 
in which young professional soldiers with their reputations to make, men such as the 
Brackenbury brothers, Charles Chesney, Henry Hozier, EB Hamley, Lonsdale Hale and 
Robert Home, could make points to the most senior officers in the army, argue with them, 
learn from their experience and develop the contacts which would enable them, in their 
turn, to move on to high rank and responsibility. 
The Royal Artillery Institution and its companion body in the other scientific corps, 
the Royal Engineers, provided a similar service of a more specialised nature, and their 
proceedings were also regularly circulated amongst their officers. There was of course a 
considerable degree of cross-fertilisation (for example Lieutenant Colonel CC Chesney, 
RE, delivered a lecture to the RA Institution on 13 December 1870, on `The reform of 
Prussian tactics') but their main purpose was to provide for the continuing professional 
education of the officers of their own corps. Colonel Wilbraham Lennox's Preface to a 
Series of Publications for Royal Engineer Officers, in June 1875, set out these objectives 
with commendable clarity, and the enthusiastic response is a good indication of the 
professional interest of that body. 121 
The published proceedings of these two institutions demonstrate the degree of their 
interest in what was going on in Europe. To take one typical example, the Professional 
Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers for 1878 contain eighteen papers; of these, 
eleven relate to the activities of continental armies, and the variety of topics is instructive; 
- Firing tests at Spezzia, translated by Lieut. -Colonel 
Maquay, RE 
- Organisation of the Imperial Russian Engineers, translated 
from the German by 
Captain J Gore Booth, RE 
- On entrenchments, by Major-General 
Bainbrigge, RE, incorporating extracts 
translated by him from Lieut. -General von Hanneken's `Remarks on the Russo- 
Turkish War' 
121 Illustration 8 and page 243. 
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- Report of General Todleben on the investment of Plevna and surrender of the 
Turkish army, November 28,1877 (OS), translated from the Russian by 
Captain GT Plunkett, RE 
- The third battle of Plevna, September 7-12,1877, part I, translated from the 
French by Captain GT Plunkett, RE 
- Ditto, part II, translated by Lieut. AO Green, RE 
- Personal equipment, by Captain T Fraser, RE, relating to his experience in 
European and Asiatic Turkey 
- Reminiscences of the campaign in Armenia, by Captain H Trotter, RE 
- The entrenched camp of Plevna, translated from the French by Captain C 
Woodward, RE 
- Extracts from `Instruction sur le service de l 'artillerie dans un siege, 1876' , 
translated by Captain T Fraser, RE 
-A letter from General Todleben to General Brialmont, on the defence of Plevna, 
translated from the French by Captain JW Savage, RE. 122 
The specialist military magazines. The most notable of these were The United Service 
Gazette, Colburn's United Service Magazine and The Naval and Military Gazette, which 
Hew Strachan has described as `extremely virulent professional publications' . 
123 These 
publications flourished throughout the years which concern this study. They were the 
trade journals of the period. On the whole they provided an admirable forum for serving 
officers to discuss details of administration or general interest at regimental level, and to 
air their grievances about pay and promotional prospects. Amongst this plethora of 
domestic detail there were occasional attempts to address matters of more elevated 
importance, and some of these occasions will be referred to in later chapters, but, as was 
pointed out at the time, circulation was confined to a limited professional body, and their 
influence on the people in a position to make decisions was not powerful. 
122 Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, vol. 2 (Chatham, Royal Engineer Institute, 1878). 
The linguistic skills of officers like Plunkett are worthy of note. The Royal Artillery could demonstrate 
similar accomplishments; the eighteen year old Lieut. Grierson translated Todleben for the RAI the same 
year. (see page 44). The value of the work of these, and other similarly gifted, officers will be seen 
in all 
the later chapters of this study. 
6R 
When it comes to specific issues, therefore, the daily newspapers and the specialist 
journals for regimental officers were certainly less important in creating the climates of 
opinion within the circles which counted than the periodicals, proceedings and 
institutions which have been described. Between them, these last were the mechanisms 
through which those with specialised knowledge, and indeed anyone who felt that they 
had something valuable to contribute, could make their views known at a level where 
they could exert some influence. Material of this kind, supported as it usually was by 
detailed analysis and developed at length, made more impact on the decision-makers than 
anything which appeared in the daily press. 
Commissions and Committees The pressure of events, whether crises of anxiety about 
the defence of the realm, conflicts of interest between the champions of the navy and the 
army for resources, or the endless desire of ministers to reduce the amount of the nation's 
money which the forces absorbed, resulted in an almost continuous succession of Royal 
Commissions, Parliamentary and Special Committees to examine one or another aspect 
of the army's structure. In 1859 Promotion and Retirement in the Army had just been the 
subject of one Royal Commission (HC 1857-8, xxix, 241), and this was followed 
immediately by others to examine the Militia (HC 1859, ix, 5), Defences (HC 1860, xxiii, 
431) and Recruitment (HC 1861, xv). Throughout the next twenty years the flow 
continued, culminating, for the purposes of this study, in the appointment by the 
Secretary of State of a Committee of General and other Officers of the Army on Army 
Re-organization under the presidency of Lord Airey (PP 1881, xxi, c279 1), which 
reported in March 1880. 
The amount of evidence presented to these bodies was formidable, and 
demonstrates the concern of those involved to learn all that they could from practice in 
other countries. The 1870 Commission on Military Education (HC 1870, xxv, 
223-602), 
for example, not only recorded long and detailed reports from the military attaches 
in the 
123`The early Victorian army and the nineteenth century revolution 
in government', EHR, vol. 95,1980, 
786. 
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European capitals but sent the secretary, Lieutenant John Hozier, to Paris and Berlin to 
accumulate more information. 
How much effect this continuing activity had on the way that the British army was 
organised, equipped and trained will be the business of the following chapters, which 
examine the individual issues in turn. 
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Chapter 3 Changing Technologies 
This chapter will examine the reactions of the British army to the effects which 
technological advances were inducing in other armies. It will not be possible to include every 
area of technology in the survey, because the field is so wide, and the chapter will 
concentrate on those areas where the impact of technical change was most strongly felt; 
fortification, railways, telegraphs and signalling systems, artillery, machine guns and small 
arms. Matters relating to health and hygiene, food production, uniforms and personal 
equipment will not be entirely ignored, but they will be looked at in other chapters, when 
they impinge on topics such as army organisation and training. 
Fortification 
For fifty years the British people had been accustomed to thinking of themselves as 
safe from the danger of invasion from abroad. Occasional voices had been heard to say that 
this feeling of security was a delusion, ' but even the old Duke of Wellington had found it 
difficult to convince the public at large that there could be a threat so long as the Royal Navy 
stood as the nation's bastion. 
This happy feeling of insulation from continental threats was suddenly put into question 
in 1858. In January of that year there was an attempt on the life of the French Emperor, and 
the fact that the plotters had been able to lay their plans in England caused great indignation 
in Paris. Colonel Claremont, who was Military Commissioner at the British embassy, 
submitted a series of reports of increasingly bellicose comments by French military and naval 
leaders, and his letters of the period record the concern which this created in the minds of 
politicians and soldiers in Britain, including the Secretary for War. 
2 It seemed that there were 
after all dangers, and that these might even be pressing. Gladstone, who was about to 
1 Burgoyne, JF, `Memorandum on Defences for Great Britain', November 1856, PRO W033/8,471-84, is 
typical of professional concerns, and identifies France as the obvious threat. See note 8. 
2 Report, 14 March 1858, letters 16 May 1858,18 June. 1858 and 25 June 1858, Cowley Papers. PRO FO 
519/168. Extracts from these documents are in appendix B2. 
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succeed Disraeli as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and who was not a man to encourage 
additional defence expenditure, had nevertheless acknowledged in an article published just 
before the war between France and Austria in Northern Italy that there were valid grounds 
for thinking that Napoleon III was looking for a fight, ` .... that England and Austria were the 
involuntary and unconscious competitors for the honour of his choice; and that with a 




The need to put the country into an adequate defensive posture led to new appraisals of 
the army in general, the reserves and volunteers, the railways - and the physical defences. 
Fortifications, which had last been overhauled during the wars with the first Napoleon, but 
otherwise had generated little concern since the end of the domestic wars in the seventeenth 
century, were critically examined once again. As General Sir John Burgoyne, the Inspector- 
General of Fortifications, put it in a memorandum to the Secretary for War; 
however circumstances may hitherto have led to the predominant feeling 
that fortifications at home were unnecessary, there are few people who are not 
now persuaded that the new circumstances of steam navigation and the nearer 
balance of Naval Powers in the world, added to the enormous development of 
military means and resources in various Continental States, now render such 
precautions absolutely necessary. 4 
The newspapers encouraged their readers to enlist in the Rifle Volunteers, and the more 
technically minded commentators used the columns of the periodicals to analyse the danger 
in detail. It was recognised that, for reasons of geography, the main ports, arsenals and depots 
on which the defence of the country ultimately depended were particularly vulnerable to 
assault from the landward as well as the seaward side. Burgoyne had drawn attention to the 
threat arising from the increased range of modem artillery. 
It being now ascertained that these guns can throw shot and shells as far 
as 9,000 yards, and with considerable accuracy, it becomes a matter for urgent 
consideration, how these and such extensive and important establishments, can 
s be best protected from their destructive effects. 
3 Gladstone, WE, `Foreign affairs --- war in Italy', The Quarterly Review, vol. 105, April 1859,532. 
4 Burgoyne to Herbert, 11 May 1860. Broadlands Papers, Papers respecting National Defences, University of 
Southampton, ND/A/26-36. 
5 Burgoyne, Memorandum on the probable effect of the Rifled Cannon on the Attack and Defence of 
Fortifications. 1859. PRO WO 33/7,2. This memorandum also appears in PRO W033/8. See note 8, below. 
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James Fergusson, already an acknowledged expert on fortification, set out the dangers 
in a long article in July 1859.6 There was an immediate threat; the French could well get an 
army of 200,000 men on shore, and the country would be hard put to it to find an adequate 
force to oppose them. London might have to be abandoned, but the main dockyards must be 
made defensible so that the navy would be able to deprive the invader of communications, 
and a great fortified base established in the Midlands. JE Addison reiterated the theme in 
Fraser's Magazine in December, though he felt that it was essential to fortify and defend 
London as well. 7 
These were forceful descriptions of the problem, but they did not offer solutions. 
Action to identify what should be done, and then do it, would as always depend upon 
ministerial response. Fortunately, the government which assumed office in June of that year 
was led by a politician who was well suited by experience and temperament to taking up at 
least the first part of the challenge. Palmerston was no better placed, in terms of the political 
realities, than any previous British statesman to initiate the long-term improvements in 
defence arrangements which were ideally necessary, but he was very ready to be seen to look 
firmly at short-term measures to resist a threat. In August he appointed a Commission to look 
into `the Condition and Sufficiency of the Fortifications existing and projected for the 
Defence of the United Kingdom, and on the most effectual means of placing the Kingdom in 
a complete State of Defence'. Their report, published on 7 February 1860, recommended a 
far-reaching programme of improvements, at a cost of £11,000,000.8 
Sidney Herbert, the Secretary for War, said that the money must be found, even if the 
6 Fergusson, James, `The invasion of England', The Quarterly Review, vol. 106, July 1859,245-84. 
7 Addison, JE, `The national defences', Fraser's, vol. 60. Dec. 1859,643-60. 
8 PRO WO33/8 contains the Collected Memoranda and Reports on Home Defences which provided the 
background for their study, starting with a memorandum by the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge, 
in 
1852, and including many detailed reports by Burgoyne, Jervois and other officers. 
The full list of contents is on 
pages 437-8 of that document. 
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government had to raise a loan. By the time the report appeared, however, the 
immediate danger of invasion from France was felt to be receding. Palmerston continued to 
insist in parliament that the programme should proceed, but he had little support from his 
chancellor, and there was vociferous opposition from the naval lobby, who felt that any 
money available should be spent on ships rather than fortifications. 10 Accordingly, progress 
was slow. " 
Just how seriously ministers had in fact taken the threat of invasion remains a matter for 
debate. 12 The enthusiasm to enroll in the Volunteers suggests that the public accepted it. On 
the other hand Claremont's letters make it clear that he had never been convinced that there 
was a real danger, and they give more than a hint that prominent members of the 
establishment, including the Queen, senior soldiers and the new Secretary for War, regarded 
the scare mainly as a good opportunity to persuade the public and parliament to accept the 
need for greater expenditure on the army. 13 
In the event, the slowdown in expenditure on fortifications was not entirely 
disadvantageous, since the implications of the recent rapid developments in military and 
naval technology which Burgoyne had described had not been fairly evaluated on the field of 
battle in Europe, and it was not yet clear what the detailed improvements should consist of 
Experts such as Fergusson and Tyler advanced conflicting views about the merits of 
earthworks and masonry or armoured plate, but the experience on which they had to rely was 
of the assaults on the Malakoff and the Redan, and it was recognised that the improvements 
in the destructive power of artillery since 1855 would require a more formidable resistance 
9 Memorandum on Fortifications, 13 Dec. 1859. PRO W033/8. 
10 This point of view is forcefully expressed, for instance, in two contemporary articles in the United Service 
Magazine; `National defences - the report of the Commissioners' and `The defences of the United Kingdom, 
and the report of the Royal Commission', USM, 1860 pt. 2,375-7 and 526-85. 
" Woodward, EL, The Age of Reform, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946), 163-73. 
12 Ian Beckett, for example, argues that General Peel and the Government did not regard it as a serious threat; he 
says of the Volunteer Force that ` .... 
its raison d'etre - invasion - was largely hypothetical'. Riflemen Form, 
260. 
13 In particular, Claremont's letters of 25 and 29 June, and 8. July 1858,29 March and 1 August 1859. PRO 
F0519/168. Extracts from these letters are in appendix B2. 
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than these. 14 To be sure, Burgoyne had already made his own views known in the 1859 
memorandum, with its emphasis on `bomb-proofs and screens of earth' rather than `escarp 
walls ..... that are exposed to view', but proof of their effectiveness was required. 15 The 
committee set up to report `upon the probable influence of the new rifled cannon upon 
existing Fortifications, and future Plans for new Works of Defence' had to acknowledge that 
.... 
it is possible, when the rifled cannon come into general use in warfare, 
modifications may be suggested in the construction of works of defence, to 
meet, as far as practicable, the increased power of artillery; but such 
modification must be the result of actual experience; ... 
16 
The outbreak of the American Civil War in April 1861 provided the opportunity to gain 
this experience, and a new military threat enhanced the urgency of the research. Relations 
between the British and Federal governments had been strained for some time, and the 
`Trent' incident brought matters to a head. There was a real possibility that the two countries 
would go to war, and during November and December 1861 urgent measures were taken for 
the defence of Canada against invasion from the South. 17 Several reports to the Secretary for 
War, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, stressed the need for the physical defences of the key 
bases to be strengthened. 18 Closer to home, memories of the depredations of John Paul Jones 
triggered renewed alarms for the coasts of the British Isles; a Mr. Moncrieff wrote from 
Edinburgh to say that the Americans would indulge in `all manner of buccaneering' on the 
East coast of Scotland, with Aberdeen a particularly vulnerable target; it was deplorable that 
no defensive works had been completed. Lewis sought the advice of Burgoyne, who replied 
that there was indeed a limited threat from both America and France, and not just to 
Aberdeen; forts should be built, to be manned by the Volunteers, despite the expense. The 
Home Secretary concurred, so far as the threat from France was concerned, while making the 
14 Fergusson, `The invasion'. Tyler, WH, `The rifle and the spade, or the future of field operations', JRUSI, 
vol. 3,1860. Dr MD Welch says of Tyler that `(m)embers of the Royal Family, members of government and 
senior generals all listened attentively to Tyler's ideas. ' Science in a Pickelhaube, (London, RUSI, 1999), 2. 
15 Burgoyne, 1859 memo., 2-3. 
16 PRO W033/8,607. A similar practical observation relating to testing the relative merits of muzzle-loading 
rifles can be seen in the report of the Enfield and Whitworth Committee, 5 November 1858. PRO WO 33/7. 
" Until most of the British North American colonies were brought into a Federation in 1867 the name Canada, 
strictly speaking, only embraced two of the provinces, but for convenience the modern usage is employed here. 
18 The Harpton Court Papers include the following; MacDougall, Colonel P, `On the prospect of war with the U. 
States' 
,3 
December 1861 (2943); de Grey, Lord, `Defence of the West Indies', 3 December 1861 (2946); 
Seaton, Lord, `On the defence of Canada', 9 December 1861 (2958); Burgoyne, Sir John, `On military 
75 
good point that the activities of American privateers in the modem era of steam propulsion 
would be severely limited by their lack of convenient coaling stations. A tart minute from the 
First Lord of the Admiralty brought this correspondence to an end. Instead of these vague 
speculations, it suggested, an hour's discussion in a cabinet committee meeting at the 
Admiralty could determine what needed to be done, taking into account the significant 
resources available to the navy and naval coast volunteers. " 
Meanwhile, Burgoyne was taking steps to benefit from the practical lessons which the 
American war provided. Jay Luvaas, in his detailed and stimulating account of the impact of 
this conflict on military thought in the world at large, has described how Burgoyne was able 
to send two officers to America with meticulous instructions about the technical information 
which they were to collect, and the whole-hearted co-operation which they received there 
from General Totten and his colleagues. 20 Further visits supplemented what they had learned; 
Captain Richard Harrison, accompanying Colonel Jervois, Burgoyne's assistant, on a mission 
to review the defences of Canada in 1863, recorded their observations of the Federal armies 
in the United Service Journal, while another sapper officer, Lieutenant Featherstonhaugh, 
published an account of the Confederate works at Petersburg the following year. 21 
This experience was undoubtedly valuable in providing evidence of what worked on 
the ground, and it tended to reinforce the opinion that earthworks were to be preferred, 22 but 
Burgoyne was not prepared to accept every American judgment. He showed this in a report 
in February 1865 about the lessons to be learned from the capture of Fort Fisher, in which he 
pours scorn on the absurdity and ignorance of warfare on land shown by Secretary Stanton 
and Admiral Porter in their assessment that this fortress was more formidable than the 
operations against the United States', received 14 December 1861 (2984); de Grey, Lord, `Defence of Quebec', 
26 November 1862 (2994). 
'9 Harpton Court Papers; Moncrieff, 4 December 1861 (2952); Burgoyne, 7 December1861 (2953); Grey, G, 
undated (2954); Somerset, Duke of, 15 December 1861 (295 5). 
20 Luvaas, Jay, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, new ed. (University Press of Kansas, 1988), 9-11. 
21 Harrison, Captain R, RE, `A trip to Meade's army on the Rappahanock', United Service Journal, vol. 105, 
May-August 1864. The article is unsigned; the attribution is Luvaas's, op cit., 28. Featherstonhaugh, Lieutenant, 
RE, `Notes on the defences of Petersburg', PPRE, vol. 14 1865. 
22 Jervois, Lieutenant-Colonel WFD, Report on the Defence of Canada, Made to the Provincial Government on 
the 1e. November 1864, and of the British Naval Stations in the North Atlantic: Together with Observations 
on the Defence of New Brunswick, etc., London, 1865, PRO WO 33/15,15. 
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Malakoff. 23 That serious attention could be paid at the highest level to such reports is 
demonstrated by a note written in the margin; `And moreover the Difference between 
assaulting a work defended by a large army in its Rear and carrying a Fort isolated and 
garrisoned by 1200 men'; signed `Palmerston'. 
The gradual cooling of the tensions between the Federal and British governments in the 
later stages of the war, and improved relations with Imperial France (whose expansionist 
ambitions were now being concentrated on areas of less concern to British interests), allowed 
the establishment to feel that any remaining threat to the soil of Britain had passed - and 
with it the pressure to continue to spend large sums on modernising fortifications. Much, 
indeed, had been achieved, as was duly noted by Colonel Jervois in a War Office 
memorandum summarising the position in July 1864, but only half the money which the 
committee had recommended had been spent; 24 and even this limited success may have been 
due, at least in part, to the intervention of the Queen, who was sure that Prince Albert, who 
had died at the height of the crisis in December 1861, would have insisted on the 
25 continuation of the programme. 
Some concern for the safety of Canada remained, and the lessons learnt from American 
experience were still particularly relevant there; 26 but attention had turned once more to 
Europe, as Prussia's drive to achieve a position of dominance in a united Germany embroiled 
the continent in an escalating pattern of violence. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 
intrigued, even startled, British observers because of its speed and decisive conclusion, and 
while they were assimilating the lessons to be learnt from that fact there was little attention to 
spare for any study of fixed fortifications. The exception is one account in the Professional 
Papers of the Royal Engineers, where the technical interest of the author in the subject, rather 
23 Burgoyne, `Capture of Fort Fisher', 8 February 1865, Broadlands Papers, University of Southampton, 
CAB/183-93. 
24 Jervois, Present administration of Lord Palmerston, 6 July 1864, Broadlands Papers, ND/A/45. The text is in 
Appendix B2. 
25 General Charles Grey to Sir George Lewis, 2 April 1862. Harpton Court Papers, C/1325. The text of this 
letter is in Appendix B2. 
26 Simmons, Colonel JLA, RE, Defence of Canada Considered as an Imperial Question (London, Longmans, 
1865) emphasises this. 
77 
than its intrinsic importance to the campaign, leads him to examine the details of fortress 
construction. 27 
The war which now broke out between the Prussian-dominated States of Germany and 
France in August 1870 reopened every question, including that of the sanctity of the shores 
of Britain. This was brought to the attention of the public by the appearance of The Battle of 
Dorking in the pages of Blackwood's in May 1871. This dramatic work undoubtedly made a 
big initial impression on the public, but in the end seems not to have had much lasting 
influence on the reorganisation of the army. 28 All in all, despite the recurring frissons of 
excitement which works like these continued to create, it is difficult to avoid the feeling that 
an assurance that Britain itself was inviolable had once again captured the public mind, with 
the comforting message that it was not necessary to spend large sums of money on fixed 
defences. 
Soldiers, certainly, continued to take a professional interest in technological 
developments in the art. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Chesney and Major Stotherd, two 
respected sapper officers, were sent to the continent in the immediate aftermath of the 
Franco-German War, in June 1871, and one of the main parts of their brief was to report to 
the Inspector-General of Fortifications on the general state of the French army, including 
their fortifications. Their observations about Peronne and Verdun probably provoked only 
mild interest at the time, but they make poignant reading in the light of the events of 1916- 
17; 
The knot or nest of fortresses accumulated on this portion of the 
French frontier (Peronne), and once thought to make it well nigh impregnable, 
would in future offer but a slight obstacle to an invading army .... 
These works 
... are completely 
dominated by hills from 100 to 250 feet in height, and from 
1,500 to 2,000 yards distant from the town. 29 
There seems to be some idea that the French, now that they have lost 
Metz, will convert Verdun into a first-class fortress. This might be done very 
effectually by occupying the hills commanding it by means of a system of 
27 Webber, Captain CE, RE, `Notes on the campaign in Bohemia in 1866', PPRE, vol. 16,1868,34-59. 
28 See page 23. 
29 Report dated 24 -27 June 1871, PRO WO33/24,408. 
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detached forts, and, with such addition, there seems to be no reason why it 
might not be made a very strong place. 30 
The pages of the Engineers' professional journal continued to include fortification in the 
consideration of the lessons to be learnt from the war, 31 and the topic occasionally earned a 
mention in more general publications. For example, an article in Blackwood 's in 1875, while 
savagely criticizing the shortcomings of French army organisation in general, said that much 
good work had been done on strengthening their fortifications. 32 
Certainly, there continued to be great professional interest in developments on the 
continent, but little in the writing suggests that a need was felt for an active response on the 
British side to defend the island itself. The concern appears to have been partly professional 
interest in the technology, and partly a desire for reassurance that the British interests in 
preserving a balance of power in northern Europe and the continuing integrity of Belgium 
were not about to be disturbed again. A report of Henry Brackenbury's in 1876 exemplifies 
this, as he describes the increasing sophistication of the chain of Belgian frontier defences. 
33 
Exceptionally, one thoughtful soldier did express a serious concern for British domestic 
security. During 1871 Colonel Robert Home was writing a series of articles in Macmillan's 
about army organisation and the defence of the country, and he found an ominous warning in 
the siege and capitulation of Paris. `What lessons then are we to learn from French 
calamities, if not that in modern war the capital of the State must be fortified if the State is to 
make a successful resistance? '34 His solution harks back to those proposed a decade earlier; a 
ring of forts at two-mile intervals with a circumference of seventy miles round London. 
However, the prevailing climate of opinion was unreceptive; Gladstone and Cardwell were 
seeking to reduce, not increase, the defence budget, and it seemed that the issue could be 
forgotten. 
30 Report dated 4 August 1871. PRO WO33/24,45. 
31 For example, PPRE, vol. 20,1872, is entirely devoted to the Franco-German 
War, and fortifications figure 
amongst the topics discussed. 
32 Marshall, Frederic, `The state of the French army', Blackwood's, vol. 118, August 1875,125-41. 
33 Brackenbury, Colonel H, RA, Minute in `Abstracts of Proceedings of the Department of the Director of 
Artillery for the Quarter ending 31 December 1876', PRO W033/31. 
34 Home, Robert, `London fortified', Macmillan's, vol. 23, Feb. 1871,278. 
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A new impetus was given to the study of defensive works in general by events in the 
Balkans. Uprisings in the Turkish European provinces, and their bloody suppression, resulted 
in full-scale war between Russia and Turkey in 1877. Advancing Russian armies had little 
difficulty in crossing the Danube and seizing the frontier fortresses, and an energetic thrust 
by their advance-guard carried the vital Shipka Pass through the Balkan mountains, but their 
progress towards Adrianople and the Bosphoros was delayed by the effective resistance of 
the Turkish forces defending Plevna. 35 Plevna was not a traditional fortress, but the Turks, 
arriving there in haste, took energetic steps to create an entrenched camp replete with field- 
works and redoubts, behind which they defied the assaults of the Russian army for four 
months. 36 This siege generated enormous interest amongst military professionals 
everywhere; 37 and its strategic importance has been emphasised ever since. AJP Taylor 
illustrates this with characteristic vigour. `Plevna is one of the few engagements which 
changed the course of history', he asserts, explaining that the delay it caused stopped the 
.... though the 
Turkish army was in Russians from totally destroying the Turkish empire; ' 
collapse by the end of the year, the Russian was little better'. 38 
No doubt Taylor's judgment is just, to the extent that the Russian government would 
have found it difficult to sustain a long campaign at such a distance from the centre, but he is 
wrong about the state of the army. The testimony of the military observers with the troops 
emphasises the robustness with which the Russian soldiers withstood the rigours of a winter 
campaign in mountainous country and, crucially, the impact of the arrival of massive 
35 Greene, FV, Report on the Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878, reprinted (Nashville, 
the Battery Press, 1996), 163-280. This report, written by a specially appointed American military observer and 
commissioned by the American Secretary for War, gives a clear narrative of the whole campaign. 
It is 
significant that this work, originally published in the USA in 1879, was immediately made available 
in a British 
edition, (London, WH Allen, 1880). 
36 Greene, 193 and Plate 12. 
37 PPRE, vol. 5 (1881), is entirely devoted to Captain GS Clarke's account of the siege, and 
its impressive 
bibliography lists numerous Russian, German, Austrian and French, in addition to the 
British, works on the 
subject. General Todleben's report to the Russian Commander-in-Chief 
had already been translated for Proc 
RAI (vol. 10,1877,369-78) by Lieutenant JM Grierson, RA (at the age of eighteen) and for PPRE 
(vol. 2,1877, 
81-90) by Captain GT Plunkett, RE. 




reinforcements of experienced fighting men, whose lack had contributed to the setbacks of 
the early part of the campaign. 39 
What particularly attracted the interest of professional soldiers to the siege of Plevna 
was its demonstration of the defensive power of rapid rifle fire from behind entrenchments, 
and it can be argued that this caused them, at the time and since, to pay less than due 
attention to the rest of the war, particularly the campaign in Armenia; but before pursuing 
this topic it will be necessary to step back some years and look at the evolving study of field 
works and entrenchments. 
Field works and entrenchments 
Any thematic approach to a military topic creates a difficulty; the problem of trying to 
disentangle one aspect from all the others which impinge upon it, and treat it in isolation. 
This is particularly true of field works, because of the necessary involvement of issues 
relating to the effectiveness of weapons, the quality and provision of equipment, and their 
effect on battle doctrine and tactics. The intention of this section, therefore, is to summarise 
the evolving pattern of thinking about field works in the British army in the light of the 
experience of the wars of the period, accepting that some of the same ground must be 
covered again in other sections of the study. 
In1859 the British army's most recent experience of sophisticated warfare was in the 
Crimea. That campaign had taught more lessons about permanent fortifications than about 
field works and entrenchments, but it had not escaped the attention of thoughtful men that the 
technical developments which had dictated a new approach to the former would also cause 
fundamental changes in the open field. Evidence of this appeared in early April. James 
Fergusson wrote a long article in the Edinburgh Review saying that the days of close-order 
drill were over, or should be, and that from now on entrenchments and earthworks were the 
39 Greene, 366-74,416-17. 
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only means of protecting soldiers in the field against the new rifled small-arms and cannon. 40 
The same month, Captain WH Tyler, RE, presented a paper to RUSI to make the point to a 
professional audience. 
Infantry and artillery fire have now acquired a fearful increase of 
power, and it seems probable, that entrenchments, instead of being useful 
auxiliaries, to be employed occasionally, will eventually become a main 
feature, even of operations conducted in the open field. 41 
The war which was about to break out in Italy rather contradicted than supported this 
opinion, and many of the participants, Austrian as well as French, came away with the 
conviction that the epitome of the furia francesa - the galling use of a swarm of skirmishers 
and short-range cannon followed by a headlong assault in close order - was still the 
dominant factor on the battlefield. 42 The tenacity with which this doctrine was maintained 
thereafter, in the teeth of so much contradictory evidence, can only be compared with the 
continuing faith of cavalrymen in the decisive impact of their sabres. 
The contrary evidence was not long in coming. As professional attention focused on the 
American Civil War, and once their initial disdain for what they saw as the blunderings of 
these amateur warriors had been to some extent overcome, observers realised that 
entrenchments had indeed become what Tyler had predicted. British observers, in particular, 
fastened onto this aspect. Colonel Charles Chesney returned repeatedly to the theme; in two 
articles in the Edinburgh Review in 1865 and 1866, and another in the Fortnightly Review in 
1875, he reiterated that lessons must be learnt, not least that field entrenchments were a 
decisive factor. 43 More importantly, in terms of influencing the military establishment, he 
emphasised the same message in a lecture at RUSI in April 1865. The Commander-in-Chief, 
the Duke of Cambridge, was in the chair, and, in his closing remarks, said that, of the two 
vital points which he would take away, 
40 Fergusson, J, `Rifled guns and modern tactics', Edinburgh Review, vol. 109, April 1859,514-45. 
41 Tyler, Captain WH, `The rifle and the spade', 1 April 1859, JRUSI, vol. 3,170-94,184. 
42 Charles Chesney, for example, said that there were no new tactical lessons to learn 
from Magenta and 
Solferino, which were fought in the style of the wars of Napoleon I. 
`The study of military science in time of 
peace', 5 May 1871, JRUSI, vol. 15,232-68,262. 
3 `The last campaign in America', Edinburgh Review, vol. 121, Jan. 1865,252-88. 
`Recent changes in the art of 
war', Edinburgh Review, vol. 123, Jan. 1866,95-130. 
`Sherman and Johnston, and the Atlanta campaign, 
Fortnightly Review, vol. 18 ns, 1875,611-24. 
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(o)ne is, that in this war, and, I think, in all future wars, the spade must 
form a great element in campaigns..... even the movements in advance were instantly confirmed, I may say, by the position being entrenched in a manner 
which would preclude the danger of attack. 44 
The Austro-Prussian War, coming so soon after the end of the American war, now 
focused attention on the issues which were felt to be responsible for the speed and decisive 
nature of this short campaign, and interest in entrenchments rather diminished. Nonetheless, 
some of the specialists continued to stress that practical answers to the increasing killing- 
power of battlefield weapons must be found. Majendie continued to analyse progress, in a 
series of articles in Cornhill, and in one of these, in May 1869, he contrived to call in aid the 
current interest in the skirmishing tactics of the successful Prussian army to support the need 
for entrenchments; 
We must now strive to protect our troops from the deadly fire which 
will henceforth be brought to bear on them .... 
Hitherto, this branch of the 
subject has been strangely neglected. Abroad it is not neglected ---- nearly all 
the great Continental armies are busy instructing their troops in the art of 
seeking and obtaining cover. This is to be done in two ways: by the 
improvement of the skirmishing drill, and by the adoption of an efficient and 
ready system of field entrenchment. 45 
Colonel Gerald Graham reiterated the message at a RUSI debate the following June, 
shortly before the outbreak of the Franco-German War. Drawing copiously on the American 
experience he emphasised what he understood to be Austrian and French doctrine that 
entrenchments were essential, and were invulnerable to assault from the front by unsupported 
infantry. 46 
Whether these doctrines had truly been taken to heart by continental armies was now to 
be revealed. Contemporary narratives of the fluid opening phase of the Franco-German War 
suggest that they had not, but commentators did lay stress on the diligence with which the 
Germans constructed their lines of circumvallation round the besieged fortresses as the 
44 Chesney, CC, `Sherman's campaign in Georgia', 7 April 1865, JRUSI, vol. 9,1865,204-20,220. The second 
point related to the future of cavalry. 
Majendie, VD, `The new military breech-loader', Cornhill, vol. 19, May 1869,599. 
46 Graham, Colonel Gerald, VC, `Shelter trenches, or temporary cover for troops in position', JRUSI, vol. 14, 
1871,448-78. 
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campaign developed. 47 The first official British analysis of the war, issued by the 
Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office in November 1871, in the form 
of an edited compilation of the reports of the British military attaches and observers, claimed 
that `(n)umerous instances might be cited to show how important a part the spade played in 
the late campaign .... 
' and pointed out that one of the few French successes arose from a 
failure by the Germans to guard against a sortie from Paris, which the French then exploited 
`.... with an enormous amount of work .... 
' in entrenching the captured positions. 48 
There is some evidence that professionals in the British army had, for the moment, 
absorbed the right messages, as a lecture given at RUSI in January 1874 demonstrates. 49 
Colonel Schaw was Professor of Fortification and Artillery at the Staff College, and he 
combined his study of the writings of Captain Goetze (of the Prussian Engineers) with his 
knowledge of the American war to formulate detailed proposals for the British army; a higher 
proportion of sappers, and infantry and cavalry to have constant sapper support in the field; 
all troops to have adequate equipment to clear the ground in front of their positions 
('Freimachen des Gesichtsfeldes'); troops to be trained for night assaults to reduce the 
defensive advantage of the trenches. 
Plevna soon provided graphic evidence of the validity of these injunctions, and the host 
of reports of events there was seized upon by soldiers who wanted to carry the argument 
forward. There were two significant lectures and debates at RUSI in 1878. In January a 
young cavalry officer talked of American trials which showed that properly equipped soldiers 
could bury themselves from view in six minutes, and that in his opinion the Turkish trenches 
were too deep. 50 This was followed in June by another, attended by soldiers, sailors and 
civilians who had seen the war (including the Chairman of the meeting, Lieutenant-General 
Sir Arnold Kemball, Admiral Selwyn and Mr CB Norman), and clearly intended to drive this 
47 Chesney. Report, `Musketry trenches', 454. PRO WO 33/24. 
48 Wilson, Captain CW, RE, Extracts from the Reports of the Military Attaches who accompanied the French 
and Prussian Armies during the Campaign of 1870-71, (London, War Office, 1871), 16. PRO WO 147/23. 
49 Schaw, Lieutenant-Colonel H, RE, `Field-engineering; illustrated by some of the operations of the German 
engineers during the war of 1870-71', JRUSI, vol. 18,1875,18-54. 
50 Graves, Lieutenant FJ, 20th Hussars, `On military equipment', JRUSI, vol. 22,1878,126. 
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message, among others, home . 
51 The lecturer, another Professor of Fortification (at 
Greenwich), drew copiously on the writings of observers to show that the lessons learnt from 
the American war had been vindicated by the Turks; how assiduously they entrenched 
themselves, provided that they had engineers to support them; and how vital it now was for 
all troops to have a sufficient supply of entrenching tools which they had been trained to use. 
It seemed that the truth of this was now accepted without argument. The Royal Artillery 
Institution's prize essay topic in 1879 acknowledged' .... the general adoption of field 
entrenchments on the field of battle .... 
'52 and discussion turned to the details of digging 
equipment for the soldiers. 53 In the Spring of 1879 tests were carried out on a tool based on 
continental designs, but ` .... the spade, when tried, 
broke after three minutes' use; it is not 
suitable as an intrenching tool' . 
54 
On the face of it no more than a trivial incident, typical of what happens in testing new 
equipment, this brusque dismissal of one tool may be an early sign of an underlying 
resistance amongst the military to the logic of what they were hearing, a resistance which 
came to dominate the thinking of the twenty years which follow the end of the period of this 
study. Despite all the evidence, continental armies were beginning to have second thoughts 
about the relative powers of the defence and the offence, and consequently about the 
importance of field entrenchments. 55 While the long defence of Plevna had generated so 
much initial interest (no doubt partly because of the respect with which Todleben's opinions 
were treated), more attention now began to be paid to the successes of bold offensive actions 
in the Armenian campaign, notably the destruction of Moukhtar Pasha's army at Aladja Dagh 
and the storming of the fortress of Kars. 56 A new generation of military thinkers - men such 
s' Needham, Captain John L, RMA, `Lessons from the late war', JRUSI, vol. 22,1878,941-56. 
52 See the Silver Medal Essay; Elles, ER, `On the question whether any development of the material of Field 
Artillery is necessitated by the general adoption of field entrenchments on the field of battle; and if so, on the 
direction such development should take', Proc RAI, vol. 10,1879,558. 
53 James, Captain Walter H, RE, `Modern fire: Its influence on armament, training and tactics', JRUSI, vol. 24, 
1880,382-3. 
sa 'Abstracts of Proceedings of the Department of the Director of Artillery, for the quarter ending 30th June 
1879', PRO WO 33/34, Minute 36,894,28 April 1879,271. 
ss Howard, ME, `The Armed Forces', ch. 8 in The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 11, (CUP, 1960), 209. 
56 The index to Vol. 10 of Proc RAI, 1879, reveals that that versatile young soldier James Grierson had also 
translated `The war between Russia and Turkey in Asia Minor, 1877' from Löbells Jahresberichte. 
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as Blume and Bernhardi in Germany, and Bonnal and the disciples of du Picq in France 
was rediscovering the doctrine that the offensive spirit could overcome any obstacle. 
`Indiscretion, it would seem, had become the better part of valour', in Luvaas's telling 
phrase, and the British army was to pay dearly, in South Africa twenty years later, for 
forgetting the lessons of Plevna and the Wilderness. 57 
Railways 
`Prussian institutions, aided by railways and telegraphs, must revolutionize our ideas of 
armies. '58 These words, written in the immediate aftermath of the succession of stunning 
victories which had brought German arms to the walls of Paris in three weeks in 1870, 
acknowledged the impact which fundamental changes in means of communication had made 
on nineteenth century warfare. The growth of railways in particular made it possible for 
vastly bigger armies to be assembled and moved rapidly to the seat of war, and to be supplied 
and supported once there. This was seen to be the key to military success. Since it depended 
upon meticulous planning and organisation `.... strategic planning became geared to the time- 
table - above all, the railway time-table. '59 
Not surprisingly, given the perennial strategic problem dictated by the threat of 
simultaneous invasion from either side of their scattered domains, the Prussians were the first 
to pay serious attention to the military possibilities of the railways. Edwin Pratt, in his 
magisterial work on the subject, records `.... that the construction of railways for strategic 
purposes was advocated in Germany as early as 1833'; he recounts in detail Prussian efforts 
to develop this new technology, and the resulting French apprehensions. 60 
57 Luvaas, J, `European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914', ch. 4 in Howard, Michael (ed. ) The Theory 
and Practice of War (London, Cassell, 1965), 81. This chapter and ch. 5 in the same volume, Brian Bond's 
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the military imagination as the century wore on. 
58 Home, Robert, `Are we ready? ', Macmillan's, vol. 22, Oct. 1870,402. 
59 Liddell Hart, BH, ` Armed forces and the art of war: Armies', ch. XII of The New Cambridge Modern 
History, vol. 10 (CUP, 1960), 309. 
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significantly to the earlier work. 
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The first practical demonstration of the contribution which the growing network of 
lines could make to warfare came in 1859, when the French and Austrians confronted each 
other in Northern Italy. Although detailed analysis revealed that the use made of the railways 
by both sides was disorganised in the extreme, the fact was that the French were able to move 
75,966 men and 4,469 horses from Paris to the conflict area in ten days, instead of the sixty 
days which it would have taken on foot. 61 This makes a significant contrast with the situation 
in the Crimea only five years previously. There, the outcome was crucially affected by the 
difficulty which the Russians encountered in reinforcing and supplying their army by road. 
Had they then possessed the network of railways which served their forces in 1877-8 the 
result might have been very different. 62 
At Casteggio and Montebello reinforcements were introduced to the actual field of 
battle by train, and this led to some colourful eye-witness reporting in the papers. 63 It also 
quickly caught the attention of professional observers in Britain. In August W Bridges 
Adams, writing in the journal Once a Week, concluded that `.... (w)ars cannot be carried on 
without railways". 64 Archer Crowe emphasised the same message in an article on the 
campaign in the October edition of The Edinburgh Review, and Major Miller, RA, VC, 
reiterated it in the first of two lectures to RUSI in April 1861.65 
Adams clearly recognised the significance of what had been happening in Italy, but the 
motivation for his article was the challenge of a more immediate continental stimulus in the 
aftermath of the French victory - alarm at the prospect of a French invasion of Britain. 
Supposing that some modern Van Tromp under French orders should sweep 
the Channel to land soldiers on our shores, what then would be our best course 
of defence? I am merely arguing this as a supposition, precisely as Prince 
66 Joinville did. 
61 Pratt, Rail power, 10. 
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August 1859,127. 
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His solution was heavy artillery on railway wagons, which no invader would be able to 
match. The existing network of lines, he was confident, was suitable for the task. This was an 
important point, and would have a bearing on the extent to which European railway 
developments influenced British thinking. Britain, after all, had pioneered the development 
of commercial railways, and the first recorded movement of a body of troops by rail took 
place on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830.67 Similarly, the first military 
railway in the field was built by the British in the Crimea. Accordingly, British opinion was 
confident that it had little to learn from others in the way of railway technology. 
Organisation was another matter. The years following 1859 produced growing evidence 
of the decisive role which the management of railways would play in determining who won 
and who lost when war broke out. The reporting of the American Civil War and the wars of 
1866 and 1870 made much of the railways, and once again eye-witness reports have left 
lasting records of dramatic interventions on the battlefield, epitomised by the arrival of 
Johnstone's Shenandoah army by train at the decisive moment of the first battle of Bull 
Run. 68 
These successes were duly noted by professional soldiers. Captain WH Tyler, RE, 
lecturing at RUSI on `Railways strategically considered' in May 1864, quoted extensively 
from The Times in describing Montebello and Magenta in 1859, and used American 
newspaper reports to illustrate the tactical value of the railways at both battles of Bull Run. 69 
Similarly, Hamley acknowledged that ` .... at the 
battle of Bull Run, the defeat of the 
Northern army was mainly accomplished by the attack of a brigade brought on the field by 
railway from the Shenandoah valley'. 70 However, the professionals did not allow themselves 
to be carried away by what they saw as exceptional circumstances. Hamley registered an 
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on the principle that railways afford an extremely precarious reliance when within reach of 
the enemy's enterprises. '71 
This was to be the recurring theme of the soldiers; railways were revolutionising 
strategy, but were vulnerable and unreliable when near the field of battle. Tyler had noted 
these drawbacks in 1864, while enumerating the seven general lessons which the use of 
railways was teaching. 72 Charles Chesney, writing on `Recent changes in the art of war' in 
January 1866, dwelt on the strategic implications of railway development, but denied that the 
decision on the field at Montebello had been influenced by rail-born reinforcements and 
asserted that ` .... the 
long annals of the American war give no reason to believe that we are 
near the day when commanders will arrange their order of battle with a view to bring their 
troops under fire by train'. 73 On the other hand, Captain Hozier, reporting on the use of 
railways in the Franco-German war, noted that during the battle of Woerth the French were 
` 
.... constantly reinforced during the day by detachments brought up by railway' . 
74 
However, the message which the British army accepted was the cautious one, and Lieut. - 
Colonel Robert Home reiterated the theme in a lecture at RUSI in 1875; ` .... the railway 
becomes for the movement of troops of little value; but for the purpose of supplying troops, 
and removing sick and wounded, its value is at all times very great. '75 
The success of the German use of railways in the war was neither overlooked nor 
denigrated; Home went on to describe in admiring tones the German mobilisation plan, 
which was updated annually and distributed to `every officer of certain grades', as a veritable 
Bradshaw. 76 There was no mystery about this, he said; it was simply a matter of attention to 
detail; and he gave, as an example of how it could work in practice, a hypothetical plan for an 
English invasion of Scotland. However, he was ` .... 
far from advocating that we should 
71 Ibid. 
72 Tyler, 329,332. 
73 Chesney, CC, `Recent changes in the art of war', Edinburgh Review, 123, Jan. 1866,126. 
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adopt German customs in this country. But it is well to see what German customs are, and 
how the Germans have worked out the problem of utilizing their railways'. " 
Why was this? If thoughtful soldiers like Home, and others who will be mentioned 
below, saw so much to admire in German railway management, why did they not press for a 
similar national structure in Britain? It was certainly not through lack of understanding of 
how other countries were dealing with the development. A series of lectures and debates 
during the years following the Austro-Prussian War make it clear that the leaders of thought 
within the military establishment were kept regularly informed about the significance of what 
was happening on the continent. Major Noott, in a comprehensive analysis of Britain's 
defences in the immediate aftermath of the 1866 war, stressed that a`.... war in England 
would be carried on principally on railways', and commented admiringly on Prussian 
practice. 78 An unidentified contributor to the United Service Magazine developed the theme 
in two short articles in 1869 and 1871, describing Prussian and Austrian systems, referring to 
the proceedings of a French conference on managing railways in war, and rehearsing the 
history of their use in previous wars. 79 In 1872 Captain Burnaby's lecture at RUSI gave a 
similar tour d'horizon, and the Director of Public Works added his voice to the discussion in 
an unsigned contribution to the Edinburgh Review. 80 The following year there was another 
lecture and debate at RUSI which summed up all the previous discussion. 81 In it Luard once 
more ran over the history of railways in war, taking particular note of the contrast between 
the general success of the German organisation and the failures of the French, and of the 
strenuous efforts being made by the latter to remedy the defects in their system. 
I cannot do better than recommend those interested in the subject to peruse 
the `lessons' learned by Colonel Jacqmin, from his experience in the 
working of the railways in this war, reviewing, as he does in his able work, 
their ministration on both sides. 82 
77 Ibid. 
78 Noott, Major FW, `Home Defences', Macmillan's, vol. 15, Feb. 1867,290. 
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Evidence that such lessons were duly perused can be seen in a note which Wolseley wrote in 
the margin of a translation by Charles Brackenbury of a French report referring to the 
inadvisability of allowing soldiers to travel on trains without supervision. `See Jacqmin on 
the Railway service during the war of 1870. ' 83 
Luard also stressed, crucially, that Britain had much to learn from the American 
experience in the civil war about ` .... the management and application of railways' . 
84 This 
was the key point. Other continental powers were wisely doing their best to copy the 
successful German system, but the correct lesson for the British was in the general approach, 
not the specifics; the need to be prepared, to have an organisation in place in peacetime, and 
above all to practise moving large bodies of troops. 85 
When it came to the details of the organisation, however, the American model was 
much more to the point, and there was general agreement about the reasons. First and 
foremost, Britain was a democracy. Prussia/Germany, on the contrary, was an authoritarian 
state in which national security dictated that the railway system, like every other institution, 
must be devoted to this service, and the state structure was such that there were no obstacles 
powerful enough to inhibit it. Other continental states had little option but to try to match this 
single-minded approach if they hoped to survive the German challenge. The British case was 
different. National institutions like the railways existed for the benefit of the country in 
general (whether in practice this meant the landed interest, business or the public at large was 
not always clear), which would not tolerate their subordination to the requirements of the 
army unless there was a recognisable emergency. Secondly, the strategic conditions were 
different. Home's scenario of an English invasion of Scotland was designedly a ludicrous 
one, because the continental situation simply did not apply on the British side of the channel. 
Should there be a threat of invasion the domestic rail network already fulfilled the main 
.... our 
last wars have been expeditionary wars, and requirements for national defence, but' 
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the probabilities are in favour of such wars being those in which we are most liable to 
indulge in at present'. 86 
Accordingly, all that was needed in Britain was the establishment of a military 
railway department, which could co-ordinate the efficient movement of troops when 
required, and legislation to permit the army to take control of the lines in a national 
emergency, as demonstrated by the Federal government during the Civil War. As the 
Americans had shown, there was no need for the army to have any closer control under 
normal circumstances, and in any case the main concern of the regular forces would be to 
deliver and maintain an expeditionary force overseas, so it was quite appropriate that the 
connection between the management of the lines and the army should be through the 
enrolment of suitable members of the staff of the railway companies into the Volunteers. 
This attitude did not escape criticism at the time; The Daily News of 23 April 1867 
commented that ` .... the authorities of the regular service ignore the existence of railways as 
if they were still manoeuvring under Marlborough'; 87 but the recurrence of the theme in the 
lectures and debates of the period shows that the issue was by no means ignored by the army 
leadership or the government. 88A paper for RUSI ten years later repeated the general view of 
informed opinion in the army, that the American model was more appropriate for Britain 
than any other, but (the point made so often by thinking soldiers) that what she must learn 
from Germany was the necessity of having the mechanism for mobilising ready for war at all 
times. 89 
The regular army, in fact, remained satisfied that the strategic purpose of the railway 
system was simply to get an expeditionary force to the ports. Thereafter, transporting them 
to, and maintaining them in, the scene of action was a matter of shipping rather than 
railways, and, despite certain adverse experiences in the Crimean campaign, there was a 
86 Luard, 707. 
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generally well-founded confidence that the navy was good at that - while, as James 
Grierson pointed out with pardonable glee some years later, the Germans were not. 90 Later 
events seem to have justified this confidence. If, when major expeditionary forces had to be 
deployed, difficulties arose - as they did in the early stages of the Second Boer War, for 
instance - the problems were caused by the lack of adequate stocks of military stores and 
horses rather than from failures by the domestic railways or the ships. 
Of course, once an expeditionary force had been established ashore, it would need local 
railways, and these would often be non-existent. While they had more experience of building 
military railways for themselves than any of the continental armies, they had learnt that the 
practical difficulties of doing so under the pressure of campaign conditions were intense, and 
what they had seen of even German performance in the continental wars had not changed 
their thinking. `In the Franco-German War what short lines were made were neither so 
speedily constructed nor so successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any 
length could be made during a campaign. ' 91 Russian achievements in their campaigns against 
Turkey in 1877-8 caused this judgment to be reappraised. Captain Sale of the Royal 
Engineers told a RUSI audience in 1880 that Poliakoff's achievement in building a tactical 
railway in four months ` .... offers a striking example of what can 
be done by energy and 
liberal expenditure, when free of administrative entanglements, and marks a distinct step in 
the application of science to warfare' . 
92 
As Pratt points out, these lessons were taken to heart by the army, particularly in India, 
in the immediate aftermath, and the British army continued to maintain a level of expertise in 
this particular technology which was not surpassed by any of its rivals. 
93 
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Telegraphs and Signals 
Compared with other European armies, parts of the British army of the 1850s were 
unusually sophisticated in the use of visual signalling in the field. The techniques, based 
mainly on flags, but also embracing heliographs when conditions were suitable, had been 
developed by individual units under the harsh pressure of circumstances on the North-West 
frontier of India. In those rocky hills and deep valleys a military column could only move 
safely if it had secured the high ground on its flanks, and it was vital for the survival of all 
that communications between the main body and the outlying pickets should be accurate and 
immediate. 94 
Unfortunately, most of the British forces which went to the Crimea in 1854, and their 
leaders, had not benefited from that experience, and communication between commanders 
and troops depended, as before, on messages carried by hand, with all the risks of delay and 
inaccuracy - poignantly illustrated by the misdirected charge of the Light Brigade at 
Balaclava - which that entailed. On the face of it, this tends to bear out the thesis that the 
army in the Crimea continued to live in the past and had learnt nothing since Waterloo, but 
such a judgment would in this instance be unfair. The possibilities offered by the electric 
telegraph had been noted, and an operational innovation planned. Sir Vivian Majendie has 
recorded that 
(t)he first designated application of military telegraphic communication to 
the use of an English army in the field was in 1854, when an equipment was 
sent to the Crimea to accompany the army in its field movements. The 
equipment was, however, not applied to this purpose, for the simple reason 
that there were no field movements worthy of the name; but it was 
employed for the establishment of a permanent communication between the 
British Headquarters and our base of operations. 95 
During the Indian Mutiny, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were 
able to keep in touch by the same means, and it seems that the techniques had already 
94 Stotherd, Captain RH, RE, `Military telegraphy and signalling', JRUSI, vol. 14,1871,331. See also Major- 
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improved. `This was probably the first occasion on which telegraphy was employed on any 
large and useful scale with an Army in movement. '96 
At the beginning of the period with which this study is directly concerned, the 
antagonists in 1859 were no further forward. There was a telegraph network which permitted 
communication between the commanders of the armies and their bases at home, but the 
lessons from that were of more significance for the politicians than the soldiers, a point 
which was made in an article on `The national defences' in Fraser's Magazine in December 
1859, emphasising the advantage in co-ordinating their movements which this gave to a 
potential invader. 97 The outbreak of the civil war in America two years later created an 
entirely new situation, and this did have an impact on the thinking of the British army. The 
great distances and difficult terrain over which the war was fought focused attention on the 
problems of communication. It was observed that the railways were accompanied by a 
similar network of telegraph lines and that these were being put to good use by the 
contending armies. In his lecture on the strategic use of railways in May 1864 Captain Tyler 
drew attention to the importance of this. 
The railways and rivers in America have been, in consequence of the 
distances to be traversed, and the indifferent character of the roads, of 
paramount importance in a military point of view; and the telegraph wire has 
partly superceded, for similar reasons, other means of transmitting orders .... 
98 
Majendie, writing five years later, made the same point, but took care to record that, 
though the British army should learn from the Americans, its own experience had already 
contributed to the development of the technology, particularly where communicating on the 
field of battle was concerned. 
It seems, however, to have been reserved for the Americans to develope (sic), 
under the pressure of their desperate struggle, a complete telegraphic 
communication. Then, also, for the first time, if we are not mistaken, a 
recognized system of signals was extensively employed in the field; although 
it is fair to notice that the system had been already designed in England, and 
brought under the notice of our Government (in 1861) by Major Bolton, late 
of the 12"' Regiment, to whose persistent exertions, in conjunction with 
Captain Colomb, RN, we are mainly indebted for the present official 
96 Ibid, 746. 
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98 Tyler, 332. 
95 
recognition of the imortance of the subject, and its reduction to an 
established system. 9F 
American experience had clearly made an impression on the British establishment. In 
September 1864 Earl de Grey, the Secretary for War, decided'.... to refer the whole question 
of army signals and telegraphy for the consideration of a Committee .... 
', with Sir John 
Burgoyne in the chair. 100 Their deliberations depended heavily on a report and descriptive 
letter on the American signal corps submitted by Lieutenant Sir Arthur Mackworth, RE, 
following his visit to the Federal army that year, and the Committee's report of 21 December 
1865 included recommendations for the appointment of a permanent superintendent of army 
telegraphs and signals, as well as the establishment of a telegraph detachment of Royal 
Engineers at Aldershot, very much after the American model. 
Before these proposals could be acted upon, events in Europe brought the focus of 
attention back across the Atlantic. The Austro-Prussian War showed that the Prussians in 
particular had grasped the importance of the new means of communication, and this gave 
British officers another practical demonstration to study. In October 1866 Charles Chesney 
wrote that `(t)he Prussian staff had diligently studied the lessons given by the American War 
in combining field operations, however distant, by means of the electric telegraph', and that 
this had been a decisive factor in the success of their strategy. 101 Captain CE Webber, RE, 
writing `Notes on the campaign in Bohemia in 1866'in the Professional Papers of his corps, 
described the workings of the Prussian Field Telegraph in detail. He did not unreservedly 
admire everything about it ('The store wagons proved too heavy') but `(t)he efficiency of the 
Field Telegraph Department having contributed to the successes of the Prussian army, it is a 
proof that its organization was well arranged, and that the lessons to be learnt from it should 
not be thrown away'. 102 
Action followed rapidly. On 16 January 1869 an Army Special Circular entitled `Army 
Telegraphy and Signalling' gave the Royal Engineers superintendence of all Military 
99 Majendie, 746. The American viewpoint, taking due note of the British Crimean experiments, is outlined in 
Hagerman, Edward, The American Civil War and the Origins ofModern Warfare (Indiana UP, 1992) xii, 23 
and 40-44. 
ioo PRO WO 33/15/0268. 
101 Chesney, CC, `The military growth of Prussia', Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1866,587. 
102 Webber, Captain CE, RE, PPRE, vol. 16,1868,34-59,39. 
96 
Telegraph Stations, directed that the School of Military Engineering should establish courses 
for officers and NCOs of all units of the army (who would then become instructors in their 
own units), designated a common flashing system for field service and ship-to-shore 
communication, and even provided for the transmission of private messages - for a fee paid 
in advance. 103 
Professional interest continued at both unofficial and official levels. An article in the 
United Service Magazine in 1869 analysed French experiments in telegraphy at the camp at 
Chalons the previous year; 104 and General Sir William Codrington, who had been sent by the 
Adjutant-General to observe the manoeuvres of both the French and Prussian armies in 1869, 
reported in detail on their field telegraphs. 105 His conclusion was that it was doubtful whether 
the technology was yet sufficiently advanced for the transmission of orders on the battlefield, 
but that it was easy and practical to use it on the main lines of operation. He commended the 
French equipment and procedures as models. Charles Chesney reinforced these views in two 
articles in the Edinburgh Review, emphasising that telegraphy could destroy much of the fog 
of war, while converting countries like France and Prussia to ` .... one vast 
base for the 
conduct of warlike operations'. 106 
Captain Stotherd's lecture at RUSI on 13 May 1870, and the discussion which 
followed, provided the forum for a review of the whole subject. 107 Stotherd extolled the 
virtues of the Prussian system, as described by Captain Webber and reinforced by Captain S 
Anderson, RE, who had observed the Prussian field manoeuvres of 1869, noting, inevitably, 
that the Prussians would have benefited from a good visual system at the front, such as had 
been developed by the army in India. Major-General Sir Lintorn Simmons, who was in the 
chair, endorsed his words, and Simmons was an influential figure. Accordingly, steps were 
taken to provide the nucleus of a mechanism for the central management, as well as the 
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training, of the skills involved. The Engineer branch of the War Office was given a Post 
Office company and a Telegraph troop, and the means for training appropriate personnel. 
This was certainly a step forward, but it is interesting to see that, in 1871, the newly titled 
Instructor in Telegraphy found himself responsible, not only for the training of telegraphy 
and signalling, but also for demolitions, submarine mining, photography, chemistry and 
(later) barrack plans, so there was little danger of the new skills absorbing a disproportionate 
share of the army's resources. 108 
On the contrary; as so often, the principle had been accepted but the resources provided 
for its implementation were neither great enough nor focused enough to do the job 
thoroughly. As Lord Carnarvon, the Tory `shadow' colonial secretary, observed in a wide- 
ranging criticism of the limited scope of the initial Cardwell reforms in October 1871, in 
comparison with the systems available on the continent ` .... the 
field telegraph, which has 
played so great a part in recent wars, exists only for a very limited force '. 109 
Army officers continued to make the same point, usually as part of the general thesis 
that the greatest lesson to be learnt from continental, and specifically from Prussian, practice, 
was that effectiveness in war depended upon having a well-practised organisation in place in 
peace. Captain Burnaby included telegraphs in this category in a lecture at RUSI in 1872,110 
and the very influential Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Home reiterated the message in the same 
place in 1875. ` Prussia conquered France, not so much from valour on the field of battle, as 
by the most painstaking care in every detail'; ill and the German telegraph system, organised 
from national level down to field detachments, exemplified this. 112 
The lesson was clear, but Carnarvon's point was the decisive one; expenditure for 
military purposes would only be provided for a very limited force. The technologies were 
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understood; the efficiency of having a national system which could be put at the disposal of 
the military at a stroke was accepted; but the political reality was that the nation would 
stomach neither the cost nor the disruptive threat involved in giving the military any pre- 
emptive rights to the communications network in time of peace. 
Artillery 
One of-the dominant themes of the period was the extent to which the development of 
new industrial processes and materials inter-reacted with the practical requirements of 
soldiers, in a time dominated by threats of war. In this respect the artillery could well stand as 
a microcosm for the army as a whole, not least because of the way that the reactions of the 
soldiers concerned have since been represented. 
The issues which this section will examine are those of technology, not tactical 
deployment, but two caveats must be immediately entered; first, that these two aspects 
cannot be entirely disentangled; second, that the technical details of the developments, in 
metallurgy, chemistry and mechanical engineering, will only be touched upon to the extent 
that they illustrate the problems with which the military had to deal, because space and time 
would not allow a more comprehensive presentation here - but acknowledging also the 
writer's lack of competence to grapple with the intricacies of the technologies involved. 
There were four main issues affecting the development of artillery; what materials 
should be used in the construction of guns and carriages; whether the barrels should be 
smooth-bore or rifled; how developments in propellants and explosives should be exploited; 
and whether the guns should be muzzle- or breech-loading. In the eyes of many subsequent 
writers, this last issue was by far the most significant, and the stance adopted by the British 
military establishment on it has frequently been used to illustrate the common thesis that the 
Victorian army was dominated by pusillanimous reactionaries, ignorant of their profession, 
complacent, and unwilling to look at, far less learn from, foreign practice. The relevant 
volume of the Oxford History exemplifies this approach; 
Cardwell regarded artillery as an arm in which the mechanistic nation should be 
relatively strong..... His efforts here, however, were largely sterilized by the 
99 
conservatism of the ordnance officers; who actually insisted at this time on 
going back to muzzle-loading cannon, and thereby kept us behind the rest of 
Europe for a good part of twenty years. On the morrow of the Franco-Prussian 
war this was truly an astonishing folly; ,. 
113 
William McElwee, writing in 1974 (shortly after giving up the post of Head of the Modern 
Studies Department at Sandhurst), reiterates the message. `These innovations (the early 
introduction of breech-loading guns in the British army) were, of course, regarded at the War 
Office with grave mistrust. '114 The interjection `of course' makes his position clear, as do 
other comments in the same book. For instance, to support his argument about the appalling 
deficiencies in the British service at the beginning of the Second Boer War, he significantly 
misquotes the statistics about the artillery available. `Yet, by 1881, there were only two 
breech-loading batteries left in the British army, both in India; and by 1890 there were 
none. ' 115 He cites Appendix C of volume one of Callwell and Headlam's History of the Royal 
Artillery as his source for these figures, but what this appendix clearly records is that in 1890 
the army at home included 32 field batteries of modern breech-loaders and 15 of muzzle- 
loaders, and in India 12 batteries of breech-loaders and 41 of muzzle-loaders. 116 
This section will look at what was actually being said and done at the time, and it will 
be contended that a very different picture emerges - of private industry being encouraged to 
work closely with professional soldiers to exploit advances in technology, of continuing 
experimentation, of anxious observation of what other armies were doing, of serious debate 
within the profession about the relative importance of conflicting service requirements, and 
of a clash of opinion, familiar to any who have witnessed the birth of radical new ideas, 
between the pragmatists and the visionaries. The fact that the Ordnance Department of the 
army was charged with the responsibility for developing and providing guns for the navy as 
well must not be overlooked. This had the advantage of concentrating the skills and 
experience of the two services in co-operation (and it must be a matter for regret that this 
pattern of working together was not accepted as a general model for the forces), but it did 
113 Ensor, 15. 
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increase the risk that too much effort would be devoted to trying to reconcile the 
irreconcilable in one gun - as, for instance, the navy's need to penetrate armour with the 
army's desire to inflict casualties in the open. 
In 1859 all four issues were being actively explored, but the questions which 
particularly concerned the professionals were those relating to the materials to be used in 
making the guns, and the application of rifling to the barrels. In January there was a very 
technical lecture at RUSI, in which Captain Blakely, RA, explained that ` .... every cannon 
foundry in the kingdom is busy making guns which in a year or two must be obsolete; .... 
' 117 
In order to take the strain imposed by more powerful propellant charges it was necessary to 
reinforce the vital parts, and he outlined his proposals for using steel or wound wire for this 
purpose, praising Armstrong for producing guns according to similar principles, and noting 
with approval experiments being carried out by `Major Wade, of the US ordnance' and 
`Colonel Treuille de Beaulieu, a distinguished French artillery officer'. For the next twenty 
years the experiments continued, and there was much debate about the most suitable metal 
for barrels. This was the time when the techniques for manufacturing steel were being 
refined, and Herr Krupp was beginning to persuade the armies of Europe that all-steel guns 
were the ultimate answer, but there were many technical problems in the early stages, and 
steel was still a much more expensive option. Blakely had spelt this out in 1859; 
I am told that the introduction of steel for the manufacture of cannon renders 
my invention unnecessary. I am, however, inclined to believe that, the more 
valuable is the metal employed, the less John Bull will like to pay for its 
being so used that it cannot do an eighth of its work. l l8 
The practical significance of this cost factor was illustrated by the professor of artillery 
at the RMA, Woolwich, in a paper for the RAI in 1867, showing the comparative costs of 
using different metals; cast-iron £21 per ton, Armstrong's built-up wrought-iron construction 
117 `An account of some experiments elucidating the theory on which the author founds 
his patented method of 
manufacturing cannon; also of the endurance of some guns and other cylinders made to test the practical value 
of this method', 21 January 1859, JRUSI, vol. 3,1859,1-17,7. 
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£87 (down from £100), Krupp's steel £170, and gun-metal £187.119 Accordingly, while 
the army in India continued to use the traditional bronze, the British army persevered with 
wrought-iron, but on the Armstrong, built-up, principle. 120 There was practical evidence to 
support this policy, since the merits of the material had been professionally noted by 
observers of the American Civil War; a copy of a letter written from Washington on 11 
November 1861 by Colonel FM Eardley Wilmot, RA, spoke of seeing `(o)ne of the rifled 12 
prs. of wrought iron most excellent. A cast iron 12 pr. having a wrought iron ring on the 
breech not much liked. ' 121 
The material used to make the guns was mainly a matter for a handful of specialists, but 
the issue of rifling, affecting as it did both the range and accuracy of the weapon, concerned 
the whole army. James Fergusson, writing in April 1859, commented that the opinion that the 
increased range and accuracy of rifled muskets must drive the artillery off the battlefield took 
no account of the fact that the same improvement was about to take place with cannon; `... . 
there is no principle applicable to rifles which is not equally applicable to artillery. ' 122 He 
cited experiments carried out by General John Jacob many years previously to show that a 
well-made rifled gun could throw a projectile accurately over ten miles, and commented 
favourably on the performance of Armstrong's prototype rifled gun of 1854 in trials against 
the standard 9-pounder field gun. 123 While recognising that there was still much work to do 
before the technical problems were all solved, he stressed the importance of encouraging the 
civilian engineers to get on with it without hindrance. The many references to the work 
which was currently in hand, in the Quarterly Reports of the Ordnance Select Committee for 
that year, suggest that this advice was being heeded. Minute no. 794, besides referring to 
Armstrong's 32-pounder (for naval service), describes the trials of rifled field guns at 
Shoeburyness; no. 942 refers to Lancaster's oval-bored field guns; and no. 1047 reports on 
119 Owen, Major CH, `The present state of the artillery question', Proc RAI, vol. 5,1867,213-30,219. 
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Whitworth's prototype rifled 6,9 and 32- pounders. 124 It is significant that these reports 
include references to a work entitled L Etude Sur les Canons Rayes by Captain Gillion of the 
Belgian artillery. 
With hindsight, it seems that the merits of rifling, which had been demonstrated for the 
first time in battle on the field of Solferino, 125 must have been so clear that there could be no 
resistance to its general adoption. However, greater accuracy at longer range was not always 
the overriding requirement; reliability, endurance and ease of maintenance in action were 
sometimes more valuable in practice. Edward Hagerman says that technical problems with 
rifled guns made them unpopular with the armies in the American Civil War, and confirms 
that the smooth-bore `Napoleon' 12-pounder continued to be the weapon preferred by 
artillery officers and field commanders throughout that war. 126 This choice was duly 
acknowledged in the British service, as Charles Chesney recorded at the time, noting one 
particular reason why this was so. 
And so disappointing has been the experience of rifled guns in the closer 
fields of America, that General Grant, in very recently laying down the future 
organization of the United States artillery, has directed one half of his 
batteries to retain the simple smooth-bore howitzer known as the Napoleon 
gun 
127 
Here there is a hint of the perennial problem confronting the British army; the 
reconciliation of the needs of the soldiers defending the colonies with the needs of those who 
were concerned with the possibility of becoming involved with a European opponent. 
American experience in their `closer fields' was particularly relevant to the former, because 
of the terrain in which they were required to fight, but the European armies were more 
impressed by the need to increase the range of the guns in their more open country. In the 
event, the `continentalists' clearly won the argument, and only a year after Chesney's 
comment, the professor of artillery was confidently telling the RAI that `(i)t 
is now pretty 
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generally acknowledged that rifled ordnance should be used in preference to SB guns for 
land service' . 
128 He added, somewhat tartly, in what may well have been a riposte to a long 
article by the editor of the Edinburgh Review comparing the approaches of the main 
European powers to the question of rifling (which Chesney had also noted), 129 that 
John Bull must learn patience, and not expect to re-model his artillery in a 
year or two; and he should also turn a deaf ear to the loud and positive 
declamations of amateurs, and trust all questions of armament to those who 
are educated for and spend their lives in the service. 130 
The developments in ammunition, in their propellants, their explosive and killing 
power, and their fuze mechanisms, were so technically demanding that there was little 
opportunity for gifted amateurs to intervene. This study will not attempt to enter into the 
technical detail. 131 What is significant here is the way that the professionals involved kept 
abreast of what was happening and what was required; the regular reporting of inventions 
and experiments to the Ordnance Department and, later, the Department of the Director of 
Artillery, duly published and circulated each quarter; the continuing contact at a personal 
level between the relevant soldiers and the civilians who were creating the new materials; 
and the vigorous attempts to find out what other armies were doing in this respect. 
The quarterly `Abstracts' provide a formidable (even overwhelming) mass of 
information to illustrate how this was being done, and the `Abstracts' for the quarter ending 
31 December 1876 are typical of their kind. The regular section devoted to Foreign Artillery 
includes a report on the quality of a fragment of case shot recovered from the French 
manoeuvres at Chalons by Colonel Reilly, a despatch from General Walker, the military 
attache at Berlin, with answers to technical points about artillery trials which he had put to 
the German government, analysis of `a specimen of a Prussian time fuze for shrapnel shell' 
supplied by the German military attache in exchange for a British fuze, a report culled from 
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the French Revue d'Artillerie about Russian experiments showing the greater penetrative 
power of steel shell tempered in oil, and an account by the military attache at St. Petersburg 
of a fatal accident with a Russian naval gun. 132 It is interesting to see how the military 
attaches were used to obtain such samples of materials. This seems to have been an 
important, if sometimes tiresome, part of their job; for example, two letters of Walker's to the 
Foreign Office in June 1869 show that he had been asked to collect and send samples of 
Prussian explosive powder for analysis, and that he ended up by carrying the parcel to 
England himself in HMS Minotaur. 133 On a subsequent occasion, he was relieved to receive a 
letter from Cardwell, saying that there was no need to get hold of a specimen of the 
Mitrailleuse at present, but that he would like ` .... some 
definite information as to the 
construction and power of that weapon' . 
134 
It does appear that, in these aspects of technical progress, the Royal Artillery was 
taking care to keep abreast of the latest developments, and that there was, generally speaking, 
a consensus of opinion about the merits of the systems on offer. Notoriously, this was not the 
case where the issue of breech- or muzzle-loading was concerned. There was a fundamental 
difference of opinion about the balance of advantage between the two systems, which led the 
British service to follow a different path from that of its main rivals for most of this period, 
and provided much of the evidence which has since been used to pass condemnatory 
judgments on both the army and navy of the era. The issue therefore merits a rather more 
detailed examination. 
Breech-loading systems had of course been tried out ever since the first introduction of 
firearms, but the problem of sealing the breech effectively enough to avoid either 
catastrophic accidents or, at best, a crucial diminution of power through leakage of gas, had 
proved insuperable. Accordingly, loading artillery from the muzzle became the only accepted 
method for armies, and this served well enough until (as Blakely had noted in the lecture 
132 Abstracts of Proceedings of the Department of the Director of Artillery for the quarter ending 31 December 
1876. PRO WO 33/31. 
133 Walker to FO, 14 and 24 June 1869. PRO FO 64/673. 
134 Cardwell to Walker, 6 January 1871. PRO FO 64/729. 
105 
quoted) the development of more accurate and longer-range rifled muskets began to drive the 
guns farther from the line of battle, which made it desirable to increase the range and 
accuracy of artillery in at least the same ratio. As with muskets, rifling provided the solution 
to the immediate problem, but charging a rifled muzzle-loading cannon was similarly slow, 
and the attraction of loading at the breech equally appealing. 
There was the additional benefit, as with muskets, that a breech-loading system 
potentially reduced the exposure of the gunners involved to enemy fire. The first experiments 
with rifling of cannon, which were undertaken by Armstrong while the Crimean War was 
still in progress, therefore included tests of breech-loaders. ' 35 The results obtained by both 
Armstrong and Whitworth were considered to be impressive, and in 1859 the Royal Arsenal 
at Woolwich began to equip the army with breech-loading cannon. 
The ballistic performance of these guns met with universal approval, but from the start 
there were questions about their reliability and endurance in the field. Fergusson's article in 
April 1859, while acknowledging that both the French and the Prussians were experimenting 
with the system, expressed reservations about the perfection of the breech mechanism; 
136 and 
a brief reference to the American view, in Eardley Wilmot's letter previously quoted, 
suggests that this was not seen by them to be an important aspect of performance; `breech- 
loading looked on with indifference. ' 137 However, the experiments on the continent led to the 
rapid introduction of breech-loading big guns in the swiftly modernising French fleet, and 
added to the threat which this growing power posed to the Royal Navy - something which 
the editor of the Edinburgh Review felt it advisable to bring to the attention of the Secretary 
for War, his kinsman and predecessor at the Review, in a long private letter in April 1862.138 
The activities of their European opposite numbers were kept under regular review by 
means of annual tours abroad conducted by selected gunner officers, and the report of the 
tour in 1864, to Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, drew particular attention to the fact 
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that breech-loading field guns were now being generally introduced. 139 It is interesting, 
therefore, to contrast the assessment by these officers with what some of their colleagues 
were saying. 
First, two influential theoreticians. Major Owen's paper to the Royal Artillery 
Institution in 1867 set out the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems, but 
expressed no strong preference, noting merely that `(t)he Prussians, like ourselves, employ 
BL guns for field service, the French, Americans, and others, ML guns'. 140 Henry 
Brackenbury, writing of field artillery in a general analysis of the military equipment of the 
Great Powers of Europe in 1867, said that, recognising that rifling was the vital factor, every 
Power was following its own line of development. While Prussia and Russia had already 
settled on the all-steel breech-loading system of Krupp, the French were wisely sticking with 
their bronze muzzle-loaders and the Austrians, after experiencing `terrible drawbacks', had 
reverted to similar weapons. In his view, there was not much to choose between any of them 
as fire systems. 141 He was, however, rather perturbed to note that a committee of British 
senior officers also favoured reverting to muzzle-loaders on the grounds of their greater 
simplicity and reliability, and was glad that the Commander-in-Chief was opposed to such a 
step, because of the additional disruption and expense which it would impose upon the 
Regiment. 142 It is apparent that neither Owen nor Brackenbury considered that there was a 
need for the British army to rethink its approach on technical grounds. 
However, as Brackenbury had recognised, other gunners were beginning to feel that 
there was a strong case for reverting to muzzle-loading. The pressure came mainly from 
officers in the field, who had been expressing reservations about the reliability of the breech- 
loaders from the beginning. A report written by Captain FS Stoney, RA (Captain Instructor, 
Royal Gun Factories) in 1868 sums up the situation clearly. As far back as 1863, he pointed 
out, the Armstrong and Whitworth Committee, set up to look at the various options, had 
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come to the conclusion that the Armstrong muzzle-loader was the best choice for field use as 
well as for heavy guns. 143 
This startling conclusion led to further enquiry; a new committee, 
consisting of Sir R Dacres as president, and 12 experienced RA officers of 
high rank, as members, was appointed in 1866 specially to investigate the 
subject, and according to Lieut. -Col. Miller, Secretary, the actual terms of 
this committee's decision are, (footnote; see paper entitled `The 
comparative advantages of breech-loading and muzzle-loading systems for 
Rifled Field Artillery', Proceedings RA Institution, Vol. V. p. 312) `that they 
be manufactured hereafter. ' 
The general reason for coming to this result is briefly summed up by 
Lieut. -Col. Miller as follows: -'If we had to take immediate part in a 
European war we should bring into the field a delicate gun requiring 
constant care and a great variety of stores for its sole use; (footnote omitted) 
we should further be liable to the risk of the gun failing us at critical 
moments, but we should not have the satisfaction of getting any advantage 
in range, accuracy or rate of fire which would not equally be presented by a 
muzzle-loading system' . 
144 
While the debate continued no more breech-loaders were made, 145 and the December 
1867 Report of the Director of Ordnance and the Proceedings of the Ordnance Select 
Committee for the first quarter of 1868 both record a determination to find a good muzzle- 
loader for field use. 146 Pressure from concerned professionals continued, and there was a 
powerful debate at RUSI in March 1870. Colonel Maxwell presented a paper explaining the 
reasons why the Indian army was adopting a muzzle-loading 9-pounder, and went into 
considerable detail about the situation in other countries. He disagreed that this was a 
retrograde step in terms of accuracy and range; 
until the past year there existed, and perhaps exists still in the minds of 
many artillerymen, a somewhat ill-defined impression that a breech-loader 
must shoot better than a muzzle-loader. I, for one, hold that this is by no 
means the case. 147 
In the debate which followed, Eardley Wilmot, now a general, added his weight to the 
argument; 
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I think the artillery has gone rather in the wrong direction; in seeking for a breech-loading gun for field artillery, they are seeking for a thing for which 
there is no necessity; not that there is an objection to breech-loading, as 
such, because if a heavy breech-loading gun could be found, it might be 
made a valuable weapon. 148 
The build-up of professional objections to breech-loaders was now too strong to be 
gainsaid, and in the newly appointed Director of Artillery, Brigadier-General Adye, those 
who favoured a return to the old system found a powerful supporter, and one whose position 
enabled him to take action. It is therefore pertinent to ask the question; was he, in this respect 
(as Howard Bailes's comment noted in chapter 2 of this study suggests), a conservative, 
harking back to an outdated technology, or a practical soldier solving an operational 
problem? Colonel EM Lloyd, RE, in the Dictionary of National Biography, inadvertently 
adds strength to the `conservative' j udgment, in seeking to absolve Adye from the 
responsibility by misdating the reversion to muzzle-loaders by some eight years. 
To his administration has been attributed the failure of the British artillery 
to keep pace in improvements with that of other countries. Adye was 
undoubtedly a firm believer in the wrought-iron muzzle-loader. But the 
reversion to muzzle-loading had taken place in 1863 before he came into 
office, and it was only after he had left office that improvements in 
gunpowder furnished irresistible arguments in favour of breech-loading. 149 
Adye, naturally, felt that he had acted as a rational soldier. In his memoirs he describes the 
operational and cost disadvantages of the Armstrong guns, the build-up of opposition at 
committee level between 1865 and 1867, and the practical steps which he initiated to resolve 
the matter. In 1870 he had got hold of a German 9-pounder breech-loading gun, `.... and 
after a long series of trials the committee reported that the English gun was superior, not in 
simplicity, but in range and power, and in rapidity of fire'. 150 He proceeds, at some length, to 
describe the vigour with which he encouraged continuing experimentation, until further 
refinements in steel construction and propellants justified a return to breech-loading guns in 
1881.151 While it would be difficult to contradict his contention that the reversion to the 
manufacture of muzzle-loaders in 1871 was made on practical grounds (and popular amongst 
148 cold, 202. 
149DNB Supplement, vol. 1,18-20. 
150 Adye, General Sir John, Recollections of a Military Life, (London, Smith, Elder, 1895), 286-7. 
I51 Ibid, 288-9. 
109 
active soldiers), there is evidence that it soon became apparent to some professional soldiers 
that the British army was falling behind its rivals because of its dilatoriness in absorbing the 
significance of the improvements in technology. This is illustrated by some comments 
written by Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills-Johnes in the frontispiece and some inside 
pages of the copy of Adye's memoirs in the National Library of Wales, and quoted in 
Appendix B2. 
These comments deserve respect, but they were written in 1895. Back in 1871, when 
the manufacture of muzzle-loaders was resumed, the issue was still in dispute. So respected 
an expert as Majendie was still protesting that the foreign preference for breech-loaders was 
based on faulty information. He analysed in detail European trials involving British muzzle- 
loaders to demonstrate, rather persuasively, that the tests had been rigged and the evidence 
distorted in favour of Krupp steel breech-loaders. His conclusion was that Krupp guns, 
besides costing more than twice as much as their `Woolwich' competitors, could still not 
stand up to heavy work; the British services should not hastily return again to breech-loading, 
and certainly not in response to the special pleading of those with a vested interest in 
promoting one particular system. 152 On the other hand, Colonel HA Smythe, RA, who had 
seen the Prussian guns in action in the bombardment of Thionville and Metz, was extemely 
impressed; 
I may perhaps here remark, without intruding any opinion on the general 
question of muzzle and breech-loading, that the working of these breech- 
loaders with this projectile and fuze, against this object, and at the rates here 
ordered, seemed nearly perfect; the ease of loading and security of the men 
could hardly be equalled, and the smoothness and clockwork regularity of 
the whole operation not easily surpassed. 153 
And so the debate continued. In May 1873 Lieut. -Colonel Reilly, Adye's Assistant 
Director, issued the results of a detailed study of the French artillery, including their 
judgment of the British guns. 154 Their conclusion was comforting; `(t)he Woolwich Service 
152 'English guns and foreign critics', Proc RAI, vol. 7,1871. 
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gun gives results which are not inferior to those of any other field gun actually in the Service 
in Europe- 
. 
'55 Reilly, clearly anxious to anticipate the objection that, nevertheless, the French 
had abandoned muzzle-loaders, was at pains to show that the British service was not entirely 
alone. 
Though it must always be most interesting and instructive to follow the 
experiments in France and Germany, we should not be too ready to adopt their 
decisions as conclusive .... It is often asserted that we stand alone in adhering to our muzzle-loading 
system of artillery - it may therefore be well to state that the very opposite is 
the truth, as the following nations have more or less followed the same 
method: - Norway, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turke g, GreeceEgypt, 
Holland, Brazil, Peru, Chili (sic) and the Chinese Empire. 1 6 
On 8 June 1874, an evening meeting was convened at RUSI to hear another paper on 
the subject, and an impressive number of soldiers and sailors assembled to contribute to a 
crucial discussion. 157 The paper, delivered by Major JP Morgan, RA, contained much 
technical analysis of the whole range of guns and projectiles, and drew particular attention to 
the dangerous unreliability of time-fuzed ammunition with breech-loaders; it was all very 
well for the Prussians, who were content with percussion fuzes, but the British army would 
always need guns which could fire air-bursting shrapnel. It then became apparent that, 
although he quoted Adye at length, to the effect that ` .... the 
breech-loading system itself 
had broken down, not only as regards the ammunition but also as regards the guns', he was 
actually advocating an improved version, of his own invention, rather than the retention of 
muzzle-loading. 158 The debate which followed revealed that opinion was still very much 
divided, even amongst those who could claim expert knowledge. Colonel Chesney made the 
vital point that the requirements of field and naval artillery must be distinguished; in his 
experience, German army officers were ` .... perfectly and entirely satisfied 
that breech- 
loading is the system .... 
' but that it did not follow that this was the case with naval 
ordnance, an opinion which was strongly endorsed by several of the naval officers present, 
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citing Prussian and French experience as well as their own. 159 When the debate turned once 
again to field artillery, the greater reliability of the muzzle-loading system continued to be 
urged by Captain Owen and Major Stoney as the justification for making no change, and it 
was obvious that there was no support at all for Morgan's own proposal. 160 
Three years later, informed opinion in the Royal Artillery was still of the same mind, 
but the wind of change was beginning to be felt. In July 1877 Major Maitland, in his lecture 
at the RE Institute, while illuminating the thesis that the past three years had witnessed ` .... 
remarkable progress in the science of Artillery, not only in our own country, but among 
nearly all the continental nations .... 
', asserted that the new muzzle-loading 12-pounder 
being introduced into the British service was ` .... 
by far the most powerful weapon in the 
world of its kind'. 161 No doubt the graphs and tables which he presented supported his case, 
but the significance of the determination of most continental armies to continue with the 
improvement of their breech-loaders was now beginning to impress the army establishment, 
including Adye. 
Director of Artillery, 16.8.77, forwards the following for record: --- 
Foreign Office, 5.7.77, communicate despatch, no. 29, from Her Majesty's 
Charge d'Affaires at Dresden, who informs that the new German field guns 
are universally considered superior to any in Europe, the Austrian Udatius 
gun excepted, which some authorities are disposed to prefer to the German 
gun. 
The question of muzzle versus breech-loaders is, he states, no longer 
considered an open one by continental critics, and as a consequence of this 
opinion, the English guns are classed as third rate by all foreign 
specialists. 
162 
From this time on the change in official opinion seems to have been swift and 
complete, as can be deduced from the pages of the service journals. In 1879 an essay was 
159 jbid, 433. The observations of Captain Scott, RN, 435, and Admiral Ryder and Captain Selwyn, RN, 436, 
expose the flimsiness of Ensor's argument that `.... The artillery branch of the army was 
in the hands of 
reactionaries with a passion for muzzle-loaders, and they imposed their views on the navy at a time when naval 
ordnance elsewhere was progressing faster than military'. Ensor, 122. 160 Ibid, 433-8. 
161 Maitland, 113. 
162 Abstracts of Proceedings of the Department of the Director of Artillery for the quarter ending 
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published in the Proceedings of the RAI enumerating all the advantages of breech-loading, 
with many tables and figures, and stressing that this was the way forward - and it is worthy 
of note that this essay was awarded the silver medal prize for the year. 163 The debate at RUSI 
about the influence of modern fire, which followed soon after, showed that the superiority of 
breech-loading was no longer seriously questioned; Charles Brackenbury's proposal of the 
adoption of gun-shields, as Captain James pointed out, only made sense with such weapons, 
` 
.... 
but as the path of artillery progress seems to lie in that direction, this is not a 
consideration which need deter us' . 
164 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Adye was now, as he claimed, pushing vigorously 
for their reintroduction by the Royal Artillery, and that this process began a year later. Was this 
decade, then, a dreadful aberration on the part of a smug and ignorant military hierarchy? 
When the sequence of events is reviewed in retrospect, it is understandable that the Hills- 
Johnes opinion (that Adye and his like were somewhat slow to respond to the march of 
technical progress) has found its supporters, but two points stand out clearly, and it is not 
difficult to infer a third. 
First, the acknowledged and serious drawbacks of the early breech-loaders were rightly 
regarded as too serious to risk, by men who would generally have to fight a long way from 
help, under conditions where absolute reliability was truly a matter of life and death. The 
artillery equipment immediately available for the British army must, therefore, meet this 
requirement. Second, the leading figures involved, far from being ignorant of, or indifferent to, 
what was happening elsewhere, took pains to ensure that they were kept informed and that the 
process of reappraisal was continuous, if cautious. Third, the question of comparative cost, 
which occurs with some regularity in all the discussions, goes a long way towards explaining 
why preserving a system which delivered `more bangs to the buck' was judged to be a prudent 
163 Elles, Captain ER, RA, `On the question whether any development of the material of Field Artillery is 
necessitated by the general adoption of field entrenchments on the field of battle, and if so, on the direction such 
development should take', Proc RAI, vol. 10,1879,558-76. 
164 James, Captain Walter H, RE, `Modern fire: Its influence on armament, training and tactics', 7 May 1880, 
JRUSI, vol. 24,378-403,388. Illustration 3 is a French sketch of the Armstrong 12 pounder BL gun of 1880. 
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ay of both currying favour with the government (as Hills-Johnes put it) and maximising the 
amount of money available for other military priorities. In a democratic society such 
considerations are usually practical necessities, and if the military leadership of the time took 
this course they can scarcely be condemned for it. 
Machine guns 
As with many other technologies, the development of machine guns passed through 
three main phases; first, the exploration of the initial idea, at a time before the prevailing 
level of other technologies was sufficient to support it; later efforts, once the basic 
technologies had become available, to turn this concept to practical use, involving the pursuit 
of alternative and competing solutions; finally, agreement on one preferred method, and the 
rapid exploitation of the resulting tool. In the case of machine guns, the first phase long 
preceded the period of this study, and the third immediately followed it, so the concern of 
this section will be mainly with the intermediate phase. 
There are accounts of guns which could fire many shots at the same time, or in rapid 
sequence, as far back as the fourteenth century. 165 The problem was that, until the 
development of integral ammunition and secure breech mechanisms, the results achieved by 
these weapons did not justify their wide deployment, and even such a splendid idea as James 
Puckle's machine gun of 1717 simply provided a little passing amusement. 166 
By 1859 both the main problems were in the process of being solved. Respectable 
integrated ammunition and acceptable, if by no means perfect, breech mechanisms were 
available. The outbreak of the American Civil War, which led to rapid improvement in both 
these areas, encouraged the American engineer RJ Gatling to devise a range of manually 
operated, multi-barrelled, rapid-firing guns, and a handful were used in action before the end 
165 Reid, William, The Lore of Arms (London, Arrow Books, 1984), ch. 7,65. There is a fascinating picture of 
one such Orgelgeschütz of the early 16a'. c. on page 68, which looks not unlike a World War II Russian rocket 
launcher. 
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of the war. 167 British observers were able to watch tests of the new weapon, but reported 
unfavourably, to the General Commanding in Canada, on its power and its durability. 168 On 
the other hand, and crucially, a Swiss observer was impressed; his account was quickly 
published in Europe, and (as it turned out) the French army took due note. 169 
So far as the British service is concerned, if the Proceedings of the Ordnance Select 
Committee for the Quarter ending 31 March 1867 are to be believed, the army at home never 
saw Mahon's report. At all events, minute 20,873, `The Gatling Battery', referred to a letter 
from Sir F Bruce at Washington, dated 25 December 1866, containing a newspaper account 
of `a new firearm called the Gatling battery gun', and said that no steps should be taken until 
this report had been confirmed. 170 This soon followed, and their reaction was swift. Minute 
21,200 of 18 February 1867 showed that they were obtaining a gun and ammunition from the 
London agents, and the report of its trial at Shoeburyness was available on 13 March. 
Unfortunately, this gave conclusions similar to those which Mahon had relayed to General 
Williams; the gun was generally inferior in effect to equivalent field guns and too heavy to 
justify its expense, except possibly for some static defensive works. In any case, the agent 
wanted to withdraw the gun until he could replace it with an improved model. 171 For the time 
being that was that. 
However, some forward-looking soldiers were showing greater interest, particularly 
because there were now signs of progress on the continent. Henry Brackenbury had been 
asked to contribute an account of the state of the armies of the major European Powers to the 
first volume of the new St. Paul 's magazine, which appeared in November 1867. In it he 
introduced the topic of the Mitrailleuse, admitting that he was relying on rumours of `... . 
these mysterious pieces, to be worked by turning a handle, which it is said can keep up a 
continuous shower of rifle bullets .... 
These are probably constructed somewhat on the plan 
167 Gatling, RJ, `Machine guns: the "Gatling Battery" - the Agar and Claxton guns - the French and 
Montigny Mitrailleurs', JRUSI, vol. 14,1870,509. 
168 Mahon, Captain Thomas, RA, report to Lieutenant-General Sir WF Williams, 1 August 1862; cited by 
Luvaas, Legacy, 25. 
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170 Abstracts of Proceedings of the Ordnance Select Committee, for the quarter ending 31'`. March 1867,233. 
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of the American Gatling gun. ' 12 Major GV Fosbery, VC, elaborated on this theme in 
volume 13 of JRUSI shortly thereafter, contrasting the merits of the Mitrailleuse with the 
defects of the Gatling, and this provoked a furious rejoinder from Gatling himself in volume 
14.173 In this he gave all the reasons why his range of guns was superior to its rivals, and 
argued with some conviction that the French had plagiarised his ideas, ending with a 
prescient vision of a time when machine guns would play a decisive role on the battlefield. 174 
Meanwhile, his agent had been working to convince the British establishment of the 
Gatling's merits. In February 1869 the Director-General of Ordnance noted that Mitrailleurs 
were under serious consideration, if they had not actually been obtained, by the governments 
of Russia and Prussia, as well as Belgium and France; that he had received news from the 
Gatling agent that in tests in Munich their guns had scored `a decisive triumph' over all the 
competition, and that the latter now solicited an order from the British government. 175 A 
sample Montigny Mitrailleuse had already been ordered, and consent was given to buy a 
Gatling. 176 
The war of 1870 now provided an arena in which the Mitrailleuse could be seen in 
action, and the general agreement amongst observers was that the results were disappointing. 
To a large extent this was the result of faulty tactical deployment, but fundamental criticisms 
were still being made of the concept itself. These are admirably set out in the long 
memorandum which the Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office 
circulated in 1871, summarising the reports of the military attaches during the campaign. 
Many instances were given of Colonel Walker and Captain Hozier reporting, from their own 
observation and from the evidence of Prussian and Bavarian officers, that such weapons were 
not effective under most conditions. 
172 Brackenbury, H, `The military armaments of the five Great Powers', St. Paul's, vol. 1, November 1867,193- 
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On the whole, to judge from the general tone of the despatches of the Military Attaches and 
the opinions expressed in the German Military Press it would seem that the mitrailleuse, 
although generally recognized as a powerful auxiliary for the flank defence of fortifications, 
and in other exceptional cases, is of no great value in the field. '77 
This served to confirm, on good authority, the established opinion within the British 
military hierarchy (the 'pragmatists'), but the `visionaries' still had their voice. Colonel HA 
Smyth, RA, who had also seen the Prussians in action during the war, claimed that some 
officers were impressed by the effect of the Mitrailleuse, and would have liked to have them 
as battalion guns. 178 Captain Fox Strangways, RHA, in a lecture at Aldershot in March 1872, 
could see a use for them in reinforcing the assault. `A few mitrailleuses, crammed up with the 
infantry, might be at hand at once, and exercise a powerful effect in supporting their 
lodgment, and in preventing the retiring enemy from reforming. ' 179 
To their credit, the Ordnance establishment, despite their reservations, continued to 
explore the qualities of the alternatives on offer. The Special Committee on Mitrailleurs 
sought and recorded the views of officers who had seen the European versions in action 
(including Walker, Reilly, both Brackenburys, Hozier and Fielding, as well as Colonel 
Conolly, now military attache at Paris, but who had missed the fighting). Their differing 
opinions were set out in two reports at the end of 1871, and the final judgment was 
sufficiently equivocal to make it reasonable for Adye, the Director of Artillery, to maintain, 
in his annual report to the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance in February 1872, that 
(t)hey may occasionally be useful in certain fixed defensive positions, but it 
seems doubtful whether exceptionally complicated weapons for purposes so 
rare should be maintained, .... 
They are, in my opinion, delicate feeble 
weapons and have but a narrow sphere of usefulness. 
180 
177 Extracts from the reports of the Military Attaches who accompanied the French and Prussian armies during 
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Colonel Lumley Graham disagreed. In the translator's preface to his version of 
Boguslawski's Tactical Deductions, in 1874, he pointed out that, though the author was not 
impressed by Mitrailleuses, he (Graham) felt that they could be decisive weapons if properly 
used. 181 This opinion was aired more forcefully at another vigorous debate at RUSI the 
following April. Captain E Rogers presented a paper on `The Gatling gun; its place in 
tactics', in which he asserted that the `open verdict' on machine guns in general had arisen 
because the system `was not thoroughly understood' by those who had discussed it 
previously. 182 Every significant continental army was now introducing them; whatever the 
experience of observers such as Walker, many German officers were in favour of their use, 
and he invoked the impressive name of von Moltke himself when quoting from the `official 
work on the Franco-Prussian war' to support this claim. '83 
This paper and the debate which followed were naturally mainly concerned with tactics, 
but they brought out the two connected issues which were to prove decisive in settling the 
future of the machine gun. The first was the question of the power-weight ratio. When 
deployed, they were as heavy and cumbersome as field guns, but, in the view of professionals 
like Captain Owen, Captain Nolan and Major Hale, had neither the range nor the hitting 
power to compete. The figures had been quoted regularly over the years and could hardly be 
gainsaid. The second was that they were still being thought of as artillery weapons, as either 
an adjunct or an alternative to the field guns. Rogers pointed out that this was a mistake, and 
he quoted at length from the report of the Swedo-Norwegian Committee on mitrailleurs on 
` 
.... the 
importance of not confounding mitrailleurs with artillery, as much on account of 
. their effect as the proper nature of their employment' 
1 s4 
Improving the power-weight ratio would do much to promote this argument, that 
machine guns were potentially infantry rather than artillery weapons, but this was not an easy 
181 Boguslawski, A von, Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, tr. Colonel Lumley Graham, 
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matter with the existing types of equipment, and in December 1880, which marks the end of 
this period under study, yet another Second Progress Report of Committee on Machine Guns 
was still describing trials of many competing systems. 185 A handful of Gatlings and 
Nordenfeldts had, it is true, accompanied the expeditions in Africa and Afghanistan during 
the late 1870s and early 1880s, and Howard Baffles (a penetrating analyst of the impact of 
technology on the Victorian army) has shown that these experiences encouraged the 
enthusiasts to press for their wider use. 186 However, vindication of the caution of the 
Ordnance Department was at hand. In 1882 the American engineer Hiram Maxim, working 
in London, designed the first truly automatic weapon, making use of the power of the recoil 
to reload and fire the gun. This made it possible to reduce the weight and size dramatically, 
while enhancing the hitting power, and at last the army had a gun which it was practical to 
use at battalion level with the infantry in the field. 187 
Small arms 
A layman watching a parade of British infantry in 1859 would have been forgiven for 
thinking that the men were armed with weapons similar to those which their grandfathers had 
carried in the Peninsula fifty years before. The ponderous, large-bore, muzzle-loading 
Enfield rifles looked like the old `Brown Bess' musket, though they were in fact a much 
better weapon, considerably improved in reliability, range and accuracy; but they still 
suffered from the faults common to all muzzle-loaders. They could only be loaded 
comfortably by someone standing and they were slow and complicated to load and fire. They 
had proved their worth when up against Russians equipped with smooth-bore muskets in the 
Crimea, and were regarded as the best military muzzle-loading rifle in current use, but it was 
already acknowledged by most of the military hierarchy that they should be replaced. 
'88 It 
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needs to be recorded, however, that so thoughtful an observer of the American war as 
Colonel Denison was still maintaining that the long Enfield was ` .... without any exception 
the best of all rifles .... ' as late as 1868.189 
An inherently better system was available, since breech-loading rifles of several kinds 
had been tried out for many years; the Hall rifle, for instance, had been in use in the United 
States since 1817, and the more efficient Sharpe's rifle since 1848.190 Breech-loaders did 
away with the need for a ramrod, and they could be loaded while kneeling or lying down, 
but, until ammunition which incorporated its own ignition system was perfected, the 
necessity to use a separate percussion cap as the primer meant that the rate of fire was no 
better than that of the muzzle-loader. Inventors in several countries had been working for a 
good many years to overcome this problem, and solutions had been found. In 1828, Johann 
Nikolaus Dreyse developed an integral cartridge in which the fulminate primer was placed 
immediately behind the bullet, and a needle-shaped firing-pin pierced through the propellant 
explosive to ignite it. This needle gun was adopted by the Prussian army from 1848 onwards, 
and for the next few years they were the only large army to possess a breech-loading rifle. ' 91 
This development was duly noted in England. James Fergusson, evaluating the small- 
arms systems available in April 1859, recorded that `.... as far back as 1848 the Prussian 
soldier could deliver three or four balls for one which any enemy could return .... 
', but 
concluded that ` .... with the present 
drill and present mode of manoeuvring troops, its 
adoption would be a fatal mistake .... 
' for the British army, because the ammunition would 
be used up so quickly. 192 This was to be a continuing reservation whenever innovations to 
increase rapidity of fire were in question, as Charles Chesney observed in 1866.193 
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The war in Italy in 1859 was fought with muzzle-loaders by all the participants, and the 
American Civil War began with both sides similarly armed. 194 This war inevitably stimulated 
rapid experimentation and innovation, and by 1865 many different systems of breech-loading 
rifles and carbines were in use. This provoked great interest on the European side of the 
Atlantic, and The Times, with characteristic confidence, began to insist that one of these, the 
Mont Storm rifle, should be adopted forthwith by the British army, because of `.... its 
immeasurable superiority over all other weapons of the same kind'. 195 
In 1864 there came the war over the Danish Duchies in Schleswig-Holstein, in which 
the needle gun was seen in serious action for the first time, and its success made some impact 
on professional observers; but it was two years later, when the Prussians unexpectedly 
overwhelmed the Austrian army in the Seven Weeks' War, that the public at large began to 
understand just how decisive breech-loading rifles had become. This distinction between the 
professionals (in France as well as Britain) and the general public is significant, because it 
has created an erroneous idea in the minds of many subsequent writers about the alertness of 
the military establishment to the need for change. RJ Gatling contributed to the creation of 
the myth. In his JRUSI article in 1870, while complaining about the frustrations endured by 
all inventors, he declared that 
(t)he inventors of breech-loaders will readily recall the many 
disappointments and rebuffs they met with from European 
Governments until the Prussians adopted them, and demonstrated their 
great superiority upon the battlefield of Königgratz..... Then, for the 
first time, the other European Governments saw the effectiveness of 
the breech-loader, and made haste to adopt it. 196 
William Russell must share some of the blame. He had written in the most excited 
terms to Delane in July 1866 to get him to impress upon the British authorities that they must 
give the army a comparable weapon at once, 197 and the Pall Mall Gazette had commented 
that this was probably the first time that ministers had spoken of a civilian newspaper 
194 Hagerman, 308 n. 31. 
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correspondent as a person `.... whose opinions were entitled to great weight' in such a matter. 
Two biographers of Russell's have fastened on to this; Atkins has already been cited, and 
Hankinson makes the same point; `He was instrumental, after Königgrätz, in bringing the 
importance of the "needle-gun" to public attention' . 
198 
Subsequent military historians seem to have accepted the truth of this. Both Hew 
Strachan and Edward Spiers have given further support at least to the general message that it 
was the 1866 war which brought home the significance of the breech-loader; Strachan says; 
`.... not until Königgrätz in 1866 did the powers of Europe fully appreciate the qualities of the 
weapon' 199, and Spiers says; `Like the French, who introduced the Chassepöt - an even 
better weapon than the needle gun - in 1866, the British followed the Prussian example' 200 
In saying so they are echoing words of Sir Michael Howard's; `(o)nly then (in 1866) did the 
other Powers hasten to equip themselves with the breech-loaders whose patterns had been 
neglected for years on the shelves of their Ministries. '201 
This seriously underrates both the collection of military intelligence and the research 
activity which had already taken place. The British army, and ministers, were fully aware 
that Marshal MacMahon's instructions to the French `General and Staff Officers serving at 
the Camp' at Chalons in the summer of 1864 included detailed notice of the superiority of the 
needle gun over all muzzle-loading rifles. 202 In any case, appropriate action was already in 
hand. As Captain VD Majendie, RA, (later Sir Vivian Dering Majendie), who was then an 
assistant Superintendent at the Royal Laboratory, Woolwich, said at the time; 
An impression that the English army owes the adoption of breech-loaders 
to the late German war, - that but for this remarkable campaign we might 
have continued to cherish an implicit belief in our muzzle-loading Enfields, 
until some Skalicz, or Nachod, or Sadowa of our own should have rudely 
destroyed it, is so prevalent and at the same time so inaccurate, that it is worth 
while to review briefly the history of the matter. 203 
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The fact was that that the army had been looking at breech-loading systems in great 
detail. Seven years previously, some cavalry regiments had been issued with breech-loading 
carbines. 204 The needle gun had been examined and rejected, as being too inaccurate, too 
short in range, too slow to operate ( '.... its rapidity of fire being not quite one half that of the 
Snider-Enfield'), too prone to damage and, because of the escape of gas from the breech, so 
inconvenient to the user `.... that the Prussian soldiers prefer to deliver their fire from the 
hipp 205 Majendie sums it up by saying; 
It is with regret, therefore, that we have noticed the occasional advocacy in 
our papers of the adoption of the Prussian system. That such attempts must 
prove abortive, we need hardly state; but it still remains a ground for 
regret, when what is in reality a matter for congratulation and confidence is 
represented as a subject for apprehension and mistrust. 206 
What, then, had been happening? It was, he says, owing to `.... a gradual perception of 
its necessity which has grown up amongst us, and to the energy and anxious foresight of our 
military authorities' that the right choice had been made. He describes how, in June 1864, 
Lord de Grey set up a special committee, chaired by Major-General David Russell, and 
including officers who had examined the matter with the US army, to consider whether the 
British army should now convert. 207 The committee reported promptly, in July, that the 
infantry should convert wholly as soon as possible. Accordingly, the matter was referred to 
the standing Ordnance Select Committee, which proceeded to advertise for potential 
suppliers, on 23 August 1864, and to carry out exhaustive tests on the eight candidates which 
survived the initial examination, and of which samples were available. 
204 See PRO W03317/043, Small Arms Committee. Report on Breech-loading cavalry carbines, 1859, for an 
encouraging series of tests on American and French models. 
205 Thid, 355-6. Majendie had taken the two phrases quoted from a hostile analysis of the quality of the needle 
gun on page 5 of the Pall Mall Gazette of 7 July 1866. The authoritative tone and accurate information of this 
article and a subsequent one on pages 9 and 10 of the 24 July 1866 edition make it clear that the Pall Mall 
Gazette knew what was in hand, even if The Times did not. Illustration 6 compares the actions of the needle 
gun, Snider-Enfield and Martini-Henry. 
206 Ibid, 357. 
207 Ibid, 344. See also Labbett, Peter, British Small Arms and Ammunition 1864-1938, (London, Labbett, 1993), 
7-10. 
123 
Again, the report followed quickly. On 14 March 1865 they said that, while they were 
not completely satisfied with any model, they would recommend the Snider conversion of the 
existing Enfield if the ammunition could be improved. Curiously, the Secretary of State 
chose to ignore this recommendation and accept one of the rejected models. Perhaps 
remembering The Times's advocacy, he placed provisional contracts for 3,000 Enfields to be 
converted on the Storm system, but the results were so poor that the project was rapidly 
abandoned and the problem was returned to the committee. By then, Colonel Boxer, the 
Superintendent of the Royal Laboratory, had produced a greatly improved cartridge for the 
Snider, which was now 30% more accurate than the muzzle-loader as well as firing four 
times faster. On 9 May 1866, the committee recommended that this system be adopted, and 
this was officially endorsed by the Secretary of State for War on 23 May. 
Therefore, when William Russell wrote his letter on 9 July, the British army was 
already in the process of converting to the Snider breech-loading system, which did 
incorporate integral ammunition, and which was notably better in respect of range, accuracy, 
robustness, safety and speed of fire than the Prussian needle gun. All this was spelt out in 
Parliament. On 13 July 1866 Earl de Grey, now in opposition, asked the Earl of Longford, the 
new Assistant Secretary of State, what the position was; and three days later Captain Vivian 
raised similar questions with General Peel, the Secretary of State, in the Commons. The 
replies were basically the same. The process of conversion to the Snider system was 
proceeding fast; by the end of March 1867 200,000 of the total stock of 600,000 Enfields 
would have been converted, and at very reasonable cost. (It worked out at 12/- per rifle. ) 
`You then get rid of the ramrod and the copper cap, and at a very trifling expense you have, 
at all events, a very good breech-loader. ' 208 
As for Russell, General Peel did not specifically refer to Russell's letter of 9 July; he 
simply acknowledged `.... that we had accounts of the effects of breech-loaders from the 
special correspondent of The Times', as well as from Captain (sic) Crealock in Vienna and 
Colonel Walker in Berlin. 209 On the other hand, it does appear that The Times and Russell are 
208 Hansard, 13 July 1866,782-7, and 16 July 1866,826-40. 
209 Ibid, 837. 
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entitled to some of the credit for the setting up of the all-important 1864 committee. 
Lieutenant Arthur Walker, a musketry instructor at Fleetwood, had expressed his admiration 
for the newspaper, its `able correspondent ' and Lord Elcho for their support, in a paper 
presented at RUSI on 6 June 1864, which he later claimed had stirred the government into 
action. 210 
It is interesting to note that when, towards the end of 1865, the Canadian government 
felt threatened by a potential incursion of `Fenians' from across the American border, they 
ordered 5,000 American Peabody breech-loaders as an immediate stop-gap, and asked the 
British government for longer term assistance. In response to this request, they received a 
first shipment of 30,000 Snider-Enfields, complete with their accoutrements, in 1867.211 
To sum up, the process of equipping the British army with breech-loading rifles 
received its initial driving force from soldiers working with inventors at home and in 
America, fuelled by active experience in the American Civil War and stimulated by the 
success of the needle gun in 1864. Under those pressures, the process was carried out 
expeditiously, and the result was that the British army now carried a rifle ` .... at present 
without its equal in Europe'. 212 
Development did not stop there. In that same parliamentary discussion in 1866, 
General Peel had explained that the Snider-Enfield conversion was a short term expedient, to 
buy time until a newly designed weapon could take its place. Testing continued and, in 1871, 
the army began to receive the Martini-Henry, which had a smaller bore, but a greater range 
and improved accuracy at a distance; and once again the army could feel confident that their 
personal weapon was more than equal to what was in use in other armies. 
213 
210 Walker, Lieut. A, `Breech-loaders for the army, and gun-cotton as an explosive agent in modern warfare', 
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The Snider-Enfield and the Martini-Henry were both single-shot rifles. The 
development of reliable integral ammunition had made it a practical proposition to produce a 
weapon which could fire more than one round before needing recharging, and several 
repeating rifles had been in use since the American Civil War. European armies, including 
the British, debated long and hard about the merits of such weapons. Those opposed to the 
idea were still concerned with the argument, familiar from the debate about the introduction 
of breech-loaders, that a soldier equipped with a repeating rifle would tend to fire off all his 
ammunition in a short time, which would be expensive as well as dangerous. 
The Balkan campaigns of the late 1870s caused the military to revise their opinions. 
The Turkish army, largely equipped with modern American repeating rifles, demonstrated at 
Plevna how difficult it now was for an attacking force to overrun the defences of an 
entrenched and fortified base, if the defenders were armed with rapid-firing rifles. 214 During 
1878 this generated some extremely lively debates at The Royal United Service Institution. 
Three in particular, two of them led by Colonel Clive and chaired by Wolseley, and the other 
by Captain Needham under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir Arnold Kemball, 
included evidence to show that the introduction of breech-loaders had not led to greater 
consumption of infantry ammunition during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German wars, 
and that the Turks, while inflicting devastating losses on their assailants, had had no 
difficulty in keeping their infantry supplied with ample ammunition during the defence of 
Plevna. 215 
Debate continued. A well-attended lecture at RUSI in May 1880, chaired by 
Beauchamp Walker, gave many of the soldiers who had seen the effects of modern rifles on 
the battlefield (including General Codrington, Colonel Charles Brackenbury, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Lonsdale Hale, Major Fraser and the lecturer, Captain James) the opportunity to 
214 Their infantry weapon was the single-shot Peabody-Martini but the cavalry had repeating 
Winchesters. 
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stress the deadly impact of rapid fire, and that ` .... the 
future undoubtedly lies with repeating 
rifles'. 216 At the end of the year work was well in hand on finding the right weapon for the 
British forces, and it is interesting to see that the Admiralty were particularly insistent that 
there should be a positive outcome. Two documents in the Wolseley papers at the PRO show 
how attention was being paid to continental reports of technical developments in this field, 
and the level of experimentation, with every available model of repeating and magazine rifle, 
which was being carried out at the time. 217 It was to be another ten years before the British 
infantry received the Lee-Metford, their first magazine rifle, but the ground had been 
prepared. 218 
215 Clive, Colonel E, `On the influence of breech-loading arms on tactics, and the supply of ammunition in the 
field. ' JRUSI, 22, part 1,12 April 1878 and part 2,10 May 1878. Needham, Captain John, `Lessons from the 
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Chapter 4 Organising the army 
This chapter will look at the structure of the military forces, including the regular army 
and its reserves, the militia and the volunteers. It examines how the army's position in 
relationship to Crown and Parliament was called into question by events in Europe, the 
difficulty with which the army's role was defined during the period, and the effect which 
continental structures had in exposing the need for radical change in military 
organisation. Three issues dominate the argument; recruiting and maintaining enough 
men; creating a responsive organisation; and establishing a body which could provide the 
army with strategic direction. 
It was often said at the time that one of the reasons why the British army was not 
better equipped to carry out its role was that this had never been defined, and that the 
military leadership did not know what they were supposed to plan for or guard against. ' 
The validity of this claim is open to the challenge that, whenever the issue was raised and 
possible priorities put forward, there was little disagreement amongst those who took part 
in the debate. The point at issue was that, compared with their potential continental rivals, 
British soldiers could not afford to focus their attention on a narrow range of possible 
threats; unpredictable emergencies might crop up anywhere in the colonies. It seems 
more plausible to argue that the army was as aware of what it might be called upon to do 
as the peculiar circumstances of the country would allow, and that its purpose in raising 
the subject was not so much to try to identify its role as to force the politicians who 
ultimately controlled the purse-strings to acknowledge the scale of the resources which 
were needed to enable that role to be fulfilled. Wolseley illustrated this forcefully in an 
article which he wrote for Macmillan's in April 1871. Certainly, he spelt out the priorities 
- though, curiously, he left out the obligation which traditionally headed the list at this 
time, the support of the civil power; but it is reasonable to speculate that Wolseley, as an 
1 `Of all the evils in the British army, this is far the worst. Everything is unsettled. No man knows what the 
exact duty of his office is. ' Anon, `The defences of England', Macmillan's, vol. 22, Sept. 1870,399. 
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Anglo-Irishman, would have been so familiar with that overriding aspect of the army's 
role that he did not feel it necessary to include it. His list of priorities is; 
1. The defence of these Islands from invasion. 
2. The police of the seas, so that our merchant ships might sail round 
the world in safety. 
3. The protection of our colonies and foreign possessions. 
4. The liability of having to send a contingent of 100,000 men to the 
continent of Europe to assist an ally. 2 
In setting out the army's stall, he made the point that it was Parliament and people, 
not `educated soldiers', who must wake up to the implications, in terms of cost and 
preparation: 
If a clear statement of our military requirements is now so laid before the 
people, through Parliament, that as a nation we learn to feel that the 
maintenance of a certain determined force is necessary for the preservation 
of our national existence, no future Ministry will ever dare to leave us 
without it. 3 
Paradoxically, the very process for which Wolseley was calling would lead, during 
the last two decades of the century, to a serious controversy about the army's priorities. 
This involved the heated debate between the `blue water' and `continental' schools, on 
whether or not the army should plan for an active role on the continent. This will be 
referred to in chapter five, but in 1871, when Wolseley wrote his article, that was very 
much in the future. He was about to take up the appointment of Assistant Adjutant- 
General at the Horse Guards (his reputation high following his success with the Red 
River Expedition) specifically to add impetus to Cardwell's reforming plans, 4 so there 
may be some significance in the fact that he chose to set out the detailed implications of 
his proposals in a signed article. This suggests that he felt confident that, in saying what 
2 Wolseley, Colonel Sir Garnet, `Our military requirements', Macmillan's, vol. 23, April 1871,526. It can 
reasonably be claimed that the first three priorities were self-evident. As to the fourth, the Commander-in- 
Chief had already specified this precise force, in his memorandum of November 1870 for the Secretary of 
State. Verner, vol. 2,41. 
3 Ibid, 525. This theme recurs throughout the period. See, for example Simmons, Sir Lintorn, The Military 
Forces of Great Britain, (London, Mitchell, 1871), 105-6, and two anonymous articles, `A scheme for the 
re-organization, recruiting, and instruction of the army', by `an officer of rank', JRUSI, vol. 4,1860,73-4, 
and `The military position of England', in the Fortnightly Review, vol. 18,1875,109. 
4 Wolseley, Field Marshal Viscount, The Story of a Soldier's Life, vol. 2,226-7. His appointment dates from 
1 May 1871. 
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he did, he had the support of the Secretary of State as well as his fellow `educated 
soldiers'. 
Crown and Parliament 
At that time the relationship between the army, the Crown and Parliament had not 
been entirely clarified. As was the case with other national institutions, it had evolved 
through a series of constitutional upheavals during the struggle for power between 
monarch and legislature. 5 From time to time ministers might feel able to assert that there 
was no longer an issue about where ultimate control lay; Cardwell, for example, 
.... any 
doubt answering a question from Lord Elcho in February 1869 about whether' 
arises as to the relative position of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for 
War 
.... 
', declared that ` .... 
having stated that the authority of the Secretary of State is 
supreme, I, of course, agree in the opinion of my Noble friend that there exists in 
principle no dual government .... 
. 6 Nevertheless, there was wide recognition that `dual 
government' did exist. Professor Strachan makes this clear by summarising a 
contemporary view of the situation as set out in the introduction to The Military Forces of 
the Crown: Their Administration and Government, written by a War Office official, 
Charles M Clode, and published in the same year as Cardwell's answer to Elcho. The 
William III settlement, he says, safeguarded the freedom of the people 
by vesting the command of the army in military officers responsible to 
the crown, and by vesting the administration of the army in civil 
ministers responsible to parliament. 
Herein is the orthodoxy. 7 
In line with this orthodoxy, historians of the British army have said that Cardwell's 
reforms, whatever else they did or did not achieve, settled this particular issue. Spiers 
says that Cardwell 
5 Strachan, Hew, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), gives a clear summary 
of the issues, particularly in ch. 3. 
6 Hansard, 3' series, vol. CXCIV, 23 February 1869,203-4. 
' Strachan, Politics, 44. Douglas Galton, writing at the height of the debate about the Cardwell proposals in 
1871, used the same source to set out the historical basis of dual control, in `The military 
forces of the 
Crown'. 212-4,242. See also Griffiths, Major Arthur, The English Army: Its Past History, Present 
Condition, and Future Prospects (London, Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1878), 51. 
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terminated the so-called `dual government' of the army, by establishing a 
statutory distribution of duties within the War Office and by formally 
subordinating all administrative officers, including the Field Marshal 
Commanding in Chief, to the Secretary of State. 8 
So does Luvaas. `This gifted and courageous administrator reorganized the War Office in 
1870, thus ending the system of dual control by bringing the administration of the army 
clearly under the thumb of the secretary of state' .9 
Later in this chapter it will be argued that in fact the issue of dual control rumbled 
on throughout the rest of the century. As late as 1897 it was possible for one of the rising 
stars of the army to write, admittedly for a German audience, that `(t)he Queen is the 
head of the army. It is administered in her name by the Secretary of State for War, and 
commanded in her name directly by the Commander-in-Chief . 
10 It is difficult to believe 
that any Secretary of State from Cardwell onwards would have accepted that the word 
`directly' presented a true picture of the constitutional position. On the other hand, the 
Queen continued to think of the army as `her' army, in a personal way that she would not 
have claimed for the navy, at least until her cousin was persuaded to retire in 1895.11 
Putting this aspect of the issue to one side (as successive governments managed to do), it 
was still the case that soldiers continued to talk about dual control in relation to the army, 
though with a more pragmatic connotation. The question which they were actually 
addressing - accepting the ultimate supremacy of the Secretary of State - was how far, 
and by what means, Parliament would actually assert its control over the commanders of 
the troops. 
It will be shown that continental institutions, and particularly the structures for 
controlling the armed forces, were carefully studied, often held up as exemplary systems 
to be copied, as often criticised in the light of their subsequent performance in the stress 
8 Spiers, Late Victorian Army, 2. 
9 Luvaas, The Education of an Army, 99. 
10 Grierson, JM, Scarlet into Khaki, new edition (London, Leventhal, 1988), 98. Originally published in 
Germany, 1897. 
11 The royal view of their direct personal relationship with the army appears to have continued into the 
following reign. See Ian Beckett on Edward VII's attitude in ch. 3 of French, David and Brian Holden Reid 
(eds. ) The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London, Frank Cass, 2002), 47. 
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of war; and that they had a considerable influence on the organisation of the British 
service. 
So far as the big constitutional issue was concerned it has to be said that the British 
paid very little attention to what was happening on the continent. At the practical level, 
however - of how to create a coherent and effective military structure within the 
framework of the constitution - it was conceded that there was merit in seeing how 
other countries addressed the problems involved. The experience of the Crimea had had 
much to do with this. There, the failures of the British military organisation had been 
embarrassingly contrasted with the better performance of the French. Even then, 
however, at the height of the controversy provoked by the sustained press campaign and 
the subsequent parliamentary enquiry, there was no lack of voices to say that the 
administrative chaos had been grossly exaggerated. 12 Nonetheless, the more professional 
performance of the French served to enhance the generally accepted opinion that they 
remained the pre-eminent military power, and therefore a model as well as a threat for the 
British army. 13 The Volunteers who came forward in 1859 were inspired to do so by that 
threat, but the model was held up to them for emulation as well, in a series of articles 
which Engels wrote for the Volunteer Journal in 1860 and 1861, praising every aspect of 
French organisation. 14 
In the aspects of most concern - the control of the forces, their numbers, 
disposition and terms of service, the arrangements for supplying their material needs, and 
the auditing of expenditure - the French example was accepted as the most significant, 
12 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, 2-3, gives many contemporary references. 
13 A typical example can be seen in the evidence of Sir WT Power, Commissary-General, to the 
Strathnairn 
Committee, Appendix 17,2"d Report, 23.3.1867. HC 1867, XV, 402. 
14 Chaloner and Henderson, Engels as Military Critic, Part III, reproduce these articles in detail. However, 
in their introduction, xvi, the editors do point out that a contemporary reviewer, writing in the United 
Services Gazette of 23 March 1861, criticised ` .... that new-fangled admiration 
for French soldiering 
which we, after long and intimate knowledge, hold to be an utter delusion. ' 
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as well as the most accessible. 15 This perception would change, and the process can be 
seen to evolve in three stages over the twenty years of this study. 
During the early 1860s there was a growing interest in how these matters were 
organised in other countries, particularly in Russia (the other perceived threat to British 
interests), Austria, the USA and Switzerland (this last because of its then unique solution 
to the problem of creating a nation trained in arms). Prussia, judged largely on the basis 
of the indecisive performance of its army during the troubles of 1848-9 and its impotence 
in1859, was generally regarded as a poor model, and at this first stage was often 
contrasted unfavourably with France. `We can fight our battles, whether it be necessary 
to defend our own shores or to send 100,000 men to the other side of the earth to 
reconquer an insurgent province. Prussia unaided could not keep the Rhine or the Vistula 
for a month from her ambitious neighbours, ' was a typical Times judgment of the period, 
followed five days later by a more dismissive sneer. `She has a large army, but 
notoriously one in no condition for fighting. ... 
No one counts on her as a friend; no one 
dreads her as an enemy. ' 16 
The second stage, in the aftermath of the Danish War of 1864 and the Austro- 
Prussian War of 1866, saw a rapid re-appraisal of Prussia's position, graphically 
illustrated by Charles Chesney's commentaries, the tone of which changed from cool 
disparagement in January 1866, through measured analysis of Prussia's progress in July, 
to the frank acknowledgment by January 1867 that Prussia was now a formidable 
power. '7 France's pre-eminence, though under challenge, was still generally accepted in 
1869, as Sir Archibald Alison concluded in February of that year. While noting - in 
stigmatising ` .... the 
ignorant economy of the Parliament of Britain' as the cause of the 
army's disorganisation in the Crimea - that `Austria was economical in her arms and 
training, and she was trampled down by Prussia in a ten days' campaign', he nevertheless 
is For a typical assessment of France's predominance at this time, see Petrie, Captain Martin, `The military 
forces of the Nations of Europe', JRUSI, vol. 5,1861,45-67,61. 
16 The Times, editorials, Thursday, 1 November 1860,6, and Tuesday, 6 November 1860,8. 
17 Chesney, C, `Recent changes in the art of war', Edinburgh Review, vol. 73, January 1866,97. `The 
military growth of Prussia', Edinburgh Review, vol. 74, July 1866,593-4. `The campaign in Western 
Germany', Blackwood's, vol. 101, January 1867,82. 
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denied that the Prussians were necessarily a better model than the French. `When they 
have fought for a whole summer on the Rhine with the French army - equally well 
armed and organised, and with a five years' service for its conscripts - it will be 
possible to give an answer to this question.... ' 18 He continued his analysis two months 
later, using as his starting point a recently published report prepared for the War Office at 
the Topographical Department, and drew the same conclusion. 19 The French regular army 
was the best; its long-serving veterans ` .... a tower of strength in the hour of need'. 
Where the Reserve was concerned, `(w)e believe this to be the best in Prussia, most 
numerous in Austria, and least powerful in France'. Taking the two together, ` .... we are 
inclined to believe that the French Imperial army will take the field with a war strength 
superior to that of either of the great German Powers ..... . 
20 
The final stage, reversing all such previous judgments, followed inevitably from the 
triumph of German arms in the war of 1870-71; Prussia/Germany now became both 
model and threat, and the humiliation of the French an example to all of the price of bad 
organisation, startlingly exposed . 
21 The impact of this process of reassessment on 
thinking in Britain must now be examined. 
Until 1865 Britain did not maintain military attaches as a matter of course in foreign 
capitals, though from time to time officers might be sent to sensitive posts as Special 
Commissioners. France, however, was the exception, as the career of Edward Stopford 
Claremont demonstrates. Having served for ten years in Canada as a young officer 
(where it may be inferred that he had an opportunity to polish his knowledge of the 
French language), he was attached to the Headquarters of the French Army of the East 
from April 1854 till July 1855, and then appointed Military Commissioner at Paris, where 
he continued to serve (as Attache on Special Service from 1858, including an interlude on 
18 Alison, Sir A. `On army organization', Blackwood's, vol. 105, February 1869,153,160-1. 
19 Alison, Sir A., `On the reorganization of the armies of the continental powers', Blackwood's, vol. 105, 
April 1869,466-79. The WO report, written by Lieut. -Colonel Cooke, CB, RE, November 1868, 
is in PRO 
WO 33/19. 
20 Tbid, 471,472. 
21 From September 1870 on, so much was written to this effect, that it would not be sensible to try to give a 
true picture in a footnote, but the pages of Blackwood 's alone, in the following few months, contained six 
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campaign with the army in Italy in 1859, and Military Attache from 1865) until he 
resigned at the end of the Franco-German War. 22 His contribution at the time of the 
British reaction to the `panic' of 1859-60 was referred to in chapter three, and the Cowley 
Papers make it apparent that Ministers, the Commander-in-Chief and the Queen 
continued to seek his regular advice, because of their close interest in all aspects of 
French military organisation throughout the 1860s. 23 
Claremont's letter of 23 September 1862, commenting on Captain Martindale's 
report on the French camp at Chalons, reflects a continuing British interest in this 
enviable permanent resource. Charles Hamley, for example, had written a long and 
generally admiring article about the camp in Blackwood's in 1859, emphasising the 
advantages which the French army enjoyed as a result, in terms of organisation and 
morale. `It is when we advance from bodies to masses, when we pass on from battalions 
to brigades and divisions, that the superior experiences and the greater practice of the 
French troops show to advantage. ' `Exalt a vocation and the members of it will exalt 
themselves. Give the soldier his place in society, and he will make himself worthy of 
it. 1,24 That the War Office continued to regard Chalons as a principal source of 
information about developments in the military profession throughout the 1860s is 
apparent from surviving reports in the War Office files. In 1865, for instance, they 
ordered the printing and circulation of a translation of the papers which Marshal Mac- 
Mahon (sic) had issued to the `General and Staff Officers serving at the Camp' during the 
1864 manoeuvring season; 25 and as the war clouds began to thicken in 1869 General 
Codrington, sent to observe the French and Prussian manoeuvres, reported in great detail 
what he and Claremont had learnt there. 26 As Codrington's immediately following reports 
articles by William Hamley and four by GR Gleig emphasising the new threat and the importance of the 
lessons to be learnt, reaching some sort of a climax in May with George Chesney's `Battle of Dorking'. 
22 Details from FO List 1880. 
23 Appendix B2 gives extracts from some of Claremont's reports during the 1860s. His connection with the 
Court was emphasised in October 1862, when he was appointed one of the Grooms of the Privy Chamber 
to her Majesty. 
24 Hamley, Charles, `Chalons - The camp', Blackwood's, vol. 85, March 1859,268,271. 
25 Camp at Chalons, 1864. Papers issued to the General and Staff Officers serving at the Camp, (London, 
Topographical and Statistical Department, War Office, 1865). PRO WO 33/15/0261. 
26 Codrington, General WJ, ` Report to the Adjutant General to the Forces on the Manoeuvres at the Camp 
at Chalons', 8 October 1869. PRO 30/31/14. 
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on the Prussian army show, 27 threats to France's professional pre-eminence were 
beginning to emerge , 
but until the startling events of the following year her military 
institutions continued to enjoy great respect. 
EB Hamley summed up this admiration for the French system in typically flowery 
language. 
All that science can do by its researches, all that mechanical art can 
effect by its practised skill, all that industry can ascertain by experiment, is 
brought to complete the organisation and material necessary for the 
effective action in modem war of this great numerical force. Incessant 
discipline, vast arsenals, organisation at once comprehensive and minute, 
for the supply, equipment, and movement of the troops; a trained staff and 
trained commanders - all aid in giving the utmost efficiency to the vast 
machine. 28 
The references to `great numerical force' and a `vast machine' reflect a growing 
awareness of the fundamental nature of the changes in the armies of the continental 
powers since the previous century, in terms of management as well as size. The first 
questions to ask, therefore, were why this had happened and whether Britain should or 
could match the changes. 
Addison's analysis of the national defences in Fraser's Magazine in December 
1859 dealt succinctly with the first question. Britain was the most powerful and advanced 
nation, but its structure was `commercial', while the continental powers were ` ... . 
governmental, and have habitually in view a state of war .... at the cost of national 
progress during peace'. 29 Addison, as was noted in chapter 3, supported the general 
opinion that this made Britain vulnerable to sudden invasion. Those who agreed with this 
would examine the details of army organisation abroad to see what lessons could be 
learned. A few robust voices, however, reflecting the conservative element within the 
ranks of the regular army, continued to maintain that, in general, the foreigners had got it 
27 Ibid. Reports of 19,25,30 October 1869. 
28 Hamley, EB, `Louis Napoleon as a general', Blackwood's, vol. 95, March 1864,326. It is interesting to 
note the similarities between this passage and his later encomium on Prussian organisation, after the war of 
1870-71, in later editions of his Operations of War (page 335 in the 4t' edition of 1878). 
29 Addison, JE, `The National Defences', Fraser's, vol. 60, Dec. 1859,643. 
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wrong. An anonymous article in the United Service Magazine in 1863, having considered 
the structure of European armies in the light of the events of 1859, decided that there 
were lessons for all parties about the dangers of ceasing to rely on a long-serving regular 
army. 
The whole German nation seems to be animated with the insane idea of 
getting up the greatest possible number of half instructed and loosely 
organized troops. Russia had its lesson in 1854-55, Austria in 1859; 
Prussia and the others will probably have their turn if they do not look 
sharp; .... 
(1859 showed the weakness of) the far-famed and extolled 
Landwehr system; it is in fact much on a par with our own constitutional 
force, the Militia, an imposing military crinoline, under it an ugly 
skeleton wrapped in parchment. 30 
A paper presented to RUSI on 23 March 1860 set out the issues; ` .... 
it behoves us 
in the present perturbed state of Europe, and the uncertain position of our relations with 
foreign powers, to consider if some improvement could be introduced into our military 
system' . 
31 The Crimean campaign had shown that Britain had no reserves available to 
reinforce an army in the field. In addition to correcting this crucial weakness, a bigger 
army was essential, so the techniques for recruiting and retaining soldiers must be 
improved, which involved reviewing pay, conditions and length of service. A way had to 
be found for integrating all the available defensive manpower, Militia, Volunteers and 
Regulars, into a coherent force, and this must involve creating district-based depots, twin 
battalions, and Volunteers brigaded with the Regulars in permanent divisions organised 
for war. To make such a system work, the quality of the leadership must be improved; 
officers must be subject to examination, and exposed to regular practical exercise in field 
manoeuvres. 
In setting out the organisational issues the paper made no claim to be revealing 
previously unrecognised problems; indeed, it quoted extensively from a memorandum 
written the previous year by John Godley, Assistant Under Secretary of State for War, 
addressing the same subjects and referring in greater detail to what was happening on the 
30 Anon, `Military Studies - No. 2, Organization', USM, 1863, pt. 2,70. 
31 `A scheme for the re-organization, recruiting, and instruction of the army', by `an officer of rank', read 
by Colonel the Hon. James Lindsay, MP, JRUSI, vol. 4,23 March 1860,74. 
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continent. 32 That this RUSI paper was intended to make a serious contribution to the 
process of reform is clear from the date. It was presented by the Chairman of RUSI, an 
MP as well as a prominent soldier, on the day that a Royal Commission had been set up 
to inquire into the system of recruiting the army in the United Kingdom 
with the view of suggesting such changes in the organisation of the 
Recruiting Department as might tend to facilitate the raising of men in a 
more expeditious and economical manner and to prevent desertion. 33 
If size and efficiency must be increased, the additional expense could not be 
ignored. In a Britain fairly identified by Addison as `commercial', and proud of the 
prosperity created by its trade and industry, there was always a struggle between the 
desire to protect the country and its colonies on the one hand, and on the other to avoid 
devoting unnecessary expenditure of money or labour to an essentially uncreative 
activity. The speed with which the country reduced the money which it was prepared to 
spend on its army as soon as a particular crisis appeared to be over, and its reluctance to 
commit expensive resources to guard against hypothetical future threats, had, as has been 
seen, generated serious concerns for years amongst those directly responsible for national 
defence. The first problem was that, when they came to look at potential rivals with 
bigger armies, the British army appeared to be relatively so much more expensive. An 
article in March 1863 pointed out, indignantly, 
.... that 
England pays more by half a million for the maintenance of her 
comparatively small military force, than France does for the support of her 
most efficient and splendidly appointed army, four times the strength of 
the British one. 34 
The reason was clear; British administration cost more than twice as much as French 
because the French were not hampered by the inconveniences of a divided responsibility; 
total control of their forces was exercised for the Emperor by the Minister for War. The 
British might improve efficiency by copying some aspects of their Intendance system, 
but this could not solve the fundamental problem on its own, as the Chaplain-General of 
the forces continued to emphasise eight years later. `We pass over to Pall Mall, where 
32 Godley, J, Memorandum on the Means of Recruiting the Army, and on an Army of Reserve. 22 March 
1859. PRO WO 33/7. 
33 Collinge, JM, (compiler), Office Holders in Modem Britain, pt. 9, Royal Commissions of Inquiry 1815- 
1870 (London, IHR, 1984). London Gazette 22245. 
34 Brady, J, `Relative cost of the French and British armies', Cornhill, vol. 7, March 1863,311. 
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Mr. Cardwell reigns; the supreme head over the most expensive, and, we may venture to 
add, by far the most inefficient, military establishment on the face of the earth. ' The 
reason? Dual control; `.... it seems to us that the Controller (Sir Henry Storks) and not 
. 
the General, will command the army' 3s 
This theme, the relatively high cost of administering an army which did not actually 
give good value for money, would recur throughout the next twenty years, 36 and the 
reiteration of these invidious comparisons made its mark on the thinking of the 
establishment. The third report of the crucial Northbrook Committee, in February 1870, 
acknowledged the facts and accepted that the system was inefficient as well as 
cumbersome. 
We have, from the best information at our command, compared these 
numbers with the numbers engaged upon similar duties in other Countries; 
and the result proves that a much larger Administrative Staff is employed 
in this Country, in comparison with the strength of our Regular and 
Reserve Forces, than in any of the principal Nations of Europe. 
It will naturally be asked, why the numbers employed in England are so 
much larger than those employed by Continental Powers; and the answer 
is to be found in the fact that the whole Military Administration of this 
Country has been organized upon a system of want of trust, which has 
created double establishments for the transaction of the same business. 37 
In recognising the situation, and describing the action required to alter it, the report made 
explicit references to European opinions and practices. 
The tendency which exists in the Administration of the Army, both in the 
War Office and at the Horse Guards, to too great centralization in matters 
of detail, is very natural, and is not confined to this Country. In a 
remarkable essay on `Responsibility in Times of War', recently published, 
the Archduke Albrecht, Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the 
Austro-Hungarian Forces, ably combats this tendency, and lays down as 
fundamental principles of Army Administration, that there should be, - 
3s Gleig, GR, `How is the country governed? ', Blackwood's, vol. 110, September 1871,393,396. Lord 
Elcho made the same point in very similar words; Letters on Military Organization (London, Murray, 
1871), 85. 
36 Commentators in the periodicals include Walpole, S, `Army reform', Cornhill, vol. 18, Dec. 1868,671; 
Alison, A, `On army organisation', Blackwood's, vol. 105, Feb. 1869,152; Dwyer, F, `National armies and 
modern warfare', Fraser's, vol. 1 ns, April 1870,543. Similarly, MPs; Mr White, the member for Brighton, 
grumbled that `[w]e paid nearly six times as much as the French did .... 
', Hansard, 3rd 
. series, vol. 
194,11 
March 1869,1101; in 1875 John Holms, MP, returned to the charge; `At the War Office at Berlin in 1870, 
some 268 men managed the whole of their large army at a cost of £51,739, whereas our small army was 
mismanaged by 568 persons at Pall Mall, and at a cost, that same year, of £170,000', The British Army in 
1875, new ed. (London, Longmans, 1876), 52. 
37 Reports of a Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Arranjements in Force for the Conduct of 
Business in the Army Departments (London, HMSO, 1870), 3 report, 12 Feb. 1870, ix. 
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'Is'. A strictly-organized and sharply-defined circle of action for 
each one in his own sphere, and to this end there must be - 2na Prevention of meddling by a superior authority with the sphere 
of action of his subordinates .... 
)38 - 
The Staff of the Army is divided into two distinct Branches; that of the 
Adjutant-General, and that of the Quartermaster-General. In France, and in 
the principal Military Nations of Europe a different organization is in 
force, under which there is one Chief Staff Officer, with such a number of 
Subordinate Staff Officers as may be required for the various duties which 
have to be performed [footnote omitted]. If the latter organization were 
adopted in this country, we believe that considerable advantages would 
follow. 9 
This seemed to have established that the problem arose from ` .... our 
complicated, disjointed, indeed, it may be almost said chaotic military organisms .... 
', 40 
and that the solution was simply to copy the best continental practice. It would have been 
foolish to deny that there were indeed lessons to be learnt in this area, but it was equally 
clear that particular conditions applied in Britain which made it practically impossible to 
copy any continental structure slavishly. Most obviously, the needs of the far-flung 
Empire, the protection of the colonies and trade routes on which so much of the country's 
prosperity depended, and above all the need to safeguard the possessions in India, meant 
that systems which worked for Prussia or France could not be applied to the British army 
in their entirety. 
As always, the devil was in the detail, particularly when the issues related to 
recruiting, the terms and length of service, and whether voluntary service could provide 
enough men of the right calibre. In the event, the systems adopted struggled to produce 
the numbers required. This meant that, although efforts to borrow from the best of 
continental organisational structures achieved some progress, it was not possible to create 
a system capable of matching their potential rivals until the overwhelming emergency of 
a world war led to the imposition of conscription thirty five years after the end of this 
study. 
38 Ibid, xiii. 
39 Ibld, xvii-xviii. 
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For that reason, the organisational issues will be considered after the confused and 
confusing topics of recruitment, obligations and terms of service. 
Manpower 
The large armies of the continental powers were based on conscription. This 
confronted the establishment with an immediate problem. In Britain the issue was 
encumbered with so much emotional baggage that it was difficult to examine the 
practical aspects at all. There were always powerful voices to assert that the British 
people would simply not accept conscription, so there was no point in even considering 
this option. The excellent John Godley addressed the issue squarely in his 1859 
memorandum. There must either be conscription or better inducements for rational men 
to enlist. Conscription 
.... 
is the simplest, the most intelligible; above all, the most certain to be 
effectual. Accordingly, it is now, I believe, adopted by every civilised nation 
except ourselves and the Americans. On the other hand, it is attended by 
such enormous hardships and other disadvantages, that I believe nothing 
except the terror of immediate invasion and conquest would induce the 
British people to submit to it. 
Conscription, which is at first sight and superficially a cheap mode of 
recruiting armies, is in reality, the most expensive that can be adopted. 41 
These two objections, the one of principle, the other purely practical, were to 
dominate the debate, but initially it was the former which held sway. The 1860 
Commission on Recruiting accepted it as indisputable. They recognised that it was ` ... . 
essential to success to have the means of rapidly augmenting an Army so as to admit of 
large bodies of men being brought at once into the field .... 
', but declared that it was not 
possible to raise them by conscription, even for the Militia. `In this the British so widely 
40 Noel, Robert R, `The battle of Sadova, and military organization', Westminster Review, vol. 31,1 January 
1867,2. 
41 Godley, `Memorandum on recruiting', 1. 
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During the period of anxious reflection which followed the extraordinary success 
of the Prussian army in 1866, Henry Brackenbury, seeking for lessons for his own 
service, still felt bound to acknowledge that ` .... compulsory soldiering 
is, and always 
has been, repugnant to the English feeling', 43 and an article with a similar purpose in Pall 
44 Mall agreed that conscription was ` .... at present, at 
least, out of the question'. A 
decade later John Holms was still making the same uncompromising assertion; 
Conscription for the Regular Army cannot be said ever to have had an 
existence in this country, and it is impossible to read the history of those 
efforts which have been made to introduce it, either directly or indirectly, 
without being satisfied that any new effort to force it upon the country 
would be resisted by the united judgment and intelligence of the nation. 45 
This deeply ingrained prejudice notwithstanding, the issue did keep cropping up as 
the country began to appreciate the vast size of continental armies. In 1859 the wave of 
euphoria which began to succeed the `panic' as the numbers of Volunteer riflemen 
increased, encouraged the Illustrated London News to declare that there was no need for 
conscription because a 
` 
.... volunteer army such as 
this, composed of the best blood in the British 
Isles is a force of greater efficacy and value than is in the power of the 
continental states to enrol. Their constant conscriptions so drain the life- 
blood of the people that there is no reserve left from which, at the call of 
danger or of duty, an army of volunteers- costing nothing, but worth far 
more to a State than a paid army of double the numbers - can be raised for 
' 46 the defence of the country . 
No doubt this was intended as much to encourage the self-esteem of the Volunteers, 
a cause close to the heart of the ILN at the time, as to give a sober assessment of the 
42 Report of Commission on Recruiting, 30 June 1860, HC 1861, XV, iii. The Commander-in-Chief used 
almost exactly the same words ten years later, in a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State. Verner, vol. 2, 
39. 
43 Brackenbury, HC, `Military reform (pt 1)', Fraser's, vol. 74, December 1866,685. 
44 `What sort of an army do we want? ', Pall Mall Gazette, 27 November 1866,1-2. 
45 Holms, J, The British Army in 1875,119. 
46 Illustrated London News, 21 May 1859, annual edition, 481. The same article declared the necessity of 
their electing their own officers. `A popular army must be placed under popular management. 
' 482. 
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situation. Ian Beckett, in his history of the Volunteer movement, says that such bombast 
was not taken seriously by the professionals. 47 On the other hand, at least one responsible 
minister used much the same words as the ILN in the course of a long contribution to the 
debate on the Volunteer Bill in Parliament, in which he cited his experience of what he 
thought of as the volunteer armies then fighting in the American Civil War to support the 
conviction that ` .... we 
had at our command over 150,000 men as efficient for the 
purposes of defence as any army which could be called into the field' . 
48 
However, Professor Beckett is surely right to maintain that professional opinion in 
general was aware that a semi-trained body of this size, however imbued with patriotic 
fervour, would be impotent to withstand a large modern army of trained soldiers. JA 
Ballard acknowledged the problem in August 1860 in Blackwood's. In amongst the pages 
of detailed analysis about how Britain must enhance the numbers and training of her 
voluntary forces in order to repel a foreign invader, he made passing references to the 
value of a levee en masse, without, unfortunately, explaining how this would be raised or 
trained. 49 An anonymous contribution to the United Service Magazine put the issue more 
bluntly; it was useless to spend money on fixed defences, whatever `distinguished 
officers' might say, if the soldiers were not there to man them. 50 However, the immediate 
threat subsided, and distinguished officers prevailed. 
A reawakening came in 1866. `The nation has been startled out of its slumber by 
the extraordinary successes of the Prussian army, and has learnt that those successes have 
been due to prevision and forethought, ' wrote Henry Brackenbury in December, in the 
first of five articles on the need for army reform. 51 There were many lessons for Britain, 
but she could not slavishly follow the Prussian system for raising trained manpower, 
since even to revive the militia ballot would prove very difficult; though he made it clear 
47 Beckett, Ian, Riflemen Form (Aldershot, The Ogilby Trusts, 1982), 10. 
48 Hartingon (Under Secretary for War), Hansard, Parl. Debates 3rd Series, vol. 170 (1863), 1699. 
49 Ballard, JA, `National defences and volunteers', Blackwood's, vol. 88,145,150. 
50 Anon, `Our national defences - Fortifications, or an army in the field', USM, 1859, part 3,6. 
si Brackenbury, HC, `Military reform', Fraser's, vol. 74, December 1866,684. The other articles in this 
series followed in March, April, June and August 1867. 
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in a subsequent article, in the new St. Paul's in November 1867, that this was a matter for 
regret. 
We labour under fearful disadvantages. Other nations take the flower of 
the manhood of the country for their armies, and the highest and lowest of 
their sons fight side by side in the ranks. Too independent to accept 
compulsory personal service even for our country, we yet are unwilling to 
pay the cost of our exemption, and instead of making the army the first of 
all professions, we seek only for how small a sum it is possible to get men 
of any stamp, and we lower our bidding till we can just fill our army with 
the dregs of our cities ..... 
52 
The issue featured strongly in the crucial debate about `Army organization' at RUSI 
the following April, under the chairmanship of Major-General the Hon. James Lindsay, 
now Inspector-General of Reserve Forces. Major Arthur Leahy, RE, who led the debate, 
referred at length to the Report of the 1866 Commission on Recruiting, noting that 
.... while they were receiving evidence, war was declared between Austria 
and Prussia, and the astonishing result of the three weeks' campaign which 
ended in the defeat of the Austrians at Sadowa, and brought the war to a 
conclusion in a few weeks, caused increased public attention to be directed 
to our Military institutions .... 
53 
This had naturally suggested the Prussian system as a model for the British forces; but, 
although one of the principles of that system was ` .... a general conscription with 
liability of every able bodied man to serve in the regular army or its reserves .... , 
[t]his 
principle could not be applied to this country .... 
' 54 
But perhaps this was no longer the case. When the debate was resumed ten days 
later, a rambling intervention by Major Sir Harry Verney, MP, picked up the point that 
the Prussian system of short service was the key to the size of their army. Challenged 
whether this implied that conscription was the answer, he said `I think every man in this 
country is bound to be ready to serve his country when danger is at hand', and later in the 
debate Lord Ranelagh advocated the revival of a militia ballot. 55 
52 Brackenbury, HC, `The military armaments of the five great powers', St. Paul's, vol. 1,194. 
53 Leahy, Major Arthur, `Army organization', 27 April 1868, JRUSI, vol. 12,1868,329. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, adjourned debate, 346,351. Verney (1801-1894) was the son of General Sir Harry Calvert. He 
adopted the name Verney on inheriting Claydon House from a cousin of that name. Florence Nightingale 
was his sister-in-law. He served in the infantry and the guards, and was an MP for fifty-two years. DNB. 
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The events of 1870-71 intensified the concern. In February 1871 Leahy, now a 
Lieutenant-Colonel, led another debate on army organisation at RUSI, during which 
Colonel Ouvry, after quoting Moltke on the virtues of ' .... a nation in arms trained to 
habits of military discipline and obedience', fiercely criticised opponents of conscription, 
like Frederic Harrison, for showing ` .... such an 
ignorant impatience at performing a 
natural duty, as is evinced in the above quotation, a natural duty which is submitted to by 
all other nations'. 56 The Duke of Manchester expressed strong support to `make every 
man serve'. Later in the debate, Mr. Chadwick advanced the merits of the Swiss system 
of a national militia, and Mr. Dickinson, claiming fourteen years' experience of the 
working classes, gave the Harrison view, that the working man would never stand for it, 
the lie direct. 57 
In fact, while majority opinion remained hostile to compulsory service, the practical 
issues were taking on more importance. The fact that the British land forces were 
relatively more expensive was undeniable. Was conscription part of the solution to that 
problem? At the most simplistic level, it seemed that it was. Conscripts in Europe were 
paid very little, yet provided vast numbers of trained men, many of whom were of high 
educational and moral calibre. 58 However, military professionals in Britain, bred in a 
society perhaps more attuned to the sophistications of mercantile thinking than their 
continental counterparts, were alert to the fact, which Godley had highlighted, that the 
true cost to the national economy was more than a simple sum of the numbers of soldiers 
and their wages. Even in 1859, Addison had noted the adverse impact of conscription in 
other countries on `national progress during peace'. 59 Several commentators elaborated 
on this theme, the damage which a `commercial' economy must suffer if all its 
manpower, including those with valuable skills, were to be removed from the civil 
56 Leahy, Lieut. -Colonel, RE, `The organization of our military forces', 14 February 1871, 
JRUSl, vol. 15, 
1872,187. The `above quotation' referred to -'[b]ut the Prussian system is impossible in England; 
England will never consent to undergo Bismarkism [sic]. Any attempt to force the working man into the 
ranks will be resisted even to the "ultima ratio populi, no blood tax shall ever be levied in England". If such 
is attempted there will be an end to the ruling classes and the monarchy' - was taken from Harrison, F, 
`Bismarckism', Fortnightly Review, December 1870,631-49. 
57 Ibid, 189,190-1,225. 
58 Alison, `On army organization', 152. The fact that a thorough-going conscription improved the calibre of 
the forces was a recurring theme. See Brackenbury, HC, `Military reform', 684. 
59 See note 29. 
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economy during many of their productive years. 6° In addition, two informed observers 
drew attention to the fact that in Germany (the archetype of a conscription society) there 
was a significant hidden annual cost arising from the subsidies provided by families for 
the support of their conscript sons and from their billeting within the native population. 
John Holms, analysing the Prussian budget in detail, put an annual figure of £505,000 on 
this contribution, but the well-informed General Beauchamp Walker set it much higher, 
at £1,900,0000.61 Sir John Adye, writing some years earlier, had acknowledged the 
same point, but felt that national security was more important in the final analysis than 
economy. 
It may be true that the Prussian system, in removing so many from the 
pursuits of civil life, is equally costly in the end. Conscription doubtless 
consists in obtaining the services of men below their market value, but then 
they obtain what they require - namely, soldiers sufficient for national 
defence; and when the safety and honour of their country are at stake, they 
62 are lavish, not of their money, but their blood. 
However, in the end the decisive issue was trade, even more than money, and this 
was where Britain really differed from her continental neighbours. Whatever her 
concerns for home defence or for possible intervention on the mainland, the reality 
dictated by Britain's overseas commitments was that most Regular soldiers (unless they 
were Household troops) would be required to serve two thirds of their time in India or 
some other distant part of the country's overseas possessions, and this was only 
administratively practicable if they were engaged for a longer period with the colours 
than was provided for by the continental systems. (Russia, with its gigantic army of serfs 
conscripted for life, was the solitary exception, but no possible model. ) 
A few soldiers saw the solution as lying in creating two armies, a long-service 
volunteer army for overseas service and a conscripted army for home defence. In 
November 1870 Robert Home argued that the only practical solution was to put all men 
60 See, for example, Ardagh, JC, `The comparative cost of the armies of different nations, and the 
loss to a 
country by conscription', JRUSI, vol. 20,1876,218-52. 
61 Holms, The British Army in 1875,68-70. Walker, General CP Beauchamp, `Compulsory or voluntary 
service', Macmillan's, vol. 38, October 1878,452-8. 
62 Adye, Brigadier-General John, RA, `National defence and army organisation', Blackwood's, vol. 110, 
August 1871,213. 
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to the ballot, train them in the army at home for long enough to make them soldiers, then 
transfer them to the Militia; the ranks of the army overseas could then be replenished by 
volunteers from among these men. 63 Captain HLW Hime, RA, strongly recommended a 
similar solution in an essay in 1875, and was given the RUSI prize for it. Every other 
country in Europe had adopted conscription and, whatever the arguments against it, it 
must come in the end. 64 His version entailed the abolition of the Militia and the 
Volunteers, rather than their integration, but, as he predicted himself, entrenched opinions 
in favour of those forces were enough to ensure that this was unacceptable in the short 
term. Accordingly, the solution to the problem of recruitment would have to be sought 
elsewhere than through compulsory service for a short time with the colours, followed by 
years of Reserve or Militia commitment. 
The need, set out in the 1860 Report, was for a body of trained men large enough 
and accessible quickly enough to enable the British army to meet and sustain its possible 
commitments in the new environment. Putting conscription to one side, was it advisable, 
or even possible, to copy foreign patterns of service on a voluntary basis? Godley's 1859 
Memorandum laid down the markers by describing how the system worked in Europe, 
and saying that Britain must achieve a comparable result. 
In Prussia, the whole male population is compelled to pass through the 
ranks of the army, and, after a short service as regular soldiers, they fall 
back into -1, the Army of Reserve; and, 2, the Landwehr or Militia, 
in 
which their names are enrolled until they attain the age at which military 
service is dispensed with. In Austria, Russia, France, and Sardinia, the same 
end is aimed at by a system of furloughs. 65 
Without compulsion, there was only one way to make ` .... the army a 
desirable 
profession for rational men', and that was to ` .... give the market price 
for every man 
whom we raise .... 
' 
. 
66 If Britain paid enough, the men would be forthcoming. Then the 
question of the Reserve could be tackled. The evils of the unique British Militia system 
were `manifold and obvious'; it was `as useless as it is costly', 
67 but by reducing the 
63 Home, Robert, `Army organization', Macmillan's, vol. 23, November 1870,75-6. 
64 Hirne, Captain HLW, RA, `Universal conscription: the only answer to the recruiting question', JRUSI, 
vol. 19,1875 92-127, particularly 111 et seq. 
65 Godley, Memorandum on Recruiting, 6. 
66Ibid, 1-2. 
67 Ibid, 6,8. 
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length of service in the Regulars to either seven or ten years - the compromise peculiar 
to the British requirement to allow for service overseas - and by offering decent 
inducements to join the Reserve, the desired result could be achieved, and that without 
increasing the overall cost. This was a solution which continued to appeal to many of the 
traditionally-minded among the military establishment. In September 1869 Sir Archibald 
Alison described his own strategy for obtaining the men required in this way without 
abandoning the voluntary principle, and set out similar proposals from a distinguished 
array of interested parties including Sir Charles Trevelyan, Colonel Valentine Baker, Sir 
John Burgoyne, Colonel MacDougall and Lord Elcho. 68 
However, as other commentators continued to point out, this would not be sufficient 
to deal with Britain's particular problems. While France was the model, the problem had 
not been so apparent. She also had overseas possessions to pacify, and, although she 
recruited her army by a different method, their length of service with the colours enabled 
France to solve that administrative equation in much the same way. The emergence of 
Prussia as a military power created an entirely new situation. Here was an army organised 
for continental war. Having no distant possessions to police or defend, Prussia could use 
her regular forces both to build up vast reserves and to provide the mechanism for taking 
them to war promptly. 
The affairs of the Prussian army go on like a well-constructed clock so long 
as there is peace with other nations. ... 
War comes, and in a week or ten 
days' time, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, are augmented 
to their full strength, and in readiness to move. 69 
Unfortunately, neither the existing structure of the British army nor its commitments 
could be easily adapted to such a model. `Prussia may, with impunity, make skeletons of 
line regiments, keeping up the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers. Why? 
Because her entire male population consists of trained soldiers. 
70 In Britain, by contrast, 
while a Reserve made up of time-expired Regulars would be an invaluable resource in 
any serious emergency, the numbers would never approach those of continental reserves, 
68 Alison, Sir A, `On the limitation of enlistment and army reserves', Blackwood's, vol. 106,279-89. 
69 Gleig, GR, `The two systems', Blackwood's, vol. 109, January 1871,125. 
70 Gleig, GR, `Inefficiency of the British army', The Quarterly Review, vol. 129, October 1870,528. 
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and they would not be available to assist with the perennial requirement of the army 
for drafts to keep its colonial forces up to strength. 
There were two issues here. Not only was the Regular Reserve never going to rival 
the European armies in numbers; additionally, the regiments at home, committed to the 
duty of feeding drafts to the army overseas, inevitably contained in their depleted ranks 
an inordinate number of young recruits, neither robust enough nor sufficiently trained to 
match their potential rivals in a sudden emergency. The Adjutant-General, General Sir 
Charles Ellice, made the problem clear in two memoranda to Gathorne Hardy, the 
Secretary of State, in July 1877 and January 1878, contrasting the British situation with 
the reality of the German system which was the ostensible model. In his view, and he 
claimed to be speaking for the Commander-in-Chief, some of the evils might be 
`palliated' if the twenty-four battalions next on the list for foreign service were 
maintained at `an increased establishment', but the system would only work if drafts of 
reinforcements would always be drawn from the ranks of the trained Reserve. 7' This 
sounded like the proposal of a solution, but in practice it was no more than stating the 
problem, in default of legislation to make the Reserve permanently liable to recall at any 
time, rather than just in response to a general mobilisation. 
If the Reserves could not provide the manpower, then the Militia and Volunteers 
must do so. This would only work if their organisation could be integrated into that of the 
Regular army, and if it were certain that there would be enough of them. Some authorities 
continued to be confident that patriotism and better inducements to voluntary enlistment 
in the Militia would bring men forward in sufficient numbers to enable that body to 
become ` 
.... a training school 
for one year for the whole military force of the country 
'. 72 Rather surprisingly, Wolseley, as late as 1878, was expressing the same opinion in 
a War Office report, because of what he had seen in America. 
71 Ellice, CH, Memorandum on Major-General Whitmore's Paper on Recruiting, 11.7.77, and 
Memorandum by the Adjutant-General, 19.1.78, PRO WO 147/51,7-9. 
72 Sir William Russell, MP, quoted by Adye, `National Defences', 212. Adye also cited Lord Sandhurst, to 
the same effect. Major-General Sir Robert Walpole proposed a similar solution in a letter to The Times of 
Friday, 3 February 1871. 
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Nothing can be more erroneous than to suppose we cannot raise a very 
large army in England because we depend on voluntary enlistment. I was 
in America almost the whole time that the Confederate War lasted, and 
saw the United States raise nearly a million men upon that plan..... In 
England, thanks to the volunteer system, we have at this moment about 
three-quarters of a million of men who have been more or less drilled as 
soldiers. 73 
Others were not so confident, feeling that the only sure way to secure the numbers would 
be through a universal obligation to serve some time in an embodied Militia. In saying so, 
however, they sometimes found it expedient to express the concept in such a way that the 
word `conscription' could be avoided. This was a favourite theme of Gleig's. `Enough 
will be done when we see enrolled - not by voluntary enlistment but by ballot - some 
three hundred thousand militia .... 
74 Then the Militia could be so organised that ` .... at 
any time you may extend your standing army to whatever figure is desired'. 75 The 
struggle during the rest of the century to achieve the desired numbers in both Regulars 
and Militia suggests that in this matter the pessimists were more prescient judges than the 
optimists. 
However, the political will was not there, and the reassurance offered by 
Wolseley's assessment, with its echoes of Hartington's confident words fifteen years 
earlier, continued to prevail. 76 Accordingly, the restructuring of the forces had to take 
place without the crucial addition of this guaranteed base of malleable manpower. 
Organisation 
The harshest lesson brought back from the Crimea was that the country must be 
prepared in peace for war. Continental powers were, and the message was clear, if bleak. 
The traditional, `commercial', attitude of Government had always been to avoid wasting 
73 Wolseley, GJ, War between England and Russia, PRO WO 147/49,1. 
... 74 Gleig, GR, `The two systems', 127. A year later, he was more thorough-going, proposing making' 
service in the militia universal ... 
Base the voluntary service of the regular army on the compulsory service 
of a militia .... 
'. `Reorganisation of the army', Fraser's, vol. 5, May 1872,609,611. 
75 Gleig, GR, `Reorganisation', 611. For a similar view, see Vincent, CE Howard, `The armed strength of 
Europe', JRUSI, vol. 19,1875,564. Havelock, Henry, `A national training to arms', Fortnightly Review, 
vol. 19 ns, 1876,430-64, makes similar proposals and also struggles to contrast a compulsory 
ballot 
c'good') with conscription ('bad'). 449-5 1. 
6 See page 143. 
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money on the army during peacetime, and then, when war broke out, to shelter behind the 
Royal Navy until time and lavish emergency expenditure had recreated a respectable 
force. Burgoyne had denounced the fallacy of this in 1858; 77 Charles Brackenbury was 
still emphasising the warning in 1875; `Prussia, and therefore Germany, can never be 
caught unawares. She is always and absolutely ready' . 
'g The message was not lost on the 
many Commissions and Committees which were called upon to review different aspects 
of army organisation during these years, but their response to it was heavily coloured by 
the perception at the time of where to look for military excellence. 
In 1859, when this still lay clearly with France, the systems of other countries were 
evaluated but the French was the favoured model. In particular, the Intendance, the 
department, directly responsible to the Minister for War, which enjoyed total 
responsibility for meeting the logistical needs of the French army, seemed to exemplify 
the merits of a centralised and integrated system which would achieve two desirable 
objectives; to provide a single and permanent mechanism for supplying the army's 
material needs, in place of the multitude of disconnected and discontinuous departments 
which were supposed to provide the same services (usually on an 'ad hoc' basis) in 
Britain; at the same time, to keep control of expenditure out of the hands of the soldiers. 
A series of Committees and discussions culminated in the Strathnairn Committee in 
1866, which examined the procedures of every significant European army in exhaustive 
detail before proposing the adoption of the closest practicable copy of the Intendance in a 
79 new Control Department. 
The details of the new department were thrashed out in an exchange of letters 
between the War Office and the Treasury which reveals the practical difficulties involved 
'? Burgoyne, General Sir JF, Popular Fallacies with regard to our Security against Invasion, June 1858. 
PRO WO 33/8,509. 
78 Brackenbury, Major CB, RA, `The intelligence duties of the staff abroad and at home', Friday, 19 
February 1875, JRUSI, vol. 19,1876,247. He had stressed the virtue of preparedness in his translation for 
the Intelligence Department of the Report of the Committee on army re-organization upon the Bill upon the 
general organization of the French army. PRO WO 147/15,4-5,9. Wolseley heavily annotated his copy, 
and it is no surprise that he was expressing similar sentiments in 1878. `England as a military power in 
1854 and in 1878' The Nineteenth Century, vol. 3, March 1878,436. 
79 A summarised list of the reports on foreign armies which this Select Committee considered, showing the 
extent of the evidence which they took into account, is in appendix B 3. 
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in trying to emulate, under a parliamentary government, a system devised for a more 
absolute regime. 80 In France the central responsibility was clear; the Emperor, titular (if 
not, in the event, actual) Commander-in-Chief, controlled both the fighting soldiers and 
the Intendance through an appointed Minister for War, who was always himself a 
military man. 
In Britain, although the objective was the same, the result was to perpetuate, and 
even to exacerbate, the uncertainties of the relationship between War Office and Horse 
Guards. The noble Commander-in-Chief remained in charge of the fighting troops. 
Within the War Office the Controller in Chief was to take responsibility for Transport, 
Commissariat, Stores, Purveyors and Barracks, but he was not, as originally proposed, to 
have the rank of Under Secretary of State. Instead, the structure was to be 
I. An Under Secretary of State with the same duties as at present, 
competent to advise the Secretary of State on military matters, and who 
shall be generally, if not always, a military man. 
2. A Controller in Chief, without the rank of Under Secretary of State, and 
with a salary of 1,5001. 
3. A principal financial officer, with 1,5001. per annum, assisted by a 
deputy. This officer to be a gentleman of acknowledged financial 
reputation and experience in accounts, and always a civilian, and of 
equal official rank with the Controller in Chief. 81 
The way that the new department went about its business quickly led to strong 
criticism, but initially the complaints were that they had not gone far enough to reproduce 
the French system. A critical article by Spencer Walpole in March 1869 pointed out that 
in the event both the Under Secretary, Sir Edward Lugard, and the Controller in Chief, 
Sir Henry Storks, were military men, and the consequence was inevitable. 
Sir H Storks was desired to embody the report into regulations; and if 
those regulations are honestly compared with Lord Strathnairn's report, it 
will be immediately seen that just as Lord Strathnairn fell short of the 
French, so Sir H Storks fell short of Lord Strathnairn. The intendants 
which, under the name of controllers, Lord Strathnairn had proposed to 
deprive of half their authority, Sir H Storks reduced to the position of the 
servants of the commanding officer. The intendants in France acting on 
their own responsibility, Lord Strathnairn converted into controllers 
80 Letters between Lt. -Gen. Sir E Lugard, Under Secretary, WO, and GW Hunt, Secretary to the Treasury, 
19 and 28 Dec. 1867,28 April and 29 June 1868. PRO WO 33/21A. 
81 Ibid, 28 April 1868. 
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moving with the concurrence of the commanding officer; and Sir H Storks 
directed to act under the directions of the commanding officer. 82 
If, he went on to say, these controllers had been given the proper authority `(w)e 
might have made each military command really complete in itself; this, on the 
supposition that a controller and a commander with equal authority would in practice find 
it comfortable and easy to work together without friction. 83 
That might possibly work in theory, but events the following year mercilessly 
exposed the shortcomings of the Intendance system. Suddenly, the virtues of a 
decentralised structure based on the principle of giving every field commander control of 
his material needs (within the limits of his sphere of command) began to seem obvious. 
By April 1871 Charles Chesney was explaining to the readers of the Edinburgh Review 
that the French General Trochu had, even before the Franco-German War broke out, been 
writing ` .... expressly to expose the administrative shortcomings of the Intendance in the 
Crimea and in Italy, as regards the three important matters of the supply of military 
stores, provisions, and hospital necessaries'. 84 He contrasted the chaos which the crisis of 
1870 had exposed in the French system with 
.... that marvellous 
Organisation, to which the Prussians, above all other 
means, have owed the successes which in seven years have elevated their 
kingdom from a second-rate position among the greater States to be 
acknowledged as the most formidable military power ever produced since 
the days of Rome. 
The key, he explained, was 
.... the extraordinary completeness of preparation, which the decentralisation first begun in the province for its Corps, and carried down 
to each separate brigade, had prepared to make effectual. The secret of this 
grand success in the art of preparation lies in the facts clearly given by 
Lieutenant Talbot, that `the equipments and materials necessary to put the 
army on a war footing, down to the smallest detail, lie ready in the depots 
of the military train and in the armouries of the regiments. ' 5 
82 Walpole, S, `Military administration', Cornhill, vol. 19, March 1869,317. 
83 Ibid, 318-9. 
84 Chesney, CC, `Studies of the recent war', Edinburgh Review, vol. 133, April 1871,581. 
85 Ibid, 580. Two articles in Fraser's, vol. 5, March and May 1872, and attributed to the young Howard 
Vincent, contrasted the virtues of the German system and the shortcomings of the French particularly 
strongly; `Recent publications bearing on the War', 331-40 and 553-69. 
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Chesney knew that Cardwell and his team of military reformers were already 
making valiant attempts to reproduce a British version of the district organisation, and to 
build on that a command structure which could produce an effective field force when 
required, but he was rightly dubious about the likelihood that control of the army's 
material needs would be similarly decentralised. He foresaw continuing controversy. 
Unhappily, this great question of army administration, as applied to 
ourselves, has been made absolutely one of persons, instead of being 
discussed purely on principles. There are those in high office who believe 
their credit pledged to the carrying out their original design of a vast civil 
department pervading and checking the whole military fabric. There are 
others who are deeply sensible of the certain and ruinous evil of the dual 
management of a machine which should be the embodiment of unity, and 
so are ready to use any means to overthrow that double form of 
administration - the outcome of divisions between civil and military 
branches of the War Office - which has suddenly been laid upon our army 
to its sore discontent. 86 
Chesney's gloom was well founded, since the arguments were not resolved for 
many years, for all the efforts of anxious military reformers. `The control department is 
fast getting beyond all control', said Wolseley at the end of 1872,87 and Charles 
Brackenbury elaborated on this theme in a lecture at RUSI. 
.... 
There is rising up in our military system such an Imperium in imperio 
as bids fair to deprive the Army of that feeling of brotherhood than which 
nothing is more essential to its efficiency. It is impossible to suppose that 
so fatal a step can be dreamt of as making the civil element within the 
Army superior to the military. If so, we might sheath our swords for ever; 
and the very appearance of such a notion is in itself to be avoided. 88 
Five years later Lonsdale Hale was spelling out his detailed analysis of the German 
system in articles for Macmillan's, and complaining that one of the three reasons why 
Britain seemed incapable of emulating its excellence was the continuing unwillingness of 
86 Ibid, 581. 
87 Wolseley, Garnet, `Our autumn manoeuvres', Blackwood's, vol. 112, Nov. 1872,640. 
88 Brackenbury, CB, `The autumn manoeuvres of 1872', Monday, 20 January 1873, JRUSI, vol. 17,1874, 
82. 
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the civil branches of the army to allow soldiers to control their administration and 
supply. s9 
And so matters remained, as the 1870s ended. In the event, and typically, the need 
for the army to have control of its own transport and supplies - whether for service in 
the colonies or the world at large - was not recognised until one more scare about a 
possible threat of invasion, a decade later, suddenly focused attention once more on the 
need for a force which could take the field effectively. 90 
Meanwhile, the impact on the British service of continental developments in the 
way that an army should actually fight - its tactics and the performance of its leaders - 
needs to be considered. 
The shape of the army 
Continental armies seemed to be much better organised for fighting a major war. 
Two particular factors were involved, and in both cases the Prussian army offered the 
obvious model. The first was the organisation of all the components of the land forces 
into corps d'armee based on defined geographical areas. This was seen to provide the 
opportunity for officers and men at all levels to become familiar with one another in 
peace, so that they would feel comfortable both `vertically', within the hierarchy of 
command, and `horizontally', when it came to working with other arms, if they went to 
war. 
The second was the existence of a general staff, so constituted that it would provide, 
not only the professional services required by a sophisticated modern army, but also what 
89 Hale, Lonsdale, `The spirit of the military training in the German army', Macmillan's, vol. 38, May 
1878,48-57, and `Notes on the German military system', Macmillan's, vol. 38, July 1878,221-32. See, 
particularly, 231. 
° Bond, The Victorian Army, 144. Spiers, Edward, `The late Victorian army', in The Oxford History of the 
British Army, 195. 
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Henry Brackenbury later called ` .... the powerful 
brain of the military body, to the 
designs of which brain the whole body is made to work' . 
91 When British soldiers looked 
at the German General Staff their eyes were immediately drawn to the towering figure of 
its chief, the long-lived and much-admired Helmuth von Moltke. Inevitably, therefore, 
when the issue was discussed they found it difficult to debate the merits of having a 
general staff of their own without also having to address the potentially embarrassing 
question of how the responsibilities of a Chief of Staff could be reconciled with those of 
the existing British Commander-in-Chief. This was undoubtedly one of the reasons why 
the whole issue was allowed to drag on for a generation, until both Cambridge and his 
two successors had retired, but there was more to it than that. 92 These two issues, 
localisation and the value of a General Staff, will now be addressed. 
Localisation and leadership 
The debate about the benefits of adopting a district-based structure on the Prussian 
model, embracing the Militia and the Volunteers as well as the Regular army, led directly 
to the structural changes introduced by Cardwell, but it soon became apparent they were 
not sufficient of themselves to create what would nowadays be called an effective `rapid 
reaction force. 
In April 1869 the report of the Director of Reserve Forces noted that France or 
Prussia could put 600,000 men or more into the field at need. If invasion threatened the 
British Isles there would be great confusion, unless all the forces available in the country 
were organised into military districts, and practised in operations by annual manoeuvres 
against the forces of other districts. 93 Sir Archibald Alison developed the theme, taking 
advantage of the opportunity of reviewing the autumn manoeuvres of 1871 to emphasise 
the importance of such a structure for creating effectiveness through familiarity. 
91 Major-General Brackenbury's evidence to the 1887 Select Committee to examine into the Army and 
Navy Estimates, cited by Spenser Wilkinson, 39. 
92 A neat modern summary of the struggle to establish a British General Staff can be seen in Halik 
Kochanski's `Planning for War in the Final Years of Pax Britannica, 1889-1903', ch. 1 of French, David 
and Brian Holden Reid (eds. ), The British General Staff Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London, 
Frank Cass, 2002). 
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If the late campaign in France has taught one lesson more than another, it is that the days of going to war with brigades and divisions hastily formed 
from independent battalions, with a scratch park staff and new generals, 
are over.... . We attach immense importance to the troops intended for these 
manoeuvres being, not pitchforked into Aldershot or any other central spot 
for formation, but being carefully formed into brigades always, and when 
practical into divisions, in their own local districts, and sent up to the 
general points of concentration fully fitted out for the field in every 
particular, under the brigadiers with whom they have been serving, with a 
staff to whom they are accustomed, and with their whole field equipment 
and transport provided by their own district controllers. 94 
By 1876 the military districts which had been called for existed in principle, but, as 
Alison pointed out, this was only a theoretical structure, and ` .... a mere aggregate of 
isolated battalions, regiments and batteries is no army in the modern sense at all'. 95 When 
faced by `.... the iron will of Bismark (sic), the far-seeing genius of Von Moltke .... 
' 
Britain could no longer rely on cobbling together a field force to meet an equally amateur 
foe, and must have one complete corps ready for immediate action. 96 
It was at this time that John Holms, MP, was denouncing the army (using an 
approach rather similar to that of Sir John Harvey Jones a century later) for not being run 
on business-like lines. `What, I ask, would be the natural fate of a commercial business 
conducted after this fashion? Why, of course, bankruptcy would be speedy and 
inevitable. ' An example of what could be achieved was ready at hand. `The more 
carefully the military system of Prussia is examined, the more clearly it will appear that 
she has acted in this matter of military organisation on plain practical common-sense 
principles .... 
' 97 This applied particularly to the way that their army corps were run. 
Each Army Corps, then, constitutes an army in itself, and efficient 
management is the business of the General at its head. The competition 
between Commanding Officers in respect to efficiency and economy 
exercises a most wholesome influence. Moreover, autumn manoeuvres 
between the different Army Corps are regularly engaged in; they serve to 
93 Lindsay, Major-General Jas., Reserve Forces Report, 1868-9, PRO WO 33/19,38 et seq. 
94 Alison, Sir Archibald, `Autumnal manoeuvres', Blackwood's, vol. 111, March 1872,328-9. 
95 Alison, Sir Archibald, `On army mobilisation', Blackwood's, vol. 119, February 1876,131. 
96 Ibid, 140-1. 
97 Holms, The British Army, 49,10. 
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test not only the capacity of the Generals in command, but also the 
efficiency of the forces, and the public have a clear notion of what they are 
paying for, and whether they have their money's worth. 98 
Altogether, the picture of an army corps constructed, trained and led on the Prussian 
model, as described by all these contributors to the debate, was of a fully equipped and 
finely tuned machine. On mobilisation it enjoyed two massive virtues; swift access to all 
that was immediately necessary in the way of war stores and manpower reserves; and the 
efficiency conferred by being led to war by officers who were already fully familiar both 
with their specific roles and with one another. The contrast with the British system was 
clear. In Britain, they said, when a field force was needed, it had to be cobbled together 
from whatever units were available and could be brought up to strength by ad hoc 
expedients, its inevitably superannuated generals replaced by fitter (but unfamiliar) men, 
and a Staff created from scratch. It is easy to see that the Prussian model, so described, 
established a desirable ideal standard at which to aim, but it is reasonable to ask whether 
the model was actually so readily achieved by the Prussians in practice. 
British commentators had to work with the information which was available to 
them, and this will not in general have given them access to detailed information about 
the mobilisation of individual Prussian formations. However, since 1892 an account of 
one Prussian regiment's experience of mobilisation in 1870 has been readily accessible to 
a British audience, as it was then that Major GFR Henderson translated and summarised 
the relevant pages of the History of the 33rd East Prussian Fusiliers for RUSI. When 
mobilisation was declared on 16 July 1870 this East Prussian regiment was on the Rhine, 
garrisoning Cologne as part of 16 Division of VIII Corps. What happened then is 
revealing. `On the 17th the Officers detailed to bring in the reserves left for East Prussia 
.... 
', some 700 kilometres distant. So much for the advantages of being close to the 
depot. 
The Corps Commander, being appointed Governor of the Rhineland, was 
succeeded by General v. Goebert, hitherto commanding the 13th Division, 
VIlth Army Corps. 
98 Ibid, 47-8. 
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The regimental Commander was appointed to the 3rd Landwehr Brigade 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Henning was transferred from the 40th Fusiliers to 
take his place. 99 
To cap it all, they were immediately transferred to the 15th Division. 100 In other words, 
they went to war in the company of unfamiliar units, and under newly appointed 
commanders at every level, just what Wolseley and Holms complained about in the 
British service. 
If the Prussia of 1870, its problems confined to the continent of Europe, found 
difficulty in achieving the ideal, it is no surprise that the British army continued to 
struggle with the problem. However, it has to be admitted that the difficulties created by 
such dislocations were significantly less severe in the Prussian army, and the explanation 
is to be found in the greater degree of training common to Prussian officers. James 
Fergusson was in no doubt about this. `It is the marvelous homogeneity of the whole 
hierarchy of Prussian officers, from the chief of the staff to the youngest ensign, which 
has given their army such unity that its acts are like those of a single organised being. ' °' 
Brackenbury's metaphor of the Prussian General Staff as its brain fits well with this 
concept of homogeneity. 
General Staff 
It is interesting to see how this realisation, that a sense of unity of purpose was one 
of the great advantages arising from the existence and power of the Prussian Great 
General Staff, gradually took hold of the imagination of the two Brackenburys. Henry 
Brackenbury was the younger by six years, but the first to offer his opinions about the 
need for army reform to the public. His writings and lectures in the 1860s had dwelt 
mainly on the need to look at recruitment, conditions of service and supply. When he 
touched on issues of leadership it was to propose the abolition of the post of Commander- 
99 Henderson, Major GFR, `Precis of the Regimental History of the 33d. East Prussian Fusiliers in the war 
of 1870-71', JRUSI, vol. 36,1892,71. 
goo Thid, footnote, 72. 
101 Fergusson, `The national defences', 20. 
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in-Chief in favour of an all-powerful Minister of War on the French model, and his 
thoughts had not turned to the role of the staff, 102 Meanwhile Charles, whose health was 
less robust, had been establishing his reputation as a historian and military instructor. 
Both brothers managed to get to France during the Franco-German War, and what 
they saw profoundly affected their thinking. The admiration for Prussia's military system 
in Charles's lecture about the need for autumn manoeuvres has already been referred to. 
He now developed the theme in a paper for RUSI, contrasting Germany's sense of 
purpose and encouragement of individual initiative with the moral and structural laxity 
which he had seen in France. 103 
His second lecture on autumn manoeuvres, noted earlier, explicitly proposed the 
Prussian staff arrangements as a model, but with this interesting qualification. `The 
position of Staff Officers is or ought to be a definite one. They are not Generals nor, in 
any sense, leaders of troops, and it would tend towards the detriment of the Army if the 
Staff came to be looked upon as a body of Commanders, or even to be referred to on all 
occasions. 7104 
A year later Charles was a staff officer himself, assistant to General MacDougall, 
the first head of the newly created Intelligence Branch. One of his first tasks was to 
prepare a report on how intelligence staff functioned on the continent, and for this 
purpose he examined the staffs of Prussia, Austria and France. His voluminous report 
emphasised that both France and Austria had learnt the harsh lesson that they must copy 
the Prussians, and that Britain lagged far behind them all in exploiting the potential 
benefits of the systematic use of Intelligence. 
It is acknowledged universally that no good plans for defence can be made 
until a large amount has been accumulated of information, such as the 
Intelligence Branch is now seeking to obtain. This information is at 
present non-existent in England at least in any form suitable for military 
requirements. 
102 The references here are particularly to his series of articles on `Military reform', in Fraser's, in 
December 1866, March, April and June 1867, culminating in a final summary in August 1867. 
103 Brackenbury, CB, `The military systems', passim. 
104 Brackenbury, CB, `The autumn manoeuvres of 1872', 82. 
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In each country there is established at Head-Quarters, an organization 
which originates the ideas, decides upon the means, superintends the 
execution, accumulates and arranges the results, of all such studies made 
by the Staff for defensive and offensive purposes. '°5 
This passage shows his awareness of the value of the contribution which a staff organised 
on Prussian lines could make to the effectiveness of the army as a whole; and other parts 
of the same report suggest the direction in which his thoughts were moving. There are 
references to the selection of staff officers - that they were to be the cream of the army; 
to the importance of emancipating `Ordinary Staff Officers' from the routine drudgery of 
the duties which took up the time of the staff in the British army, but were performed in 
Prussia by `Adjutants' in the field and the Accessory Establishment (Neben Etat) in the 
Great General Staff; to the value of having the training of young officers under the aegis 
of the staff. 106 
When, in February 1875, he was asked to give his lecture at RUSI on the same 
subject, in the presence of the Duke of Cambridge, he expanded the theme to show how 
crucial it was for the army to have a detailed plan for mobilisation ready to meet any 
predictable emergency, and `(i)n Prussia, Austria, France, the minor States of Germany, 
and, I believe, in almost all other European countries, the work above sketched is done by 
the "General Staff' .... 
' 107 Any country neglecting such preparations in peacetime must 
be prepared for catastrophic defeat in war, but in Britain `(w)e have our classes and 
examinations for the staff at the Staff College, and, having got our officers, we scarcely 
ever again set them to do real staff work till war comes'. Britain, he said, must employ 
more staff officers, use them for their proper purpose, and not be cowed by ` .... that 
terrible word of power before which we all tremble, - the Estimates'. 
108 Unfortunately, 
Cambridge's closing remarks made it all too clear that the Estimates were indeed the fatal 
stumbling block, and that nothing could be done about it. 
105 Brackenbury, Major CB, `Report on the Departments of Foreign Staffs corresponding with the 
Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department', November 1874. PRO WO 147/23,31. 
106 Ibid, 2,3,7-8. 
107 Brackenbury, Major CB, `The Intelligence duties', 245-6. 
108 Ibid, 264. 
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Thus it came about that when Henry Brackenbury, ten years later (and after much 
diligent service in a succession of staffs hastily assembled by Wolseley to grapple with 
sudden emergencies), found himself at the head of the Intelligence Department he could 
only lament the lack of a General Staff. `I cannot but feel', he reported to the Hartington 
Commission, `that to the want of any such great central thinking department is due that 
want of economy and efficiency which to a certain extent exists in our army. ' 109 
To a student of military history, armed with the knowledge of how events would 
fall out during the following thirty-five years, the logic of the argument seems clear 
enough, but at the time both the government and a large part of the military establishment 
could see all sorts of reasons why this pattern of a general staff was not appropriate for 
Britain. In fact this issue was to generate some of the bitterest arguments - within the 
War Office, between the War Office and the government of India, and particularly 
between the army and the navy - of the following decade. 
The root cause of the problem was a gradual re-focusing of thought, during the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, about 
the way that the army should address its priorities. These were the years during which the 
issues which arose between the `blue water' and the `continentalist' schools - how best 
to secure imperial defence; whether the navy alone could defend the country against 
invasion; whether or not the army must be ready to intervene directly on the continent; 
the relationship between the War Office and the government of India when it came to 
deploying the forces of the sub-continent; whether the very existence of a military 
planning function must lead to a war which politicians would be unable to prevent or 
control - came to a head. Until these arguments could be resolved, if not reconciled, it 
proved impossible to give the army a structure which would support a British general 
staff . 
Given the strength of feeling on all sides, it is to the credit of those involved that the 
short reign of Edward VII did produce the necessary decisions, and that, when the long 
109 Cited by Wilkinson, The Brain, 39. 
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period of peace on the continent was shattered in 1914, the country was as well prepared 
as its unique institutions could allow. The British army then learned that it still had many 
agonising changes to make, but at least it had been accepted that the army had a role to 
play in fighting on the continent; there was a structure which could provide a small but 
effective expeditionary force immediately; and the army (and indeed the empire) had 
been given a general staff. ' 10 
In 1880, however, the issues had not yet been clearly defined, and so could not be 
resolved. Soldiers like the Brackenburys might look wistfully at the neatness and 
precision of the Prussian system, based on the two pillars of an army permanently 
constituted in self-sufficient army corps and with a controlling general staff, but the 
political establishment was not yet prepared to address the difficulties involved in 
establishing either. Cardwell's memorandum of 1872 summed up the reasons for not 
accepting the corps structure as follows. 
The Prussian system of separate corps d'armee is inapplicable in England, 
for many obvious reasons, such as - 
1. That we have no conscription. 
2. That our population is migratory. 
3. That half our army is always in India, Malta, Gibraltar, &c. 
4. That we have no co-terminous enemy. 
5. That if we made a foreign expedition, it would not be in corps d 'armee 
by rail, but our Army must first assemble at a port of departure, and 
then be carried by ship to a new port as its future base. 
6. That in this country our distances are small, and our internal 
communications equal to any possible emergency. 
7. That our garrisons are almost all round London, Dublin and the great 
arsenals. 
8. That we must, in case of danger, concentrate large forces in one place, 
and be prepared to throw them wherever the danger might appear. 
9. That it would be inexpedient, under a voluntary system, that in any 
campaign all the glory, or all the suffering, as the case might be, 
should fall upon the population of any particular district. 
10. That the cost of providing buildings for separate corps d 'armee on the 
Prussian system would be enormous, and is uncalled for. 
No attempt, therefore, has been made to attain to the Prussian system in 
this respect. " 
110 The first six essays in French and Holden Reid, The British General Staff , and 
Gooch, John, The 
Prospect of War, (London, Cass, 1981), chs. 1-5, analyse all these issues in detail. 
111 Cardwell, PRO WO 147/53/1,14. 
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Cardwell was here talking specifically about the matter of organising the army into 
corps, but his note also demonstrates the prevailing attitude about how the army should 
approach its tasks - the clear implication that a British field force, whether menaced by 
an invader or embarking on a foreign expedition, could be confronted by such a variety of 
possible scenarios that it was neither possible nor necessary to have a structure in place 
charged with the task of preparing an operational plan in anticipation, or an army trained 
to fight in a particular way. Inevitably, ministers' thoughts were chiefly directed to the 
regularly recurring calls for actual military intervention in the colonies, and for such 
activities their view was that the role of the staff was to provide administrative and 
logistical support rather than operational thought. Accordingly, they saw no justification 
for a general staff on the Prussian model. 112 
This unwillingness of ministers, particularly among Cardwell's Liberal successors 
as Secretary for War, to accept the concept would continue for the rest of the century. 
The report of the Hartington Commission in 1890, clearly reflecting the influence of 
Henry Brackenbury, in words highly reminiscent of those of his brother quoted on page 
161, strongly advocated the establishment of a General Staff. 
We are informed that in the military systems of all the great Powers of 
Europe there is a special Department of the Chief of the Staff, freed from 
all executive functions, and charged with the responsible duty of preparing 
plans of military operations, collecting and co-ordinating information of 
all kinds, and generally tendering advice upon all matters of organisation 
and the preparation of the army for war. We consider that by the creation 
of such a central organising department, the military defence of the 
Empire would be considered as a whole, and its requirements dealt with in 
accordance with a definite and harmonious plan. i 13 
The report was endorsed by the incumbent Secretary for War, WH Smith, but, crucially, 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, his Liberal counterpart (who had held the office in 
Gladstone's third Administration, and would do so again in 1892), strongly dissented, in 
traditional fashion. 
It is true that in continental countries there exists such a department as is 
here described. But these countries differ fundamentally from Great 
112 Strachan, `The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904-14', ch. 5 in The 
British General Staff, 87. 
113 Report of Hartington Commission. PP 1890, Cd 5979, vol. XLX, 71. 
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Britain in the constitution of their Army, and of its government, as well as 
in the purposes for which it is maintained. They are constantly, and 
necessarily, concerned in watching the military condition of their 
neighbours, in detecting points of weakness and strength, and in planning 
possible operations in possible wars against them. But in this country there 
is in truth no room for `general military policy' in this larger and more 
ambitious sense of the phrase. We have no designs against our European 
neighbours. Indian `military policy' will be settled in India itself, and not 
in Pall Mall. ' 14 
For the time being nothing was done. James Grierson described the inevitable 
results in a letter to Lord Stamfordham from Pretoria, where he was serving as Roberts's 
Quartermaster General, in July 1900, which sums up so many of the issues with which 
this chapter has been concerned. 
What a lot we have to learn from this war in every way! I think our first 
lesson is that we must have big annual manoeuvres and have our staffs 
properly trained. We don't seem to grasp anything higher than a division. 
And we must have `staff j ourneys' to teach the control of armies in the 
field. If we take the field with a force the size of this one against an 
European enemy and continue in our present happy-go-lucky style of 
staffing and staff work we shall come to most awful grief. There is no 
system about it, and without a system a large army cannot be properly 
handled. 115 
It was the system which was lacking; and there could be no system until there was a 
far clearer agreement about what the chief priorities were. 
Doctrine 
To British soldiers of the time, and to many since, system was precisely what the 
Prussian structure gave. They believed that it derived from the powerful direction given 
by the Prussian General Staff, and that this helped the Prussian (and German) army to 
develop a coherent doctrine. The validity of their judgment has recently been challenged 
in two respects. Professor Strachan has argued that `(t)he status of the General Staff 
within Wilhelmine Germany has been much exaggerated', and that in any case they were 
114 Ibid, Dissenting report. It is ironic that when Haldane was successfully urging the creation of a General 
Staff, in the aftermath of the Boer War, the Prime Minister he had to persuade was Campbell-Bannerman. 
115 Quoted in Macdiarmid, 271. 
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not concerned to promulgate doctrine; ` .... 
doctrine was not the German General Staff's 
method of instruction: it taught by way of concrete examples'. 116 
With regard to the first of these propositions, it can be argued that, while it took the 
elder Moltke some years to assert the primacy of the General Staff over the War Ministry, 
progressively thereafter he and his successors, Waldersee, Schlieffen, the younger Moltke 
and finally Hindenburg and Ludendorff, established their control, not just of German 
foreign policy but eventually over the monarchy itself. At all events British soldiers, from 
1870 onwards, certainly saw the Prussian military system, if not the whole state, as one 
monolithic structure organised with such efficiency that a coherent military doctrine 
could be taught and understood by all. 
As to the second proposition, there was a great deal of respect in British military 
circles for the practical way that the Prussians planted their doctrine throughout the whole 
German army by such a method that it would lead to the desired unity of purpose - 
precisely by the wise and constant use of historical examples to train the leaders to react 
appropriately to the problems which they were likely to encounter in war. As a current 
instructor at the Joint Services Command and Staff College recently described it, `(t)his 
operational doctrine was based upon what most observers saw as Germany's traditional 
approach to war as demonstrated by Moltke the Elder in the Wars of Unification. It 
consisted of defeating an enemy in rapid, mobile campaigns - Bewegungskrieg. ' 
117 The 
problem for the British, as summarised in the words of Campbell-Bannerman quoted on 
page 164, was that they had so much wider a range of possibilities to deal with, because 
of the width of the bounds of empire and the diversity of challenges this could present. 
Accordingly, they could not hope to lay down a doctrine for fighting a particular type of 
campaign, as Germany or France could; but in default what they could offer were 
principles, which, it was hoped, could be applied to any military situation. 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that these principles were taught solely, or 
even mainly, in some abstract conceptual way. The great British military textbook of the 
116 Strachan, ch. 5 in The British General Staff, 87. 
117 Foley, Dr. Robert, `Attrition: Its Theory and Application in German Strategy, 1880-1916, (unpublished 
PhD thesis, King's College, London University, 1999), 59. 
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era, Hamley's Operations of War, has its `Jominian' moments, but every section of the 
work is copiously illustrated by examples drawn from recent campaigns, and emphasises 
how crucial it is that the principles should be learnt from studying the examples of their 
application. This is a typical passage. 
The principles dealt with in this chapter are few in number, and are put 
forward merely as a foundation to build on; and yet it is probably not too 
much to say that they lie at the root of all methods that have been 
successfully employed in war. If we study closely the battles of great 
commanders we find the truth of this assertion fully established .... What, for example, were the main causes of the Jaanese success and the 
Russian failure in the battles of Manchuria? ' 18 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the leaders of the debates, among them 
the Chesneys and the Brackenburys, larded their articles and lectures with examples from 
the same wars that their continental contemporaries studied, while Lonsdale Hale, that 
supreme pedant, devoted all his formidable energies to the minute analysis of the Franco- 
German War - and Wolseley's letter quoted on page 51 shows that some senior officers, 
at least, appreciated the value of studying these campaigns on the ground. Maurice was 
another to lay stress on the importance of learning leadership principles from the 
continental wars, and Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, probably the finest 
piece of British military writing of the last half of the century, was expressly designed to 
show the qualities of leadership in practice. The reasons why the British army continued 
to lack that unity of purpose and understanding so regularly demonstrated by their 
German contemporaries should not, then, be ascribed to any fundamental difference in 
the way that the principles of their profession were presented to them. They must be 
looked for in the structure of the forces, and particularly in the lack of a mechanism for 
ensuring that good ideas and necessary changes were not just accepted in principle but 
put into practice throughout the army. The importance of this will be addressed in the 
next chapter, which looks at the application in the field of the lessons arising from the 
continental wars. 
118 Hamley, 415. This passage is from the 6th edition of 1907, in which a complete new Part VI, devoted 
entirely to the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, has been added by General Kiggell in order to bring it up 
to date, using the most recent examples available. 
167 
Chapter 5 Application in the field 
Chapter three looked at the impact of technological advances on weapons, logistics 
and communications. It is now time to examine what British soldiers had to take into 
account when debating how these tools of the military trade could be put to use most 
effectively. This chapter will therefore pick up where chapter four left off, and consider 
the issues relating to how the army should fight. This will involve looking at the tactical 
changes which the technological advances made necessary, the training and education of 
officers to equip them to manage and lead the components of the army, and the extent to 
which the whole force was made an effective instrument. Some of the organisational 
questions which were considered in chapter four will come into the discussion once 
again, but only in so far as they had a bearing on creating the necessary conditions to 
make effective command possible. 
British soldiers who studied continental armies could see that this last quality was 
distilled from a body of doctrine, and this presented British soldiers with a problem. 
`Doctrine' was not a word with which the British military establishment of the time was 
particularly comfortable. Professor Holden Reid, writing about the ` .... 
doctrinal vacuum 
that the British army has tolerated until very recently', has pointed out the distinction 
which has to be made between doctrine and military theory. For elements of theory to 
become matters of doctrine they have to gain corporate acceptance. `Furthermore, 
doctrine is endorsed by the Army Board and not just by special interest groups'. ' In the 
British army of the 1860s and 1870s, where the constituent parts of higher formations 
were constantly changing, and where soldiers served most of their time in small garrisons 
dispersed around the empire, the organisation for developing and refining a body of 
doctrine, so defined, simply did not exist. The word `practice' was a comfortable and less 
prescriptive alternative, as Spenser Wilkinson demonstrated in a passage describing the 
1 Holden Reid, Brian, Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart (Lincoln, 
Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 1. It is tempting to add a third category, dogma, to cover 
matters of doctrine that have become so entrenched that they must never be questioned; the French attitude 
to the offensive, before 1914, for example. 
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operation of the Prussian Great General Staff, and the relationship between theory and 
practice. 
Before there can be a good practice there must be a true theory, and a true 
theory can be acquired only from historical study pursued according to a 
sound method. Moreover, the theory can never have an independent 
existence; it must always derive its sustenance from fresh contact, with the 
historical reality of which it is the abstract. 2 
Within the British service there was no shortage of theories, and of established 
practices at regimental level, but a mechanism for creating and then maintaining a 
strategic doctrine for the army was lacking, so when this chapter talks of doctrine at a 
higher-leadership level it will generally be referring to what British military men 
perceived foreign thinkers to have established, and which they hoped or feared might 
become part of a body of British doctrine. Occasionally what they were absorbing from 
the theorists was not in fact so thoroughly practised by the continental professionals as 
appeared on the surface - as will be seen in the case of the resurgence of the doctrine of 
the offensive, and also when the advantages of a permanent structure of army corps were 
being canvassed. 
In November 1872 Colonel Wolseley, still new in his appointment in the Adjutant- 
General's department, wrote an article about the army's recently completed autumn 
manoeuvres. His object, he said, was 
.... to 
let John Bull know frankly the opinion of a large class of military 
men as to the shortcomings of our army, when viewed as a machine for 
the purposes for which all armies exist..... They are not original, being 
shared by the thinking men in every well-instructed foreign army, and by 
the great bulk of our rising officers. 3 
Wolseley had less direct experience of continental armies than many of the other rising 
officers, but he was in no doubt about the need for fundamental changes in the way that 
the British army was organised and led. Luvaas has argued persuasively that both 
Wolseley and his friend MacDougall were not so much influenced by the newly 
fashionable enthusiasm for all things Prussian as by their experience of the revitalisation 
2 Wilkinson, Spenser, The Brain of an Army, New ed. (London, Constable, 1895), 181. 
3 Wolseley, `Our autumn manoeuvres', 627. 
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of the Canadian Militia, 4 but it was the climate created by the Franco-German War which 
made talk of major reform at least tolerable to the establishment at home. The fact that 
autumn manoeuvres on a respectable scale were taking place at all was a step in the right 
direction, but analysis of the performance of those involved raised basic questions. `First, 
the fitness of our executive system to the requirements of modem war, as well as the 
manner in which that system has been carried out; second, the fitness of our 
administrative system for the purpose of feeding and of otherwise supplying the wants of 
our army during war'. 5 
Wolseley's critical observations on the executive shortcomings exposed by the 
manoeuvres were, as ever, pungent - particularly on the necessity for professional 
education (accompanied by the removal from command of those aged generals who could 
not demonstrate their understanding of the requirements of modern warfare), the 
disastrous consequences of perpetuating obsolete formations, the value of allowing staff 
officers to practise their functions, the opportunities for all ranks to get to know and value 
one another, and the benefits of keeping all those involved informed of the objectives. It 
is disappointing, therefore, that his second objective, to question the administrative 
functions, concentrated entirely on condemning the perpetuation of dual control, arising 
from the way that the Control Department was allowed to function, because that left no 
room for what could have been valuable comments about the need for the integration of 
all the forces into a practicable plan for mobilisation and deployment. 
Whenever issues relating to leadership were debated in the British army two 
underlying themes heavily influenced discussion. The first related to opportunities for 
officers to practise the skills necessary for leadership in war by handling troops in large 
numbers. As Wolseley pointed out in the article quoted, large-scale manoeuvres drew 
attention to what was lacking; that would always be painful, but without such exposure 
nothing could be done to develop sound doctrine. This was the way of the reformers. The 
4 Luvaas, The Education of an Army, 120-1. 
5 Wolseley, `Our autumn manoeuvres', 627. 
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other issue, which tended to pull in the opposite direction, was more insidious, not least 
because it was, and remains, in some ways a great strength of the British military system. 
The power of the British regimental culture, nurtured by a system involving the regular 
rotation of units of this size to stations separated by vast distances, within which larger 
formations tended to be formed only on a temporary basis to meet a particular need, was 
always a brake on any doctrinal innovation which might threaten it -a continuing 
attitude of mind vividly described by Holden Reid in his analysis of a later period of 
doctrinal change. 6 Commentators who wanted to stimulate the pace of reform drew 
attention to the inherent danger of this inward-looking attitude throughout the period, but 
could not hope to eliminate it. 7 
Training and education 
Two of the forces which shaped Victorian society were its relish for the benefits of 
material progress and its faith in the perfectibility of man. Both these forces encouraged a 
lively interest in improving the educational attainments of the country at large. For the 
masses, a higher level of literacy and numeracy would produce a more skilled and 
contented workforce, as well as a morally enriched society. At more privileged levels the 
establishment of measurable qualifications for entry into the learned professions and the 
public service would lead to an improvement in standards of competence and probity, 
which would be as useful as it was admirable. 8 
In recent years historians, particularly Professors Bond and Strachan, have shown 
that the minds of the leaders of the Victorian army were not immune to similar 
sentiments, and that some positive steps were taken to respond appropriately, by 
introducing schemes to improve the educational level of the rank and file and the 
professional skills of the officers. 9 Indeed, the interest of leading soldiers was more 
6 Holden Reid, Brian, Studies in British Military Thought, 9-10. 
7 See, for instance, Galton, `The military forces', 225-6, and Griffiths, Arthur, The English Army: Its Past 
History, Present Condition, and Future Prospects (London, Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1878), ch. 9,235-47. 
8 Bond, BJ, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London, Eyre Methuen, 1972), 26. 
9 Ibid, particularly 25-7. Strachan, H, Wellington's Legacy, chs. 3 and 4. 
171 
sharply focused than that of their civilian colleagues. Whereas society in general saw 
little need to involve what might be happening elsewhere in the debate, the army could 
not afford to neglect the impact of increasing levels of professional competence in the 
ranks of its European rivals. 
The educational level of the rank and file was a continuing matter for concern, but 
in a peculiarly British way. It was acknowledged that continental armies, recruited by 
conscription, benefited from receiving into their ranks a reasonable cross-section of the 
population, whereas the voluntarily enlisted British army tended to attract only the lowest 
levels of society. One corollary of this, that continental armies therefore contained better 
NCO material, was accepted, but scarcely worried about. In default of any possibility of 
filling the ranks by conscription, the issue was mainly one of numbers. The perennial 
shortage of recruits could only be overcome if the quality of the soldier's life were made 
more attractive to decent men, and this entailed the improvement of all their terms of 
service, including pay, living conditions and respect for the individual. Success in 
achieving these goals was to prove slow at best, depending as it did on persuading 
reluctant ministers to part with additional funding, and the difficulty in finding enough 
recruits continued to be a problem. Their quality was also a concern, but this was more to 
do with their physique than their education, as the children of the industrial slums took 
the places previously filled by stout country lads. 
The education of officers was a different matter. The robust belief that an English 
gentleman's education fitted him to take on any responsibility that life could throw at 
him, particularly that of leading men in battle (or governing the inhabitants of `less 
happier lands'), runs as a constant theme throughout all the arguments of the period. ' 0 At 
the same time, the value of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, as one method of 
entry to commissioned service for the infantry and cavalry, and the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich, as the only route to entry to the Royal Artillery and Engineers, 
was also generally accepted. Two articles which appeared in the early months of 1860 
illustrate the apposition of these two themes. 
10 Mandat-Grancey thought this to be one of the British army's greatest strengths. L'Armee anglaise, 43. 
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One, in the April edition of Fraser's Magazine, examined the situation in the 
French army to argue that it was necessary for officers to start their careers with 
specialised instruction in their profession if they were to be adequately equipped to 
progress to senior ranks. The higher echelons of the French army were filled by the 
graduates of St. Cyr and L'Ecole d'Application d'Etat Major, but the other half of the 
officer corps, which had been commissioned from the ranks, seldom rose above the rank 
of captain. While this was a strong argument for expanding and improving Sandhurst, 
there was reason to take comfort from the fact that every British officer had the advantage 
of being a gentleman. The other article appeared in the United Service Magazine in 
January. Its focus was on the Staff College, newly created from the Senior Department at 
Sandhurst. It acknowledged that specialised training was of some benefit in equipping 
officers for staff duties, but the dangers inherent in too much study were spelled out in a 
telling quotation from some remarks made there by the Duke of Cambridge. 
The question of education is one of very considerable difficulty: we all 
desire to see it carried to the highest possible pitch, so that the education 
does not reach a point where it could destroy efficiency. Your mere 
bookworm is a very reputable person in his way, but he is not altogether 
the man you want for a staff officer. ' 1 
At this stage, when the French were still the perceived leaders in the military field, 
the debate about the educational requirements of officers continued to be entangled with 
the vexed question of purchase. So long as a majority of the officer class had either 
entered the army or at least advanced in it by this means, there was a powerful 
conservative resistance to any serious proposals to make intellectual attainments of a 
specifically professional kind the criteria for selection or promotion. Opposed to them 
were those who thought that they could see in the French army the advantages of a career 
open to the talents, permitting the most able to rise to the highest positions on merit. Sir 
Charles Trevelyan exemplified this approach when he wrote on The British army in 
1868.12 Military competence, he said, could be gained by two sorts of experience, and 
these should offer the only two methods for gaining admission to commissioned rank; by 
competitive entry through a military college or by promotion from the ranks; and of the 
11 Anon., `A few words on military education and the Staff College', USM, 1860, pt. 1,71-5,71. 
12 Trevelyan, Sir Charles, The British army in 1868, (London, Longmans Green, 1868). 
171 
two he considered the second the more advantageous. The Austrian, Prussian and Russian 
armies all had a system for bringing selected cadets through a course of training in the 
ranks before commissioning, but he preferred the French system of simply selecting the 
best of the non-commissioned officers for promotion, since this ` .... extends the choice 
of officers to the whole army, .... 
' 13 
Douglas Galton approved of many of Sir Charles's proposals for reforming the 
army, but on this last issue his preference was for the cadet system, similar to that by 
which midshipmen were trained in the navy. 14 He was writing in January 1871, and by 
then Prussia had supplanted France as the focus of admiration. It is no surprise, therefore 
to see his insistence that the training of officers and men ` .... 
for their real duty, War ... 
should be taught by exercising the troops to some extent in campaigns on the Prussian 
principle, when the real qualities of officers and men are developed'. 15 Lieut. -Colonel 
Bray emphasised the same points in a debate at the RAI that February (1871); taken all 
round British officers, because of their liberal education, their love of vigorous sport and 
their opportunities for foreign travel, were excellent material - but professionally they 
were untaught. His opportunity to see the Prussian manoeuvres in 1868 had taught him 
.... many years of peace training 
in the British army' . 
16 He did not see many more than' 
things worth copying ` .... 
but the one very important point in which they were decidedly 
superior to us was, in the TRAINING OF THEIR OFFICERS,,. 17 The lively debate which 
followed related largely to the reasons why manoeuvres were not used regularly for 
similar training in the British army, and this crucial issue will be picked up later in the 
chapter. 
The value of the superior education of Prussian officers made a similarly powerful 
impact on the Secretary of State. Cardwell declared that ` .... 
if there is one lesson which 
we have learned from the history of the late campaign, it is this - that the secret of 
13 Ibid, 11. For a fierce professional condemnation of Trevelyan's opinion, see MacDougall, `Army 
reform', Blackwood's, vol. 128, Nov. 1880,561. 
14 Galton, `Military Forces', 227. 
15 Ibid, 230. 
16 Bray, `The Prussian mode of conducting large manoeuvres', 348. 
17 Ibid, 349. The emphasis is that of the editor of Proc RAI. 
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Prussia's success has been more owing to the professional education of the officers than 
to any other cause to which it can be ascribed. ' 18 This was no idle judgment. A Military 
Education Commission had been set up in 1868 under the guidance of Lord Northbrook, 
and its reports were heavily influenced by the most detailed study of arrangements within 
the armies of Europe. 19 In addition to long reports from the various British military 
attaches, the Secretary of the Commission, John Hozier, had been sent to Paris and Berlin 
to collect additional material, and these papers make up a large part of the three hundred 
and seventy-nine pages of the Commission's proceedings. 
The debate which Captain Tulloch (one of a new breed of Garrison Instructors) led 
at RUSI in June 1873, on `The education and professional instruction of officers', has to 
be set in contrast. 20 It gives a suggestive insight into contemporary views about the 
relative merits of the education to be had at Sandhurst and the public schools, relating 
both to the opportunities for teaching young officers their professional duties within their 
own regiments, but the references to the situation in other armies serve chiefly to show 
why the participants felt that the British situation was so different. 21 At this level it was 
hard to generate the kind of explosive interest in the subject which could lead to a change 
in the culture. Why, officers asked, should they be expected to sit at their studies instead 
of getting on with practical soldiering with their regiments? 
The answer was obvious, at least to those soldiers who were impressed by the 
growing professionalism within the continental armies. The ability to use the resources of 
a modem army, the sheer numbers as well as the complicated technologies, could only be 
gained by leaders who had both studied the techniques and practised them regularly. As 
James Grierson, probably the brightest of the young subalterns at the end of this period 
- and already an enthusiastic student of continental armies - put it, 
18 Biddulph, R, Lord Cardwell at the War Office, (London, Murray, 1904), 117. 
19 HC 1870, vol. xxv, 223-602. 
20 Tulloch, Captain AB, `The education, and professional instruction of officers', JRUSI, vol. 17,1874, 
759-85. 
21 For example, Howard Vincent's comments, ibid, 782. Vincent's opinions, though he was only a twenty- 
three year old subaltern at the time, are not to be despised. He had already produced a succinct and 
insightful `Brief sketch of the system of officering the Prussian army', JRUSI, vol. 16,1872,796-8. 
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(u)ntil the great body of British officers becomes convinced that the days 
of playing at soldiers are over, and that work and work in the fullest sense 
of the word, must now be the watchword, we despair of any attempt at re- 
organisation. By work we do not mean the daily duty, which is carried out 
with the greatest conscientiousness by British Officers - in no army with 
more - but study, hard study, which must be encouraged and fostered in 
every way by the authorities. 22 
The purpose of the re-organisation which Grierson was advocating would be to 
provide the opportunity for soldiers, the leaders and the led, to become familiar, as a 
matter of course, with the practical skills involved in fighting under conditions 
approaching reality before they were exposed to the shock of actual war. 
Manoeuvres and Kriegspiel 
The Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry issued by the Adjutant-General in 
1859, to which General Officers were required to give `the most scrupulous adherence', 
describe in great detail how units up to brigade level are to carry out their drills on the 
parade ground, on the march and in review. They mention, in part V, that when great 
bodies of troops are brought together the brigades will be formed into divisions and the 
divisions into wings or corps d'armee, but the instruction to such higher formations is 
confined to the coordination of the movements of the brigades in close order. Nothing is 
said about the possibility of exercising divisions or corps against one another in simulated 
warfare; an omission which reflects the fact that no such manoeuvres had been carried 
out in England since 1853. 
Many critics of the General Commanding-in-Chief attribute this to the innate 
conservatism and regimental tribalism of the military establishment. These critics saw an 
establishment content, even complacent, with a system which had worked in the 
Peninsula, and which was now obsessed with the details of colourful uniforms, grand 
parades and field days which were more fetes champetres than rehearsals for war. 
22 Cited by Macdiarmid, Grierson, 30-1, quoting an article which Grierson wrote for the Indian Pioneer in 
1881. The German origin of this guiding principle can be seen in a diary entry of Grierson's, ibid, 90. 
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Prince George shared with his Queen a dislike for change, and maintained 
a steady opposition to all military reforms. He laboured hard to keep the 
army as it was under the Duke of Wellington. Full of reactionary dogma, 
parade drills were his most delightful chore, and extravagant field days his 
pleasure. 23 
Thus Joseph Lehmann in his biography of Wolseley; and Edward Spiers says much the 
same. `He regarded the efficiency of the army as proven by its wartime successes and by 
the turn-outs at the endless round of field days and parades which he personally 
inspected'. 24 But is this a fair judgment? There is plenty of evidence to show that, in 
addition to his abiding interest in the minutiae of regimental turn-outs, the Duke of 
Cambridge took a keen professional interest in the annual manoeuvres of continental 
armies, and did all that he could to introduce the same at home - and that he repeatedly 
proposed the fundamental changes in the army's structure which should be introduced in 
order to make such exercises work. 
For Cambridge the story may be said to have started in 1852. Newly appointed 
Inspecting General of Cavalry, he addressed a long memorandum to Lord Hardinge, the 
Commander-in-Chief, in December 1852, saying that Britain must reform the army along 
the same lines as every continental army, by establishing a system of permanent brigades 
and divisions, incorporating `a due admixture of the three several arms of the service', 
and integrating Militia regiments into these divisions. A crucial part of his proposal was 
the making of a provision for their regular training under operational conditions; ` .... 
means may be found for periodical concentrations of a portion at least of these bodies of 
troops, say a Division annually, where officers and men may have an opportunity of 
'25 really learning their duties in combined bodies .... 
A month after the delivery of this memorandum the Secretary at War, Sidney 
Herbert, had agreed to the inclusion of a vote to cover the necessary expenditure in the 
army Estimates, and Hardinge had set about the arrangements which would lead to the 
23 Lehmann, Joseph, All Sir Garnet (London, Cape, 1964), 161. 
24 Spiers, Edward, The Oxford History of the British Army, 191. 
25 Cambridge to Hardinge, December 1852. Quoted in Verner, vol. 1,39-44. 
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establishment of a camp of exercise to train nearly 18,000 men for two months at 
Chobham, starting in June 1853. 
Professor Strachan has pointed out that Hardinge subsequently said that the Prince 
Consort was entitled to the main credit for this initiative, but Cambridge's enthusiasm for 
the project was duly acknowledged when he was given a prominent role in commanding 
half the forces involved. 26 
The Crimean War now intervened, attention was further distracted by the Mutiny 
and a war in China, and the Chobham experiment was not repeated. However, 
Cambridge's determination to study the benefits of large-scale manoeuvres had not 
diminished. In August 1860, now General Commanding-in-Chief, he wrote to Lord 
Cowley, the British ambassador in Paris, to say how anxious he was to learn the results of 
the cavalry manoeuvres which were to be held in the camp at Chalons. While he was sure 
that Claremont could produce a satisfactory report on his own, he felt that it would be 
more fruitful to send over a specialist, the Assistant Adjutant-General of cavalry, if 
Cowley could arrange for his reception. 27 
Professional attendance of this kind at foreign manoeuvres, by home-based officers 
sent to supplement the observations of the military attaches, continued at an increasing 
pace throughout the 1860s, and on the whole the soldiers who went were deeply 
impressed by what they saw. One of the officers who had attended the autumn 
manoeuvres of the Second Corps of the army of the North German Confederation in 1869 
was so `.... struck with the instructive character of the Exercises .... 
' that he quickly 
published an English translation of Extracts from the Prussian Orders for Conducting 
Large Manoeuvres. His preface starts with an interesting observation. 
The practice of Sham Fights having been recently introduced into our 
Garrisons and Camps of Instruction, with the good result of exciting the 
interest of both officers and men in the duties of their profession, I have 
26 Strachan, The Reform, 165-70. An interesting and detailed account of the Camp can be seen in 
Armstrong, E, `Chobham Camp, 1853, by Edward Matthew Ward', Journal of the Society for Army 
Historical Research, vol. 81,2003,87-95. 
27 Cambridge to Cowley, 2 August 1860. Clarendon Papers, PRO FO 519/178. 
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been induced to attempt the translation of some of the Orders on the 
subject that have been issued to the Prussian Army. 28 
This makes clear that the British army of 1870 was not entirely deprived of opportunities 
to practise manoeuvring against an opponent. Indeed, Charles Brackenbury's lecture at 
the RAI in December (which provides the exhortation quoted at the beginning of this 
study) started by describing the shortcomings exposed by the autumn manoeuvres at 
29 Aldershot in 1869. 
Why, then, was it so important to learn from the continent? Because, he said, an 
army could only learn by doing, and sham fights between small numbers of infantry or 
cavalry alone were neither big enough nor sufficiently embracing of all arms to provide 
the necessary opportunities to learn about the realities of tactics, supply or staff work and 
intelligence. The trouble with Aldershot was that it was so cramped that one soon got to 
know every blade of grass. All the major European armies enjoyed grander facilities, but 
the elaborate autumn manoeuvres of the Prussians and Russians were freer and more 
realistic than the set-piece evolutions practised by the French (the Austrians falling 
somewhere between the two patterns), and he strongly favoured the Prussian model, 
because this showed how it was possible to learn in peacetime how to fight a war. 
Lord Elcho, MP, a powerful voice and a good friend of Brackenbury's, said the 
same. 
Whoever has had the good fortune to be present at the Prussian Autumnal 
Field Manoeuvres, where separate armies of 20,000 or 30,000 men 
completely organized, manoeuvre against each other for a fortnight or 
three weeks together over a wide tract of country without any previously 
concerted plan, cannot be surprised at the completeness of the field 
organization of the Prussian Army, and at the aptitude for war shown by 
all departments and members of the Service. War to them simply means 
shotted, instead of unshotted guns. Contrast training such as this with that 
which up to a very recent date, our own Army has been in the habit of 
28 Milligan, Captain C, tr., Extracts from the Prussian Orders for Conducting Large Manoeuvres (London, 
W Mitchell, April 1870), Preface. 
29 Brackenbury, CB, `Autumn manoeuvres', 45-65. 
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receiving at Aldershot which is supposed our Military School for field 
operations. 30 
The events of that summer of 1870 had already done much to drive this message 
home to the thinking public. The Pall Mall Gazette, in one of its many analytical articles 
on the campaign in France, said that it was now generally recognised that the use of 
regular manoeuvres, ` .... as real as the absence of 
ball cartridge and of an actual enemy 
will permit .... 
', was one of the most important contributors to the continuing triumph of 
Prussian arms. 31 In November Cambridge returned to the charge, addressing a long 
memorandum to the Secretary of State repeating the main proposals for reorganising the 
structure of the army which he had put forward previously. 32 He explained the urgency 
succinctly; 
I feel firmly convinced that the magnificent and complete organisation of 
the Prussian or German Army will in no respect be modified or reduced 
after the conclusion of the war, but will be maintained in its full power of 
development at the shortest notice, and it consequently becomes necessary 
for all other Powers who are anxious to maintain their independent 
position amongst the nations of the world to adapt their organisation as far 
as possible to the Prussian model.... . To complete the views I have advocated in this memo. it will be desirable, 
not to say necessary, with a view to attaining efficiency, to have annual 
concentrations of the Army, Militia, and, when possible, of the 
Volunteers, in smaller or larger bodies, as it may be found possible or 
desirable to arrange such concentrations. 
That they are essential to the efficiency of an Army has been fully found 
by the admirable results they have produced in the German Armies; and 
indeed no real or sound organisation is possible in which such 
concentrations do not form a leading feature in the general arrangements. 
It was against this background that the lecture and debate led by Lieut. -Colonel 
Bray at the RAI on 2 February 1871 took place. Bray's enthusiastic assessment of the 
value of the Prussian system has already been quoted. 33 In the subsequent discussion 
30 Elcho, Lord, Letters on Military Organization (London, Murray, 1871), Letter III, written on 19 August 
1870,10. 
31 Pall Mall Gazette, 23 August 1870,1. 
32 The memo. is quoted in its entirety in Verner, vol. 2, ch. 21,38-44. It is difficult to understand how 
anyone who has read the correspondence quoted in that chapter, including an exchange of letters between 
Cambridge and the Queen's Private Secretary on the same issue, can have reached the conclusion 
expressed by Lehmann, quoted on page 177. 
33 Bray, `The Prussian mode of conducting large manoeuvres'. See page 174. 
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Major-General Simmons's powerful contribution made several important points. One of 
the commonest objections to holding large-scale manoeuvres in Britain was always the 
difficulty of getting access to suitable land in a heavily cultivated and privately owned 
countryside. These difficulties, he maintained, were much exaggerated and were capable 
of being overcome; the true problem was to persuade ministers to accept the cost 
involved, a type of advocacy for which, he felt, soldiers were not well fitted. This was 
particularly regrettable for another reason. Moltke had shown how the thorough testing of 
senior officers in large manoeuvres enabled him to select the ablest to lead the army in 
34 battle. 
In actual fact Simmons had underestimated the persuasive powers of the military 
establishment, since the principle had already been accepted. The formal War Office 
meetings which Cardwell established in 1870 had begun to record their decisions, and 
these show that the plans which were being made for more elaborate manoeuvres in 1871 
were intended to take due note of the Prussian model. The Minute of the meeting of 
Monday, 24 July 1871 records, among the rest of the detail about arrangements, that `Sir 
H Storks read a statement of the mode in which the Prussians took the field on the 
occasions of these manoeuvres .... 
', 35 and an official version of the Prussian Regulations 
was issued. 
36 
The manoeuvres duly took place in the new style, in both 1871 and 1872, and the 
performance of the participants gave rise to a great deal of critical analysis, from 
professional soldiers, politicians and commentators alike. While the opportunity to air the 
grave deficiencies which continued to confront the army could not be resisted by ardent 
reformers, exemplified by Wolseley's comments at the beginning of this chapter, the 
general verdict about their value was favourable. There was much criticism of some 
34 Ibld, 363-4 and 365. 
35Decisions of War Office Meetings, Monday, 24 July 1871. PRO WO 163/1. The Minute for 16 March 
1872 refers to the circulation of a report on the Austrian manoeuvres, and that for 30 May 1872 instructs 
`Captain Wilson to prepare a report showing the general principles upon which the manoeuvres in Prussia 
are conducted ...... 36 Baring, Lieut. E, tr., Regulations for the Training of Troops for Service in the Field, and for the Conduct 
of Peace Manoeuvres, translated from the German at the Topographical and Statistical Department 
(London, HMSO, 1871). 
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details, but Charles Brackenbury 's pleasure in the progress being made seems to have 
met with the general agreement of his colleagues. 
But who that remembers the condition of the Army as to organization, 
education, and practical training in 1866, can look on 1872 without a thrill 
of pleasure and joyful confidence in the future? Even as late as 1869 the 
manoeuvres at Aldershott, though already a visible enemy in some force 
had been introduced upon the field, were still little adapted to the 
requirements of modem armaments. 37 
Within the Royal Artillery, in particular, ` .... the Manoeuvres struck off the fetters 
of immobility .... 
', by demonstrating that the guns ought to be deployed to suit their own 
tactical requirements, rather than in strict conformity with the movements of the infantry 
or cavalry. This necessary recognition of the realities of warfare in the era of rifled 
breech-loaders was happily endorsed by order of the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
mobility of the guns was further enhanced by the introduction of seats for gunners on the 
axle-trees, copying, somewhat belatedly, the standard practice of the Prussian army. 38 
If the benefits were so obvious, it must be asked why these large manoeuvres were 
not repeated after 1872. Negative pressures were at work. These fall into two categories, 
domestic and external. Within the first category, cost once again became a decisive 
factor, as so often when an immediate threat had safely passed. This was coupled with 
renewed concerns about the physical difficulties of bringing large bodies of troops 
together, including additional issues relating to hygiene laws and water Supply. 39 These 
were the perennial domestic objections. 
The `external' objections were of two kinds. The first, which Brackenbury referred 
to as `the cuckoo cry of the Prusso-phobists', was simply that because Britain's 
institutions differed from those of Prussia it was axiomatic that there was nothing to be 
learnt from the ` .... 
lessons extracted by Prussia from her last few years of blood and 
37 Brackenbury, CB, `The autumn manoeuvres of 1872', Monday, 20 January 1873, JRUSI, vol. 17,1874, 
75. 
38 Calwell and Headlam, The Royal Artillery, vol. 1,224-6. 
39 See the Duke of Cambridge's closing remarks in Chesney, `The theory and practice of peace 
manoeuvres, with their relation to real warfare', JRUSI, vol. 16,1872,573. 
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iron because we were not there fighting ourselves'. 40 This was blind prejudice, but a more 
professional objection arose directly from the observation of foreign manoeuvres and 
their influence on doctrine. An increasing volume of criticism focused on the essential 
unrealism of even the most apparently lifelike manoeuvres, because in the end the 
ammunition was blank and the casualties a matter of arbitration rather than fact. This 
could result in the learning of dangerously false doctrine. 
In the early 1860s this criticism of unrealism related to the drill-like formalism 
which still prevailed, 41 and the proposed remedy at that time was greater freedom rather 
than abandonment of the idea. From 1870 onwards the danger of learning false lessons 
became more apparent, and the mainly German professional theorists (whose experience 
was making so much of an impression on those soldiers who were receptive to foreign 
ideas) themselves contributed to this process. Hauptmann May was among the first to 
draw attention to the dangers. His account of the Prussian Infantry in 1869 includes a 
chapter, on manoeuvre tactics and battle tactics, in which he specifically warns foreign 
officers that sham fights simply cannot duplicate the time-delays and confusions of real 
war, and that they may be drawing false lessons from what they see. 42 Charles Chesney 
was quick to assimilate the message. At his lecture in July 1872 he said that he had heard 
the recent Aldershot manoeuvres discussed ` .... 
by many men of different nations and 
various views'; now he needed to combat fallacies and dispel `baseless visions'. 43 This he 
did by citing examples from the recent war to show how the realities of fighting had 
exposed the perils of taking both strategic and tactical doctrines learnt in sham fights onto 
the battlefield. Even the victorious Germans had not fully grasped this, despite the fact 
that May and Boguslawski (` .... 
happily just translated into our own tongue by Colonel 
Graham, and so brought within the reach of all'), speaking from direct experience of the 
44 campaigns of 1866 and 1870, had insisted that the lesson must be learnt. 
40 Brackenbury, CB, `Autumn manoeuvres of 1872', 80-1. 
al See, for instance, Anon, `Military Studies - no. 1: Manoeuvres', USM, 1863, part 1,504-8. 42 Ouvry, The Prussian Infantry, 74. 
43 Chesney, `Peace manoeuvres', 550. 
44 Ibid, 556. 
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The latter part of Chesney's lecture was devoted to describing the positive merits of 
peace manoeuvres, but, bearing in mind that the last words on the subject were those of 
the Commander-in-Chief, regretfully referring to the growing physical difficulties 
involved in organising them, those present must have come away with a distinctly 
negative impression. 
In the event, the British army enjoyed no more manoeuvres on this scale until 1895, 
which will scarcely have surprised those soldiers who were privy to the confidential 
paper on `The Army in 1872' which Cardwell wrote in November of that year ` .... at 
Mr. Gladstone's suggestion; the object of it is to exhibit the principal changes which have 
taken place in the War Department since the present Government came into office'. 45 
While he was unstinting in his praise of the Prussian army, his paper set out all the 
reasons why so much of their system was not appropriate for Britain - and the argument 
carrying the strongest ring of sincerity was the enormous cost. However (although he did 
not put it in quite these words), a low-cost alternative to actual manoeuvres was available. 
`The German Kriegs-spiel as a means of giving tactical instruction has been introduced at 
X46 the following stations .... 
Kriegspiel (wargame) was a competitive exercise to train leaders without involving 
large bodies of men on the ground. It could take the form used by Moltke in his annual 
Staff Rides, where the players worked out military problems in the open, as in a modern 
TEWT, but was more generally practised indoors, as in a sand-table exercise. Captain 
Burnaby firmly favoured the first method, as practiced by the Russians, 47 but Henry 
Brackenbury's memoirs relating to 1876 suggest that the version played in Britain was 
the more sedentary one; ` .... 
I used to go up to London to attend the games of Kriegspiel, 
as Cardwell, Edward, The Army in 1872, PRO WO147/53/1,1. 
46 Ibid, 20. 
47 Burnaby, `Practical instruction', 640. Charles Brackenbury describes the nature of Moltke's `Staff 
Journeys' in `The intelligence duties', 250. Spenser Wilkinson gives a full description of what this involved 
in his account of the Uebungsreise (practice tour) which ended the third year of training at the Prussian 
Kriegsakadamie in The Brain of an Army, 168-9. 
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which were held, I think, weekly.... '48 
The value of both Staff Rides and organised battlefield tours was appreciated 
comparatively quickly by the British establishment, and the practical benefits have been 
apparent ever since. The current Director Operational Capability, Brigadier Mungo 
Melvin, recently delivered a brilliant lecture on this subject, in which he led up to the 
present use of both of these instructional tools in the British army by outlining their early 
history. He cites Brian Bond to show that the Staff College introduced `Staff Tours' in 
1895, and credits GFR Henderson with having started overseas battlefield tours when he 
was Professor of Military History and Tactics at Camberley in 1893.49 
Despite the lack of large-scale manoeuvres on the continental pattern after 1872, it 
would be wrong to assume that there were no realistic uses of space to practise military 
evolutions on a scale wider than the drill square. To take the Royal Artillery as an 
example, their History shows how the experience gained in 1871 and 1872 led to the 
acquisition and development of sufficient space at Okehampton to allow for' .... some 
system of field artillery gun practice such as exists in Germany and Austria .... 
', and 
gradually more grounds suitable for live firing followed. 50 These developments liberated 
the units concerned, to some extent, from the monotony of the drill square, but they did 
not provide an opportunity for soldiers, and particularly their officers, to gain that 
familiarity with the other arms which was such a feature of the successful Prussian army. 
Worse, they created opportunities for misleading practices to become entrenched in the 
minds of those who might have to lead men in war. 
The Royal Artillery offers a graphic illustration of the danger. Delighted by their 
release from the constraints of having to conform to the drill movements of the other 
arms, they relished the chance to develop their mobility, their speed into action and, 
48 Brackenbury, Some Memories, 243. 
49 Melvin, Mungo, `Battlefield tours and Staff Rides: A military practitioner's view', British Commission 
for Military History Newsletter, no. 12,20. For an earlier example, however, see Wolseley's letter on page 
48. 
50 Callwell and Headlam, The Royal Artillery, vol. 1,230-4. 
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above all, the aggressive spirit. Captain Fox Strangways stressed throughout his lecture at 
Aldershot in March 1872 that these were some of the qualities which had enabled the 
German artillery to contribute so strongly to their successes in the recent war, but he was 
at pains to make the distinction between true and false mobility. Since the objective was 
to provide effective fire, careful reconnaissance, shrewd choice of ground and accurate 
shooting were crucial . 
51 There was great risk in going for show; for brilliant turn-out and 
speed for its own sake, at the expense of good shooting -a theme to which he returned 
in another lecture in 1877.52 Ultimately, the attitude of mind which he condemned would 
contribute to a spectacular debacle, the destruction of Colonel Long's 15 pounder 
batteries at Colenso - where a failure to reconnoitre the ground and an overweening 
boldness led to their coming into action unsupported, and within killing range of the Boer 
riflemen. 53 
Units accustomed to training only with their own kind might think that they were 
training in a practical way for war, but the value of what they were learning was much 
diminished. Conditions were more favourable in India, where the army was not so 
restricted by geographical constraints. There all arms had frequent opportunities to train 
together, and to learn the realities of mutual dependence on active service. The trouble 
was that the military problems which they had to address differed in both pattern and 
scale from those of Europe, and this had two unfortunate consequences. Some of the 
operational techniques which young officers saw working well under Indian conditions, 
such as the merit of boldness in thrusting forward into the body of the enemy forces, 
however great the numerical odds, and maintaining tightly disciplined formations in the 
face of swarming opponents, proved to be costly when they tried the same techniques 
against opponents who were armed and trained to continental standards. Moreover, by 
comparison with European armies the numbers of troops involved were puny, and there 
were no opportunities for generals to become accustomed to handling great armies. The 
s' Fox Strangways, 147-9. 
52 Callwell and Headlam, 232-3. 
53 Pakenham, Thomas, The Boer War, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 279. 
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home establishment was well aware of this, and that undoubtedly contributed to the 
general opinion that their experience was at best worthless. 54 
At home attention continued to be focused on the doctrines which were being 
developed and practised by the continental armies. In discussion the emphasis was on the 
need for realism in training to fight against a European opponent, and in the years 
immediately following the Franco-German War the British army undoubtedly made up 
some lost ground. Through studying and assimilating the teaching of men like May and 
Boguslawski, Scherff and Kraft, and relating them to what their own observers had seen, 
they were able to benefit vicariously from the hard-won experience of the combatants. 
However, while the British army was trying to learn the lessons of 1870, doctrinal 
theories continued to evolve on the continent, and some of the consequences were 
ultimately to prove tragic for all concerned. It is important, therefore, to devote a little 
space here to looking at the significance of these changes. 
Since 1859 the armies of Europe and America had been painfully learning what was 
involved in fighting with the tools and numbers now available. The Prussians in 
particular had evolved a set of practical doctrines which proved capable of delivering 
stunning victories, and these were what the rest of the world studied. In contrast, the 
Balkan campaigns of the late 1870s contributed little. They gave rise to detailed analysis 
of some aspects of command and leadership, but on the whole observers were not 
sufficiently impressed by the competence of the generalship or the quality of the troops 
on both sides to admit that valid lessons could be learnt - unless they happened to 
confirm existing views. However, as the military theorists continued to pore over the 
details of the campaigns of 1870 and 1871, and the commanders, to the extent possible, 
practised the resulting evolutions on manoeuvres, the messages began to change. 
The Prussians had won their victories by being aggressive. The analytical thinkers 
among their soldiers, Moltke himself and the soldiers whom he had trained, were in no 
sa See Lonsdale Hale's comment quoted on page 195, but for a vigorous condemnation of this attitude, see 
Maurice, War, 94. 
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doubt that the success of offensive operations depended upon meticulous preparation, 
accurate intelligence, careful co-operation between all arms, the use of surprise to ensure 
that they had greater numbers available at the crucial places and times, and above all the 
avoidance of head-on assaults on defensive positions if there was any possibility of 
outflanking or encircling the enemy. The emphasis of their doctrine, in fact, had been to 
exploit the use of the available tools, whether in communications, logistical planning or 
firepower, to such advantage that when battle was joined the outcome would already be 
settled in their favour. During the actual fighting, however, things had not always worked 
out as Moltke would have wished. Intelligence about the enemy was sometimes faulty; 
generals misunderstood or disobeyed their orders; in the fog of battle officers lost control 
of their men at critical moments. Yet they consistently won. This led many of the 
theorists to look more closely at the fighting qualities of the soldiers involved, and to 
speculate that these were perhaps in the end more important than the technical 
considerations. 
The beaten French had particular reasons to learn from the experience, and their 
initial reaction was to copy as much as they could from the Germans. This included doing 
away with the pernicious system of allowing substitutes to take the place of those 
conscripted into the army, altering the structure of their General Staff to an 
approximation of the Prussian model, and adopting into their Service Regulations for 
1875 the tactical principles which May and Boguslawski had described, emphasising the 
dominance of firepower on battlefield tactics and the impossibility of moving or fighting 
in close order under fire. 55 However, the reorganisation of their regular army following 
the defeat created a situation which reactionary elements were able to exploit to ensure, 
for a generation, ` .... that the upper echelons of 
the officer corps were filled with the 
scions of aristocratic, anti-republican families'. 56 Within this body, anxious to 
demonstrate that they were the true guardians of the national genius, there soon 
ss See Arnold, Joseph, `French tactical doctrine 1870-1914', Military Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2, April 1978,61. 
56 Setzen, Joel, `Background to the French failures of August 1914, Military Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2, April 
1978,87, citing Raoul Girardet, La Societe Militaire Bans la France contemporaine (Paris, Plon, 1953), 
186-91,198. 
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developed an attitude of mind which began to focus once more on what they saw as the 
traditional French martial virtue, an irresistible spirit thriving on audacity and dash. 
The offensive 
These men found evidence from 1870-71, not least from the pen of Charles-Ardent 
du Picq, a French officer who (like May) did not survive the conflict, that in the 
confusion of battle soldiers of the right mettle could still expect to sweep the opposition 
aside in a concentrated rush. Selective interpretation of the Balkan campaigns of 1877-8 
reinforced this opinion. While Skobeleff had described the devastating effects of 
firepower, Dragomirov favoured the psychological impact of disciplined soldiers in 
ordered formations; man, he said, was the first instrument of battle; if he stood his ground 
the battle must be won. The 1884 revision of the French Service Regulations reflected 
these influences. It played down the effect of firepower in general (though it recognised 
the potential of the machine gun) and once more laid stress on the moral effects of 
formed bodies of supports and reserves in deciding the outcome of battle. Gradually, this 
revival of emphasis on the power of the aggressive spirit to overcome all obstacles 
hardened into that thorough-going doctrine of the offensive which was to lead to 
devastating losses, with no discernable benefit, in Lorraine and Alsace in August 1914.57 
There was much in this emphasis on the spirit to appeal to British soldiers, because 
it seemed to encapsulate the virtues which had enabled British arms to triumph so often 
against great odds. Colonel GFR Henderson's collection of essays on The Science of 
War, written in the years embracing the end of the century, shows this clearly. German 
tactics in 1870 were, he said, a bad example to follow, and May seriously mistaken, 
because they denied the effectiveness of the assault with the bayonet by formed, and 
compact, bodies of men. 58 
57 Arnold, 62-4. 
58 Henderson, GFR, `Military criticism and modern tactics', ch. 6 in The Science of War: A Collection of 
Essays and Lectures 1891-1903 (London, Longmans, 1906). Sir Michael Howard's chapter in Paret, 
Makers ofModern Strategy, `Men against fire: The doctrine of the offensive in 1914', gives a good account 
of this doctrine. He rates du Picq's contribution particularly highly. There is some evidence that French 
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Meanwhile, the Germans were, as ever, examining their own performance in critical 
detail. The published works which were so quickly translated into English, including the 
official Histories of the campaigns, give what is on the whole a picture of a coherent 
body of doctrine - despite occasional differences on points of detail, such as the 
disagreements between May and Boguslawski on the one hand and Bronsart on the other 
- but beneath this apparently consistent surface there was in fact a growing volume of 
fundamental disagreement in German military thinking. Professor Eric Dom Brose has 
recently carried out detailed research into what the German military periodicals of the 
period reveal about debates on doctrine during the 1870s, and his conclusion is that those 
who ` .... emphasised the superiority of man and morale over machine and firepower 
prevailed by the late 1870s - to the army's detriment'. 
59 He gives examples of what this 
meant. As early as March 1873, he points out, a decree dropped the concept of the 
reinforcement of the fighting line in favour of retaining formed bodies of infantry for the 
assault. When, in 1879, General Sigismund von Schlichting, Chief of Staff of the 
Prussian Guard Corps, told the prestigious Military Society of Berlin that modern 
weapons made close-order attacks suicidal, he was immediately and fiercely 
contradicted; by 1881 the vastly experienced Prince Friedrich Carl was once again 
practising large-scale massed cavalry charges on manoeuvres. 60 In particular, Brose 
highlights how the unavoidable lack of realism under these conditions induced the 
German artillery to forget what they had learnt in the wars. `Shooting the cannons 
accurately from a reasonable distance played no role when blanks were fired, for this 




Brose's case is that, in the German army as in the French, an aristocratic attitude of 
mind was encouraged, by what could conveniently be practised on the manoeuvre 
soldiers were aware of du Picq's views by 1880 (see Arnold, 62), but none that British soldiers had come 
across them. 
59 Brose, Eric Dorn, The Kaiser's Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the 
Machine Age (New York, OUP, 2001), 4. 
60 Ibid, ch. 1. 
61Ibid, 32. 
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grounds, to revert to an older and more formalised method of waging war, and to lose that 
understanding of the realities imposed by technological progress which they had 
developed during the 1860s. Indeed, he goes a little further. `As we shall see, it was the 
French and (to a lesser extent) the Russians, not the Germans, who blazed the trail of 
modem military technology in the 1880s and 1890s. '62 
The impact of these continental trends on British military thinking seems to have 
been insidious rather than overt. The German theorists whom they respected had written 
from their direct and recent experience of the fighting. The teachers within the British 
ranks, such as Clery, Chesney, Charles Brackenbury and Hale, continued to draw their 
examples from the same campaigns, and to emphasise the influence of defensive 
firepower. The attackers had won in the end, and decisively at that, but only because they 
had mastered the techniques for getting superior numbers and firepower to bear at 
decisive points, through more skilful organisation, planning and leadership. Moltke had 
always favoured the policy of the offensive-defensive, of putting his forces in such an 
advantageous position that the enemy would have no option but to waste his strength in 
trying to dislodge them. The advantage of this strategy, which Moltke's successors would 
repeat in later wars, with notable initial success (if ultimate failure), was clear enough, 
and the young Frederick Maurice of 1872 dwelt on the importance of this at some 
length. 63 
Gradually, however, as observers at the continental manoeuvres witnessed a 
reversion to more direct and compact methods of assault, the significance of the lesson 
began to be eroded. Arthur Griffiths recorded in 1878 that the superiority of the offensive 
was now firmly rooted in the German army, but that opinion in Britain remained 
62 Ibid, 42. A letter from Hauptmann Groh of the German Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, suggests 
that Brose may have exaggerated the effect of this reactionary trend, but it did exist; and Brose has 
certainly studied the debates of the period in detail. This letter and the enquiry to which it was the reply are 
reproduced in appendix A2. 
63 Maurice, `The system', 74-83. As so often when a British commentator was extracting valuable theory 
from a foreign source, he found evidence that the British army had always done it anyway; `.... the 
advantages of the time-honoured habit of the English army, that of awaiting attack in order to return it. ' 
Ibid, 95. 
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divided. 64 A demonstration of this can be found in an article written by Colonel Sir 
Lumley Graham for RUSI two years later. His declared intention was to give an account 
of the current views of continental tacticians, and he was confident that `(t)he somewhat 
extreme views expressed by some well-known writers .... 
have toned down, conflicting 
opinions have been reconciled, and a period of doubt, uncertainty, and discord has been 
succeeded by one of comparative agreement' . 
65 His article quoted extensively from the 
Instructions and drill books of the European armies to show a general acceptance of the 
lessons of the late wars, particularly those relating to the defensive power of modern 
weapons. On the other hand, near the end he gave a long extract from the observations of 
a French officer of the manoeuvres of the German XV corps in 1879, in the Revue 
Militaire d'Etranger, to the effect that the Germans were now more firmly wedded to 
dense assaults on the battlefield than the French. 
There we observe a boldness and straightforwardness of action verging on 
foolhardiness; here discretion and prudence resembling timidity. Prussian 
attacks are made perhaps too brusquely, and as there are no bullets in the 
rifles, this show of cheap heroism is apt to produce a smile; but, on the 
other hand, French attacks are too mild, too creepy-crawly, too scientific; 
in a word, they do not appeal enough to the imagination and to the heart of 
the soldier, and the humdrum manner in which our infantry worms its way 
along is certainly further from the truth than the theatrical display of our 
neighbours. 66 
Here Graham was recording, in addition to the alteration in the German doctrine, the 
language used by the new wave of French thinkers to create the fundamental change in 
outlook which would dominate their doctrine in the years leading up to 1914. This 
`offensive element' clearly appealed to Graham, since it was coupled with a reduction in 
the emphasis on individual initiative which, he said, could turn battle into ` .... 
disorderly 
scuffles between armed mobs. But there is now a return to a sounder system', involving 
collective rather than individual action, and even a revival of volley firing. 67 
64 Griffiths, The English Army, 221. 
65 Graham, Colonel Sir Lumley, `The tactics of infantry in battle', JRUSI, vol. 24,1880,870. 
66 Ibid, 895. 
67 Ibid, 896. 
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To many British officers, their thinking coloured by the experience of leading long- 
serving professional soldiers in colonial wars, this was an attractive message; and, as the 
century neared its end, such respected soldiers as Evelyn Wood and Maude were once 
again beginning to emphasise the moral impact of the headlong assault, by infantry with 
the bayonet and cavalry with the sabre. 68 The appeal of such thinking was certainly not 
lessened by the fact that Aldershot and even Salisbury Plain were better suited to such 
evolutions. 
At all events, the value of resuming large-scale manoeuvres continued to be urged 
on the British establishment. The broadside on army reform which John Holms, MP, 
launched in 1875 was intended to illustrate the seven conditions for the army which, he 
felt, every European nation with any regard for efficiency and economy must adopt; and 
this was the seventh. 
- That as a General cannot be made without drill any more than soldiers 
can be made without training, it is necessary, by means of autumn 
manoeuvres between distinct army corps, that commanding officers 
should have an opportunity of testing their own skill, so that the 
authorities and the nation may know upon whom, in case of war, they can 
best rely. 69 
This recapitulates clearly enough the practical advantages which could be expected 
from a pattern of peacetime training culminating in manoeuvres on such a scale. It is also 
a reminder that these benefits would only be obtained if the structure of the army could 
be sufficiently changed, along the lines which reformers (and the Commander-in Chief 
cannot be excluded from the list, in this respect at least) had been advocating for years. 
It is now time to look at the second theme of this chapter, the changes in the way 
that the army should actually fight. 
68 The end of the section of this study dealing with field fortifications, on page 86, including note 57, gives 
further references to the growth of this doctrine. See also Baffles, `Patterns of thought', 32. 
69 Holms, The British Army in 1875,12. 
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Tactics 
On the continent this was a period of continuous and rapid reassessment of 
battlefield tactics. Each campaign produced new lessons about what was practical, and 
what was becoming suicidal, as the killing power of weapons increased. The British 
military establishment, onlookers so far as the wars in Europe and the USA were 
concerned, learnt many hard practical lessons about the reality of warfare in the larger 
world - in China, India, Burma and Afghanistan, West and Southern Africa, New 
Zealand and Canada - but the relevance of this experience, when it came to evaluating 
what should be learnt from the European wars, only gradually became an issue for 
debate, at least among the military establishment at home. This accounts for the fact that 
the present study, concerned as it is with the impact of the continental wars during the 
1860s and '70s, will make few references to colonial, and not many to American, 
experience when looking at tactical issues; 70 but, before getting down to the detailed 
consideration of the impact of the European wars, at least a brief reference needs to be 
made to the emergence (or re-emergence) of colonial and American influences towards 
the end of the century. 
During the two decades covered by this study there was no doubt that colonial 
pressures affected decisions at the practical level. The debate about army organisation 
was strongly influenced by the peculiar problems arising from the need to maintain 
permanent garrisons at many thousands of miles distance, and (as was seen in chapter 
three) progress in modernising artillery was directly affected by colonial requirements. 
Where the development of a doctrine for battlefield tactics was involved, similarly, there 
were underlying issues, and these gained in importance during the 1870s - as soldiers 
like Wolseley, with recent experience of colonial fighting, began to reach positions of 
influence - but the refinement of such thoughts into some kind of alternative 
doctrinal 
philosophy only came to the fore later in the century. During the 1860s and '70s, 
although (as will be seen) there were occasional references to lessons arising from 
70 The case for mounted infantry is one notable exception. Their value was being argued by soldiers with 
colonial experience, in the teeth of resistance from the home establishment, from the very beginning of the 
period of this study. See page 200. 
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experience in the colonies, focus on the results of the European wars was so intense that 
there was little attention to spare for anything farther from home. 
In this context the American experience was something of a special case. Reference 
has already been made to a continuing interest in America where matters of organisation 
and technology were involved. Up till 1866 there was also considerable interest in the 
tactical lessons of the Civil War, but this evaporated as soon as the startling events of the 
Austro-Prussian War seized the attention of military thinkers everywhere. " 
Later, as the influence of soldiers with colonial experience grew, and the impact of 
the continental wars of the 1860s and '70s began to fade, the climate of debate changed. 
The tactical reassessments which began to develop on the continent towards the end of 
the 1870s were noted and to some extent absorbed in Britain, as will be shown later in 
this chapter, and these two influences - the continental and the colonial - contributed 
to a renewed interest in the possibility that there might be a specifically `British way of 
warfare' which was not necessarily doctrinally dependent on any continental model. 
The development of this debate has been spelt out with admirable clarity by 
Howard Baffles and Edward Spiers. 72 In 1888 Colonel Lonsdale Hale encapsulated the 
`continental' view, that experience of colonial war was of no value at all. `An officer who 
has seen service must sweep from his mind all recollections of that service, for between 
Afghan, Egyptian, and Zulu warfare and that of Europe, there is no similarity whatever. 
To the latter the former is merely the play of children. '73 By this time, however, 
thoughtful soldiers, even those who shared Hale's deep admiration for German methods, 
71 Luvaas explores the subsequent neglect of the American experience in interesting detail in ch. 5 of The 
Military Legacy, particularly pages 115-8. There were exceptions; Charles Chesney occasionally returned 
to the American war, particularly when the publication of reminiscences of the campaigns offered the 
opportunity for an article based on a book review. See, for example, his `Sherman and Johnston, and the 
Atlanta campaign', Fortnightly Review, vol. 18 ns, (1875), 611-24. Professor RA Preston, `Military lessons 
of the American Civil War', The Army Quarterly', vol. 65, Jan_ 1953,229-37, points out that many of the 
observers, such as Wolseley and Denison, showed years later that they had absorbed more from their 
experiences than they recorded at the time. 
72 Baffles, Thesis, ch. 1,25 et seq. and in his article `Patterns of thought in the late Victorian army', The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, (March 1981), 39-40. Ch. 9 of Spiers's Late Victorian Army gives 
a particularly clear summary of how British thinking evolved during the last twenty years of the century. 
73 Hale, Lonsdale, `The spirit of tactical operations to-day', Proc RAI, vol. 16,450. 
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were beginning to challenge so narrow a focus. Colonel JF Maurice's book War, 
published in 1891, while lavish in its praise of German realism, professional skill and 
willingness to learn, significantly expressed his condemnation of those soldiers who 
thought that `small wars' were a bad preparation for `war on a large scale' . 
74 During the 
same period a series of articles by Charles Callwell, culminating in his book Small Wars: 
Their Principles and Practice, served as reminders that there were indeed principles 
directly relating to the sort of fighting with which British soldiers were actually 
familiar. 75 At the same time, another rising young soldier, GFR Henderson, was 
beginning to point out that it had been wrong to forget the lessons of the American war. 76 
In 1859 all this was very much in the future. At home, the concern was, first, with 
the immediate prospect of having to fight off an invading continental army and, later, 
with a possible requirement to intervene on the continental mainland. The tactical issues 
which arose from the study of such challenges must now be examined. 
As the analysis progresses through the years under examination it will not be 
surprising to find that the main influences were largely governed by the perception at the 
time of which country represented the leading military power - France in the early 
1860s, combined with a fascinated, if rather patronising, interest in the American war; 
after 1866 a rising concentration on the emerging Prussian/German military machine, 
which would dominate analysis throughout the 1870s; concluding with a brief, but 
intense, interest in the Russian experience in 1878. However, two points must be made at 
once. Concern about what was happening in other continental armies than these was 
never entirely lost, whichever seemed to be the dominant force at the time (which reflects 
well on the professional sophistication of the British establishment); and the doctrines of 
74 Maurice, JF, War, (London, Macmillan, 1891), 94. 
75 `To a soldiery accustomed only to drill-book manoeuvres practised on gentle undulations, a few of the 
simple maxims known to every Gurkha havildar are, when retiring down a mountain side in the gloaming 
dogged by ferocious clansmen, worth a whole folio of Prince Kraft', is typical of his approach. Callwell, 
Charles, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, originally published in 1896,3`l ed. (London, HMSO, 
1906), 347. 
76 Henderson, GFR, The Campaign of Fredericksburg, (London, Gale and Polden, 1883) and his magnum 
opus, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, (London, Longmans, Green, 1898). 
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the leading armies were by no means as settled as some of the most eloquent literature of 
the time would make out. 
In 1859 the British army at home was beginning to realise that technical 
improvements in weaponry, particularly the introduction of rifling for small arms and 
artillery, might force a reappraisal of battlefield tactics. Lecturing at RUSI in June 1857, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, RA, had endeavoured to set the scene. Artillery, he said, 
would enjoy ` .... a great preponderance 
in determining future battles..... We shall not 
see again cavalry thrown away at an early period of action, while infantry are still 
intact'. 77 These shrewd predictions were, surprisingly, accompanied by the judgment that 
the introduction of improved rifles would not lead to major changes in infantry tactics. 
I do not think that under any circumstances battles could be fought or 
gained by skirmishers or infantry acting in extended order..... An army 
would cease to act as a whole, and operations would be restricted to a 
multiplicity of small and insignificant attacks at isolated points. 78 
Shortly before the outbreak of war in Italy two years later James Fergusson wrote 
about artillery and cavalry in similar vein, but his opinions about the future of infantry 
tactics were already radically different. Although he disapproved of giving every 
infantryman a breech-loader because this would lead to a waste of ammunition, he spoke 
admiringly of the French for training theirs to work in looser formations. `In whatever 
manner battles will in future be fought it seems tolerably evident that close formations 
and heavy infantry drills are out of date .... 
'79 
Charles Chesney's article of January 1866 in the Edinburgh Review on `Recent 
changes in the art of war' has already been referred to in the chapter on changing 
technologies. In it he expressed his satisfaction that the country had at last moved out of a 
period of military stagnation, in which `..... the officer regarded the few among his 
fellows who gave their spare hours to the study of their profession as mere eccentrics, led 
77 Dixon, Lieut. -Colonel, RA, `The rifle - its probable influence on modem warfare', JRUSI, vol. 1,1857, 
113-14. 
78 Ibid, 111. This reluctance of regimental officers to concede that control must be lost will be a recurring 
theme. 
79 Fergusson, J, `Rifled guns .... 
', 517,537. 
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by some strange aberration of intellect into a pursuit tedious in itself and tending to no 
practical result' . 
80 The art of war was now being closely studied, and due note taken of 
the need for changes in tactics. Much was being learnt from the successes of the Federal 
American forces, `(a)nd more striking still as an example, the brief campaign of 1859 
showed the astonished world the practical results of the diligent improvement by France 
of her Algerian and Crimean experience'. 8' Chesney referred particularly to the need for 
infantry to skirmish in open order, for all to note that the increased range of rifled 
artillery permitted it to be more concentrated, and concluded that in future there would be 
few opportunities for cavalry to intervene decisively on the battlefield. In addition to 
these lessons from 1859, he noted one innovation from the American war, the 
introduction of mounted infantry - but was not prepared to deliver a verdict on its merits 
in a European context. Taken overall, his lessons about tactics do not amount to anything 
very fundamental; and in this they reflect the general judgment of his peers. 
Some, indeed, drew comforting lessons that not much needed changing, anyway. A 
series of articles in the USMbetween 1861 and 1863 considered what needed to be learnt 
from the campaign of 1859. Two of these concerned `The future of cavalry'. The 
anonymous author agreed that Britain should learn from continental experience, 
particularly French, and concluded that improvements in firearms simply meant that there 
should be more light cavalry; the lance was still the queen of weapons, and mounted 
infantry a flawed compromise. If cavalry had not shown to advantage in 1859, this was 
because the ground in Italy was not favourable. `Cavalry in future will appear on the 
battle field to give decisive blows - to annihilate the foe. '82 A further two articles, on 
`The British cavalry and its organization', rejoiced in the fact that they were ` .... the 
finest body of men that the earth could produce. Not only that, but they were, and still 
are, far better mounted than any other cavalry ...... 
Their future was bright, and ` ... . 
cavalry will probably be brought into action at an earlier period in a battle than has been 
customary in former wars .... 
'. 83 Another series of articles in the same journal aimed to 
80 Chesney, C, Edinburgh Review, vol. 73,95. 
81 Ibid, 97. 
82 Anon, `The future of cavalry', USM, 1861, part 1,569-75 and part 2,47-53.571. 
83 Anon, `The British cavalry, and its organization', USM, 1862, part 1,177-89 and 337-51.178. 
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cover a wider selection of tactical topics, but its author, who identified himself as a 
cavalry officer of nearly thirty years standing, added his voice to those asserting that the 
day of the massed charge was not over. 84 
Where infantry tactics were concerned, he was struck by the continuing success of 
the furia francesa in 1859; their direct and simple methods should be the model. German 
formalism, on the other hand, should be avoided. 85 He was similarly impressed by the 
fact that the French kept the control of the different arms separate until the highest level 
of command. 86 
America erupted into civil war just as these rather comfortable opinions, implying 
no great awareness of a need for radical changes in British tactics, were being formulated. 
As was seen in the chapter on technologies, American developments in fortification, 
particularly in the field, communications and weaponry had led to much interested 
speculation from the outset; but the significance, for the future of tactical development, of 
what was happening on the field of battle, was not initially taken seriously in Europe in 
general. `They make war after a fashion of their own, these Americans; let them kill each 
other off as they please: there is nothing for us to learn by studying their campaigns. ' 
With this quotation from a `distinguished French officer', Charles Chesney set out in 
January 1865 to show that so disdainful an attitude was misguided, and possibly 
dangerous. 87 
However, his first concern was with strategy. At the tactical level, while there was 
much to be learnt about the constructive use of field fortifications and the difficulty of 
keeping control of the fight in close country, the example of the French in Italy in 1859 
was still the more valuable model. 88 In particular, he supported the view that the 
improvements in artillery were having no decisive impact on the tactical management of 
84 Anon, `Military studies', USM, 1863, part 1,504-19 and part 2,51-71,408-24 and part 3,11-31. 
85 Ibid, part 1,513. 
86 Ibid, part 2,476. 
87 Chesney, Charles, `The last campaign in America', Edinburgh Review, vol. 121, January 1865,252-88, 
252. 
88 Chesney, Charles, `Recent changes .... 
`, 97,125. 
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battle; charging home with the bayonet was still the way to achieve a decisive victory. 89 
Where cavalry were concerned, the experience of both the Italian and the American 
campaigns showed that their traditional role on the battlefield must diminish. On the 
other hand, 
(w)e are brought here naturally to consider the use of one great addition to 
modern tactics, springing from the American war - the only special 
creation, as it seems, which American generals have added or rather restored 
to our stock, viz. bodies of mounted infantry. 90 
He saw how valuable a resource such troops had been in the American war, and 
speculated, rather equivocally, about their usefulness in the European context. 91 This was 
to be a cause much taken up by British (and Canadian) soldiers with experience of 
colonial wars, and it provoked some of the most heated debate for the next fifty years. 
Luvaas has shown how much interest British observers of the Civil War had taken in the 
development of the use of mounted infantry (or cavalry equipped with good carbines and 
trained to fight on foot when necessary). 92 He identified Wolseley, the Canadian George 
Denison, George Chesney, and particularly Henry Havelock (later Sir Henry Havelock- 
Allan) as having been strongly impressed by the potential of this kind of highly mobile 
force. 
He was clearly right to do so, and the value of such troops was to be forcibly 
brought home to the British army in the Second Boer War, 93 but it needs to be reiterated 
that both the principle and the detailed organisation and tactical doctrine of mounted 
infantry were being actively promoted by a handful of enthusiasts before the American 
war began. In 1859 Major C Raleigh Chichester wrote ` .... to suggest an 
improvement I 
have long thought necessary, and which in India circumstances have compelled us, after a 
fashion, to adopt). 94 Noting with approval that the French had their Chasseurs d Afrique 
89 Ibid, 120-2. 
90 Ibid, 124. 
91 By April 1871 any reservations had been swept away. See page 205. 
92 Luvaas, The Legacy, 108-15. 
93 Denison made this point in the 2nd edition of his History of Cavalry (London, Macmillan, 1913), xi-xiv 
and 433. 
94 Chichester, Major C Raleigh, `Proposed force for outpost and advanced infantry duties generally', USM, 
1859, part 1,1-7,1. 
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and the Russians their Cossacks, he proposed the establishment of twenty-two squadrons, 
eleven at home and eleven in the colonies, of 
.... a corps of men, 
light armed, light horsed, light of body and foot, who 
can skirmish in the front and rear of armies, keeping at a distance the 
watchful enemy, pouncing on his convoys, harassing his outposts, and 
bringing early intelligence of inimical movements, pregnant often with the 
fate of thousands, ready to act where cavalry would be useless, or at a 
distance, when the presence of ordinary infantry, in time to do the work, 
could not be looked for. 95 
Henry Havelock was an obsessive advocate in the same cause. As Luvaas has said, 
American experience did much to reinforce Havelock's support for the concept of 
mounted infantry, which he promoted with passion in his later writings, 96 but he had been 
pressing his detailed proposals for such a force on the Secretary for War, based on his 
own experience in India, before the Americans had been at war long enough to provide 
evidence of its practical utility in a major campaign. A sixteen-page memorandum to Sir 
George Lewis dated 17 December 1861 set out his `Suggestions for at once supplying the 
Force in Canada with a complement of efficient Cavalry, (embodying a principle, never 
yet fairly tried on a large Scale, but undoubtedly destined to play a most important part in 
future tactics); that of Mounted Riflemen'. 97 Claiming the authority of 
.... 
having had myself I believe greater opportunities during the Indian 
Campaigns of 1857-59, of acquiring practical knowledge of the organisation 
and working of Cavalry, together with insight into its present practical 
defects, and its capabilities under a better system; than perhaps any other 
officer .... he declared that ` .... our costly and magnificent 
Cavalry, as at present trained are almost 
useless. ' 98 He had, he said, been making proposals for soldiers who would combine the 
mobility of cavalry with the ground-holding power of infantry since 1858, and was proud 
that the Emperor of the French, learning from the experience of his campaign in Italy in 
1859, was converting most of his own cavalry on this system. If the British cavalry would 
only adopt the details of training and equipment which he proposed they would once 
again command ` .... the proud pre-eminence of the 
first in Europe 
.... 
' 99 
95 Ibid, 2. 
96 Particularly The Three Main Military Questions of the Day (London, privately, 1867). 
97 Harpton Court Papers, no. 2986,1. 
98 Ibid, 5,6. 
99 Ibid, 16. 
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This last was of course the crucial question. A cavalry establishment which spent 
much less of its time in the colonies than the infantry and the gunners, and which was 
deeply conscious of how long it took to train cavalrymen to learn the traditional 
evolutions of the parade ground, found it hard to come to terms with something so 
fundamental in the way of a doctrinal change. In any case, it was not easy to find the 
space, in the privately owned and rigidly demarcated British farmlands, to practise the 
wide-ranging manoeuvres involved in learning how to add the provision of intelligence 
and protection for an army on the move to their traditional battlefield role. '°° 
Commanders in the colonies had not suffered the same constraints, and operational 
necessity had forced them to work out such tactics for themselves; not only in India, the 
inspiration for Havelock and Chichester's recommendations, but also in South Africa, 
where, in addition to the locally raised Cape Mounted Rifles, there was a small mounted 
infantry troop of the Regular 75th Regiment; and there were similar locally-raised units in 
Australia and New Zealand. 101 
Throughout this period debate continued to rage about whether such colonial 
experience had any relevance to Europe. Continental engagements and evolving doctrines 
were eagerly seized upon by the supporters of all sides whenever they seemed to provide 
ammunition for the cause. The progress of this debate will now be briefly examined, and 
then the other tactical issues will be considered in the same way. 
Cavalry and mounted infantry 
The issues in question were not easy to unbundle during argument. There was the 
question of the role of cavalry in battle. Was it still feasible to charge home with the 
sword, using the weight of heavy horses and big men to smash the enemy? Deny this, and 
there was no longer a need for heavy cavalry at all, yet in every European army the social 
100 Colonel C Cameron Shute expressed the problem particularly succinctly in a lecture at RUSI on 18 
March 1870. `Military maxims suggested, or exemplified, by the last autumn manoeuvres of continental 
armies', JRUSI, vol. 14,1871,207-8. 
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prestige and connections of these regiments were closely associated with those of the 
traditional ruling classes. Should light cavalry be equipped with sabres or lances, so that 
they could perform the same function when needed? Or should their main armament be a 
firearm, so that they could fight on foot when necessary, and better perform their wider- 
ranging duties? If the latter, there was the psychological, or at least social, problem of the 
direction from which this role should be approached; should light cavalrymen be taught 
and equipped to fight on foot, or should selected infantrymen be taught to ride? The 
entrenched traditions - their opponents would say prejudices - of the cavalry 
establishment continued to make it extremely difficult to examine these questions 
rationally and without emotion, but practical demonstrations of the need to do so arose 
from every major war. 
It is to the credit of the Commander-in-Chief that he recognised this at an early 
date, even if an innate unwillingness to enforce rapid change, especially when there 
might be powerful opposition, caused him to express his views cautiously. Whatever 
other opinions there were about the Duke of Cambridge, it was generally acknowledged 
that he was an authority on the subject of cavalry. 102 His comments on the future of that 
arm during the important RUSI debate in April 1865 have been much quoted, and it is 
odd that he has not subsequently been given more credit for his observations on that 
occasion. 
There should be masses of light cavalry. Probably the day of heavy 
cavalry has somewhat passed by. I do not pretend to say that they ought to 
be given up, because to that extent I do not go. I believe that heavy cavalry 
at a critical moment may be very useful and necessary. But, as to light 
cavalry, there can be no question that the impolicy of not having much, 
must be apparent to anyone who permits himself to consider the subject. 103 
In the light of the performance of the cavalry of all sides in the campaigns of 1866 and 
1870 these were prescient comments, and more balanced than some of the arguments 
which emerged from subsequent debate. 
101 Haythornthwaite, PJ, The Colonial Wars Source Book, (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1995), 180, 
282,293. 
102 He had been appointed Inspecting General of Cavalry in 1852. Verner, vol. 1, ch. 3. 
103 Cambridge, speaking in Chesney, `The last campaign .... 
', 220. 
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One British soldier, who had observed the autumn manoeuvres of the major 
European powers during the 1860s, and whose admiration for all things Prussian as a 
result of what he had learnt from theirs was transparent, had much advice to offer on their 
use of cavalry in a lecture at RUSI shortly before the Franco-German War, in March 
1870.104 Shute's observations had convinced him that cavalry could still participate 
decisively with the sabre on the battlefield, but equally that their role was to act as the 
eyes of the army commander and an `impenetrable' screen. In both roles the `Prussian 
cavalry had proved of inestimable value in 1866'. 105 This unusual assessment was clearly 
influenced by what he had seen of their manoeuvres since that war. The more common 
evaluation within British military circles, based on the recent appearance of the English 
translation of Hauptmann May's Tactical Retrospect, was that the Prussian cavalry had 
been badly handled in 1866. 
Two articles which appeared shortly after Shute's lecture, but also after the 
campaign of 1870-71, illustrate this. Both referred extensively to May, noting the validity 
of his criticisms, but emphasised how quick the Prussians had been to learn from their 
own experience, even if they had not been willing to learn from the Americans. An article 
on `Our cavalry system' in the USM in 1871 cited May in making both these points 
strongly. The anonymous author did add the caveat that 
there is now a Prussian mania far stronger than the French mania ever 
was. It seems now to be tacitly but generally understood, that no 
arguments are now required to justify a change, however great or radical, 
except the simple statement that `they do this in the Prussian army'. 106 
Even so, the British army should learn the lesson, and adopt both the training and tactical 
patterns of the Prussian cavalry. 
Charles Chesney made exactly the same points in his `Studies of the recent war'. As 
a result of their experience in 1866 the Prussians had triumphantly learnt that the true role 
of cavalry was to screen the army, while obtaining intelligence and harassing the enemy; 
104 Shute, Some maxims', 218-22. 
105 raid, 219. 
106 Anon, `Our cavalry system', USM, 1871, part 3,568-80,573. 
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by contrast, charging home on the field of battle was simply a suicidal waste of men. 107 
By now (April 1871) Chesney had fully come round to the view that mounted infantry 
were a crucially important resource, and he castigated the Prussians for having failed to 
appreciate this. 
It is well known that Count von Moltke has openly rejected the notion 
that European armies can profit by studying the lessons of the American 
Civil War, among which the foremost is that action of large bodies of 
mounted riflemen, which, under Kilpatrick, Sheridan and Wilson, helped 
to decide the contest between North and South. 
As a result, they had had to resort to such expedients as reinforcing the cavalry brigades 
with riflemen carried in carts. 108 
In the aftermath of the Franco-German War, this issue of the value of mounted 
rifles continued to attract the attention of alert minds. Maurice, in his 1872 Prize essay, 
could see many uses for such men, on the march as well as for escorting the guns on the 
battlefield. There would no longer be many opportunities for cavalry charges, but he still 
spoke of mounted riflemen accompanying the swarms of light cavalry in the open rather 
than seeing cavalry become mounted rifles themselves. 109 Colonel Valentine Baker, in a 
lecture at RUSI the following year, similarly emphasised the need to train, and practise, 
the reconnaissance role, and acknowledged the value of having some mounted infantry to 
support the cavalry; but he rejected any idea of training the cavalry themselves to work in 
the way that the Americans had developed. He was particularly opposed to arming them 
with pistols, ` .... a 
demoralizing and dangerous weapon for a cavalry soldier' .l 
lo Colonel 
Evelyn Wood expressed similar sentiments in a lecture to Volunteer officers, chaired by 
that vigorous Volunteer Lord Elcho. `The experience gained during the war of 1870-71, 
has confirmed the opinion long held by many soldiers that "mounted riflemen are now 
107 Chesney, C, `Studies of the recent war', 569. 
108 raid, 570. Colonel HA Smythe, RA, who had been with the Prussian 7th. Corps during the autumn 
fighting in 1870, said that the Germans were not attracted by the idea of mounted rifles because their three- 
year period of service was not long enough to allow for adequate training of all the skills required. `Some 
observations among German armies during 1870', Proc RAI, vol. 7,1871,200. 
1°9 Maurice, `The System', 104,142. 
110 Baker, Valentine, `Organization and employment of cavalry', 14 March 1873, JRUSI, vol. 17,1874,384. 
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essential to every enterprising army". "" However, cavalry trained to depend on firearms 
would never charge. Accordingly, mounted rifles ` .... should never 
be allowed to grow 
into indifferent horse. Such a corps should consist of trained marksmen on horses and 
vehicles, and should invariably dismount to fight'. ' 12 
By this time German reflections on the lessons of the 1870-71 campaign were 
proliferating. 113 Colonel Ouvry, who was instrumental in bringing some of the most 
significant of these writings to the attention of British soldiers, summarised one of these 
pieces for JRUSI in 1875.114 In this he recorded German satisfaction with the improved 
performance of their cavalry since the Austro-Prussian War, quoted from their 
regulations of 1873 to show their recognition that battlefield charges would be rare 
events, and (in what appear to be sentences directly translated from the original) set out a 
German acknowledgment that cavalry should themselves be equipped and trained to fight 
on foot. 
The cavalry reforms have been equally important. The view that the sabre 
is the arm which forms the essential characteristic of the cavalryman must, 
since the experience of 1870-71, fall to the ground. The most complete 
independent action for cavalry must be the watchword in the future, and to 
aid this a good fire-arm must be supplied. 115 
1875 also saw the publication of Clery's Minor Tactics. 116 This is an important 
book for several reasons, and it does support the argument that British officers were 
soundly exposed to what was happening on the continent. The advertisements inside the 
front cover list an imposing number of foreign (mainly, of course, German) military 
works in translation. 117 Captain Clery was at the time Professor of Tactics at Sandhurst, 
"' Wood, Colonel Evelyn, `Mounted Riflemen', IHR Military Pamphlets, vol. 16,13. The format of this 
paper suggests that it was originally delivered at RUSI. The year is not given, but 1874 would fit the 
context. 
112 Ibid, 28. It is to be noted that Wood was a rifleman, not a cavalryman. 
113 `After 1871 the German military journals were awash in debates over strategy and tactics. ' Foley, 
Robert T., `Attrition: Its theory and application in German strategy, 1880-1916', unpublished PhD thesis, 
1999,12. He cites Samuel Huntington to the effect that, by 1859, the Germans were producing 50% of all 
the military literature of Europe. 
114 Ouvry, Colonel, `A review of the improvements in military tactics and formations in Germany during 
the last year (1873). (Precis of an Article from the "Militair Wochenblatt ') ', JRUSI, vol. 18,441-9. 
115 Ibid, 446. 
116 Clery, C, Minor Tactics, (London, Henry S King, 1875). 
117 See illustration 7. 
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and the book consists of lectures which he had delivered to sub-lieutenants studying 
there. These lectures rely heavily on the events of 1870-71 for examples of good practice, 
but it is comforting to see occasional bursts of British pragmatism warning against too 
ready an acceptance of every tactical theory. His comment on the use of large advance 
guards is an example. 
Successful practice must always override antagonistic theory. The use of 
large advanced guards by the Germans in the two last wars, whatever 
objections they may seemingly be open to, cannot be condemned by 
contrast with any other more successful organisation. Hence the adoption 
of the principle has become very general in other European armies. But it 
may be well at the same time to point out some of the attendant 
disadvantages. 118 
Despite this proviso, Clery talks at length about the successes of the German cavalry in 
the reconnaissance role in 1870, and draws the conclusion that such cavalry must be 
equipped and trained to fight on foot when necessary. ' 19 
When it comes to cavalry on the battlefield, however, he struggles to find a 
consistent approach. On the one hand `(m)odern warfare has reduced the role of cavalry 
on a battle field to very insignificant proportions', but he cannot quite bring himself to 
dismiss `.... the effect, moral as well as physical, produced on the enemy by the shock of 
collision', and he finds many examples from the recent continental wars where battlefield 
charges either succeeded, or should have done so if properly executed. 120 
Towards the end of the decade, and as memories of the carnage resulting from the 
bloody repulse of most actual charges in 1870 faded, the confidence of the traditionalists 
in the cavalry began to reassert itself. In April 1878 Major Boulderson, 17th Lancers, led 
a debate at RUSI on `The armament and organization of cavalry etc. ' which amounted to 
a standard presentation of the case for the charge home with the arme blanche. 121 This 
was a well-attended affair, chaired by the Officer Commanding Aldershot, and included 
such luminaries as the Commander-in-chief from the Crimea (General Sir William 
... Ibid, 74-5. 
119 Ibid, 124. 
'20 Ibid, 145,111,112-6. 
121 Boulderson, Major S, `The armament and organization of cavalry etc. ', JRUSI, vol. 22,378-96. 
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Codrington), Lord Elcho, MP, and the recently-returned military attache at Berlin (Lieut. - 
General Beauchamp Walker). The debate which followed the lecture, as so often 
happened when the subject was one which attracted a large and distinguished audience, 
was of more significance than the paper itself 
Walker's contribution was particularly powerful. He described how fiercely he had 
previously opposed the idea of giving cavalry a firearm; but times had changed. His 
observations of the German army had taught him the necessity for cavalry to be able to 
range far and wide, and often to hold ground which they had seized. To do this they must 
be able to fight on foot, with a weapon of good range, which was why the German 
cavalry in the late war had taken every opportunity to equip themselves with captured 
Chassepöts.. But they should be trained cavalrymen. 
As to mounted infantry, of which we have heard, in my opinion they are 
neither one thing nor the other; they are not good cavalry, and are therefore 
unable to understand the independent duties as bodies of cavalry, and they 
certainly to a great extent would be spoiled as infantry. 122 
Boulderson had advanced the theory that the ranks of the cavalry should be 
differentially armed, the front rank with lance, sword and pistol, and the rear rank with 
carbine and sword. Walker felt that the British army had too few cavalry to justify any 
large number being armed with the lance. The subsequent debate became progressively 
more detailed, on this issue as well as that of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
rifle over the carbine, but in the course of it Lord Elcho, gracefully acknowledging that, 
` 
.... not 
being a cavalry Officer, and only a civilian soldier, it is not for me to give an 
opinion .... 
', delivered himself of views which were both robust and well-informed on all 
the points at issue. 123 In winding up the debate, Boulderson grudgingly admitted that 
there might be a place for some mounted infantry. 
122 Ibid, 389. Cavalry officers continued to maintain, not without justice, that British soldiers who were not 
fully trained cavalrymen would not look after their horses properly. See (the now General) Shute's 
comments at another RUSI debate in 1876, `Cavalry', JRUSI, Vol. 20,1877,179-94. 
123 Ibid, 3 90-2. He mentioned that he' .... 
happened to succeed Lord Spencer on the Small Arms 
Committee 
.... 
' He was in fact deeply involved with matters relating to the auxiliary forces, and Colonel of 
the London Scottish Volunteers. 
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Not all cavalrymen were so hidebound. Captain Henry Hozier had been an 
interested observer of the war between Russia and Turkey in the Balkans in 1877, and his 
account of it included this comment. `The dragoons are in reality mounted rifles. Alone 
of all the powers in Europe the Russians have recognized the great utility of mounted 
infantry. ' 124 However, it seems that thinking soldiers had given up any serious hope of 
seeing either the formation of specialised mounted infantry units in the regular army or an 
acceptance by the cavalry that they must be ready to fight on foot as a normal part of their 
duties. At all events, the big debate at RUSI in May 1880 led by Captain James, covering 
twenty-five pages of the Journal, contains less than one page of exposition on the 
realities of cavalry warfare on the continent (the general futility of charges and the 
necessity to be ready to fight on foot), and no mention of it at all in the debate itself. 125 
Perhaps the last word on this subject should lie with Evelyn Wood. Twenty-five 
years later, and now a famous General, he looked back at these wars in order to find 
evidence for what the future might have in store for the cavalry. 126 His conclusion was 
one which would comfort his cavalry colleagues. His list of foreign authorities is 
impressive, and he quotes from Prince Kraft's Letters on Cavalry to justify his view that 
there is a place for mounted infantry in support of the cavalry; 127 but his main point, 
based on examples carefully selected from the wars of 1866 and 1870, is that cavalry, 
properly directed, can still triumph in the charge. `Finally, we see how a startling success 
was obtained with trifling loss to the victors, by a skilful, resolute Leader, who knew how 
to utilize broken ground, and whose soldiers followed as bravely as he led. ' 128 
124 Hozier, Henry, The Russo-Turkish War, (London, Wm. Mackenzie, 1877-8), 350. 
125 James, `Modern fire', 388-9. 
126 Wood, General Sir Evelyn, Achievements of Cavalry, (London, Bell, 1897). 
127 Ibid, 249. 
128 Ibid, 190; This was the action at Tobitschau on 15 July 1866. Three squadrons of the 5t' Prussian 
Cuirassiers charged an Austrian artillery position which had been observed to have no escort. They 
captured eighteen guns, two officers and 168 men for the loss of ten men; scarcely a major engagement, but 
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During the earlier 1860s the French were still regarded as the model for infantry 
success in the field. While the general use, and demonstrable effect, of field fortifications 
in the American War had been duly noted, 129 there was no attempt to formulate any new 
tactical doctrine for British infantry, and, as late as January 1866, Charles Chesney 
remained confident that the traditional way was best. Charging home with the bayonet 
was still the best way to achieve decisive results. `(1) When made resolutely, and without 
slackening the gait, bayonet charges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten. (2) The 
bayonet is usually more effective than grape, canister or bullets. ' 130 
How different a story he had to tell by October of that same year. In the aftermath 
of the Königgrrätz campaign he was now pointing out ` .... the actual fact of the 
complete failure of Prince Frederic's attack at Sadowa on the very poorly intrenched 
position of the Austrians. ' Given that they were armed with a breech-loader, the Prussian 
doctrine 
.... that 
in all contests of infantry they must keep three objects in view; (1) 
to receive or approach the adversary on as open ground as may be; (2) to 
endeavour to keep him as long as possible engaged in a musketry contest; 
and (3) to handle their own troops in deep formation 
was the recipe for success, and ` .... the secret of those sudden flank attacks which 
surprised the Austrian officers, and caused them such severe losses in prisoners. 131 
The dramatic success of this campaign left no doubt that a new era in infantry 
tactics had begun, and the events were carefully examined in order to identify the 
elements which now needed to be taken into account. In practice, this meant that, since 
the Prussians had been so successful, their actions, and their infantry doctrine (in so far as 
it had been laid down) must be dissected in detail. Three main issues dominated this 
analysis, and the debate about them can be traced through the remaining years of this 
study. 
their `Leader' was von Bredow, subsequently famous for the brave, but costly, charge at Mars la Tour on 
16 August 1870. (Details from the official German Campaign of 1866 in Germany, 339. ) 
129 See chapter 3,83, particularly Cambridge's comment about the importance of the spade, even in attack. 
130 Chesney, C, `Recent changes', 106. 
131 Chesney, C, `The military growth of Prussia', 588-9. 
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The tactical unit - the company. The American Civil War and the 1866 campaign in 
Germany brought home to the whole world the extent to which the range and killing 
power of firearms had increased. The chapter on technologies was largely taken up by 
debate about the implications for the British army, particularly in terms of the need to 
improve its own weapons and recognise the need for field fortifications. Discussion 
continued to focus on these aspects, rather to the exclusion of other tactical 
considerations, until Hauptmann May's analysis of the performance of the Prussian army 
in 1866 was made available to a British audience by Colonel Henry Ouvry. These two 
short books, The Tactical Retrospect and On the Prussian Infantry 1869, appeared in his 
translation in 1870, and immediately soldiers found themselves confronted by the need to 
think fundamentally about how to manage infantry under the fire of modern weapons. 
The first issue was the number of men that it was possible to manage, once battle 
was joined. For two hundred years the cavalry and infantry of all European armies had 
been organised in regiments, under the command, and in many respects run as if the 
private property, of their Colonels. In most continental armies the infantry regiments 
were made up of two or three battalions, each with a theoretical war establishment of 
approximately a thousand men and commanded by a Major or junior Colonel. In the 
British army at the beginning of this period, most infantry regiments consisted of only 
one battalion, commanded in practice by a Lieutenant-Colonel (and the post of 
regimental Colonel merely a well-rewarded sinecure for a respected General). On 
campaign these battalions normally fought as a unit under the direct orders of their 
battalion commander. In the conditions which had existed until 1866 such a tactical 
arrangement had proved to be generally practical, and Richard Holmes has recently given 
a most evocative account of how this actually worked in battle in the early years of the 
nineteenth century, in the first chapter of his book, Redcoat. 132 
In 1866 the drill books and infantry regulations of all participants still embraced this 
132 Holmes, Richard, Redcoat, the British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London, Harper Collins, 
2001). The practicalities of colonial warfare were often, of course, very different, and this will have a 
bearing on some of the British reaction to this issue, in the pages which follow. 
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principle that the battalion commander directly controlled his thousand men on the 
battlefield. May, however, pointed out this was simply an impossibility under conditions 
which dictated that success depended upon looser formations and the use of ground in 
ways that could not possibly be controlled directly by one commander. The 1866 
campaign had demonstrated time and time again that battalion columns were a disaster on 
the battlefield, and if troops had to fight in dispersed order they were inevitably beyond 
the reach of their battalion commander once a fire fight had begun. 133 In practice, and he 
wrote as a company officer, the company, of up to two hundred and fifty men, was the 
ideal tactical unit; and the company commander (or chief, or father) the vital tactical 
commander. Companies must work and train together to practise what they would have to 
do on the battlefield, and battalion commanders must learn to hold themselves aloof, 
instead of trying to retain a tactical control which they could not maintain under fire. 134 
This raised several fundamental issues. The first was the size of the tactical unit. 
Prussian battalions were divided into four active companies (hence enjoying a war 
establishment of two hundred and fifty). British battalions were usually organised into 
eight active companies (not counting two depot companies), each with a theoretical 
strength of about one hundred and twenty. 135 Should the British army follow the Prussian 
example, as other European armies were quick to do? The issue was debated fiercely, if 
not always with a firm understanding. 136 Charles Chesney set out the case for the 
Prussian big company clearly, in an article in April 1871, relying heavily on May and 
stressing the shock to the Austrians when they encountered ` .... the outstanding elasticity 
and quickness which the development of the use of the company as a unit for 
137 manoeuvring has given the Prussian infantry'. 
133 On the Prussian Infantry, ch. 2. Ch. 3 carries on the argument. Battalion commanders, reluctant to lose 
tactical control on the battlefield, tried half-battalion columns, but these also lost all cohesion and, 
crucially, suffered the disadvantages of not having a permanent command structure. 
134 Ibid, throughout the first ten chapters. 
135 Home, A Precis, 5. In practice such numbers were hardly ever achieved on active service; eighty to one 
hundred effectives per company would have been usual for a British battalion. 
136 For example, see Colonel Doraville's contribution to the debate following Charles Chesney's paper on 
`The reform of Prussian tactics', which confuses a Prussian battalion with a half battalion in making the 
case for the British battalion of (ten) small companies remaining the basic tactical unit. 248. 
137 Chesney C, `Studies', 549. 
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British resistance to this innovation surfaced quickly. PL MacDougall, now a 
DQMG, took up the issue in a memorandum for the War Office a year later. `I may claim 
to be heard on this question, because I was the first writer, either in England or 
elsewhere, to advocate (in 1864) the necessity of adopting an open formation for an 
attacking line in the face of breech-loading fire. ' He set out succinctly all the arguments 
which those wishing to retain the British size of companies would continue to deploy. `It 
is by no means desirable to cut an English coat out of Prussian cloth .... 
Strong 
companies were at first adopted by the Prussians more for economical than for tactical 
reasons .... 
' There was no case for the British army to follow suit. 
1. The supposed change would radically alter our present battalion 
organization, which has been almost uniformly successful in battle, 
according to the experience of more than a century, against the best 
continental soldiers. 
2. The change, if effected, would result in a dangerous diminution in the 
proportion of officers to rank and file. 
3. There is no trustworthy evidence to show that, under the present 
conditions of breech-loading fire, the change would be a tactical 
improvement, but rather the contrary. 138 
In August 1873 Robert Home, at the time a Major in the Topographical 
Department at the War Office, published A Precis of Modern Tactics, which he described 
as a `compilation' from the list of books, mainly by foreign authors, which preceded his 
first chapter . 
139 He quotes May, Vial and Boguslawski on the significance for the 
Prussian army of the big company as the main tactical unit, but adds that this is really an 
unimportant question. The Prussian system is one correct solution, but it is dictated by a 
relative shortage of officers to men. A better solution is to split a battalion into two 
wings, each containing four companies of the British size. 140 
Home returned to this theme in a memorandum of his own in December 1877.141 In 
a history of the origins of the big company he explains how the Prussian tradition of 
138 MacDougall, PL, On the proposal to change the Organization of our Field Battalions from 8 to 4 
Companies. PRO WO 33/34,729-31. 
139 Home, R, A Precis of Modern Tactics (London, HMSO, 1873). 
140 Ibid, 4-7. See also his explanation of how two British companies, working together, would perform in 
the field. 87. 
141 Home, R, (Brevet) Colonel, AQMG, Memorandum on company size, 14 December 1877. PRO WO 
33/32/0673. 
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drawing their officers from the Junker class meant that they could only expand the 
numbers of men in the ranks by reducing the ratio of officers, and cites Beauchamp 
Walker's reports in 1870 of the evil effects on Prussian efficiency of this comparative 
shortage of suitable officers. His quotation of Walker's views on the merits of the strong 
company as the main fighting unit is an interesting recognition of the underlying issues. 
If any troops can practise it successfully, they can; this combination of 
thorough instruction grafted on a cool intelligence renders them more 
capable of carrying out so scattered a formation than any other troops I 
have ever seen. ... 
Although I lean strongly to the Prussian system of 
strong companies, of giving great authority and responsibility to the 
Captains, thereby lessening the requirement in field officers and in the 
regimental staff, I do not quite see how it could be grafted on our present 
organization without grave injustice; and I am the more inclined to make 
use of our existing battalion organization than to propose anything new. 142 
Home builds on this to make the points that the French had copied the Prussians for 
the same reason -a shortage of suitable officers; that conscript armies, having more 
intelligent men available in the ranks, needed less leading, besides throwing up more 
good NCO material; and that an army with the heavy colonial commitments of the British 
needed a higher ratio of j unior officers, to lead detachments. 
Admirers of the Prussian /German system continued to advocate adopting the strong 
company formation. During the crucial debates led by Colonel Clive in 1878, he 
reiterated his support for the German system and said of the British company ` .... that 
we cannot get power of direction in depth and front; we must sacrifice either the one or 
the other - because the company of 100 men is too small'. 
143 Lonsdale Hale agreed. 144 
Charles Brackenbury also recognised the tactical merits of the strong company, but put 
the issue into a practical British context. 
I happen to have been a great deal with infantry in actual war, and perhaps 
you will allow me to state (my own opinions). I believe a large company 
would be better as a tactical unit in case of continental fighting against a 
civilised enemy, but the small companies may possibly be better for bush 
142 Ibid, 19-20. 
143 Clive, `On the influence .... 
', 822. 
144 Ibid, 854. The record states that `Lieutenant-Colonel Hale, RE, in a few brief remarks, supported the 
adoption of large companies. ' The present writer finds it difficult to decide whether this note expresses 
relief for uncharacteristic brevity, or an exquisite irony. 
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fighting, and under these circumstances it is rather difficult to say which we 
English should choose. 145 
Wolseley, who was in the chair, had no such doubts. In a long contribution he warned 
young officers to guard against being carried away by books and pamphlets, and 
remember that the basis for the strong Prussian company was their shortage of officers, 
and he called upon Beauchamp Walker to confirm this; which he did. Wolseley then 
rehearsed the arguments which MacDougall and Home had included in their memoranda, 
adding the killing comment that, while there were people like his friend the lecturer who 
genuinely believed in the tactical benefits of the strong company, most of their supporters 
were civilians who were strongly biased against army officers as a class, and wished to 
save money by reducing their number. 146 
Wolseley's views will have come as no surprise to his colleagues; he, too, had put 
them in writing, in a memorandum to the Adjutant-General in March 1877. The 
arguments were expressed with his usual vigour - `I regard the fact of our having small 
companies (100 men) as the only point now in which we are tactically superior to other 
nations' - but he added a curious qualification. `Henceforth, battles will be fought with 
company units, and the larger that unit is the better .... 
', with the proviso that it must 
remain within the reach of control of one commander. 147 Despite this apparent 
contradiction, Wolseley felt very strongly that the small British company, with its high 
ratio of officers to rank and file, was a superior formation, and he continued to say so in 
forthright terms at every suitable opportunity. His article on France for Blackwoods in 
January 1878 fastens upon this issue several times, and includes the trenchant observation 
that, should the British army ever have to fight a continental foe, 
(i)t is the firm belief of those who have themselves commanded British 
infantry in action, and who are therefore the best judges on this point, that 
145 Ibid, 848-9. His brother Henry would expand on this theme in his own lecture at RUSI. See pages 218. 
' Ibid, 858-60. 
147, Memorandum by Sir G Wolseley on proposal to reduce the number of Companies in a Battalion from 8 
to 4, ' 6 March 1877. PRO WO 33/34,195-6. The Adjutant-General vigorously concurred, as his own 
memorandum of 8 March showed. Ibid, 197-8. Wolseley was still confident that the `small' British 
company was ` .... the greatest pull we 
have over the German army .... 
' when he wrote to the Duke of 
Connaught in 1889. Letter, 30 September 1889. Wolseley papers, Hove, PLB 103. 
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the foreigner, with his four clumsy companies, and without a proper 
proportion of officers, would be nowhere in such a contest. 148 
This was the opinion which carried the day, and no doubt Wolseley's voice was one of 
the main factors involved. British battalions continued with their traditional structure 
until the eve of the first World War, and only changed then because there were not 
enough experienced officers to maintain the old ratio, in a rapidly expanding army. 149 
Skirmishers and the firing line. The relationship between skirmishers and the main body 
of infantry in the field led to much heated debate. Important issues were indeed involved, 
but to some extent they were masked by misunderstanding about what was actually being 
described. It will be argued below that two particular expressions which occurred 
regularly in the works of the German commentators, `company column' and `skirmisher 
swarm', created misleading images in the minds of many British officers, and confused 
the debate. At the same time, it is clear that those who participated in the debates took it 
for granted that the works of May, Bronsart, Boguslawski and Scherff were familiar to 
all. 150 
The traditional British battle formation involved the infantry in line, two deep, with 
a cloud of skirmishers out in front, to harass the enemy - who might be in line or 
column, similarly screened by skirmishers. These skirmishers were deemed to have done 
their job when the two main bodies came to grips, at which point they would fall back 
behind their line and regroup as a reserve. Skirmishers were trained to operate in 
extended order, usually in pairs, and to make the utmost use of ground cover. The main 
body, in contrast, were drilled to move in close order, and fire, charge or retire in 
formation. In attack or defence a shattering volley, delivered at close range, was followed 
by the charge in line at the point of the bayonet, which settled the issue. The evidence of 
the wars of the 1860s was that to continue such tactics on the open battlefield led rapidly 
148 Wolseley, `France as a military power', 16-17. 
149 See Luvaas, The Education, 211, footnote 69, for the chronology of the change. 
ls°For example, Major Colley, in Brackenbury, `The tactics', 636. 
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and inevitably to a level of casualties which could seldom be tolerated. British observers 
of these wars had certainly seen and reported as much, but it was the arrival of the 
English translations of the analysis of the 1866 campaign by Prussian soldiers, 
particularly May and his critic Bronsart, which initiated serious debate in Britain about 
the implications. As Ouvry said in his preface to Bronsart's riposte to May, `there can be 
no doubt that the two pamphlets and this reply will be of infinite service to our Army in 
the reorganization which must inevitably take place ... _' 
151 
May emphasised that the 1866 campaign had demonstrated that, despite what the 
Prussian drill book maintained, attacks by formed bodies of infantry in close order were 
suicidal. Once the fire fight began, the issue depended on the reinforcement of the 
skirmishing swarm until sufficient force had been built up to drive an assault home. 152 It 
was practically impossible, under such conditions, to pull skirmishers out of the line. '53 
Bronsart's reply, widely held to represent the views, and possibly the actual words, of 
Moltke, accepted that May had made some good points, but was scornful of May's 
certainty that concerted movements at a higher than company level were no longer 
practicable. A pamphlet which appeared in English translation in 1873 helped to put these 
arguments into perspective. 154 It pointed out that the new Prussian drill book, embodying 
the experience of 1866, had only been issued to senior officers when the 1870 war 
started, and it was decided that the troops should not be confused by its implementation 
while the campaign was going on. However, it was doubtful whether the experience of 
1870 called for any major revision. The use of initiative was crucial; the skirmishers 
should take every advantage of the ground, and there should be no `wooden formations' 
in the assault. 155 
151 Bronsart von Schellendorf, Colonel, Precis of a Retrospect on the Tactical Retrospect; and a reply to 
the pamphlet On the Prussian Infantry of 1866. Ouvry's preface, vii. 
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As to whether, in practice, the Prussian skirmishing line was the fighting line, 
Lieut. -Colonel EW Bray was in no doubt. He was one of the group of officers sent to 
observe the Prussian manoeuvres of 1868, and his report was unqualified. `We use 
skirmishers to cover a movement, the Prussians use them to fight, which is a great 
difference, and requires different management. ' 156 
As books and pamphlets about the Franco-German War began to appear in 
increasing profusion, their impact on British military thinking was immediate. The vigour 
of the lectures and debates, particularly in 1872,1873 and 1874, illustrates this clearly. 
Charles Chesney referred to the ready availability of Lumley Graham's translation of 
Boguslawski's Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71 in a debate at RUSI in July 
1872. The events of this later war, he said, did on the whole reinforce the validity of what 
May had been saying about infantry tactics, and made it clear that it was imperative for 
the British army to modify its drill accordingly. 157 (Boguslawski demonstrated the 
practical impossibility of operating in close order when near the enemy. Generally, in 
attack, the supports and the skirmishers would simply become mingled, and under such 
conditions it was impossible to manoeuvre in formation, or fire volleys. 158) 
The following May, `by special request of the Council', Henry Brackenbury also 
delivered a lecture at RUSI, and his opening remarks laid down clear markers for the 
debate which was to follow. `We have now arrived at a period when the necessity for 
some change in tactics, as they have been practised by the British Army, is generally, I 
will not say universally, acknowledged. ' 159 This was intended to be an important debate, 
as he recalled in his memoirs many years later. 
156 Bray, Lieut. Colonel EW, `The Prussian mode of conducting large manoeuvres', 2 Feb. 1871, Proc RAI, 
vol. 7,358. 
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Lumley Graham, (originally published in London by HS King, 1872), new ed. (Minneapolis, Absinthe 
Press, 1996), 66-7. 
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It is a proof of the spirit which was stirring the dry bones at this time that 
the Council of the Royal United Service institution were anxious to have a 
lecture delivered at their theatre in Whitehall on the changes which the 
Franco-German War had shown to be needed in the tactics of our army. 
.... 
Probably never before or since have so many officers of great 
distinction taken part in a military discussion in that theatre. 160 
In the lecture, stressing how battlefield tactics must change, he needed to give 
.... some examples; and 
here I would venture to remind you that as the 
British Army is without practical personal experience of the effect of these 
modern weapons in battle, we must borrow from the experience of other 
armies. 161 
He was soon quoting the changes in the Prussian drill book (available in Colonel 
Newdigate's translations) arising from their experience in the late war, to show that the 
normal fighting formation was now the company column, with the skirmishers being 
reinforced as necessary, and (his emphasis) ` .... this shooting 
line is the fighting line. 162 
There was no place for the traditional line in close order, under such conditions, but in 
practice the Prussian company columns, ` .... small 
bodies moving in formation only four 
ranks deep if the skirmishers are out, .... 
(are) nothing but the line four deep, with which 
our Guards and our 52nd Regiment repulsed the French advance at Waterloo. ' 163 
Battlefield control had to be exercised in depth, not width, and officers at company level 
must be prepared to accept this responsibility. 
In the event, Brackenbury's introductory comment that the need for tactical change 
was `generally' but not `universally' acknowledged was born out by the debate which 
followed. Several officers present, including Major Colley and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Lintorn Simmons, supported his argument that the British army must adopt tactics based 
on using skirmishers in extended order to engage the enemy until their numbers could be 
sufficiently reinforced from behind to press home a successful assault, and that this meant 
that tactical control could not be exercised over a unit of more than Prussian company 
strength. 164 On the other hand, there were others whose attention, perhaps because they 
160 Brackenbury, Some Memories, 219,222. 
161 Brackenbury, `The tactics', 621. 
162 Ibid, 625. 
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misunderstood the significance of the expression `company column', was diverted from 
the real issues. 
It was difficult for a generation of officers, brought up on the confident tradition of 
the superiority of the disciplined British line over the tightly packed columns of 
revolutionary and imperial France, to avoid placing the emphasis on the second word of 
that expression rather than the first. As a result there was considerable debate about 
whether or not the assault by the Prussian Guard, in close order at divisional strength, at 
St. Privat could be taken to show that ` .... the old charging tactics formed the only 
effectual method of attack calculated to ensure victory'. 165 Naturally, it was generally 
agreed that such massive columns would never succeed against a British line. For 
Brackenbury, as for May and Boguslawski, this was not the issue. Their emphasis was on 
`company', not `column'. Their point was that the company was the tactical unit, not that 
it had to operate in a dense mass. Even the well-read and thoughtful Maurice seems to 
have been misled. In a footnote in his Prize Essay he says that the casualties at St. Privat 
led to `(t)he abandonment by the Prussians of the special form best known in England of 
even their company columns .... 
', when what was actually being abandoned was the idea 
of large bodies of troops attacking in massed formation. 166 
On the other hand, Brackenbury's remark about the similarity between the reality 
of the formation of a German company column on the battlefield and the British line 
repelling the French Guard at Waterloo was seized upon by other officers to suggest that 
there was no material difference between the new Prussian tactics and traditional British 
practice. Sir William Codrington said as much, 167 and Major-General M'Dougall (sic) 
declared firmly that ` .... 
(i)n the English service, the fighting unit is the battalion .... 
I 
believe that it will be found that a much slighter dislocation than is frequently proposed 
of our present drill system will entirely effect the object required'. 168 On the subject of 
165 Ibid, 639. Simmons had already drawn attention to the tendency to misunderstand the meaning of 
`column' during Charles Chesney's 1870 lecture on `The reform of Prussian tactics', 250. 
166 Maurice, The system', footnote, 29. 
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infantry tactics, therefore, it has to be admitted that the debate, though important, was 
indecisive. Accordingly, Charles Brackenbury (in the absence abroad of his brother) tried 
hard to establish some kind of common ground, in a note appended to the printed 
proceedings, preaching 
the necessity for instituting a drill which shall teach steadiness in attacking 
upon the principles now stated, - principles not by any means adverse to 
that held by England when she set her lines against the continental 
columns, but, on the contrary, natural growths from the root of the line 
idea. 169 
It was at least accepted that the tactical formations developed by the Prussians 
should be tested. The Commander-in-Chief in Ireland made this clear in a memorandum 
On the New System of Drill, published in Dublin in 1873.170 He was in no doubt that the 
new German tactics were right. 171 
The Superintendent of Garrison Instruction at Aldershot also quoted approvingly from 
Boguslawski - `Great clouds of skirmishers and small tactical units, that is the form for 
infantry'- but he was happy that the British army was changing its tactics 
slowly but surely; not slavishly following those of Prussia but adapting 
them to the constitution of our army and our national characteristics; at the 
same time taking full advantage of the greater war-experience of our 
neighbour, and which it would be folly to ignore. 172 
This was the case for tactical innovation. The case for retaining the traditional 
British system, clearly dear to the hearts of those who had spoken against change at the 
.... 
fighting like a horde of savages', `On the proposal', 730. Scherff's criticism of May for advocating' 
MacDougall developed his argument in a pamphlet published that same year, Modern Infantry Tactics 
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Brackenbury debate, was to be put more coherently in a lecture in Calcutta. 173 In this the 
future Lord Chelmsford revealed a commendable acquaintance with the latest foreign 
writing on the continental wars. He relied particularly on Lumley Graham's translation of 
v. Scherff to ` .... 
deprecate the introduction of the "Order in Disorder" system, and the 
skirmisher swarm formation'. 174 Thesiger's concern was that control must be maintained 
at battalion or at least half-battalion level, and he was delighted to discern from Scherff 
` .... 
how entirely he differs from those of his brother officers, who advocate the absolute 
independence of the company unit, and the skirmisher swarm formation', because he 
talked in terms of keeping the main body intact for the decisive moment. 175 That, 
Thesiger triumphantly explained, was ` .... almost exactly 
in spirit that which the British 
army has been accustomed to for many years past, only modified to meet the 
requirements of the day'. 176 Skirmishers who had played their initial part could not be 
expected to join in the assault, in close order, of the traditional line. 
In much of the rest of the lecture Thesiger found himself at odds with Scherff, and it 
may be that he read more into Scherff's criticisms of May and Bogslawski than was 
justified. There can be no doubt that he was completely misled when it came to assessing 
the merits of the actual German skirmishing tactics, and, since he was so concerned with 
the necessity for control to be maintained, the explanation may lie in the use of the word 
`swarm'. The English connotations of this word do call up a mental picture of disorder, of 
a milling throng, indeed of what Scherff had accused May of describing, `a horde of 
savages'. 
173 Thesiger, Lieut. -Colonel and Brevet-Col. The Hon. Frederic, CB, 
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However, when applied to the German infantry tactics, this was a misconception, as 
the Prussian regulations make clear. These were published in English in 1872. "' In the 
section on `General Principles for Infantry Formation' the translation reads 
2. After a division of skirmishers has been moved to the front, the word 
`Extend' (Schwärmen) is given, upon which only one section disperses in 
open order, unless a larger number of sections be specifically ordered to 
extend simultaneously. Each successive time the word `Extend' is given, 
another section opens out.... . If the line of skirmishers has to be reinforced, at every successive order to 
`Extend' one section of the division of skirmishers extends on the right or 
left flank of the line according to the special orders it receives. 
Those British officers who hated a `swarm' would surely have found `a line of 
skirmishers extending into open order by sections and on command' a less disorderly 
concept, and this might have led to a more ready acceptance of the underlying principles. 
Robert Home, in his Precis of Modern Tactics, drawing heavily on the available foreign 
sources, shows quite clearly that he is alert to the problem. In a long passage regretting 
that the expression `loose order' has come into common usage he quotes from both 
Beauchamp Walker and King William of Prussia to show that 
There is no counselling of loose formation, no urging of wild swarms of 
skirmishers out of hand, but there is a word of warning against premature 
attack, against pushing battalion columns on the top of skirmishers, and a 
gentle admonition to adhere to the company column, the proper 
recognised Prussian formation for such attacks. 178 
At all events, those responsible for teaching tactical principles to young officers 
were able to distil a reasonable compromise out of the contending opinions. In Minor 
Tactics Clery's chapter on the `principles of employment of infantry' finishes a historical 
analysis by acknowledging that the 1866 war proves that firepower, rather than the 
bayonet charge, has become the decisive factor. 
For the different actions of this campaign may be said to have been gained 
by infantry - not by the shock of columns, but by the fire of skirmishers. 
That is, those bodies of infantry that had hitherto followed the skirmishers 
177 Baring, Lieutenant E, RA, (tr. ) The Elementary Tactics of the Prussian Infantry (London, HMSO, 1872). 
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178 Home, Precis, 77. 
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in compact order now became dissolved during the action, and gradually 
pressed forward to fight in the skirmishing line. 179 
He accepted that this mode of fighting brought with it that risk of disorder which 
Thesiger and others so deprecated. Accordingly, his model for infantry formations 
embraced the principle expounded by the Prussians, of deployment in depth to provide 
the steady reinforcement of the firing line, but applied it on the basis of the whole 
battalion remaining under the tactical control of its commander. 180 This was to remain the 
pattern for the British infantry for the rest of the century. 
Flexibility in the field. The size of units, the relative numbers and configurations of 
skirmishing lines - however contentious - are but necessary preliminaries; how the 
formations are to be used on the battlefield decides the outcome. Those who believed that 
it was possible to attack an undemoralised enemy in open country by head-on assault still 
spoke of bringing brigades, and even divisions, in close order (and therefore still 
effectively under the tactical control of their commanders) into decisive contact. `The 
object is to bring our strength close to the enemy. The issue must be decided, now as 
heretofore, by the threatening advance of superior numbers ready with the bayonet. ' 181 
Given such a belief, there was little need for further consideration about the tactical use 
of smaller units. 
Those who, on the other hand, had absorbed some of the lessons of the continental 
wars, no longer put their faith in such methods. They looked for practical ways, as Henry 
Brackenbury put it, to substitute `a flexible chain for an iron bar'. 182 This involved 
distilling three elements from what was being written about the wars in question; the use 
of ground, the merit of attacks on the flanks rather than the front of the enemy, and the 
need for flexibility. (They also emphasised the need for positive co-operation between the 
fighting arms, but this will be examined later. ) These were all activities which depended 
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for their success on leadership at the most immediate level, and this required the use of 
initiative, as against unthinking adherence to the patterns of rigid drills or even the 
overriding orders of commanders who would not be in contact at critical moments. 
Charles Chesney was among the first to appreciate this. In October 1870 he cited 
particularly the Prussian Prince Friedrich Carl's Military Memorial of 1861 to show that 
Prussian regulations already allowed for the use of initiative under battlefield conditions . 
`They aim at being no more than a general guide for the use of intelligent agents, for 
thoughtful and well-trained leaders. ' 183 In December he returned to the theme in his 
lecture at the RAI. The proceedings quote him as saying that `.... the Prussians were fully 
aware of the impossibility of teaching tactics by rule', and that ` .... the new Prussian 
tactics assumed that an officer in command of any force was possessed of certain 
intelligence, and gave him considerable latitude' . 
184 
The importance of this lesson was just as clear to Henry Brackenbury's brother 
Charles. 
Wherever you search in Prussia, in office, factory, University or Army, you 
will find the same ever present virtues --- simplicity, organization, and 
discipline. But above all, every man in Prussia, from the Sovereign to the 
"boots" at an inn, has been taught and encouraged to think for himself. This 
is especially true of the Army and its Officers,.... '85 
In September 1871 Beauchamp Walker sent a copy of the revised German 
regulations with one of his despatches, in which he strongly emphasised the importance 
of this principle. 
The whole regulation, as I before remarked, breathes the spirit of Prussian 
manoeuvring which is based on a thorough instruction of the officers and a 
practical instruction of the men, so that a far greater latitude and 
independence is accorded to individuals than is the case in our service. It 
is the habit of self-reliance gained as a captain which makes the transition 
to the command of a battalion so easy to the Prussian officer, and it is this 
habit of self-reliance when in independent command which admits of their 
183 Chesney, `The campaign of August, 1870', 484. 
184 Chesney, `The reform of Prussian tactics', 240,243. 185 Brackenbury, CB, `The military systems of France and Prussia in 1870', JRUSI, vol. 15,1871,233. 
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system of fighting in extended order, and of risking so much in feints and 
flank attacks. '86 
Much of Henry Brackenbury's 1873 lecture was devoted to the same issue. He 
stressed the way that the Prussian regulations had been progressively modified since 1861 
to recognise the need for flexibility on the battlefield, in order to take advantage of the lie 
of the land and seek out the weaknesses in the opposing position, which generally 
involved feeling the way onto the enemy's flank. 187 This was only possible if junior 
officers were encouraged, and trained, to exercise their initiative. That was the crucial 
point, which he reinforced by quoting from a letter which he had received from the 
Wellington Prize winner, Lieutenant Maurice. `I think, when you have read my essay, 
you will see what I meant by saying to you that the cultivation of a habit of independent 
action is our great tactical necessity. 188 Home had drawn the same moral from his 
authorities. `And the king (of Prussia) points out that the intelligence of the individual 
officers must be exercised; within certain limits, each man must have individual freedom 
1 189 Maurice contrasted this freedom with the rigid prescriptiveness of the British 
regulations in a forceful footnote in his Prize Essay. 190 
Thoughtful soldiers, then, had no difficulty in accepting that, because the shape and 
size of the battlefield had changed, the outcome would depend more heavily than before 
on the responsiveness of the leaders of small tactical units; that is to say, junior officers. 
The reaction of traditionally minded officers was more equivocal, and it is curious to see 
how they struggled to reconcile their understanding that the tactics of successful 
continental armies had changed with their anxiety to preserve the steadiness and ordered 
discipline of the professional British battalions. One of the paradoxes of the time is that 
many of these officers will have seen numerous occasions when the exigencies of 
colonial warfare had thrown crucial responsibilities onto the shoulders of relatively junior 
officers; yet they could not easily accept that continental warfare would create similar 
186 Extracts from the Reports, PRO WO 147/23,36. 
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situations - or that, if it did, these juniors would need to be prepared for it. Soldiers like 
Thesiger continued to wrestle with the evidence of the continental writers in order to 
justify their conviction that really there was nothing new at stake, and the British 
battalion in line was still the master of the battlefield. 
Opposition to what the Brackenburys and Chesneys were saying also included 
objecting to their suggestion that it was necessary to teach anything about tactics to junior 
officers. During the debate on Brackenbury's lecture General Lord de Ros managed to 
articulate this attitude in two different (and almost contradictory) ways, and his 
contribution so admirably summed up the conservative viewpoint that it justifies 
quotation at length. First, he objected to the idea that a British officer could have 
anything to learn. 
In alluding to the responsibility necessary, which (Brackenbury) thinks 
ought to be thrown, upon the Junior Officers in action, he seemed to 
question whether our young Officers were sufficiently trained and 
acquainted with their duty to be trusted with this responsibilty. Now, I 
know it is the fashion of the present day to say our young Officers are 
ignoramuses, and that they have everything to learn - that the French, 
Prussians, and Austrians are all greatly superior in education to our young 
Officers, and possess a far more extended knowledge of their duties. I 
entirely and wholly repudiate that idea. I have been more than 52 years in 
the British Army, and I never have known of a young Officer called upon 
in any position who did not fully respond to all that was demanded of him. 
Then he argued that, in practice, such responsibility was dangerous. 
Is there no similar danger if you tell young Officers that they are to be 
totally independent of their Lieutenant-Colonels and are to go here and 
there exactly as they may fancy the ground most suitable? Is there no 
danger of their going far beyond or far short of what was intended? I think 
there is great risk in this, and I also think it is quite impossible for Officers 
on foot to command more than 150 men in the field. I do not care whether 
they are Captains or Lieutenants, it does require the activity and wider 
view of the mounted Officer to command men in action to any extent. An 
Officer on foot, no matter how quick in his movement or how loud and 
clear in voice, is lost; nobody can hear him, nobody can see him at any 
distance, or in any confusion, and I cannot think that it would be possible 
to give this independence of command to Captain's subalterns unless they 
were mounted in the field. 191 
191 Brackenbury, `The tactics', 637,638. 
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Edward Hamley, who followed de Ros in the debate to give warm support to 
Brackenbury's call for appropriate training, felt constrained to add a few words of advice 
which were perhaps more barbed than their ostensible message first suggested. 
To those who very naturally cling to our old traditions endeared to them as 
they are by so many glorious recollections, and handed down through 
generations of zealous and excellent Officers, I would, in the face of 
impending changes in the system which they love, suggest this 
consolation. Nobody can say of that system that it was calculated to 
develop in a high degree the intelligence of Officers or of men. A 
regimental career of 20 or 30 years passed in the practice of such exercises 
as we are all familiar with, far from fitting a man for responsible 
command, rather tended to dwarf and narrow him; its tendency was to 
reduce the man of resource, energy, and ability to the level of the dull man 
of routine. And therefore it was that many of us have seen Generals who 
appeared unable to rid themselves of their regimental recollections, and 
who, instead of fulfilling their proper duties, seemed to find their highest 
zest in that kind of supervision of their troops which is best left to the 
company Officers, or even to the sergeant-major. 192 
A directive entitled `Attack formation of a battalion', issued with General Order 40 
of 1876, shows that there was now at least recognition of the need to give responsibility 
to company officers once battle was joined. 
Officers commanding battalions, although retaining the general 
superintendence of the movement, must remember that it would be 
impossible in war to issue fresh instructions to Company-commanders 
after the attacking line is once engaged. They should therefore impress the 
Captains with a sense of the responsibility of their position, accustom 
them to considerable freedom of action, and, - so far as is compatible 
with due instruction, and the carrying out of the general directions 
previously given - interfere as little as possible with them when 
manoeuvring. 193 
Wolseley, in his long letter to the Duke of Connaught on 30 September 1889, 
commenting that the drill book continued to be rewritten, gave some acknowledgment 
that it did provide scope for tactical flexibility, but recognised the problem which the 
army must solve if this was to have any practical significance. `Every latitude is however 
192 Ibid, 638. 
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given to Commanders to do as they conceive best at the moment. ' The problem was that 
latitude alone was not sufficient. 
Where the German Army is so infinitely superior to ours is in the military 
knowledge and earnestness of its officers .... They are always preparing their men for war by teaching them what they will have to do in war. They 
pay little attention to the fiddle-faddle trumpery details of mathematical 
drill exactness of appearance that our old fashioned Generals still delight 
in. They go for the excellence of the picture itself, we are always polishing 
up its frame. 194 
`Teaching them what they will have to do in war' was what the army must strive 
for, if flexibility on the battlefield was the goal; and Wolseley was clear that this was still 
not being effectively achieved in 1889. 
Artillery 
Considering the great interest generated by the technical progress in gun design, the 
amount of discussion in the British army about the tactical implications for artillery, in 
the early years of this period, is disappointing. Sir John Headlam, in his introduction to 
The History of the Royal Artillery, called it a `most puzzling enigma' that this generation 
of gunners was so slow to recognise the impact of the new weapons. He put this down to 
a combination of innate caution and over-centralised control, which led to an insistence 
on precision of drill at the expense of good gunnery, and in his view it was only the 
.... opened the appearance of Prince Kraft's Letters in English translation 
in 1887 which' 
eyes of all to what rifled guns could do in the hands of gunners who knew how to use 
them'. 195 The 1860s do rather support his argument but, given the calibre of discussion 
from 1870 onwards - and some of the actions taken during the following decade - this 
judgment now seems unduly harsh. It will be shown later in this chapter, for instance, that 
194 Wolseley papers, Hove, PLB 103. 
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Prince Kraft's opinions on the tactical use of artillery were well known to, and discussed 
with approval by, many British soldiers in the immediate aftermath of the Franco- 
German War. 
However, the start was indeed slow. Colonel Dixon had predicted in 1857 that 
artillery would have ` .... a great preponderance in determining future battles', 
196 but 
Charles Chesney, whose description of the disappointing performance of American rifled 
guns was noted in chapter three, could not bring himself to agree that such weapons had 
been a decisive factor in what he (at the time - early 1866) felt to be the more instructive 
war of 1859.197 When he came to give his talk on `The reform of Prussian tactics' just 
after the crushing victories of German arms in 1870, he did praise May's recognition of 
the tactical exploitation of the German artillery but, considering that the venue was the 
Royal Artillery Institution, it is significant that he did not have more to say on the subject 
- and that it fell to one of the many gunner officers present (Major Geary) to initiate a 
discussion about the advantages of mobility conferred by the Prussian practice of 
providing seats for the crews on the axle-trees of the guns. 198 
Nevertheless, 1870 was a watershed, and four commentaries contributed to a 
renewal of intense interest in continental artillery practice. May's Tactical Retrospect 
became available in English, and the translations of Baron Stoffel's famous reports began 
to appear in the pages of Fraser's a year later. Both these works had been written before 
the outbreak of the Franco-German War, but their appearance at this stage helped to 
focus the minds of soldiers, anxiously evaluating that surprising campaign, on the reasons 
for the German success. May, writing from the point of view of a regimental infantry 
officer, was naturally critical of the performance of the Prussian artillery (and cavalry) in 
1866, but the predictions which he made from his observations were important. 
In the next war that side will obtain an unconditional tactical 
preponderance which best knows how to make use of its artillery, or rather 
that side which does not put off this practice till the moment that the war 
196 Dixon, 113. 
197 Chesney, `Recent changes', 122-3. 198 Chesney, `Reform of Prussian tactics', 249. 
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commences, that is, the side whose artillery has had the best tactical 9 
training. 
Those tactical lessons were clear; in order to use guns to the best effect, they must be 
risked, not held back, they should be grouped, preferably on the flanks of the infantry, 
and they must be trained to work closely with the other arms. 200 
Stoffel was similarly prescient. The common assertion that the Prussian artillery 
had been inferior to the Austrian in 1866, he said, was dangerously misleading. The 
Prussians were then in the process of re-equipping. His government should take due note 
of `(t)he vast superiority of the materiel of the field artillery in point of accuracy, range, 
and rapidity of firing', and that ` .... 
Prussian artillery officers are better educated and 
more instructed than the Austrian. 201 
The Topographical Department's digest of all the reports of the military attaches, 
issued in 1871, started with a section on artillery, which drew particular attention to the 
tactical improvements which the Prussians had introduced as a result of the disappointing 
performance of their guns in 1866. While it dwelt heavily on the superior killing qualities 
of the Prussian percussion fuses compared with the French time fuses, it also stressed the 
value of two tactical changes; keeping the guns well to the front in the line of march, so 
that they could be deployed rapidly; and concentrating the batteries where they could be 
used together to the greatest effect, without having to move position. 202 
The fourth, and most professional, contribution was that of Prince Kraft zu 
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who had commanded the Prussian Guards artillery in 1866. As 
Headlam said, Hohenlohe's best known works, the famous Letters, did not appear in 
English until the 1880s. However, his radical views on the use of artillery in the field had 
been available to a British audience at least since 1872, when Captain FCH Clarke, RA, 
199 May, Tactical Retrospect, ch. 7,41. 200 Ibid. His ch. 6 discusses both the failures of the artillery in 1866 and the need for close mutual co- 
operation, ch. 8 the risk factor, and ch. 9 the tactical dispositions. 2°1 Stoffel, 543. 
202 Extracts from the Reports, 2. 
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published his translation of an earlier work, On the Employment of Field Artillery in 
combination with the other arms. 203 This set out all the principles which the Prussians 
had distilled from their experience of 1866 - the need to have the guns near the front of 
the column on the march, so that they could intervene quickly in an encounter battle; 
recognition that they must be risked when necessary; the advantage of concentrating 
them, preferably on the flank; understanding that, while briskness was always desirable, 
accuracy of fire was vital; above all, that the objective was to combine with the infantry 
and cavalry in order to achieve a decisive result. There was no doubt in Clarke's mind of 
the importance of the pamphlet. 
The marked improvement in the efficiency of the Prussian Field Artillery 
since the year 1866, due in a great measure to a more correct recognition 
of its just employment in the field, has been so conspicuous in the recent 
campaign, that the translator has deemed the reflexions of one who has 
contributed in no small degree to the progressive changes affected in this 
branch of the service during the interval, worthy of a wider circulation in 
this country. 204 
This wider circulation was quickly noted. Maurice's Prize Essay of 1872 includes 
Clarke's translation in its formidable booklist, and cites Hohenlohe's opinions, and often 
Stoffel and Boguslawski as well, whenever he is considering either artillery alone or the 
combination of all arms. On `the attack', for example, he says that ' .... the 
Prussians 
have adopted a principle very new to military rules. They have decided that, in order to 
win victory, it is well worth while to run the risk of losing guns'. 205 Many years later, 
when he was writing at large about War, his section about artillery tactics still referred to 
Hohenlohe as the authority and reiterated the salient tactical points. 206 Similarly, Captain 
Fox Strangways based most of the shrewd tactical proposals in his 1872 lecture on these 
same principles, though, with the self-confidence arising from his own professional 
203 Kraft, Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen , 
On the Employment of Field Artillery in combination with the 
other arms, authorised translation by FCH Clarke (London, Mitchell, 1872). Pamphlet originally published 
as Ideen über die Verwendung der Feld-Artillerie (Berlin, 1869). Another gunner officer, Captain WG 
Brancker, had also read and assimilated Hohenlohe's principles in the original, and was able to write about 
them in March 1871. See `Notes extracted from some German pamphlets on the employment of artillery in 
the field', Proc RAI, vol. 8,8-13. 204 raid, translator's preface. 
206 
205 Maurice, The System, 142. See also pp 63-66, for his general acceptance of Hohenlohe's principles. 206 Maurice, War, 69-79. 
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experience, he did not accept them all without question. 207 What he did accept 
unreservedly (the constant refrain running through the writings of thoughtful soldiers) 
was the need to study the lessons to be learnt from actual combat, teach the tactical 
lessons, as the Prussians did, and not just concentrate on `drill and internal economy'. 208 
The artillery section of Home's Precis of Modern Tactics draws all the same 
conclusions but surprisingly (bearing in mind that it quotes so heavily from the German 
writers) quotes Hohenlohe only once. 209 Henry Brackenbury, on the other hand, advanced 
Hohenlohe's principles in great detail in the debate on tactics previously referred to, and 
showed how they had been applied to such good effect in the war of 1870-71, supporting 
his arguments by citing a paper given by Colonel Smythe at the RAI and the observations 
of the French General Frossart . 
210 The Royal Artillery were clearly studying all these 
developments with a sharp interest, and another illustration from the early 1870s will 
confirm, not only this, but also the steadily recurring theme of the recognition of Britain's 
special situation. The RAI set as their Prize Essay subject for 1874 `The constitution and 
duties of the artillery of an advanced guard of an army in the field'. The peroration of the 
winning entry included the following words; 
Without assuming that everything is good that emanates from the Prussian 
Bureau, it cannot be denied that Germany initiated the modern reforms in 
tactics, and still preserves the lead .... 
Continental nations are in every 
instance following its steps, and England must perforce do the same; 
taking care to recognise that, under the peculiar circumstances of her 
national position, a modification of continental forms of warfare will be, 
in general, necessary. 211 
Further afield, Frederic Thesiger's lecture in Calcutta included Hohenlohe's 
experience among the German authorities cited. 212 By this stage so much had been 
written about the influence of artillery on the outcome of the recent continental wars that 
207 Fox Strangways, 154-5. These two pages summarise both the principles and his criticisms. 208 Ibid, 158. 
209 Home, Precis, 133. 
210 Brackenbury, H, `The Tactics', 631-5. References to Smythe and Frossart on 632. 
211 Pratt, SC, `The constitution and duties of the artillery of an advanced guard of an army in the field', 
Proc RAI, vol. 8,1874,468-85,485. 
212 Thesiger, `Is a radical change .... 
', JRUSI, vol. 17,1874. He spells the name wrong, but knows the 
Clarke translation, 416. 
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it was possible to support almost any tactical theory from some part of the literary canon. 
Thesiger's interest was in infantry rather than artillery, and he used Hohenlohe to show 
how vulnerable the guns were to modem infantry fire if they got close to the firing line. 
Colonel Ouvry and Charles Brackenbury, on the other hand, both stressed the 
success which the Germans had achieved by using their artillery boldly, and risking the 
loss of guns when necessary; and Clery's lectures drove home the same message with 
suitable illustrations from 1870.213 When Brackenbury wrote, in 1878, the feeble showing 
of the Russian artillery at Plevna could be contrasted with the concentrated aggression of 
the German guns at Vionville and Sedan. The merits of using the increased range of 
modern artillery in order to mass and direct its fire were not overlooked, but Brackenbury 
reported how experiments at Okehampton were demonstrating that artillery used at close 
range was decisively more murderous. He added, rather cold-bloodedly, that casualties 
amongst troop horses, and for that matter among officers and men, might be high, but the 
experience of the Franco-German war showed that the equipment seldom suffered much 
damage. 214 
Brackenbury was arguing specifically for the fitting of shields to field guns. The 
debate about the influence of modern firepower, at RUSI in May 1880, devoted much of 
its attention to the same theme. Lonsdale Hale, inevitably, reiterated his accurate statistics 
about the killing power of field artillery to support the case for risking the guns at close 
range, Brackenbury repeated his call for gun shields, and James (whose paper had opened 
the occasion), although uneasy about Hale's figures, gave active support to the general 
argument for operating the guns at the decisive close range. Used in this way and 
properly equipped, he said, artillery would inflict as much as 40 per cent of all battlefield 
casualties in the next war. 215 
213 Ouvry, `A review', 449. Brackenbury, CB, `Ironclad field artillery', The Nineteenth Century, vol. 4, 
1878,41 et seq. Clery, 144. 
214 See also Murray, Lieutenant AM, RA, `Russian artillery tactics during the late campaign', Proc RAI, 
vol. 10,1878,379-87, and Captain Elles, `On the question .... 
', 561-4, for very similar views. 
215 James, `Modern fire', 401-3. Hale's contribution is on 398 and Brackenbury's 396-7. 
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The attractions of this line of reasoning were clear to adventurous young officers, 
with consequences which were referred to in the section dealing with the dangers arising 
from a growing doctrinal stress on the merits of the offensive. 
Co-operation 
Increasingly, the boldness and co-operation in action engendered by professional 
confidence and mutual trust were the qualities which British observers detected as the 
explanation for the German army's success on the battlefield. Exemplifying this, 
Henderson, writing in 1892, quoted a general instruction issued by General v. Steinmetz 
to Ist Army at the beginning of the Franco-German War, which could equally have stood 
as a statement of British naval doctrine at any time since Nelson's day. 
When and wherever we meet our enemy he must be attacked with the 
greatest vigour .... 
The excuse for doing nothing that no orders have been 
given will never hold good, so long as firing can be heard; every body of 
troops should march in that direction, and as soon as they are on the battle- 
field ascertain how the battle is going, in order to be able to join in it in the 
most effective manner. 216 
Maurice's Prize Essay stressed throughout that this essential spirit could only be achieved 
by soldiers who had worked and trained together long enough to develop a true feeling of 
camaraderie at all levels, and he was still repeating the lesson in a lecture at Aldershot 
twenty-three years later. 217 
The message that this ingrained ability to work together was the key to tactical 
success; that it was not to be confined to any one arm, but must extend across the whole 
service, was seized on by many of the British writers on tactics, including Charles 
216 Henderson, Major GFR, `Precis of the regimental history of the 33`' East Prussian Fusiliers in the war of 
1870-71', JRUSI, vol. 36,1892,73. 217 Maurice, The System, particularly 66 and following pages, and `How far the lessons of the Franco- 
German War are now out of date', USA'I, vol. 10 ns, 1895,563-4 
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Chesney, Lonsdale Hale and Robert Home. 218 It was clear to them all that the British 
army had much to learn if it hoped to meet a continental army on equal terms, but that it 
would only develop these desirable characteristics if its leaders at all levels could be 
suitably trained in the necessary techniques, and made thoroughly familiar with them by 
practising them together in regular large-scale manoeuvres. 
Efficiency on the battlefield, then, was not simply a matter of copying the 
evolutions of continental tactical units; it was much more a question of developing a new 
approach to preparing the army as a whole for war on a scale of which it had no 
experience. In the final chapter an attempt will be made to pull the threads together, and 
reach some conclusions about the extent to which this was actually achieved in the years 
following the continental wars. 
218 Chesney, `Reform of Prussian tactics', 246. Hale, `The spirit of the military training in the 
German 
army', Macmillan's, vol. 38, May 1878,48-57, and `Notes on the German military system', 
Macmillan's, 
vol. 38, July 1878,221-32. Home, Precis, 145-51. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
In 1859 the British army was under pressure; struggling to correct the manifest faults in 
organisation and structure revealed by the Crimean War; stretched to the limit to find 
sufficient resources to support its commitments in India and China; and confronted by the 
possibility of an invasion from France. When the threat of an attack on the Canadian 
provinces was suddenly added to their difficulties the best response that the military 
establishment could make to this new emergency would have been pitifully inadequate if 
put to the test. 1 
Twenty years later it did not appear that much had changed. In November 1880 
General Sir Patrick MacDougall, Commander-in-Chief in Canada, addressed the subject 
of `Army Reform' in Blackwood's Magazine. He made the tone of his commentary clear 
by quoting from William Napier's History of the Peninsular War. 
Why were men thus sent to slaughter when the application of a just 
science would have rendered the operation comparatively easy? Because 
the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of 
its exigencies, because the English people were warlike without being 
military, and under pretence of maintaining a liberty they do not possess, 
oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. 2 
He built on these words of his father-in-law's to attack the government of the day with a 
ferocity which, considering the post which he held, the cloak of anonymity could only 
barely justify. The administration, he said, would never use the politicians who knew 
anything about the army; `.... to employ them on the work was too obvious a measure for 
the system of "how not to do it" ... 
Mr. Childers, disqualified for the Admiralty by his 
knowledge of naval matters, undertook to regenerate the Army. ' 3 
In more measured terms, he gave his verdict on the current position of the army. 
The new Secretary of State for War has announced the intention of 
dealing with the various army questions still unsettled. As regards 
organisation, what has been called Lord Cardwell's scheme has so far 
proved a failure, not through any inherent defects, but from the attempt 
1 See references to documents in the Harpton Court Papers, footnote 18, Ch. 3. 
2 MacDougall, `Army Reform', Blackwood's, vol. 128, Nov. 1880,554. 3 Ibid, 553. 
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of the Government of the day to carry on wars without asking 
Parliament for the sinews of war. The Government has for the last three 
years been playing this game of false economy, and our military 
organisation has in consequence been subjected to a strain which it never 
was intended to bear, and, under which it was inevitable that it would 
break down. 4 
In fact, the organisation had not quite broken down. The country was just 
recovering from another panic (of a new war with Russia), and the army was engaged in 
serious fighting on the colonial frontiers in South Africa and Afghanistan, but, when, 
shortly thereafter, there was a sudden call to mount a major expedition to fight a war in 
Egypt, the army's response was robust. Six weeks after the decision to intervene 
Wolseley was at Alexandria in command of a well-found force of 30,000 men, and within 
a further month he had brought the campaign to a triumphant conclusion. 5 On the face of 
it this demonstrated a commendable improvement in the ability of the army to meet the 
obligations imposed on it, but the military establishment were well aware that, if the 
machine was still running, it was creaking dangerously. But was MacDougall justified in 
laying the blame for this state of affairs so squarely on the shoulders of Government? 
This must now be examined. 
The level of interest 
The image of a Victorian army of lions led by donkeys persists, despite the detailed 
work of a generation of serious historians. It is easy to see why this should be. It is 
helpful to political theorists and other practitioners of the social sciences, who wish to 
explain the origins of the socio-political phenomena which concern them, if they can 
trace these back to neat historical models. When the issues relate to class or social status 
the necessarily hierarchical structure of an army is especially attractive, particularly if the 
object is to demonstrate the deadening impact of a complacent ruling class. Alex 
4 Ibid. 
5 Nothing could be drier than the official history, Maurice, JF, The Campaign of 1882 in Egypt (originally 
published in London, 1887; facsimile edition reprinted by The London Stamp Exchange Ltd., no date), but 
its laconic account of the logistics of the expedition makes encouraging, if dull, reading. 
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Danchev, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and AW Preston have already been referred to in this 
connection, and Brian Bond quotes another illustration of the appeal of the technique. 
`The notion that an officer should be a professional soldier, qualified by technical as well 
as by the traditional virtues of a gentleman, was derided and looked down upon, except in 
the engineers and artillery, two corps which were only rather doubtfully fit for a 
gentleman to serve in. '6 This is not a totally exaggerated view. There were indeed large 
numbers of officers who lacked any interest in mastering their profession at anything 
other than a basic level, just as there were in the armies of other countries, and there were 
regiments in which the public display of interest in learning the military trade would have 
led to derision and worse. This was only part of the picture, however. There were also 
many dedicated soldiers, driven by ambition, pride or sense of duty to seek to improve 
their service and themselves, and opportunities for them to put their ideas forward; 
something which the words of the many serving officers, quoted or referred to directly in 
previous chapters, surely illustrate. 
A significant number of those who contributed by translating foreign military works 
were junior officers at the beginning of their careers. This must have met with the 
approbation, at the very least, of their seniors. When, for instance, the eighteen-year-old 
Grierson, still at Woolwich, translated Todleben from the Russian this clearly had the 
active support of his mentors; and Lieutenant Baring's version of the Prussian Field 
Regulations was circulated with the imprimatur of the War Office. Further examples of 
this kind of activity which have been mentioned in the course of this study must support 
two positive contentions about the cast of mind of many of the military establishment 
a willingness to encourage bright young officers to develop their skills, and a genuine 
desire to stimulate thinking about developments in the practice of their profession 
throughout the army. The fervour of the lectures and debates, even though constrained by 
the dignified conventions of Victorian etiquette, is further evidence of this continuing 
enthusiasm. 
6 Cited by Bond, The Victorian Army, 26, quoting Reader, Wi, Professional Men: The Rise of the 
Professional Classes in Nineteenth-Century England (London, 1966), 74. This may well be the origin of Dr 
Farrell's judgment, referred to on page 25. 
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If the existence of this interest is accepted, the only surprise is to see how much of 
the debate was taken up with events on the continent. Most ambitious British soldiers 
knew that, if they wanted direct experience of fighting, they must look to India or the 
colonies, and from time to time the relevance of European developments was questioned 
for that very reason; as, for instance, when Charles Chesney was weighing up the merits 
of rifled artillery or Havelock-Allan campaigning for mounted riflemen. In general, 
however, Lonsdale Hale's assessment of the irrelevance of colonial experience seems to 
have been accepted, and ` .... at the broadest level every thinking and literate soldier in 
the late Victorian army was European in outlook' ' . 
Assessing the influences 
It was when they were talking as soldiers to soldiers that the Brackenburys, 
Chesneys, Hamleys and Hoziers were at their strongest and most persuasive, for the 
obvious reason that they could take a basic understanding of the context and the jargon 
for granted, and concentrate on the details of professional argument. This was where the 
specialist military journals (in particular, The Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, The Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution and The Professional 
Papers of the Royal Engineers) came into their own, as the means by which soldiers 
throughout the world could be kept in touch with the developments as well as the 
concerns which were exercising military thinking. These journals, as has been seen 
throughout this study, were vitally important in putting on record the debates and 
discussions which served to polarise such thinking, and there will be more to say about 
the impact which this had on change. 
First, however, reference needs to be made to the extent to which personal contacts 
with foreign soldiers, and between colleagues at home, influenced the way that the army 
developed. 
Strachan, The British General Staff, 79. 
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The most direct form of contact between the British establishment and the armies of 
important foreign powers was through military attaches. The degree of intimacy which 
they were able to achieve with their hosts did vary from time to time, but in general their 
personal status was notably more privileged than is the case today. Some, like Claremont, 
had the advantage at home of `friends at court' in the most literal sense; others, like 
Beauchamp Walker, developed close bonds of personal friendship with the monarchs and 
princes who headed the armies of the continental powers; all were expected to report 
directly to the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State whenever they were in 
London. Even towards the end of the century, when international suspicions had raised 
new barriers to the free exchange of military information, gifted soldiers like Grierson 
were able to establish a degree of intimacy and confidence with their foreign colleagues 
which largely penetrated these barriers. When Claremont, on leave, dined with the 
Queen, or Walker was able to tell the Commander-in-Chief what the Crown Prince of 
Prussia had said over breakfast about the quality of the army which he commanded, the 
impact was immediate. The direct interest taken by the Cabinet in such reports, referred 
to more than once in these pages, may perhaps be confirmed from one of Gladstone's 
notes to Granville at the height of the Franco-German War; `I am struck by Col. 
Fielding's account of the operations on the Loire. I do not mean as to its Frenchness 
which is very natural, but as to its (apparent) soldierlike capacity'. 8 
Similarly, the reports of the officers who were sent regularly to investigate specific 
aspects of the organisation and methods of foreign armies were based on a degree of 
shared confidence which, today, would not often be found in the intercourse of even the 
closest Nato allies. The results of this are clear to see in the information regularly 
assessed in the Quarterly Reports of the Ordnance Select Committee, as well as in the 
volumes of evidence examined by each of the many Royal and Parliamentary 
Commissions of the era. 
8 Gladstone to Granville, D. 12.70. Ramm, 184. Colonel WHA Fielding was additional military attache at 
Paris. 
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The impact of private personal contacts is more difficult to assess. It seems clear 
that when young officers, men like Wolseley or Grierson, took the opportunity to travel 
privately to the scenes of foreign conflict, what they saw profoundly influenced their 
approach to military matters over a life time. This is scarcely surprising, in the case of 
lively-minded, ambitious soldiers such as these, but there are examples of even the most 
pedestrian of their colleagues taking every chance to look at what foreign soldiers were 
doing. Typical of these was General Ainslie, who rose to the rank of full general without 
ever taking part in a campaign. His memoirs reveal him as a self-indulgent fläneur, who 
regarded the army simply as a suitable environment within which to enjoy the comforts 
of gentlemanly society; yet those same memoirs are full of references to the occasions 
which he seized upon for visiting European military establishments and manoeuvres, a 
habit which was made the easier because of his family connections in Europe. There are 
several references to his sending accounts of what he had seen to the Horse Guards, even 
one to his having written a new system of cavalry drill, based on what he had seen of the 
practice of the French Cuirassiers at Luneville, but in general he confined himself to 
describing details of the soldiers' appearance, and, in the case of the French army, 
patronising comments about the deficiences of their horsemanship. 9 The shallowness of 
such observations contrasts with the sharply-focused commentaries of the military 
attaches, and explains why, as Ainslie continued to grumble throughout his memoirs, his 
opinions were disregarded by those in authority. 
Ainslie and his ilk were part of a small society (some of the ramifications of which 
are illustrated in appendix A3), and the experiences which they shared no doubt helped to 
maintain a conservative cast of mind within much of that body, but against this must be 
set the great volume of books and military tracts which pointed the way towards change. 
References to these have been made throughout the chapters dealing with specific issues, 
and Colonel Clive's opinion of their importance was quoted on page 57. The rapidity 
with which the foreign works were made available in translation to British soldiers, and 
the many references to them in articles and debates (even in distant Calcutta), attest to 
9 de Ainslie, General, Life as I Have Found It (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1883), 78-79,139,141-2,160-1, 
166-7,187,219,240,254-5,309,361,389,435-8. 
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their significance. Many of the articles, indeed, take a list of recent books as their starting 
point, and the backing pages of many of the commercially published works show the 
wide range of texts in print. As an example, illustration 7 reproduces the advertisements 
inside the front cover of Clery's Minor Tactics of 1875. 
The RUSI Journal contained regular lists and digests of the significant titles as they 
appeared, and the occasional injunction to officers to devote more time to keeping abreast 
of what was happening in the wider world. For example, in 1879 Hale had this to say 
about the French `Revue militaire de 1 'Etranger'. 
The knowledge of the existence of this publication is confined to so few 
Officers in the English Service, that it is desirable to give to a notice of it 
the most prominent position in this portion of the Journal.... . It is not too much to say, that anyone who steadily digests this weekly 
budget of foreign military information will be kept perfectly au courant to 
everything of importance which is taking place in the countries with which 
it deals. '° 
The Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution recorded in detail all the 
publications which they received, and frequently included translations of relevant foreign 
works. The Royal Engineers Institute came into being some years later than the RAI, but 
the School at Chatham provides an illustration of the effectiveness of the way that 
authority and enthusiastic individuals could work together in Victorian Britain to promote 
good ideas. In 1874 Colonel Wilbraham Lennox, RE, launched a series of translations of 
foreign works for the edification of his brother officers, and although this was a privately 
funded initiative, it had the explicit support of the Commandant of the School of Military 
Engineering. Illustration 8 reproduces his Preface to the series (revised for no. 3, issued in 
1875) and it is interesting to see, not only details of what it cost to publish such works, 
but also that sales of the first two issues, `.... limited to officers of our own Corps', 
amounted to 174 and 162 copies respectively in the first year. Shortly thereafter the RE 
Institute was able to take over the work begun by Colonel Lennox, and the extract from 
their Professional Papers for 1878, recorded on page 67, shows the range of the material 
which they disseminated. 
10 Hale, Lonsdale, JRUSI, vol. 23,1879,675-6. 
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All this suggests that those soldiers who were interested in studying their profession 
enjoyed ready access to what was best, or at least most up-to-date, in current military 
writing - but did the bulk of the army take advantage of this? Maurice was bitterly 
convinced that they did not. 'Alas! It was one thing that books should be written; it was 
another that they should be read..... The whole instinct of the mass of soldiers is against 
reading of any kind. "' 1 Maurice's patron Wolseley said much the same. `To study his 
profession, to become a master of his trade was the role of a very small knot of officers at 
that epoch. ' 12 But Wolseley, part of whose own mastery of advocacy lay in creating one 
impression at one time for one audience and something completely different at another, 
had, thirty-two years earlier, at the very epoch which he was now describing, spoken 
warmly of ` .... a profession possessing numbers of most able men, highly instructed in 
all that pertains to their calling' . 
13 
What conclusion can be drawn from these comments? It is no surprise that the great 
majority of regimental officers were not interested in reading books about their 
profession, but the size and breadth of interest of the minority may be, and there are one 
or two pointers in that direction. The shelves of the Institute of Historical Research have 
benefited from gifts of books and pamphlets from the private collections of several 
soldiers of this period, and one such was John Hozier - an officer of obvious talent, but 
who never achieved either the fame or the notoriety of his brother Henry. 14 A list of some 
of Hozier's collection is given in a separate section in the attached bibliography, and it 
implies an impressive range of linguistic skills to add to the evidence of professional zeal. 
The sales figures for Lennox's publications are a second pointer. The Army List for 1875 
shows 873 officers in the Royal Engineers (including distinguished Colonels 
11 Maurice, `The War Office and the Army', Quarterly Review, vol. 183, Jan. 1896,192-3. 
12 Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, vol. 2,233. 13 Wolseley, `our military requirements, 526. 
14 John Hozier, commissioned in the Royal Scots Greys, was a graduate of the Staff College - like his 
brother he passed out first of his class - and retired as a Lieut. -Colonel in 1880. 
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Commandant), many of them serving in remote parts of the empire. The fact that some 
twenty per cent responded to Lennox's initiative as soon as the works appeared says 
much about their approach to their calling. 
Previous chapters have drawn heavily on the records of lectures and debates held at 
RUSI, at Woolwich, Chatham and Aldershot, and from as far away as Calcutta, and it is 
important to stress that these were not the structured components of a course at the 
Academy or the Staff College, but the voluntary assemblies of busy men who shared a 
common interest. The calibre of the presenters, the eminence of the Chairmen, and the 
vigour of the discussions all attest to the value which was accorded them at the time. This 
was the forum in which the most senior members of the military establishment were 
exposed to the arguments of all levels of their professional colleagues and influential 
civilians. It is the contention here that the interplay between middle-ranking soldiers like 
the Brackenburys and the Chesneys on one hand, and these senior officers on the other, 
created the climate in which the issues of the day could be teased into practical shape. At 
all events, it is difficult to believe that anyone reading the records of these events in detail 
can maintain that the establishment in general, and the Duke of Cambridge in particular, 
were insensitive to the issues which were addressed. 
To emphasise this point it is now necessary to look again at the topic which has 
been running throughout this study as a sort of sub plot - the attitude of the 
establishment to officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. The importance of 
this arises from the disproportionate number of officers from these corps whose 
arguments have contributed to this study. This is not intended to denigrate the 
contribution of men from other branches of the service, but to show that the judgment 
expressed by Gerard DeGroot, quoted on page 34, is not supported by the evidence. 
Towards the end of his massive and magisterial History of the British Army Sir John 
Fortescue gives `a sketch of the new army, 1870-1914'. In this, speaking of officers of 
the artillery and engineers, he says that few reached General's rank because regimental 
promotion was so slow, and `.... practically none were ever to be found on the Staff of 
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the army, ). 15 This is not simply mistaken; it is seriously misleading, because such a 
statement from so authoritative a source will generally be accepted without question, not 
least by those whose concern with the period is to emphasise the caste-bound nature of 
Victorian society. The evidence available from the careers of the officers of the time 
flatly contradicts Fortescue. 
To take the question of promotion to general officer's rank first, this study's base 
group of officers has shown that regimental promotion within the artillery and engineers 
was in fact broadly comparable with that of the other arms. Ninety-seven of this base 
group eventually became general officers, and of these forty-one were gunners or 
sappers, including six of the seventeen Field Marshals, eleven of the thirty-eight 
Generals, nine of the eighteen Lieutenant-Generals and fifteen of the twenty-four Major- 
Generals. The Field Marshals included leaders of the calibre of Roberts, Kitchener and 
Nicholson, the Generals included John Adye, Robert Biddulph, Henry Brackenbury and 
Charles Warren, the Lieutenant-Generals James Grierson and the Major-Generals 
`Chinese' Gordon. 
The evidence relating to the Staff is similar. Within the War Office, it is only 
necessary to go down the alphabet as far as Sir Charles Callwell to find the names of 
John Adye, John Ardagh, Robert Biddulph and the Brackenburys - all major 
contributors to the development of the Intelligence Department, and eventually a General 
Staff. For the army in the field, the list of Wolseley's Staff for the Expeditionary Force in 
Egypt in 1882 contains forty-eight names, and of these eighteen come from the two 
corps, ranging from Chief of the Staff and Second in Command, Sir John Adye, down to 
three of Wolseley's four ADCs. 16 
The constitution of the many committees and commissions which continued to 
explore matters of defence during the decades following 1880 tells the same story. Henry 
Brackenbury was the only military member on the Hartington Commission of 1890 (and 
's Vol. 13 (London, Macmillan, 1930), ch. LX, 550. 
16 Maurice, The Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, 112. Maurice served as one of the DAAQMGS. 
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the Secretary was Major GS Clarke, RE). Similarly, when St John Brodrick's 1898 
Committee to consider the Decentralisation of War Office Business, with Brackenbury as 
a member, called its witnesses, the first five - called because of the importance of their 
positions - had all been commissioned in the artillery or the engineers; General Sir R 
Harrison (Quartermaster-General), Field Marshal Lord Roberts (Commander-in-Chief in 
Ireland); Major-General JF Maurice (General Officer Commanding Woolwich District); 
General HRH the Duke of Connaught (General Officer Commanding at Aldershot); and 
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel JM Grierson (Military Attache at Berlin). Significantly, 
Grierson had been called to advise the committee about ` .... the system under which the 
German War Department carries on its work, and how the money is spent'. 17 
This is evidence that cleverness and technical-mindedness, associated with a desire 
to learn from continental experience, were not the bars to advancement that DeGroot and 
Sydenham's biographer have maintained; that, on the contrary, such qualities were 
encouraged, and frequently led to positions of influence. The chapters in this study 
looking at the specific issues have shown that senior officers throughout the period of the 
continental wars, men like Airey, Burgoyne, Lintorn Simmons and Wolseley, took care to 
exploit the talents of the bright officers, the Brackenburys and the Chesneys, Jervois, HA 
Smyth, Grierson, with just this object in mind. When Colonel Robert Home died at the 
early age of forty-one, his obituary in the Times was lavish in its praise of one ` .... 
whose real worth was known to a comparatively limited circle; but that circle comprised 
most of those to whose hands the destinies of the Empire have been intrusted during the 
last two Administrations'. It particularly noted Wolseley's wisdom in spotting his early 
promise, 
.... and 
it must ever redound to the credit of the present Adjutant-General 
of the Army (Sir Charles Ellice) that he recognised the ability of the young 
soldier and selected him as the chief working agent to carry out the 
various projects which were at that time on foot for the complete 
organization of our Army, .... 
18 
17 PP 1898, C 8934, vol. VIII. 18 The Times, 31 Jan. 1879,2. 
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Technical matters and developments in the science of warfare were examined in 
chapter three, and the detail there demonstrates that the leadership was not only keenly 
interested in what was happening elsewhere but careful in promoting a close connection 
with the people and organisations best fitted to make the necessary advances in British 
equipment. Similarly, the chapters on organisation and structure contradict any 
suggestion that these details of the continental wars were not anxiously looked at and 
exhaustively debated. So far as the leadership was concerned, it is equally clear that 
throughout the period of the wars the generals most directly concerned, men like 
Burgoyne, Airey, MacDougall, Simmons, Lysons, Ellice and Wolseley, were committed 
to using the information so gained in order to raise the efficiency of their service. If they 
never found a solution to the fundamental problem of recruiting the necessary numbers to 
match the body of trained manpower available to the continental armies, it was not for 
want of anxious debate. 
This thesis has included contributions from the Commander-in-Chief on most of the 
issues under consideration, and his character and influence deserve to be reappraised. Dr 
Farrell took him as the subject of his thesis in 1999, but his concentration on the 
relationship between Cambridge and his Royal cousin led him to endorse the view that 
the duke's tenure of office was an unmitigated disaster for the army. It is time for a more 
balanced judgment. There is no doubt that Cambridge remained in his post too long, but 
neither his determination to maintain the direct personal relationship between the Queen 
and her army nor his reluctance to upset the conservative element among the officers - 
and certainly not the interest which he shared with King Wilhelm of Prussia in the details 
of regimental uniforms and turnout - should be allowed to detract from his positive 
achievements during these early years in command; in particular his concern to keep 
abreast of what was happening on the continent, and the implications for the British 
army. 
The reaction of the army to the necessary changes in infantry tactics was 
interesting. The debates recorded in chapter five show the high degree of acceptance of 
the main implications of the increased range and killing power of weapons, but they also 
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demonstrate the difficulties confronting those preaching the new doctrine, in the face of 
the long-established British regimental tradition. In some respects, as over the question of 
company size, there were good practical reasons for resisting change; but the determined 
unwillingness of so many regimental officers to accept that, in warfare between 
sophisticated opponents, once battle was joined they could not maintain control over their 
scattered troops, seriously inhibited the development of initiative at the tactical level in 
the infantry. The thinkers won the theoretical argument, but could not change the 
practice, and this illustrates one of the main reasons why the British army continued to 
differ so markedly from its late nineteenth century contemporaries - the lack of a 
mechanism for ensuring that once good practice was identified it would be accepted and 
applied throughout the army. 
The reasons for this were examined in the chapter on application in the field, and 
they fall into two categories. The nature of British society, and its peculiar form of 
popular government, created the first group of reasons. Society was indeed commercial 
rather than military in structure. The reasons for maintaining a large navy were accepted 
readily enough by a nation of traders, but the expense, and even the presence, of a large 
number of soldiers at home was a constant source of irritation - except on the rare 
occasions when an invasion panic momentarily raised the army's profile. Hence the 
stultifying influence of the dreaded Estimates and ` .... the need to curry 
favour with the 
government by saving money .... 
'; 19 the continuing pressure to economise, and to make 
doubly sure that soldiers were not being allowed to indulge their propensity for 
extravagance. The result was an army compelled to concentrate most of its resources on 
its first priority, the defence of the empire and its trade routes, at the expense of the 
creation of a coherent structure for the home-based force. 
The second group of reasons, the specifically military reasons, arose from that 
constraint. None of these, on its own, is sufficient to account for the fact that it proved so 
difficult to create a commonality of doctrine or practice; but, cumulatively and 
collectively, they did. 
19 Comments of Charles Brackenbury, quoted on page 160, and General Hills-Johnes, Appendix B2. 
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The structure of continental armies was designed to enable them to fight against 
their neighbours, and events had proved that the German army was the most efficient 
model. Reformers in Britain were pressing throughout the period for the country to adopt 
a similarly thorough-going district-based system, and Cardwell did his best to achieve 
this in the early 1870s, but, as his memorandum (quoted on page 163) spelt out, the 
totally different operational requirements of the British army made it appear impossible 
to organise all the units into self-sufficient Corps, trained and ready to take the field 
together. This lack of a permanent structure, and above all the dearth of opportunities for 
troops to train together in large numbers for the realities of war, meant that there was no 
mechanism for standardising whatever was best and creating the unity of purpose which 
made the German army so formidable. 
The structure was not there. Nor was the essential central driving force, such as 
could have been provided by a powerful General Staff. As the Prussian/German army 
continued to triumph thoughtful observers, epitomised by the Brackenbury brothers, 
increasingly emphasised how much `the brain of an army' contributed to its success. The 
trouble was that senior officers took so long to understand the underlying concept. 
Cambridge continued to fear that the creation of a post of Chief of the General Staff 
would fatally diminish his authority, and it is instructive to see how Wolseley, the great 
reformer, came round to the same point of view when he was given his opportunity to 
succeed Cambridge. This encouraged ministers to continue to advance the views 
expressed by Campbell-Bannerman, quoted on page 164, that because the potential 
problems facing the army of an imperial power were so varied and unpredictable the only 
practical solution was to wait on the event and then let the commander on the ground or 
of the expeditionary force, as the case might be, set his hastily assembled staff to solve 
the problems of the moment. This inevitably perpetuated the British view of staff work as 
a support service to provide a field commander with people to take care of the necessary 
logistical and administrative matters - the business reserved in the German army 
for the 
Neben Etat, and deliberately kept separate from the General Staff. 20 
20 Referred to approvingly by Haldane in his Autobiography, 206, as the Intendantur. 
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It also explains why education for leadership was neither consistent nor relevant 
throughout the army, scattered as it continued to be in small garrisons in so many 
different parts of the globe. Good principles were taught at Woolwich, Sandhurst and the 
Staff College during the 1860s and 1870s, but much of the detail was arid and, worse, 
susceptible to rapid acquisition by cramming, and so just as quickly forgotten. 21 This 
could not be an adequate groundwork for coherent leadership of a force which continued 
to be a collection of regiments and brigades rather than an army. The restriction of the 
Staff to an administrative and intelligence-providing role, rather than making them 
central to the creation and direction of policy, meant that there was no controlling body to 
ensure that the army at home should share a common doctrine. It was not so much that 
the appropriate principles were not taught; what was missing was a means of ensuring 
that the lessons were actually being applied at the operational level. It was in fact a sad 
paradox that the richest country in the world double- and triple-checked the money spent 
on the army's support, but had no similar means for monitoring its professional progress. 
To assess the consequences of this lack of rigour in ensuring that the professional 
competence of all officers was developed coherently it is necessary to move on another 
twenty years. In the aftermath of the Boer War, a committee was appointed to consider 
the Education and Training of the Officers of the Army. 22 This committee divided its 
report into three parts, the antecedent education of Army candidates, the intermediate 
education of the same, and the military training of the young officer. On the first part they 
found that `(t)he general trend of the evidence, in short, is to indicate that the early 
education of the young officer has not, hitherto, been conducted on proper lines'. 23 They 
21 Professor Bond, in The Victorian Army and the Staff College, ch. 3, gives a detailed account of this 
aspect of the teaching at the Staff College in the 1860s and 1870s. As against this, Dr Duncan Anderson, 
Head of the War Studies Department at Sandhurst, drew the attention of the present writer to the higher 
standard of attainment in modern languages and mathematics required of the cadets of that period 
compared with those of today. 22 PP 1902, vol. X. Cd 982. The Chairman was a member of the Cabinet, the Right Hon. Areta Akers- 
Douglas, MP, and the membership heavily academic, including the distinguished scientist Sir Michael 
Foster, who represented London University in Parliament, and the Heads of Eton and St Paul's. One of the 
two army representatives had to leave before their work was completed to become Governor of Sandhurst, 
no doubt, in the light of the criticisms, to the great benefit of that institution. 23 Ibid, para. 9. 
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therefore recommended that the entrance examinations for Sandhurst and Woolwich 
should be made more practical and that the examination for aspirants for a Regular 
commission from the Militia should be wholly devoted to military subjects. 
The second part concentrated on the instruction offered to gentlemen cadets. On the 
whole Woolwich met with their approval, though they recommended that more emphasis 
should be given to Tactics and Military History. Sandhurst, in contrast, was heavily 
criticised; the cadets spent too much time indoors and were not properly supervised; the 
instructors were not sufficiently dedicated or conscientious (' .... an 
instructional 
appointment is regarded in the Army generally as a shelf on which an officer may spend a 
few years comfortably .... 
'); and allowing the cadets to be drilled by NCOs set them a 
bad example. There should be more instruction in Tactics, more exposure to practical 
work in the open, and more pressure on the young gentlemen to learn their business. 24 
The committee's heaviest criticisms, however, were reserved for the third part, the 
military training of the young officer. They were particularly scornful of the `futility' of 
the promotion examinations, in terms of their irrelevant content and careless 
application. 25 Their denunciation, not only of the lack of knowledge displayed by young 
officers, but also of their lack of willingness to work or learn, was noted on page twelve 
of this study. The report said that this opinion was based on the evidence of the many 
commanding officers who had replied to their written questionnaire. There are always 
questions of subjective judgment in the analysing of such replies, and a case can be made 
that the selection of evidence, as quoted in Appendix II of the report, does not quite bear 
out their conclusion. What the majority of the replies seem to be saying is `Yes, there is 
little inducement for a young officer to be keen, because he sees that his barely competent 
colleague will gain promotion just as quickly'. This is not the same as saying that young 
officers were in fact idle. Nevertheless, it is a serious indictment of a system still 
reflecting the philosophy of the Penzance Commission of 1876; `Practically, then, the 
24 Ibid, para. 73-112. 25Ibid, para. 134-153. 
17 1 1) 
present system, which we do not propose to alter, comes to this, that promotion is, as a 
. rule, governed 
by seniority, tempered by rejection' 26 
The Akers-Douglas Committee's exposure of the haphazard nature of the training 
for leadership does raise questions about this aspect of the army's professionalism. The 
seriousness of the danger was concealed during the 1880s and 1890s. By and large the 
qualities required to fight small-scale wars against unsophisticated opponents were well 
practiced, and many young regimental officers quickly learned the practicalities of 
leadership at that level. The Boer War exposed the inadequacies of such experience when 
confronted by determined enemies armed with modern weapons, and it took many 
months before the leadership began to master the formations and tactics required for 
success in this unfamiliar environment. This was the fundamental lesson which the army 
had to learn from that campaign; that there must be a central directing body to coordinate 
all the forces of the empire, and a system of training throughout the army which would 
equip it to meet a sophisticated enemy on equal terms. 
The inadequacy of this aspect of the army's structure says a great deal about the 
fundamental problems which had been exercising the minds of the military establishment 
throughout the preceding century. The Akers-Douglas report was clear about the 
immediate issue. `The desire for economy appears hitherto to have been the deciding 
factor in this and other measures connected with Military Education .... 
'27 This was 
precisely what MacDougall had been complaining about in 1880 - economy coupled 
with denial of the reality of the consequences - which had made it so difficult for the 
soldiers who saw the need for change to achieve their purpose. 
The shock of the Boer War did create a more receptive climate. In March 1906 
Haldane, newly installed as Secretary for War (and with the acquiescence of his leader, 
the same Campbell-Bannerman whose hostility to the idea of a General Staff had been so 
influential in 1890), delivered some much-quoted words to the House of Commons. `A 
26 PP 1876, XV, C 1569, xxxiii. 27 PP 1902, X, 6. 
MSZ 
new school of officers has arisen since the South African War, a thinking school of 
officers who desire to see the full efficiency which comes from new organization and no 
surplus energy running to waste. ' 28 But the officers of whom he spoke had not sprung 
from the earth fully armed like the dragon's teeth of Cadmus. The youngest of them, 
Spencer Ewart, Gerald Ellison and Douglas Haig, had been in the army for twenty-five 
years, while their seniors - those who would actually implement Haldane's 
reorganisation - were commissioned in the 1860s. 
29 
This illustrates the crucial point that the evolution of the army's structure was, as 
Strachan stressed with reference to the early years, a continuing process throughout the 
nineteenth century. The army was not simply forced out of its complacency by a sudden 
exposure of its failings in 1899. This study has focused on the depth of concern of the 
opinion-formers within the leadership to the need to react to the lessons of the continental 
wars, at every level, and the Boer War should be seen as a catalyst as much as a generator 
of the decisive changes which followed. 
Haldane, addressing the Colonial Defence Conference in April 1907, reminded 
those present of the conclusions reached by the Esher Committee of 1904 in words 
demonstrating that two lessons which soldiers like the Brackenburys had been preaching 
since the 1870s had finally made their mark. He said that the South African War had 
shown that `we' (it must be hoped that this meant we ministers) had never fully 
apprehended the importance of the maxim that all preparation in time of peace must be 
preparation for war; `.... it is the only justification for the maintenance of armies .... 
', to 
which he added that `.... Count Moltke was able to organise victory for the Prussian and 
German armies in 1866, and again in 1870, because he and the general staff working 
28 Parl. Deb., 4t' Series, vol. 153, (8 March 1906), col. 664. Cited by Spiers, Edward M, Haldane: An Army 
Reformer, (Edinburgh University Press, 1980), 56. 
29 The Adjutant-General, Sir Charles Douglas, was commissioned in 1869, the Quartermaster-General, Sir 
William Nicholson in 1865, and the first Chief of the General Staff, Sir Neville Lyttelton, also in 1865. As 
a Major Lyttelton had been Childers' Private Secretary in 1880. 
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under him were free to apply their minds wholly to war preparation'. 30 
Two other lessons, that involvement in a continental war would require reserves of 
trained manpower far greater than could be generated by voluntary enlistment, and that 
the higher leadership could only learn how to manage such numbers by practice in 
peacetime, remained beyond the power of the army to correct. To condemn this as 
unprofessional would be unjust. It is the duty of a professional body to advise the 
employer of its services, vigorously, what the realities of their situation are, and it is the 
contention of this thesis that these particular issues were presented seriously during the 
period when the continental wars were creating a new international environment. 
It is the second duty of professionals to do all that they can, given the prevailing 
conditions, to meet their employer's requirements. It was the Secretary for War, and not a 
soldier, who reiterated to the Colonial Defence Conference of 1902 the long-held view of 
successive administrations about the function of the British army; `And I would point out 
that this is not a force kept for ambitious schemes or offensive operations or for an 
attempt to involve ourselves in the great quarrels of our neighbours in Europe'. 31 
30 Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence (London, Colonial Office, 
1909), 189. 
31 Ibid, St. John Brodrick, 78. 
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Appendix Al Special Entries to Woolwich 
The normal method of entry to the Woolwich Military Academy in 1854 was by 
selection at an age between fourteen and sixteen, and the cadets so entered were 
categorised as OS entrants. They followed a training programme of either two or three 
years, depending on their progress, so obtaining their commissions at the age of 
seventeen or eighteen. ' 
To meet the emergency requirements created by the Crimean War a series of special 
public examinations was held between 1854 and 1857 to recruit slightly older youths and 
get them into service more rapidly. Seven young officers were commissioned on 23 
October 1854 as temporary second lieutenants RE, and the name heading the list is that 
of (later Lieut. -General Sir) Robert Grant, whose biographer in the DNB records that he 
did indeed pass first in a public examination for direct commissions into the engineers 
and artillery. Grant was then seventeen years and two months old. Five men were 
commissioned in the artillery that same day, the list headed by (later Colonel Sir) Vivian 
Majendie, aged eighteen, and it is reasonable to assume that they had been recruited in 
the same manner. All of them were promoted to First Lieutenant during December of the 
same year, the exact date depending on their position in the list, and it is interesting to see 
that their seniority in their corps continued to reflect this ranking for many years. For 
example, the engineers were all promoted to regimental Major on 5 July 1872, though 
both Grant and Arthur Macdonnell, who stood fourth in the original examination, had 
been given brevet rank previously, and their promotion to regimental Lieut. -Colonel 
followed between July 1878 and September 1879, still in the same order of seniority. 
A larger batch, numbering nineteen, was recruited the same way the following year, 
and this time only the two who passed in at the head of the list, (Maj. -General Sir) Robert 
Murdoch Smith and (Maj. -General Sir) Charles Williams, were commissioned in the 
There was an issue about whether the length of their training, and therefore their age at commissioning, 
would prejudice their careers in competition with their contemporaries in other arms, and this was dealt 
with in the latter part of this period by dating their commissions six months before they passed out. See, for 
example, James Grierson (footnote, p 44). 
756 
Royal Engineers, on 24 September 1855. Their subsequent careers were of some interest, 
and are referred to in the main text of this study. Generally speaking, the remaining 
seventeen, who were commissioned the same day into the Royal Artillery, did not have 
notably distinguished careers, though perhaps (Colonel) Francis Duncan, who passed 
third after the two engineers, subsequently became commander of the artillery of the 
Egyptian army and later an MP, might be regarded as an exception. 
Robert Murdoch Smith's biographer in the DNB says that Smith passed first of 
forty six candidates for this direct method of entry. It does appear from the army lists that 
a further sixteen were commissioned into the artillery by this method on 6 March 1856, 
all initially as `temporary' First Lieutenants. 
Meanwhile, other mechanisms were being employed to swell the ranks of the two 
corps with relatively mature, if only partly trained, young officers. The Royal Military 
Academy Cadets' Register records that thirty successful candidates were `Appointed by 
direct Nomination to the Practical Class per Lieutenant General's letter of 3 March 1855 
- without previous Examination and joined in the Royal Arsenal 6 March 1855'. These 
men, known as `D' entrants, were on average eighteen years and two months old when 
they joined, and they were commissioned on 31 July 1855, after just less than five 
months at Woolwich, nine in the engineers, sixteen in the artillery, four (curiously) in the 
infantry - and one discharged. 
A few months later the first of three batches of cadets was brought in by what was 
known as the `C' entry. This group was entered in the Register as `Appointed by direct 
nomination to the Practical Class per Lord Panmure's Authority of 30 August 1855 
having passed their Examination at King's College and joined in the Royal Arsenal on 
the 5th September 1855'. Their average age was exactly eighteen. The Register states that 
`these 29 gentlemen were all that qualified out of 105 who were examined', but a further 
two were added to the list. They were commissioned on 7 April 1856 after seven months' 
training, ten in the engineers and twenty in the artillery - with one falling by the 
wayside. It is notable that, as usual, those who headed the list opted for the engineers, 
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including three officers who subsequently made a significant contribution to the issues 
with which this study is concerned - Robert Home, Henry Brackenbury and Frederick 
Hirne. 
There were further `C' entries in March 1856 and August 1857, but the period of 
training before commissioning was increasing, reflecting the passing of the immediate 
crisis. The 1856 entry were commissioned on 20 December, after eight months, and the 
1857 entry, after between sixteen and twenty two months, on several dates between 
October 1858 and June 1859. 
Officers commissioned directly into Artillery and Engineers 
Royal Engineers 
23 October 1854 
Robert Grant 
Edward Harding Stewarth 
Edward Donald Malcolm 
Arthur Robert MacDonnell 
James Hamilton Wilson 
Charles Anne Law de Montmorency 
Hon. William Le Poer Trench 
24 September 1855 
Robert Murdoch Smith 
Charles William Wilson 
Royal Artillery 
Vivian Dering Majendie 
Jas. Edward Blackwell 
Sir J Wm. Campbell 
Aemelius De Vic Tupper 
John Chas. Fra. Ramsden 
Francis Duncan 
John Ryder Oliver 
Edward Egan 
James Corry Jones Lowry 
James Peattie Morgan 
George Grote Hannen 
Philip M'Laurin Guille 
Arthur Ford 
Francis Montague Smith 
Francis Arthur Mant 
Frederick Howlett 
Richard Handcock 
Charles Mill Moloney 
George Arbuthnot 
Richard Sadleir 
William Ruxton Barlow 
Robert Calwell Smith 
1) 68 
6 March 1856 All Royal Artillery 
Alexander Doull 
Robert Emnett Cane 
Archibald Hamilton Bell 
Francis Sadleir Stoney 
George Budd 
John Haughton 




William Godeffroy Branckert 
Donald Roderick Cameron 
William Henry Noble 
George O' Conner 
Richard Newton Young 
Joseph Haythorn Edgar 
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Appendix A2 
The German army and the cult of the offensive 
Professor Brose's researches into German army doctrine in the last twenty years of the 
nineteenth century were referred to in chapter 5. His conclusions rather surprised the present 
writer, and prompted him to seek the views of the German Military History Research 
Department (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt). This appendix consists of the enquiry 






Thursday, 15 August 2002 
TgbNr.: 01-0737 
Dear Hauptmann Groh 
May I trespass once more on your goodwill? 
A professor of history at an American university recently had this to say about German army 
doctrine in the aftermath of the 1870-71 war. `I found that feuding factions in the infantry, 
cavalry and artillery had fought over the tactical and technological lessons of the Wars of 
Unification (1866-1870). Those who emphasized the superiority of man and morale over 
machine and firepower prevailed by the late 1870s - to the army's detriment. Regulations 
and majority prejudices called for tight infantry formations and shock attack tactics, large-unit 
cavalry charges featuring waves of massed horsemen, and offensive field-artillery tactics that 
maximized mobility and valor while neglecting firepower and marksmanship. ' (Brose, Eric 
Dom, The Kaiser's Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the 
Machine Age. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 4) 
He also says that the role of the artillery began to be played down because the officers of that 
arm were not so well-born as those of the cavalry and infantry, and the latter were determined 
to reassert the moral values of the feudal age. (Ch. 2) He then concludes that `it was the 
French and (to a lesser extent) the Russians, not the Germans, who blazed the trail of modern 
military technology in the 1880s and 1890s' . p. 
42. 
Professor Brose has clearly studied the German military journals and the proceedings of the 
military societies of the period with great care, and there was certainly much debate about 
fighting doctrine, but it seems to me that Brose has exaggerated the extent to which the voices 
of reaction were actually prevailing, in the 1870s at least. During that decade the German 
writers who impressed the British military establishment were men like v. Boguslawski, 
Prince Kraft and of course May (whom Brose does not mention) and the writers of the official 
histories of the campaigns, who conveyed a message which was the exact opposite of what 
Brose was saying on his page 4, - and when the backlash came, in the `80s and `90s, the 
reaction was led more by French than German doctrine. 
I have to admit that I am prejudiced against writers like Brose, who dwell so much on socio- 
political theory (the emphasis on social class attitudes, and the use of amateur psycho-analysis 
[of Kaiser Wilhelm II on p. 114, for instance]), and it is difficult to take seriously as a 
historian a man who says that `Bazaine seized the initiative on 16 August against the German 
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Second Army of Friedrich Karl, attacking him at Mars-la-Tour .... 
' (p. 9) - but he has 
studied the period. 
May I therefore ask if you could possibly answer the question; is there much evidence to 
support his argument about the rapid change of heart amongst the German military hierarchy 
during the 1870s? 
May I further impose on you by asking whether you could tell me something about v. 
Boguslawski's career after the publication of the Tactical Deductions? Did he achieve high 
rank? 
Once again, I shall be most grateful if you are able to help me at all with these questions. 













(Please quote in correspondence) 
Subject: Deutsche Militärdoktrin 1870/71 
Reference: Your letter dated 15.08.02 
Enclosures: -- 
Dear Mr. Hampshire, 








An answer to your question has to mention several facts : 
1. The German General Staff, even Moltke used the new technical inventions like railway and telegraph 
successfully. The victories in 1866 and 1870 are mainly caused by using technical auxiliaries efficiently. 
2. The role of military leadership and the point you call "heart" are also relevant for military doctrine in 
Germany. Already Clausewitz mentioned the basic role of "esprit" and "genie" and the importance of man 
and moral. 
3. It's true the officers of the German Army during the 1870s and 1880s used the new technichal 
development, but their philosophy of the world was anachronistic. The new class of workers weren't paid 
attention to, the officers corps' experience was formed by an agricultural and feudal view of life. 
4. So I believe Brose' s statements are plausible, there are good arguments for his opinion. But there are 
also good arguments for an weakend version, and so your presumption that he has exaggerated his 
cognitions could be a solution of this problem. 
At least some words to Boguslawski : His career was really successful. He became a Brigade Commander 
and retired as a Lieutenant General. 
With kind regards 
o rder 




Personal connections - the Biddulph circle 
At a time when `cronyism' in public life is attracting considerable adverse comment it 
may be salutary to be reminded how close-knit Victorian society was. Only a small proportion 
of the population was fitted by birth, education and connections (not to mention gender) to 
play an active part in the direction of affairs, and it was inevitable that the relationships 
between these privileged people should have been strong. Some of these family connections 
have been touched on in the body of this study, but it would require a full-scale research 
project to explore the significance which this could have had on creating common attitudes of 
mind to military matters. All that this appendix is intended to do is to illustrate, from one 
family's circle of friends and relations, how far-reaching the connections could be. 
The Biddulphs were a long-established and well-respected family in the marchlands 
between England and Wales, but their name would probably be unfamiliar to anyone who did 
not happen to be especially interested either in the local history of that part of the world or in 
the politico-military history of Victorian Britain. It is interesting, therefore, to see how closely 
they were connected by ties of blood and friendship with many of the people whose names 
appear in this study, and to speculate how far the ripples would reach if the exercise were 
continued one stage further - taking into account, for instance, the ramifications of the 
Wolseley `ring' on one hand and the Royal Family on the other. 1 
General Sir Robert Biddulph worked with Cardwell during the crucial years when the 
army reforms of the 1870s were being introduced. He is probably best known as the author of 
Lord Cardwell at the War Office: A History of his Administration, 1868-1874 (London, 
Murray, 1904), but he was also a lifelong friend and colleague of Wolseley's. Robert 
Biddulph's brother was Michael Biddulph, banker, MP and later Baron Biddulph. Michael's 
' These particulars were accumulated from the following sources. The Morier Papers in Balliol College, Oxford; 
Ramm, Agatha, Sir Robert Monier: Envoy and Ambassador in the Age of Imperialism 1876-1893 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1973); the Biddulph family records in Hereford Public Library; General Ainslie's Life; the 
DNB; and the FO List for 1880. 
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wife was a daughter of General Jonathan Peel, Secretary for War and brother of a previous 
Prime Minister. 
Another daughter of General Peel was the wife of Sir Robert Morier, the diplomatist, 
close friend of the Crown Prince of Prussia and his wife, daughter of Queen Victoria. 
Morier was a lifelong enemy of Bismarck, with many connections among liberal politicians in 
the German States. He was a founder member of the Cobden Club, whose members included 
John Morley and Thomas Huxley, and also of the Cosmopolitan Club, along with 
Chichester Fortescue, Austen Henry Layard, Henry Reeve, Lord Odo Russell and 
George Goschen. 
General Sir Thomas Biddulph was first cousin, once removed, of Robert and Michael 
Biddulph. He was an important member of the Royal Household, successively Master of the 
Household and Keeper of the Privy Purse, having been originally appointed by Baron 
Stockmar, whose son was another intimate friend of Morier. Thomas Biddulph's wife was 
one of the Queen's personal entourage, as was the wife of General Claremont, who was a 
Groom of the Privy Chamber in addition to his professional duties as military attache. 
Thomas Biddulph's elder brother was another Robert, Robert Myddleton Biddulph of 
Chirk Castle, who was an old friend of General de Ainslie. The latter was a regimental 
colleague and friend of General Sir Beauchamp Walker, who, like Morier, could claim an 
intimate friendship with The Prussian Crown Prince and Princess. Ainslie recorded that when 
he was staying with Robert he enjoyed meeting their friend and neighbour The Hon. George 
Wrottesley, the son-in-law and biographer of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne. 
General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnel Biddulph was only distantly related, although 
the Morier Papers in the Balliol archives confuse him with the Michael mentioned earlier. 
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Appendix B1 
Holders of offices relating to the army, Military Attaches and contributors to 
the Periodicals 
Holders of offices relating to the army 
Cabinets 
Prime Minister Foreign Secretary Secretary for War 
Feb. 1858 Derby Malmesbury Gen. Peel 
June 1859 Palmerston Russell S Herbert 
July 1861 Sir George Lewis 
April 1863 de Grey (Ripon) 
Oct. 1865 Russell Clarendon 
Feb. 1866 Hartington 
June 1866 Derby Stanley Gen. Peel 
Mar. 1867 Sir JS Pakington 
Feb. 1868 Disraeli 
Dec. 1868 Gladstone Clarendon Cardwell 
June 1870 Granville 
Feb. 1874 Disraeli Derby Gathorne Hardy 
April 1878 Salisbury FA Stanley 
April 1880 Gladstone Granville Childers 
War Office 
Parl. Under Sec. Financial Sec. Perm. Under Sec. 
July 1861 de Grey 
Dec. 1868 Northbrook 
1871 JC Vivian Lugard 
1872 Campbell-Bannerman Vivian 
1873 Lansdowne 
Feb. 1874 Pembroke 
1875 FA Stanley 
1876 Cadogan 
April 1878 Loyd-Lindsay 
1879 Bury RW Thompson 
April 1880 Morley Campbell-Bannerman 
Horse Guards 
Adjutant-General 
1858 Sir G Wetherall 
1860 Sir J Scarlett 
1865 Lord W Paulet 




QM general Military Sec. 
Sir R Airey Sir C Yorke 
Gen. Forster 
Sir J Hope Grant 
Sir FP Haines 
Sir C Ellice Gen. Egerton 




Sir AH Horsford 
1876 Sir C Ellice Sir D Lysons 
1880 Sir G Wolseley A Alison 
Sources. Woodward, Age of Reform, Ensor, England 18 70-1914, Verner, Cambridge. 
British Military Attaches in particular years. 
Year Berlin Paris Vienna 
1864 
1866 Col. CPB Walker, CB 
1870 Col. Walker 
1876 Maj-Gen. Walker 
1880 Lt. -Col. Hon. PS 
Methuen 
Source. Army Lists. 
St. Petersburg 
Col. ES Claremont, CB 
Col. Claremont Col. Hon. St. G Foley, CB Lt. -Col. HH Crealock 
Col. Claremont Col. J Conolly Col. Rob Blane, CB 
Col. Conolly Maj. -Gen. CH Morris, CB Capt. Hon. FA 
Wellesley 
Maj. -Gen. Conolly Lt. -Col. Hon EH Primrose 
The Literary Periodicals Contributors on military matters 
p 
' 
04 >, 5 




















U o, w w 
j 
f; 
Zu v1 ýc 
J Ad ye (senior) * * * * * 
Alison * 
H Brackenbury * 
C Brackenbury * * 
Burgoyne * 
C Chesney * * * * * 
GT Chesney 
Gleig * * * 
Hale 
EB Hamley 
Havelock-Allan * * * 
Home * * 
H Hozier 
MacDougall * * 
Majendie * 
B Walker 
Wolseley * * 
Others 






Despite the convention of anonymity, scholars who need to refer to such works are 
usually able to identify the authors because of the admirable work of the compiler of 
Wellesley's Index. In addition to listing every article in accessible form, he has taken great 
pains to establish the identities of the authors, by consulting the private papers and account 
books of the magazines, and occasionally by the less certain method of using internal 
evidence (such as references to other articles where a positive identification can be made). 
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The present writer has therefore been happy to accept Wellesley's attributions in almost 
every case. 
Very rarely does Homer nod. The exceptional case is an article in Fraser's Magazine 
for June, 1876; `Remarks on modern warfare', written by a soldier and signed PSC. 
Wellesley's compiler attributes this piece to an otherwise unrecorded soldier named Percy 
Scudamore Cunningham, on the ground that he was the only officer with those initials in the 
1876 Army List. It is perhaps more plausible to believe that in this particular case the author 
was asserting his professional credentials rather than signing his name. 
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Appendix B2 
Extracts from letters and memoranda. 
1. Russell to Delane, 9 July 1866 
My dear Delane 
I am glad to see from my heart that there is a sort of panic in England about the 
needle gun. Let there be no mistake about it. The needle gun has pricked the Austrian army 
to the heart. If we do not at once arm our troops with a breech-loader with fixed 
ammunition (no damned humbug about `capping') we are howling idiots, and deserve to be 
smashed in our first fight. All that stuff and nonsense about `throwing away fire', `reserve 
ammunition' and the rest of it must be got rid of. Fixed ammunition with its own ignition 
must be the system, or we lose the greatest advantage of the breech-loader. Do press this on 
the authorities if they have the smallest doubt about it. 
Now, as well as I can understand, Snider does not provide for self-igniting cartridges. 
If so, for God's sake don't let us waste 6d on him. The motions required for capping are the 
very greatest drawbacks to firing next to the ramrod ramming. Do be urgent, incessant, and 
remorseless about this. It is quite incredible how brave men are cowed by this damned 
weapon - cavalry and all. Nor could I, had I not seen, have believed in such tremendous 
volleys on their front. The needle gun trebled the line of Prussians -a line of skirmishers 
made a rolling fire like a regiment firing a feu de joi. 
[Text from Atkins, JB, The Life of Sir William Howard Russell, 2vols. (London, John 
Morley, 1911), vol. 2,140-1. ] 
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2. Claremont to Lord Cowley (Ambassador at Paris), about the threat of a 
French invasion 
25 June 1858. Castle Hill - Ealing 
I saw General Peel yesterday and he is evidently very uneasy about France; everyone 
in fact seems so much alarmed that it is quite enough to shake the best rooted convictions 
and I sometimes ask myself whether after all I may not be mistaken, yet I feel I am not. 
Although the recruiting goes on merrily at the rate of 200 men a day, yet we have sent large 
stores of muskets and so forth to India, we have very little remaining; all military matters 
are also very confused and in a state of transition; I suspect the conscience of all this 
unsettles and disturbs men's minds. The completion of the railway to Cherbourg makes 
them also see everything en noir, but what answer can one make to Military men who tell 
one gravely that an army could be sent to the said Cherbourg and embarked there without 
our knowing anything about it.... . 
I forget whether I told you that I had seen Mr Disraeli who seemed convinced by 
what I told him. I dine at the Palace on Monday and I hope the Queen will give me an 
opportunity of also telling her the plain truth. If they want to get up a cry for a special 
purpose they ought in fairness to let one into secret and then one would do one's best to 
chime in. 
29 June 1858. London 
Last night I dined at the Palace and had an opportunity of telling Her Majesty that 
there was no actual ground for all the alarm that has been felt here with regard to France. I 
assured her that all their doings were closely watched and that it was most unlikely that 
preparations on any scale should escape our notice; her answer was rather a clue to me of 
the apparent exaggeration of the whole thing, she begged me not to say too much about the 
want of preparation on the other side and not to let people feel too secure here; she laughed 
when I said I would take the hint, it is evident that it is done in a great measure to get up 
our own establishments. 
8 July 1858. 
? 71 
I think the invasion panic is decidedly dying off but nevertheless govmt. seem 
determined to put both our Navy and our Army on the best possible footing. 
29 March 1859. Paris 
I forgot to mention that Fleury said when talking of the military preparation; apres 
tout il faut Bien j ouer la petite Comedie. 
1 August 1859. Castle Hill - Ealing 
I saw Lord John the day before yesterday and underwent a close examination. I had 
already passed through a similar ordeal the day previous carried on by Ld. Wodehouse and 
Hammonds. I do not think that Government seriously apprehend anything but all are of 
opinion that the Army and Navy are not as they should be and the only chance they have of 
getting money out of the country is by keeping up the cry. I pointed out the danger of not 
keeping this cry within bounds which they fully admit but it is not easy. 
[PRO FO 519/168. ] 
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3. Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills-Johnes. Comments written in the copy of 
Adye's Memoirs in the National Library of Wales. 
Sir John Addie(sic) was looked upon by the Regiment as parsimonious and 
obstructive - whether from an obstinate opinion in favour of the muzzle 
loader or to curry favour with the government by saving money - he alone 
can tell - there is no doubt but that the superiority of the breech loader over 
the muzzle loader had been exposed on the continent that (sic) all the nations 
had armed themselves with it before sanction was given for the trial of these 
guns which led to their introduction into our army. 
'7z 
4. Memorandum by WFDJ (Colonel Jervois), War Office, 6 July 1864 
Present administration of Lord Palmerston 
In 1859, almost immediately after the commencement of Lord Palmerston's second 
Administration, a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the question of the defence 
of the Kingdom. 
That Commission endorsed the measures that had already been taken for fortifying 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pembroke and Portland, and the Government upon the 
recommendation of the Commission adopted other measures of defence, in extension of 
what had been previously in progress, and for the fortification of other vital points. 
These measures have been carried into effect, as far as they have already gone, with 
energy and success, and the whole of the works which have been approved by Parliament 
are in a fair way towards completion. 
Probably at no other period have so many works of fortification been carried on by a 
Nation at one time, and with such an absence of failure. 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Pembroke, Dover and Cork, the Thames and the 
Medway, will, when all the works recommended by the Defence Commission are 
completed and armed be well nigh impregnable to any attack to which they are ever likely 
to be subjected. In addition to the above, the defences of the Harbour of Harwich and of the 
Humber have been added to; steps are being taken to fortify Newhaven and the defences of 
other vulnerable points on the Coast have been improved. 
The result of the measures taken by the Government, both in respect of fortifications 
and in the encouragement of the Volunteer movement has been to allay the panics which 
used so often to take possession of the public mind. 
As regards fortifications abroad - in addition to the improvements which have 
been 
effected at Gibraltar, Malta, the Mauritius and elsewhere the question of the defence of 
Canada has received the earnest attention of the Government. 
An officer was specially sent out to report on the defence of Canada, and that difficult 
question is now placed in such a light that Government will be enabled to act. 
The same officer was also directed to visit our Naval Stations in the Atlantic and 
steps have been commenced for improving the defence of those Stations. 
X74 
Already new works have been undertaken at Halifax, and a commencement has been 
made in the improvement of the defences at Bermuda. 
VVFDJ 
War Office, 6"'. July 1864 
The expenditure on fortification at home since the 1St. April 1859 
has been about 
and the outlay on fortifications abroad 




About £1,250,000 of this sum has been voted by Parliament in the ordinary Estimates and 
£3,000,000 by Special Acts of Parliament which have empowered the Govt. to raise loans 
to the extent of £3,850,000. 
WFDJ 
[Broadlands Papers, University of Southampton. ND/A/45. ] 
97ý 
5. General Charles Grey to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, 2 April 1862. Balmoral 
Castle 
My dear Sir George 
I write a line by the Queen's desire to express HM's hope that you will not be too 
easily turned from the completion of works which have been decided upon after mature 
consideration, without, at all events, convincing yourself that a change is imperiously 
commanded by a change of circumstances. 
There was nothing that the Prince deprecated so strongly as constant changes of plan, 
which prevented the completion of any works, and bid fair to leave us as defenceless in the 
moment of danger. 
It is possible that wooden ships may be quite superseded for future warfare; and that 
no forts, however heavily armed, may be able to impede the progress of iron vessels. 
But this fact shd be proved beyond the possibility of doubt, & it shd be clear to 
demonstration, that the proposed forts at Spithead will not answer the purpose expected 
from them, before you consent to the suspension of the works. 
Believe me 
Yrs very truly 
C Grey 
[Harpton Court Papers, C/1325, National Library of Wales. ] 
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6. Copy of a letter by Captain FitzGeorge to Henry Brackenbury, 25 July 1871, 
found inside a copy of FitzGeorge's book Plan of the Battle of Sedan accompanied by a 
Short Memoir (London, Edward Stanford, 1871). 
My dear Brackenbury 
I have not yet had my work because it is only offered to the trade today, but I need 
hardly tell you, that after your kindness to me at Metz, I should not have omitted to send 
you a copy; I have directed Stanford to send you 2 copies, so that you may forward one to 
the Marechale, who I trust will accept it. I am afraid it will hardly repay her reading it, but 
it may serve as a memento of a friend and well-wisher. It is published rather late in the day, 
but the time taken up in binding and correcting the lithography has delayed its appearance, 
added to which it was written and drawn at a time when my hands were full of work. 





7. MS copy of an extract from a letter by Colonel J Eardley Wilmot, RA, to Sir 
George Cornewall Lewis, 11 November 1861. Washington US 
Photocopied on the three following pages. 
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Administration of the Transport and Supply Department of the Army 
HC 1867, XV 343. 
Conclusion. First report, 6 August 1866. 
`The Committee having satisfied themselves that the formation of a Department of 
Control, and the amalgamation of the Supply Departments of the Army, are urgently 
required; and also that the Head of such a Department should be responsible for, and 
direct, under the Secretary of State, in concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief, 
all duties connected with Supply and Transport. (Page V). 
Reports on European Armies. Report, 23 March 1867. 
Appendix 23. Report from Colonel Hope Crealock, dated Verona, 3 September 
1866, about the Austrian army. 
Appendix 24. Report by a Committee of Officers on the French Intendance, 1855. 
27 pages. 
Appendix 25. Report by Colonel Claremont, CB, on the Intendance militaire of the 
French army. 5 pages. 
Appendix 26. Note obtained by Lieut. -General Sir Hope Grant, 13 September 1866, 
from the Minister of War at Paris. Sketch of the French Intendance, by Deputy 
Commissary-General de Fonblanque. 6 pages. 
Appendix 27. More from Claremont. 
Appendices 28/9. Report by General Codrington to Panmure on the French 
Intendance, from 20 January 1856.17 pages. 
Appendix 30. More from Claremont. 
Appendices 31/2. Notes from Major-General Cadogan on the Italian Intendance, 
dated Padua, 1866. 
Appendices 33/4. Extracts from reports on the Prussian army by Lieut. -Colonel E 
Reilly, RHA, dated Prague, 11 August 1866, and by Colonel Beauchamp 
Walker, CB, 15 November 1865.6 pages. 
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Appendices 35/6. More from Walker. 3 pages, and a report on Field Railway 
Divisions in Prussia by v, Roon. 
Appendix 37. More from Reilly, 19 October 1866. 
Appendix 38. Postscript notes of the military correspondent of The Times. Prussian 
transport. 1 page. 
Appendix 39. Report from Colonel Robert Blane, military attache at St. Petersburg, 
10 October 1866.6 pages. 
Appendix 40. More on Russia, from Russian Chief of Staff. 6 pages. 
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Appendix B4 Careers of Officers 
Explanatory note 
The attached spread sheet contains details of the careers of one hundred and 
twenty five British army Officers. Most field headings and abbreviations are self- 
explanatory, but the following notes may be helpful. 
Father's status. MO = Military Officer. NO = Naval Officer. 
Entry method. How the officer secured his commission. 




DX Special Direct 
M transfer from Militia 
Corps. The body into which he was first commissioned. 
Cavalry. LG = Life Guards, DG = Dragoon Guards, L= Lancers, LD = 
Light Dragoons, H= Hussars. 
Artillery. RA = Royal Artillery, Bengal A= Bengal Artillery, G C'st Art = 
Gold Coast Artillery. 
Engineers. RE = Royal Engineers, Bengal E= Bengal Engineers. 
Foot Guards. GG = Grenadiers, CG = Coldstream, SFG = Scots Fusilier 
Guards. 
Infantry. RB = Rifle Brigade, R= Rifles, Ceylon R= Ceylon Rifles, LI = 
Light Infantry, f= Foot, RWF = Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Yorks &L= York 
and Lancaster, NSFen. = Nova Scotia Fencibles. 
Also Bt Maj. Whether he had also received brevet promotion to Major; only noted 
when he subsequently received brevet promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel. Some 
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Breech- and muzzle-loading guns in use between 1860 and 1899 
Callwell, Major-General Sir Charles, KCB, and Major-General Sir John Headlam, KCB, CB, DSO, 
Colonel Commandant, RA. 
The History of the Royal Artillery from the Indian Mutiny to the Great War, Volume I (1860-1899) 
(Woolwich, RAI, 1931), Appendix C. 
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Cannon. Sections showing construction of Armstrong 
muzzle-loading 7 and 16 pounders and Whitworth 
breech-loading 9 pounder, 1873. 




Cannon. Armstrong breech-loading 12 pounder. 
Revue d'artillerie, Vol. 17,1880-81. 
illustration 3 
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Illustrated London News, 13 August 1870 
Illustration 4 
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Machine Guns. Montigny Mitrailleuse. 
Revue d 'artillerie, Vol. 3, Plate XI 
Machine Guns. Maxim. 















Gatling, made at Elswick by Armstrong. 
Martini-Henry. 
JRUSI, Vol. 15, Plate XVIH 
It 
RJ h6nry 
Breech-loading rifles. Needle Gun (left) Snider-Enfield (right) 
Cornhill, September 1866,357,348 
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PREFACE TO THE SERIES. 
No special maus exist for translating and publishing foreign works on Military 
Zngfneering, by which the experience of other armies may be made known to 
Officers of Royal Engineers. It is to be hoped that this want, which is much "felt 
by many officers of the corps, may be supplied when the Royal Engineer Institute 
at the School of Military Engineering, comes into full operation. Meanwhile I 
propose to publish, for private circulation, a series of Books, such as translations of 
foreign works kindly made for the purpose by some brother ofcers, and other 
suitable papers. 
The series will be strictly professional and confined to subjects connected with 
Military engineering, and the circulation being limited to officers of our own 
Corps, I think it may be found useful by officers as a means of circulating infor- 
mation obtained in their travels or otherwise, which may be interesting to their 
brother officers, although not such as they would feel at liberty to publish to the 
world. Each subgeriber must therefore clearly understand that the issues an of a 
confidential nature to the extent that their contents are not to be published or com- 
mented upon in the public press, eta To prevent mistakes all such ireues will be 
printed on yellow paper and placed in a cover of the same colour, and marked " for 
private circulation only. " 
Should any numbers be issued which are not of a confidential character, they will 
be in blue covers and printed on ordinary paper. 
WILBRAHAM LENNOX, 
Portsmouth, 12th June, 1875. Lieut. -Colonel R. E., and Brevet-ColaneL 
P. S. The series at present consists of 
No. 1-Proposed Prussian organization for the duties of troops at sieges. Translated 
from the German by Lieut. Herbert E. Rawson, R. E. Price Is. 6d. 
No. 2-Prussian Sapping Regulations, as revised since the war of 1870-71. Translated 
from the German by Captain H. A. Gun, R. E. Price Is. 6d. 
No. 3-Prussian Etappen Regulations, as revised since the war of 1870-71. Translated 
from the French translation by Lieutenant Donatus O'Brien, R. E. Price 2s. Od. 
TO BE FOLLOWED BY 
The Elements of Fortress Warfare, the Austrian Text Book, by Captain Brunner, 
Austrian Engineers. Probable cost 2s. Od. 
The Prussian Pontooning Regulations. 
The Construction of Field-Railways in Austria. 
But the continuation of the series will depend upon the support given to it by my 
brother Officers; the publication is at my own risk, and if any profits accrue upon the 
flrst. numbers, they will be applied to cover losses or reduce the cost of subsequent 
issues. (The expense of publishing Nos. 1&2 was X37 Is. 5d., of which 925 4B. 
has up to date been recovered by sale of 174 copies of No. 1 and 162 of No. 2. ) 
The Commandant of the School of Military Engineering has kindly allowed these 
papers to be sold with those printed at Chatham. The Brigade-Major will send copies 
RA soon as published to those Officers who notify to him their wish to subscribe to the 
series, or he will forward separate numbers as demanded. V. O. I.. 
Lieut. -Colonel Wilbraham Lennox 
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